Modernizing Mozambique:

Frelimo Ideology and the Frelimo State

João Titterington Gomes Cravinho
St. Antony's College

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of Oxford, Trinity 1995

Abstract

Modernizing Mozambique: Frelimo Ideology and the Frelimo State

João Titterington Gomes Cravinho
St. Antony's College

Over the twenty years since Mozambique became independent the changes in
Frelimo's ideology and the Frelimo state have attracted various interpretations. This
thesis contends that they are either invalid, disproven by the passage of time, or
insufficient in certain respects, and it offers an alternative framework for
understanding Frelimo ideology and the Frelimo state.

Situated in the context of a study of the state in Africa, the thesis summarizes two
main paradigms of the Frelimo state and presents a critique of them. It then presents
the outlines of an alternative perspective, concentrating upon three fundamental
principles: territory, unity and modernity. In essence these principles sum up Frelimo's
approach to aspects of the state: its geographical extension, the creation of a nation-
state and the imposition of a particular cultural perspective. Each of these principles
is traced back to its roots.

The thesis then adopts a chronological approach to trace the development of Frelimo's
ideology and the manner in which it has influenced the Frelimo state over the years.
The Marxist-modernizing discourse adopted by Frelimo in the early 1970s is shown to
have arisen from specific conditions which later disappeared. However, Frelimo's use
of this discourse for justifying its own existence and the fundamental principles on
which it anchored its policies, meant that when the Marxist-modernizing discourse
was abandoned Frelimo had profound difficulties in explaining itself. This crisis
persists up to the present moment. In order to show how the Marxist-modernizing
propositions affected a particular aspect of the state, the thesis provides a study of
state intervention in agricultural marketing, concentrating on the state marketing
organization, Agricom.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements

This thesis is dedicated to those to whom I have the greatest debts.

To my parents, Ann and João Cravinho,
and to Jessica

TANZANIA

ZAMBIA

ZAIRE

MALAWI

Lake Malawi

Lake Niassa

NIASSA

CABO DELGADO

INDIAN OCEAN

Lichinga

Pemba

Lilongwe

Memba

Nacala

Cuamba

NAMPULA

Nampula

Lusaka

Cabora Bassa Dam

TETE

Muatize

Tete

Zambezi

ZAMBÉZIA

Harare

MANICA

Inhaminga

Quelimane

Mozambique Channel

ZIMBABWE

Manica

SOFALA

Chimoio

Dondo

Beira

MOZAMBIQUE

International boundary
Provincial boundary
Railroad
○ National capital
◉ Provincial capital
○ Town
✈ Airport

Chicualacuala

BOTSWANA

INHAMBANE

GAZA

Limpopo

SOUTH AFRICA

Massingir

Inhambane

INDIAN OCEAN

Pretoria

Moamba

Xai-Xai

Mbabane

Maputo

MAPUTO

SWAZILAND

0 50 100 150 200 km
0   50   100   150 mi

Map of Mozambique. Source: William Minter, 1994.

Preface

In late 1991, when I began my doctoral work, the field of Mozambican studies was in an uncertain transition. Academics were no longer as politically engaged as they had once been and indeed, perhaps as a result of their earlier experiences, they tended to be world-weary and cynical. Interpretations of Mozambique's postcolonial experience were breaking away from the optimistic consensus of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Dramatic changes were taking place. The terrible war that had ripped the country apart for a decade was drawing to a close and Frelimo had embraced the neo-liberal values of Bretton Woods. In South Africa the main political forces were committing themselves to a negotiated end to apartheid and, on the wider stage, the Cold War was over and the Soviet Union was dissolving. The moment was ripe for taking stock of the changes within and around Mozambique.

In 1989 Clarence-Smith proclaimed that there had been a "paradigm-shift" in Mozambican studies.[1] His contention was fairly limited in its scope, suggesting merely that analyses of 'what went wrong' in Mozambique had previously focused upon deliberate destabilization directed from Pretoria and they were now beginning to focus upon problems with Frelimo's agrarian policies. Predictably perhaps, Clarence-Smith's comments proved controversial: the new writers whose work he welcomed responded enthusiastically and members of the older generation, whom he was implicitly criticising, missed no opportunity in showing their disagreement.[2] For a while one's approach to the Clarence-Smith article served as a litmus test of one's loyalties in the field of Mozambican studies.

[1] Clarence-Smith, 1989: 10.
[2] Clarence-Smith's comments appeared in a review of the work of Michel Cahen, Christian Geffray, Yussuf Adam and the 1988 special issue of *Politique Africaine* dedicated to Mozambique.

The initial set of questions that I proposed to address would have fed into that debate. The present thesis is substantially different from those plans, though it is still a response to the Clarence-Smith article. My theme at the outset was 'the politics of structural adjustment'. The evidence of Frelimo's shift from the use of the language of Soviet Marxism to that of international neo-liberalism raised questions about how the ideological foundations of a movement undergo change (particularly when so many of the people involved in it remained the same). A study of the relations between the Mozambican government and the international financial institutions, and in particular the negotiations between them, might shed some light on that issue. It would also contribute to a greater understanding of the extent to which Frelimo was in charge of policy-making at a national level, one of the topics at the heart of the Clarence-Smith debate. At a more localized level, I hoped to be able to contribute towards the study of the effects of structural adjustment upon agricultural policies and agricultural communities. There were clearly growing disparities in wealth and poverty but nobody had provided a study of the political effects of the economic redistribution that was occurring. Who benefited and who lost from the government programmes of the late 1980s, and how much of this was intentional policy, were questions that required consideration.

It seemed to me that my first task in this project should be to establish and describe the *status quo ante*. If I was to look at change I had to be able to compare it to a starting point. The present thesis is the result of my growing disenchantment with the existing accounts of the nature and development of Frelimo's ideology and the Frelimo state. Whereas my initial purpose had been to write such an account with regard to structural adjustment, over time the focus of my work moved back to earlier periods as I sought to understand the roots of many aspects of Frelimo which were inadequately described in the literature. At

the same time I felt the need to widen my point of view by placing my work in the context of a study of the state, in this case the study of the Frelimo state,

The first three chapters document the various themes that have emerged most forcefully in my research. The first chapter describes my understanding of the state in Africa and explains several concepts that appear in my work. In the second chapter, I look at two contending paradigms of the Mozambican state and offer an alternative set of organizing ideas. The third chapter is dedicated to the theme of 'modernization' which appears in the title of the thesis. The following three chapters deal chronologically with Frelimo's ideology and the Frelimo state, building upon the basis that was established in the earlier chapters. This account of more than twenty years of Frelimo's history presents a perspective that is considerably less disjointed than much of what has been offered in the past. The seventh chapter arose out of the need to look at a specific aspect of the Mozambican state in order to see how ideological questions have played themselves out in a practical context. Agricultural marketing, the policy area which I chose for this purpose, had never been closely studied before. The final chapter summarizes the main arguments of the thesis and explains in what way it may be seen as a contribution to answering the questions raised by Clarence-Smith.

Chapter 1

State and Civil Society in Africa

1. Introduction

Throughout Africa the state is in crisis and Mozambique is no exception.[1] Few would disagree with this statement and yet it masks a multiplicity of possible meanings. The objective of this chapter is to cut through some of the confusion surrounding analyses of the state and to establish the most appropriate way of understanding the state in Africa. Gramsci and Weber, who had little to say about Africa but much about the state, are summoned up in order to establish the field of analysis and to comment on alternative concepts of the state. The second part looks at some concepts that derive from their work, such as 'hegemony' and 'political legitimacy'. Accounts of post-colonial Mozambique usually lack precision on the nature of the state and yet many of the disputed issues about Frelimo ideology and the Frelimo state hinge upon this issue.

2. Concepts of the State

The lack of a commonly accepted definition of the state has led to the term being used, explicitly or implicitly, in a confusing variety of ways. Frequently the state is described in anthropomorphic terms, as though possessed of a specific will and interests of its own that supercede the people who work for it and through it. The expression 'raison d'état' is occasionally used as an ultimate explanation for a course of action, as though nothing more need be said about the matter. But to what extent is it useful to think of the state in these terms?

[1] See for example Hanlon, 1991.

Philip Abrams makes a distinction between "state-system" and "state-idea".[2] "State-system" refers to a complex of formalized institutions of political and executive control, staffed by personnel who may be thought of as a "state-elite".[3] Ministries, and all their various branches, are the main institutions of the state-system. The state-system exists for the purpose of creating and/or maintaining a certain order of society. Because any given order favours some sectors of society over others, the state-system can be said to be an instrument of domination.

The "state-idea" has different incarnations in different societies and different times, but it carries with it certain common aspects. The state-idea is an ideological construction in which the authority of the state-system is taken to be supreme for all of the people within a specified geographical area, at least since the world has been divided between political authorities who each claim sovereignty over 'their' territory. Thus the first aspect of the state-idea is the link between state-system and territory. The state-idea promotes and consolidates the legitimacy of the state-system to control and direct the lives of people within given borders (which may of course change). This also creates a link between the state[4] and the creation or development of the "nation". The solidity of the state over the long term depends in part upon the maintenance of a sense of community and therefore wherever one finds the development of the state one usually finds also the promotion, through the state-idea, of the nation. This is as much an ideological construct as the state-idea, indeed the two are closely connected. Further, the state-idea promotes the legitimacy of political authority vested in the state and exercised through it.[5]

Abrams goes on to argue that the state itself should be seen as an exercise in ideological control for the purpose of imposing the unacceptable. Because the state-idea is used to

[2] Abrams, 1977: 70-71.
[3] Abrams, 1977: 71. Here Abrams is simply describing how Miliband and others before him have decided to define the state.
[4] When I use the term 'state' on its own I am referring to the state-system and state-idea together.
[5] The concept of political legitimacy is examined more closely later in this chapter.

promote the domination which takes place through the state-system, Abrams argues that the latter is no more than a giant exercise in mystification for the purpose of imposing hegemony:[6]

> The state, then, is not an object akin to the human ear. Nor is it even an object akin to human marriage. It is a third-order object, an ideological project. it is first and foremost an exercise in legitimation - and what is being legitimated is, we may assume, something which if seen directly and as itself would be illegitimate, and unacceptable domination. Why else all the legitimation-work? The state, in sum, is a bid to elicit support for or tolerance of the insupportable and intolerable by presenting them as something other than themselves, namely, legitimate, disinterested domination.[7]

The imposition of order, the order which the state-idea represents, is rarely a physical imposition. On occasion elements of the state-system - the courts, for example, and, backing them up, the police and the army, do physically impose this order. Where the physical imposition of such an order is not necessary, Abrams argues, it is because the state-idea has done the work beforehand. So for Abrams the state is of no use as an element of analysis because to accept it as such is to "participate in the mystification which is the vital point of the construction of the state".[8]

Abrams argues that the whole concept of the state is part of the fiction by which "illegitimate domination" is sustained and that we should therefore abandon studying it except for the purpose of unmasking this reality. It is not useful for our present purposes to follow him down that path. That would require an understanding of what is meant by the legitimacy of domination. Legitimate for whom or for what type of dispensation? Or could there be some objective measure of legitimacy? Abrams provides us with no answers to these questions.

[6] The idea of 'hegemony' is discussed later in this chapter.
[7] Abrams, 1977: 76.
[8] Abrams, 1977: 77.

Max Weber rejects the functionalist notion of the state. For Weber the state is a structure of domination but it should be defined in terms of how it operates rather than what it is for. The specificity of the state, Weber argues, is its claim to control the use of force:

> Sociologically, the state cannot be defined in terms of its ends. There is scarcely any task that some political association has not taken in hand, and there is no task that one could say has always been exclusive and peculiar to those associations which are designated as political ones: today the state, or historically, those associations which have been the predecessors of the modern state. Ultimately, one can define the modern state sociologically only in terms of the specific *means* peculiar to it, as to every political association, namely, the use of physical force.... we have to say that a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.[9]

Weber argues that the state distributes power, and that it functions through the implicit threat of violent coercion.[10] Weber does not argue that the state functions *only* through coercion. Its legitimacy, when commonly accepted, means that there is usually no immediate need for coercion. In Abrams' terms we might say that the state-idea is dominant, and through it the state-system. Weber does not defend an explicitly socio-economic analysis of the state. He leaves unanswered the question of who exercises power through the state and whom that power is exercised over. He does not tell us about which relationships are mediated through the state, although he does argue that the state is concerned with the mediation of relationships, or in other words the distribution of power.

I propose to take some aspects from both Abrams and Weber in looking at the state in Africa. The state is simultaneously the claim to sovereignty over the people living within a given territory, and the means by which that claim is put into effect. The means by which the claim is advanced are both physically coercive and ideologically overwhelming. Opposition to the state is met in the first instance by non-physical sanctions and in the final instance by physical compulsion. Thus I am taking Weber's

[9] Weber, 1918, "Politics as a Vocation", in Gerth and Mills, 1974: 77-78. Italics in the original.
[10] Weber, 1915, "Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions", in Gerth and Mills, 1974: 334.

view that the state can only be defined in terms of its monopoly over the legitimate means of violence, and Abrams' claim that the state-idea is the mechanism by which the state-system is imposed upon the population.

Analytically, Abrams' distinction between state-system and state-idea is useful. In practical terms the two are often difficult to distinguish. After all, there can be no state-system without a state-idea. A further contribution that I propose to use comes with the notion of "institution" used by the "new institutionalists", such as Douglass North. Institutions are defined as "the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction", a combination of formal rules, informal constraints and enforcement.[11] North explains that institutions are "regularities in repetitive interactions among individuals";[12] they are the rules that govern political decisions, property rights and norms of behaviour.[13] By using this definition, we can think of the state as a complex of institutions, synthesizing the state-system and state-idea in a way that overcomes the theoretical distinction between them.

The state is a set of institutions characterized by its monopoly of the legitimate use of force. These institutions may or may not be codified. Not all institutions enter into the set of those that compose the state. Conventional dress codes, for example, are certainly established institutions but they do not command the authority of the state. The state - the institutions that compose it - is not an immutable thing, with permanent characteristics and "interests". On the contrary, the state must be seen as permanently changing.

---

[11] D. North, 1990, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, quoted in J. Ensminger, 1992: 5.
[12] North, 1986: 231.
[13] North, 1986: 230.

---

3. Gramsci and Civil Society

Not all of human interaction lies within the context of the state because there are institutions that have no claim to the use of force in order to impose their rules. North's definition of institutions - "regularities in repetitive interactions" - is a wide one, encompassing a considerable proportion of human behaviour, but many such institutions go far beyond what we have been calling the state. It has become common to call these other institutions "civil society". The following paragraphs deal with the way Gramsci dealt with 'civil society'.

Gramsci developed his use of this concept in close association with the concept of hegemony.[14] He never gave us a precise definition of what he meant by 'civil society'[15] but the sense in which he used the term shows that he was thinking of those institutions that are outside the sphere of the state and also outside the sphere of production. According to one writer, Gramsci considered that society was composed of three sets of relations: the state, relations of production and civil society.[16] Naturally all of these interact with each other as well. Relations of production in this context just means "the basic relation between labour and capital".[17] This excludes institutions such as trade unions or employers' associations or the legal framework which all affect relations of production; these institutions belong to civil society or to the state. Churches, trade unions, women's movements, all the institutions that arise from the different ways in which people are divided or joined together, are thus part of civil society.

---

[14] Earlier than Gramsci, Hegel used the term 'civil society' but he gave it a different meaning. For Hegel it was "the sphere of economic relations" and the expression was commonly used in this sense in the eighteenth century (Simon, 1991: 71).
[15] Gramsci (1971: 206-276) and Simon (1991: 68-77).
[16] Simon, 1991. In my readings of Gramsci I have not been able to find clear evidence that he believed in the tripartite nature of society. It is a possible reading of Gramsci but it was never clearly spelt out.
[17] Simon, 1991: 70.

The next step that Gramsci takes is of particular interest. He joins together the two concepts - state and civil society - saying that together they represent the integral state. Renaming the narrow conception of the state (what we earlier called the state-system) as political society, Gramsci argued that together with civil society the two constitute inseparable aspects of the same process of domination. Civil society exercises domination through hegemony, and political society (the state-system) exercises it through coercion. The two together, he argues, represent "hegemony protected by the armour of coercion".[18]

All of this brings us close to the definition of the state that was suggested above, with an additional feature, namely a description of the relationship between those institutions that can lay claim to the authority to use force and those that cannot do so. There is no incompatibility between our proposed definition of the state and Gramsci's integral state - in fact there is much complementarity. Meanwhile Gramsci has stepped well away from the classical Marxist notions of power residing in a narrowly defined state and is beginning to look upon power as a much more complex *relationship*,[19] going beyond the borders of the state-system.

In theory the use of force is considered legitimate only when the law establishes this to be the case, even if it does so in a personalistic fashion, as for example with crimes of *lèse-majesté*. In practice however, the means of force at the disposal of the state are frequently used for purposes that could not be defended in strictly defined legal terms. Weber's ideal-type of legal authority, which presumes an impersonal rationality, is rare if it is to be found at all, as Weber himself points out.[20] But because political practice over time is in itself a source of legitimacy, the border-line between state and civil society, between

[18] Gramsci, 1971: 263.
[19] For comparison see the section on the state in Bukharin and Preobrazhensky (1922: 39-45).
[20] Giddens (1971: 157-158) and Weber, in Gerth and Mills (1974: 216-221).

that which is backed up by the legitimate disposition of force and that which is not, is anything but easy to establish.

4. Civil Society in African Studies

The widespread application of the idea of civil society to the study of African politics and political economy over the past decade or so is largely a result of the earlier over-concentration on the state. The state was the focus of attention by politicians and academics alike during the period of transition from colonialism, and after independence the new governments concentrated almost exclusively on infusing the state with their own purposes. The state was the great unifying factor that brought the remote areas of the country into contact with the capital city and it was through the state that the new rulers hoped to create the nation and to transform their countries, regardless of their political credo. There was also an enormous expansion of the state sector; this coincided with (and was partially responsible for) a tremendous decline in nearly all economic and social indicators, leading to calls, particularly from aid donors, to "roll back the state". The enrichment of the political classes, and the growing poverty of the mass of the population almost everywhere, led observers inside and outside of Africa to criticise the continent's political systems. In the 1990s most African countries have had some form of multi-party elections. All this purports to represent attempts to bring 'civil society' back into the driving seat. I would suggest though, that this is misleading in that it is very difficult in practical terms, or even analytically, to distinguish state from civil society.

Gramsci said that civil society was the locus of the construction of hegemony. For Chabal, "the state aims at political and economic appropriation. Civil society is the object of this hegemonic appropriation".[21] This leads him to define the politics of civil society as being the politics of counter-hegemony. The great difference between Europe

[21] Chabal, 1992: 84.

and Africa, he argues, is that in the former the state is the result of the struggles that have taken place, over centuries, within civil society; in the latter it is the reverse. The politics of civil society is therefore constituted as a set of responses to the politics of the state. Chabal goes on to argue that the state defines the boundaries of political legitimacy and that the politics of civil society are therefore "almost inevitably confined to the realm of political illegitimacy".[22] As the state's political legitimacy is reduced so is the realm of legitimate political action. "The voice of civil society is then often officially silenced even if it continues to be heard".[23]

Chabal is in fact conflating two uses of the term 'legitimacy', resulting in a conclusion that can easily be proved false. The first sense in which he uses the expression is as a synonym of 'legality'. The state defines the boundaries of political legality and indeed in many countries political action that is not undertaken through officially established and sanctioned channels is illegal. In post-colonial Africa, challenges to the dominant group - those who established their control over the state-system and appropriated the state-idea - were often taken to be challenges to the integrity of the nation because the dominant group had proclaimed itself to be the embodiment of the national will. By defining legality, and by claiming legitimacy to do so through reference to the concept of the nation-state, the dominant group established that any challenge to its pre-eminence could be considered a challenge to the existence and further consolidation of the nation-state.

The second sense in which Chabal uses the term 'legitimacy' is as a description of the level of acceptability of those who govern from the point of view of those who are governed. "In pre-colonial Africa", Chabal explains by way of describing the concept, "rulers could lose legitimacy if the rains failed".[24] In this sense though, the state does not define the boundaries of political legitimacy. It is not the case that when the state's

22 Chabal, 1992: 85.
23 Chabal, 1992: 85.
24 Chabal, 1992: 56.

legitimacy (which is in the eye of the collective beholder) is reduced, then so is the realm of legitimate political action. It may be that the realm of legal political action is reduced in those circumstances but this is not inevitable. A state which does not hold much political legitimacy (acceptability) may be too weak to impose laws that limit other forms of political activity - the Banda regime in Malawi, for example, had to take the opposite course of action, opening up to what has been called civil society. Chabal's understanding of civil society, its politics and its realms, is not easily sustainable when one seeks to apply it to specific cases. Chabal oscillates between attempting to pin down examples of civil society at work and interacting with the state, and warning his readers of the difficulties of identifying the thing:

> Civil society ... is defined *in relation to* the state or rather the politics of civil society are defined *in relation to* the politics of the state. Civil society is, therefore, subjective, unstable, discontinuous and unquantifiable. It can only be identified by approximation, *ex post facto*, in the effect which its politics have - somewhat in the manner in which the uncertainly principle applies in physics.[25]

Ultimately the problem is that there is no clear water between the concepts of state and civil society and attempts to apply the ideas end up mired in semantics.

Jean-François Bayart offers us the Marxian dictum that civil society is "the true foyer, the true scene of all history" and from this beginning he goes on to subscribe to Marx's definition: "the forms of exchange which condition and are conditioned by the forces of production", the basis of which is the family or clan.[26] Earlier in his career Bayart had suggested different (and influential) ways of looking at civil society:[27]

25 Chabal, 1992: 85.
26 Bayart, 1989: 155. An alternative translation of Marx's definition (which comes from *The German Ideology*) runs as follows: "The form of intercourse determined by the existing productive forces at all previous historical stages, and in its turn determining these, is *civil society*". The use of the term 'intercourse' rather than 'exchange' makes the definition much more wide-ranging. See Marx and Engels, 1969: 38.
27 See Bayart 1983 and 1986. The latter is essentially an English restatement of the former, due perhaps to the idea, held by some, that anglophone Africanists do not read what their francophone counterparts write.

Though it is arguable that the concept of civil society is not applicable outside European history. I shall define it provisionally as "society in its relation with the state ... in so far as it is in confrontation with the state"[28] or, more precisely, as the process by which society seeks to 'breach' and counteract the simultaneous 'totalisation' unleashed by the state.[29]

By returning to Marx, Bayart retreats from the use of "civil society" as an analytical concept to one in which it does not attempt to go beyond description. In the passage just cited civil society can only exist - indeed is defined - as the tension between state and non-state. It is as though the two mediums, state and civil society, were of different densities, like oil and water, so that even when mixed up they would quickly separate by virtue of the way they are defined. The way in which we have looked at the state so far, incorporating Weber, Abrams and Gramsci, presents a contrast to Bayart's early proposals. Although there is a theoretical distinction to be made between state and non-state, this distinction cannot be based upon an assumed tension. Marx's definition - "the forms of exchange [or intercourse] which condition and are conditioned by the forces of production" - is taken into account when one uses the term 'institutions' in the way that Douglass North has suggested. And if one does that, then the only distinction possible is between those institutions that are backed by the threat of force and those that are not. Civil society and state are not necessarily in tension - in fact Gramsci suggests that the opposite is usually true ("hegemony protected by the armour of coercion").

Despite its title[30] Bayart's book has little to say about the state.[31] The reason for this is that it is actually about power in African politics, understood in the sense that Foucault speaks of power:

---

[28] Bayart attributes this definition to R. Fossaert, *La Société. Les Etats*, vol.5 (Paris: Seuil, 1981), pp.146-147.

[29] The second definition comes from J-L Domenach, 'Pouvoir et société dans la Chine des années soixante-dix', *Modes populaires d'action politique* (Paris), 1, 1983, pp.49-52. (Bayart, 1986: 111 and Bayart, 1983: 99.)

[30] *The State in Africa: the politics of the belly* (Bayart, 1993).

[31] This point is made in a review by Clapham (1994: 437), and in an earlier review by Michael Twaddle which is cited by Clapham.

---

power is not to be taken to be a phenomenon of one individual's consolidated and homogenous domination over others, or that of one group or class over others .... power must be analysed as something which circulates, or rather as something which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localized here or there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organization. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power.[32]

Perhaps this points to the best way of understanding 'civil society' in Africa: as a constantly changing relationship between those who control the instruments of coercion and those who do not, without forgetting that those who do control the use of force do not do so all of the time, in every situation; and that force can be used against the state without necessarily being counter-hegemonic. Take for example the following statement by Chabal:

Even where the state continues to appropriate prodigious amounts (as in Zaire) it [i.e. the state] is losing untold revenues to the parallel economy (in effect the exchequer of civil society).[33]

Mobutu is well known to have installed a regime of plunder of his country's resources.[34] His form of government is in effect no more than organized robbery within the borders of the country by those whom he nominates to positions of power. He and his nominees are, together, the backbone of the parallel economy. So should they be seen as state or as civil society? Undoubtedly they control the coercive means which are at the disposal of the state. And yet their activities cannot be considered to be activities of the state if 'the state' only covers that which is legitimized by the law. This is the implied definition of state in the above quotation from Chabal - for how else could one argue that the state is both appropriating and losing revenue if we know that we are talking about the same individuals on both sides of the equation? The situation, in the analytical terms implied,

---

[32] Foucault 1980: 98. Bayart rarely quotes Foucault but it seems to me that Foucault has been extremely influential in the development of Bayart's idea of power.

[33] Chabal, 1992: 142.

[34] For example, MacGaffey (1991: 28): "The centralization of political power under Mobutu was accompanied by a concentration of economic revenues in the hands of a small circle owing personal allegiance to the president". See also MacGaffey, 1987 and Callaghy, 1984.

is the following: Mobutu and his henchmen, using their official positions (i.e. as state), appropriate the state's military power in order to plunder the state for their personal gain as individuals (i.e. civil society); as state, they also "appropriate prodigious amounts" from others (civil society) using the military means at the state's disposal; the legal process of enriching the state is important because it is a stepping-stone to the illegal process of enriching themselves. The parallel economy may be the exchequer of civil society but the state is also its treasure-trove, and both are plundered by the highest representatives of the state who by virtue of that position are also the richest men in civil society. Clearly this makes nonsense of the state-civil society tensions that are allegedly present.

What emerges from this is that the state-civil society distinction is close to useless as an analytical tool because it is so inconstant and contingent upon the specific context one is referring to. If the context is a very general one - the whole of the African continent for example - there is very little that one might usefully say about the state-civil society relationship, either historically or looking at any given moment. References to the state and to civil society should be thought of as meaning only very loose arrangements with considerable overlap. The legal control of forces of coercion may be thought of as a general guide to distinguishing state from non-state though, as we have seen, even this is problematic.

5. The Hegemonic Drive

'Hegemony' entered the vocabulary of political thought with Plekhanov and then Lenin (for whom it meant the leading role of the working class in an alliance with the peasantry) but it was with Gramsci that the term took on a new meaning and gained wider use as a concept.[35] In Gramsci's writings a dominant class exercises political power

[35] The comments on Gramsci come from Antonio Gramsci (1971) and from Roger Simon (1991).

and control over others by consent or acquiescence backed up by the possibility of force. Hegemony is therefore "the organisation of consent". It is worth noting several characteristics of Gramscian 'hegemony', apart from this important emphasis upon the manufacturing of consent. Hegemony cannot be imposed exclusively by force; it contains within it 'leadership' which in the Gramscian sense involves recognition by other social groups and some control over the dynamics of the political process. This 'leadership' is a precondition for the construction of hegemony, and necessarily involves some form of alliances across class (or ethnic, regional, religious) lines. Gramsci explicitly recognised the need to go beyond a purely class-based system of alliances in order to take in what he referred to as social forces of a "national-popular" character. When hegemonic power is threatened, the dominant group may re-establish a new hegemony with what Gramsci called a "passive revolution". By this he meant a process of relatively far-reaching reforms undertaken by the state (without the participation of a burgeoning alternative 'leadership') for the purpose of reasserting the hegemony of the dominant group. Finally, it should be pointed out that Gramscian hegemony is realized through the state but it is constructed in the sphere of civil society. Here the distinction is clear: hegemony must reach out beyond the law and into those areas that can have no recourse to physical coercion. Some years earlier Max Weber, and before him Marx, had used the term *Herrschaft*, literally Lordship, to transmit a similar idea.[36]

In dealing with the concept of hegemony in his 1979 book, Bayart offers the following definition of the "hegemonic quest":

> [it] aims at the creation and crystallization of a relatively stable balance of forces between different dominant groups, both old and new, and their regional and ethnic parts, in the national framework fixed by the coloniser; at the arrangement of relationships between this formative dominant class and mass of the population; at the ordering of relationships between this dominant class and western economic and political power; at the elaboration of an ethnic or a common feeling which gives its coherence to the whole and which cements the

[36] Giddens (1971: 156 and footnote 28) has argued that *Herrschaft* is actually a narrower concept than 'hegemony'. He prefers to translate it as 'authority' rather than 'domination', relating it to specific commands and not a whole milieu within which relationships operate.

new system of inequality and domination, while camouflaging it at the same time.[37]

By 1989 Bayart had decided that his earlier definition was too mechanistic, although he said that it did have the merit of pointing out "the triple game of the hegemonic quest". Namely: (a) the change of scale brought about by colonialism and the development of "the area of the State as a double area of identity and inequality"; (b) the opportunities (for enrichment and "real primitive accumulation") offered by the monopolisation of the means of production in the hands of dominant groups; (c) access to political power (and therefore legitimate force), allowing for the *mise au travail* of subordinate groups. Colonialism transformed the means for achieving this last objective by leaving behind the "technology of the bureaucratic centralised State".[38] The colonial state may have been weak but it had developed the means of appropriation which made it valuable to the dominant groups in both colonial and post-colonial Africa.

Chabal takes Bayart's starting point and goes on to ask what forms this process may take. He discerns two:

> The one consists in capturing, or, more accurately, penetrating, the state; the other aims at establishing a counter or parallel hegemonic project to rival and challenge the state.[39]

The first of these forms was applied all over the continent at independence when the political and bureaucratic machinery of the state system passed into the hands of Africans. "The Africanisation of the colonial state was rightly perceived by Africans to be the most expedient route to hegemony".[40] The state was seen as a highly desirable

---

[37] From J-F Bayart (1979: 19), *L'Etat au Cameroun*, Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques. Quoted in J-F Bayart (1989: 110) in translation and in P. Chabal (1992: 218) in the original French.
[38] Bayart, 1989: 110.
[39] Chabal, 1992: 220.
[40] Chabal, 1992: 221. The concept of 'Africanisation' does not refer simply to the replacement of white personnel by Africans. Chabal uses the term to signal "the process by which colonial politics ... was re-appropriated by Africans (rulers and ruled) in the context of a (historically) modern world of

---

employer to have, for the social status and material privileges that it conferred. Hegemony appeared through the need to create and consolidate - inside and outside of the state - the conditions for the expansion of these privileges and their reproduction for subsequent generations.

After independence, and particularly as populations became younger and more people gained access to education, competition to join the state elite grew more intense and state activities expanded further into the economic sphere in order to meet this growing demand. To ignore such a stratum of the population would have been an invitation to political trouble. This leads to an insight that is often forgotten: the analysis of the role of the state in the economy cannot be limited to an assessment of the economic logic, and nor can it be exclusively based upon the new government's avowed ideology. The reasons for state intervention are in many cases related to the need to impose and maintain hegemony. Furthermore, although such interventions may be disastrous, for example, to the balance sheets of parastatals, they are usually also profitable for the individuals involved.[41] The regimes that proclaimed their adherence to capitalism were in this respect no different from those that called themselves socialist: the challenges facing all of them were similar. The next phase, once it was no longer possible to extend still further the opportunities for state employment, was the extension of the possibilities for state patronage (or patronage by individuals within the state). This perpetuated the link between those employed by the state and the communities which were drawn into the hegemonic arrangement.

Claims upon the state system, everywhere in Africa, have grown incommensurately in relation to the possibilities that were provided by the increasing centralization of resources. This leads to the need for a renewal (or alteration) of the hegemonic

---

nation-states. In other words, I am interested in the process by which post-colonial Africans 'digested' the political legacy left by their European conquerors" (p.201).
[41] For example, Bates, 1981: 26-28.

arrangement that can only come through the exclusion of larger sectors of society, and/or the increasing use of coercion to stabilize the existing distribution of power. Thus the construction and undermining of hegemony are constant processes, and may sometimes be the same thing. In the longer run this has led to widespread bankruptcy of the 'developmental state'.[42]

The second of Chabal's forms of hegemonic drive refers to the potential development of counter-hegemonies by those who have been excluded (immediately or over time) in the hegemonic arrangement of the post-colonial society. This means the creation of a new hegemony dominated by groups which are at present marginalized. There are many different examples of this. There was the rash of coups, military or other, that took place in the late 1960s; there were various attempts at secession in different countries; and guerrilla movements in some countries have developed fully-fledged civil wars and sometimes managed to overthrow the state. As Chabal points out though, one should not seek to draw too clear-cut a line between these two forms of hegemonic drive for they are not mutually exclusive. Adherence to a counter-hegemonic strategy is sometimes no more than another form of attempting to penetrate the state, and there are numerous examples of elites being co-opted.[43] Access to the state is all-important and attempts to gain absolute control are often sublimated by the offer of privileged access.

> The centrality of the state in contemporary Africa is thus not simply the result of the economic benefits which access to it confers but also derives from the fact that all counter-hegemonic projects are defined and organised in relation to it.[44]

The idea of hegemonic absorption is illustrated by the case of Angola. In 1975 the MPLA believed that it was capable of eliminating opposition to its hegemonic drive, and sought to do so for sixteen years; conversely Savimbi's UNITA also believed that it had no need

---

[42] This argument is developed in Dutkiewicz and Williams, 1987.
[43] Chabal, 1992: 227-228.
[44] Chabal, 1992: 228.

to compromise as ultimately it would prove victorious.[45] The period of peace during 1991-2[46] and the elections of September 1992 offered the possibility of finding a solution that would entail what Bayart calls the "reciprocal assimilation of elites".[47] However, because each side continued to believe that it would win elections, and therefore vowed to respect the results, there was no move towards anything other than a winner-takes-all solution. Both UNITA and MPLA, each reassured by their international allies, mistakenly believed that peace could be imposed as a result of the new international legitimacy that they expected to gain as victors in the elections. In the end the elections pointed to a clear winner. The victorious MPLA's offer of a few token governmental posts for UNITA was seen as a further humiliation and so the country returned to a state of war. The devastation that followed during the next two years proved more bloody even than the previous sixteen years of war. However, just when the MPLA's military superiority was leading some in Luanda to think of an outright military victory, a new settlement was reached, in which UNITA will enter the government as a junior partner. If peace holds it is certainly tempting to see the Angolan example as vindication of Bayart's idea.

6. Political Legitimacy in Africa

The notion of political legitimacy is understood to be the level of acceptability of those who govern from the point of view of those who are governed. This means that, like hegemony, it is in constant evolution as each measure taken will attract support from some and dissent from others. It should be distinguished from the notions of

---

[45] There was an important input from the international environment (Guimarães, 1992) but it is interesting to note that since the end of the Cold War (and the outbreak of Angola's second civil war), the ideological references have been all but dropped from the language of the two sides, in favour of ethnic, racial and regional references. Underneath the old rhetoric about communism and capitalism, the different community identities that have now become overt have in fact always been important.
[46] The brokering of the peace treaty is described by Moisés Venâncio in "Portuguese Mediation of the Angolan Conflict in 1990-1" in Chan and Jabri, eds, 1993.
[47] Bayart, 1989: 150-179. Some co-optation did actually take place, though on a minor scale: two government ministers (responsible for culture and health) were with UNITA right up to the elections, and the current Angolan ambassador to London, Tony da Costa Fernandes, co-founded UNITA with Jonas Savimbi, although he defected and fled Savimbi's wrath in March 1992.

accountability and representation. The former "defines the framework within which the political legitimacy of rulers is assessed, the criteria by which they are judged".[48] Ultimately this must also entail the possibility of removing from a post of responsibility someone who is judged to have failed by those criteria. The latter has to do with "the modalities of political obligation, the formulae which govern the reciprocities of power".[49] These concepts are not necessarily linked to power vested in the state. During the colonial period there remained power structures linked to the pre-colonial order, outside of the realm of the state and yet endowed with (changing) notions of accountability, legitimacy and representation.

Chabal has distinguished a pattern of three phases of political legitimacy in post-colonial Africa. The first sprang from the anti-colonial movement. The colonial form of government, which was not always contested by Africans, came under increasing fire after the Second World War, both from within the colonies and from the international community. In some colonies the nationalist claims to speak "for the people" were put to the test in elections and validated: such movements had greater political legitimacy than the colonial order, and indeed their legitimacy was a direct result of the lack of legitimacy of the colonial order. As Chabal puts it, "the legitimacy of nationalist parties derived rather more from their nationalist quality than from their representativeness as organisations".[50] This is not to argue that nationalist organisations had no claim to be representative; instead it is saying that this was not the principal factor in the manufacturing of their legitimacy. Furthermore, the movement's representativeness had to be accepted externally - by the colonial power or by the international community at large (particularly the UN). The first phase of political legitimacy in post-colonial Africa was therefore this phase in which the governing party's antecedents in the anti-colonial struggle were its certificate of legitimacy.

48 Chabal, 1992: 56.
49 Chabal, 1992: 56.
50 Chabal, 1992: 137.

Bayart, in his definition of "the hegemonic quest" which was quoted above, raises a couple of points that are important when looking at political legitimacy. The dominant groups, he said, worked within the new territorial framework that had been fixed by colonialism; and they sought to elaborate "an ethnic or a common feeling which gives its coherence to the whole and which cements the new system of inequality and domination, while camouflaging it at the same time". Because the post-independence political order derived its legitimacy from its anti-colonialism (nationalism, to use the word loosely), its legitimacy extended to all of the former colonial (the national) territory. Challenges to the legitimacy of this order were therefore treated as challenges to the national integrity of the new country. They were unacceptable forms of political intervention that would have to be met in one of two ways: by co-optation or by repression. Bayart's second point - the need to develop a "common feeling" - is something that may be seen in many countries where leaders developed idiosyncratic doctrines, or adopted ideologies developed elsewhere, that would point to a quasi-sacred mission that only they could fulfill.[51] As Chabal comments, with reference to Skocpol, "all post-revolutionary regimes (and independence was a political revolution) legitimise their existence and justify their deeds by reference to a greater god".[52]

The political legitimacy of the post-colonial order began to suffer erosion after just a few years, encountering demands for greater representation. Such representation need not be of the electoral variety and indeed many of the rulers that managed to maintain their political legitimacy for years and even decades (Houphouet-Boigny, Kaunda, Nyerere, Banda) presided over one-party states. Essentially these demands for greater representation were demands for the leaders of marginalised communities (and through them their communities) to be included in the hegemonic project. In some cases the leaders of communities that were not marginalized sought a greater role than the one they

51 Hence Kaunda's 'Humanism', the 'scientific socialism' of Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Benin, Nyerere's 'African Socialism', and others.
52 Chabal, 1992: 137.

already had. There were essentially two ways in which these demands were met: by seeking new formulae that would allow for the inclusion of such disaffected groups; or "by invoking a doctrine of legitimacy derived from the historical tasks of nation-building and economic development".[53] These two possibilities could be combined, leading to the construction and expansion of the patrimonial state. The second phase of political legitimacy was therefore one of dealing with these new demands.

Robert Jackson illustrates this:

> The art of statecraft in Kenya [under Kenyatta] is largely a careful exercise in maintaining the support of key ethnic and other interests through the judicious allocation of scarce public resources, while at the same time preventing overt opposition or hostility to government from those less favored through the skillful threat or application of coercion. Government itself is highly plural, with bargaining and competition occurring among Cabinet members acting on behalf of supporting groups and between the ministries themselves.[54]

Chabal points out that this leads to the expansion of the already "Africanized" state into new areas of society. The state branches out, colonising and being colonised in its relation to civil society, eventually leading to such a blurring of the state/civil society distinction that the concept is close to useless, as we argued above.[55] This suggests an *a priori* distinction between state and civil society that would be difficult to sustain. The colonial state also worked through civil society. Indeed, when it did work it did so through civil society, and when it did not work through civil society then it was no more than physical coercion.

---

53 Chabal, 1992: 139.

54 Robert H. Jackson (1970), "Planning, Politics and Administration", in Göran Hyden, Robert Jackson and John Okumu, eds, *Development Administration: The Kenyan Experience*, Nairobi: Oxford University Press, pp. 177-178, quoted in Chazan et al, 1988: 134.

55 In the early parts of Chabal's book he employs the 'state' and 'civil society' concepts (indeed chapters 4 and 5 bear those respective titles) but towards the end (chapter 13) he argues that it is necessary to temper the idea that there is a sharp distinction between the two. However, the state/civil society dichotomy continues to appear in the remainder of the text because Chabal remains convinced of its analytical usefulness even if it does not help when considering "the real world" (pp. 219-220).

The third phase of post-colonial political legitimacy is for many countries the current one. It is a phase of crisis in which the previous forms of legitimacy are no longer valid. The anti-colonial struggle is now a distant memory everywhere except perhaps in Namibia (though, even there, signs are that it is fast receding into the past), and the state can no longer expand nor be further colonised. In some countries (Zaire being the most extreme) society has been bled dry through the artifice of the state, and what remains of the state's legitimacy is employed in franchising its revenue-raising activities out to the private enterprise of state officials. Everywhere, it seems, police and customs officials engage in supplementing their salaries in a way that is nominally illegal and yet accepted and facilitated by the political authorities who have no other means of attempting to obtain social peace.[56] The international environment - the oil crisis, the new scale of intervention by the Bretton Woods institutions, the end of the Cold War - has been such that it is increasingly difficult for the dominant groups to buy legitimacy and stability in the way this was done in the past. Thus, this crisis of legitimacy is, nearly everywhere, one of vast proportions.

Chabal argues that the present crisis of legitimacy is also one of accountability, a fundamental turning point in the political framework by which Africans govern and are governed. He says that there is now

> a greater recognition on the part of rulers and ruled alike that there is a closer link between legitimacy and representation than post-colonial African systems had allowed for. Where there is no effective representation there is little legitimacy.

---

56 In January 1994 the government in Mozambique passed a law which made it compulsory to wear seat-belts in the front seats of cars. In a country where cars routinely circulate at night without lights, where there is no such thing as a maximum number of passengers for public (but private) transport, where brakes or tyres are never tested, the law seems at first sight a little strange. After all, there were many other aspects of road safety that could be tackled first and in any case many (probably most) cars don't have seat-belts at all. A couple of days after it came into effect the real logic of the law became obvious. Under constraint from the IMF to curb public sector salaries, the government had to search for other ways of motivating and maintaining its police force. The law is extremely easy to enforce and there are frequent reports of policemen donning their uniforms (sometimes not even that) and standing at an intersection waiting for their lunch to come along in the form of a fine to a driver that isn't wearing his or her seat-belt.

> Where regime legitimacy dissolves, parallel channels of representation are created outside the direct control of the state.[57]

He goes on to link this undeniable crisis to "the present mood in Africa for greater democracy"[58] by which he means the rash of multi-party elections that have been held since 1990. Here Chabal is underestimating international pressures and oversimplifying domestic pressures. The international pressures are clear enough: the US and (to a lesser and varied extent) European countries have on occasion insisted upon multi-party elections, as have the Bretton Woods institutions in their own way; the United Nations has been pressed into service in several parts of the continent to help organize the elections and literally hundreds of organisations have suddenly become specialists in electoral observation. On the domestic front it is very difficult to generalise. Everywhere the pressures are different, as are the objectives of the dominant groups as they head towards elections.

In Angola, amongst the people there was real enthusiasm for the elections even in the most remote areas of the country.[59] People wanted to vote because they were convinced (and this was what all parties were saying) that elections were an alternative way of solving disputes. People were voting first and foremost for peace, and only incidentally for the party of their preference.[60] In Angola, the concept of representation was only important, if at all, in the minds of some of the international supporters of the peace treaty. As for the contending parties, each side felt it could gain legitimacy *in the eyes of the international community* through the electoral process, being much less concerned about the national population.

---

[57] Chabal, 1992: 142.
[58] Chabal, 1992: 143.
[59] I was an electoral observer covering eight polling stations in the area of Luacano, some 270 kms north-east of Luena, in the eastern province of Moxico.
[60] From conversations and personal observation. I have written about the Angolan elections in "Angola on the Brink". *Oxford International Review*, vol.4, no.1, pp.35-37.

In other countries the motivations may be different and in some of them, no doubt, the elections are really about changing forms of representation. Zambia, São Tomé, Cape Verde, Niger, Benin and Malawi are all examples of countries in which popular pressure forced elections to be held and resulted in changes of government. But when one sees Mobutu applying to the French government for aid for democratization it is very difficult to take seriously the notion that we are witnessing Africa's wholesale conversion to western-style electoral democracy.

In short, Chabal's periodization of political legitimacy seems to be of relevance.[61] The current period is one of deep transformation and, in many parts of the continent this is due to the bankruptcy of the state. Bayart believes that one of the fundamental characteristics of pre- and post-colonial African politics is the poverty of the continent's resource base and the need for those in positions of power to concentrate wealth and the means for producing wealth in their own hands. In order to do this, he argues, leaders have always sought to use their privileges for their own benefit and that of their community, however that may be defined. Also, they have been consistent in enlisting outside support (financial, political, military) in doing this. However, this fails to account for those parts of the continent that are resource-rich. One can point to the oil-producing states (Nigeria, Gabon, Angola) and see that they are also going through many of the same problems that are apparent elsewhere on the continent. The diamonds of Zaire and Angola do not seem to have given those countries a different political tradition. In the past enormous wealth was generated, usually flowing from the interior to the coast, with the trade in gold, ivory and slaves. So Bayart's explanation is, at best, a partial one.

One big difference that Bayart sees between the pre-and post-colonial periods is that the opportunities for social differentiation, and expropriation through the state, are now exponentially greater than in the past. If political authority in Africa always sought to use

---

[61] A more nuanced account of these different phases appears in Williams, 1994.

its power for the purpose of social differentiation and expropriation, there has been, as he argues, great continuity in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial political practice. The result of this continuity of African politics most recently has been the bankruptcy of the state. Without the possibility of patronage, political legitimacy evaporates, and this in turn discredits the state further as it loses its centrality to the "hegemonic project".

Interestingly, the Bretton Woods institutions have had an ambiguous role in this process. Proclaiming themselves to be the great defenders of the "little man" against the exploitation of corrupt state officials[62], they have to a certain extent curtailed the powers of the state. They have removed some decisions from the sphere of government, they have forced governments all over the continent to cut back their expenditure on salaries, education, health and the military, they have promoted the privatisation of parastatals and the liberalisation of exchange rates, and so on. However, the crucial point is that the money pumped into African countries by the IMF and World Bank still goes through the state.[63] Bayart notes the irony in this, reminding us that "loans granted following long negotiations and ostensibly binding agreements seem to a significant degree to have been used for different purposes from what was intended".[64]

Thus the Bretton Woods institutions, who by their own account are battling against the state on behalf of civil society, seem to be providing the other side with the ammunition it needs. The patrimonial state can only survive (maintain its legitimacy) if it manages to secure adequate sources of revenue. In a situation where large amounts of state revenue have been diverted, the World Bank and the IMF have actually been filling the gap. One could say that this is an example of what Chabal might call the 'Africanization' of Bretton Woods. This kind of 'development aid' is not so much shaping as being shaped by the internal dynamics of African politics. Bayart would also recognise it as an

[62] Ronald Findlay (1991: 19) says that the IMF and the World Bank are "the universal guardians of the rational-legal order in the economic sphere".
[63] Williams, 1981: 25.
[64] Bayart, 1989: 27.

example of what he sees to be Africa's age-old "extraversion", the search for resources which will allow rulers to consolidate their hold on power.

7. Conclusion

An understanding of the state is key to discussions of post-colonial politics and this chapter has clarified the sense in which the concept will be employed. The state should be understood as encompassing both state-system and state-idea, and that these aspects in turn symbolize the two most crucial qualities of the state: its legal monopoly of the use of violence and its hegemony-creating capacities. The forms in which these processes occur cast doubt upon the practical or analytical value of the concept of 'civil society' when it is juxtaposed to the concept of the state. An alternative approach suggests the use of a broad definition of 'institutions', separating those which have recourse to the legal use of force and those which do not. The latter cannot, however, be thought of as juxtaposed to the former sort of institutions because they are the very underpinnings on which the legal use of force rests. In much the same way the state idea could not be thought of as juxtaposed to the state system. 'Hegemony' and 'the state' are therefore taken to be inseparable concepts.

Another notion which will reappear in this study is that of 'political legitimacy', taken to mean acceptability of those who govern from the point of view of those who are governed. Legitimacy is seen as society-specific, or more precisely as social group-specific. A social group of any scale involves a concept of legitimacy. It is possible to discern general trends of legitimacy in African politics and the discussion referred to this periodization.

These conceptualizations of the state, hegemony and legitimacy are at odds with the way in which these terms are employed in the work of many writers. The often vague implicit or explicit meanings given to these terms are unsatisfactory for the purposes of this thesis

and the way that we have defined the concepts permits us now to embark upon a study of the role that they have played in Mozambique through Frelimo's evolving ideology and policies.

Chapter 2

Approaches to the State in Mozambique

1. Introduction

The disputed nature of the Frelimo state is at the heart of differing interpretations of independent Mozambique's history. The first part of this chapter describes the assumptions made about the state in Mozambique by two authors whose work epitomizes different approaches. The next part explains my own approach to the Frelimo state, drawing on some of the material in chapter 1. In the course of this discussion Frelimo's own view of the state that it created will become clear, particularly through the use of official documents. It is important to understand the regime's own assessment of what it believed that it was doing. There is a large body of academic literature for which official documents were taken, uncritically, as source material and this chapter therefore offers a critical approach to Frelimo's own understanding of the state, placing it in the context of the movement's ideological development.

The Mozambican state was not born in 1975. That year marked the transfer of political power from the moribund Portuguese colonial regime to Frelimo, the liberation movement that had fought an armed struggle against colonialism since 1964. At the time many journalists and academics believed implicitly that Frelimo could create a new Mozambican state, structuring it according to its stated plans and objectives. The inheritance of the past was seen as a static 'given' under which a line could be drawn rather than as a dynamic complex that was to have a bearing on the future. In the event, the implementation of Frelimo's plans was heavily shaped by the historical context. Furthermore, the very plans themselves were the product of historical circumstances. Those who compare the Mozambican experience to Frelimo claims and expectations

inevitably find that reality is far removed from the rhetoric. The alternative, a position taken by some of the "solidarity writers", has been to compare the Frelimo state to what existed at independence, make reference to all the difficulties that the new regime had to face, and then conclude that despite everything much progress has been made.[1]

The first author whose work is discussed here is John Saul, who was until recently the most prominent of Frelimo's academic supporters. He first worked with Frelimo in Dar es Salaam in the 1960s, and his work influenced and even dominated a large part of scholarship on Frelimo for many years. The second author whose work is referred to is Michel Cahen, long a trenchant critic of Frelimo from a Marxist perspective. Until recently his work has been much less known than that of Saul in English-reading circles, though no less the valuable for that.[2]

2. Paradigms of the Frelimo State: John Saul

To a large degree the beliefs that helped to shape the Frelimo state were developed during the war for independence. During that period John Saul contributed to some of those beliefs. Notions about the nation, legitimacy and representation can all be traced back to the pre-independence years. John Saul's early writings, during the years of the armed struggle, are politically almost indistinguishable from the official declarations of Frelimo's Central Committee and the speeches and publications of the movement's main spokesmen. In 1973, when his first major writings on Mozambique were published, Saul was closely aligned to the views of Marcelino dos Santos and Samora Machel who had

---

[1] The expression "solidarity writers" will be used to refer to a group of activist academics and journalists who, over the years, have shaped their arguments according to Frelimo's political needs of the day. Naturally this does not mean that they were always wrong. It is also the case that apart from a few exceptions most such "solidarity writers" showed occasional independence in their writings.

[2] Cahen has only recently begun to publish in English, though several of his texts are available in Portuguese. However, because they appeared in Portuguese journals rather than Mozambican ones they are no less marginal than his French texts to an academic community that was until recently fairly insular.

---

emerged victorious from the power struggles which beset the movement from the early 1960s to 1970.

In particular, Saul was keen to emphasize that Frelimo and its objectives were different from what had already been seen in Africa. Elsewhere in Africa, he argued, the result of the independences of the 1950s and 1960s had "almost invariably been a mere Africanization of the existing colonial structures", and this had "served to choke off rather than to liberate productive forces and release human energies".[3] In Mozambique, however the course of the struggle had afforded an opportunity to create something different. "The result, in all likelihood, will be not merely national liberation, but a social revolution."[4] Saul then contends that some "educated" elements inside Frelimo had been reluctant to identify themselves with the "people's struggle" and this had caused problems inside the movement. These "educated" elements represented Frelimo's "conservative line" and Saul characterizes them as "reactionary members of the petty bourgeoisie". The emphasis here is upon the term "reactionary", because the leadership also came from the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie. However, in Saul's view,

> the ideology of the progressive members of the petty bourgeoisie who have come to dominate Frelimo is not merely anti-imperialist; in fact, it is, at least implicitly, increasingly socialist.[5]

What happened, according to Saul, was that in the course of the war, and as a result of close contact with "the people", the progressive members of the petty bourgeoisie realized that they had no option but the one outlined by Amílcar Cabral, which was to commit "suicide as a class in order to be reborn as revolutionary workers, completely identified with the deepest aspirations of the people to which they belong".[6] This ideological development was considered to be the logical result of the deepening of the

---

[3] Saul, 1973: 23.
[4] Saul: 1973: 25.
[5] Saul, 1973: 31.
[6] Saul: 1973: 32, quoting Cabral, "The Weapon of Theory".

struggle - "mass-line politics, social reconstruction, protracted warfare" - and Saul argues that this came by demand of the people. He says that the people "have, in effect, demanded cadres rather than functionaries (and new exploiters)".[7] The conflict within Frelimo, which he says was between a "conventional nationalist movement" and a "revolutionary movement struggling to be born", was resolved by "the masses":

> Of course, as the struggle develops, and in the longer run, the masses themselves come to an ever greater degree to be the arbiters of this conflict: this too is one of the 'benefits' of the horrors of guerrilla warfare.[8]

This account of the development of Frelimo's ideology up to 1973 - revolutionary nationalism, but not yet socialism - accepts and promotes the view that Frelimo was taking its cue from the peasantry. The movement's leadership manages to commit class suicide and to identify with the needs of "the masses". Thus, Frelimo's legitimacy - to carry out war, to reorganize the liberated areas, and later to govern - is seen as springing from the peasantry. This is identical to the official Frelimo line. At no point are we told how the peasantry made its point of view felt, although Frelimo's Second Congress is occasionally referred to as a defining moment. Legitimacy and representativeness are uncritically assumed rather than claimed.

Saul's acceptance of this logic takes him very rapidly to the next step, which is to accept Frelimo's right, indeed duty, to combat all that might be an obstacle to its own plans. Here Saul concurred with Frelimo's analysis that in the past the Portuguese had managed to divide and rule by using mechanisms such as "tribalism and regionalism" and therefore Frelimo had to overcome these factors. Moreover, it is interesting to note that this element was considered to be important in distinguishing "progressive" members of the Frelimo leadership from the conservative elements. The victorious group in Frelimo's internal power struggles emerges, in Saul's work, with a popular mandate to construct the

---

[7] Saul: 1973: 29
[8] Saul: 1973: 32

nation and to lead it through a social revolution. By accepting that Frelimo represented the interests of the peoples of Mozambican (whose first interest, according to Frelimo, was to become a single people of Mozambique), Saul was accepting that Frelimo must assume the responsibility of fashioning the state for the purpose of achieving its social revolution. All that was thought to be in the fairly distant future.

Meanwhile, in the liberated areas Frelimo and Saul claimed that an alternative embryonic state was being created. Saul recognized that at that point there was no distinction between legislative, executive, judicial and representative functions, although he argues that later these were all separated:

> At this stage [i.e. during the liberation war] in the development of a new Mozambique the movement was, of course, party, state administration and representative institution all in one, an intertwining of threads which were slowly to be disentangled and rationalized after the winning of independence.[9]

It is important to note Saul's view on the liberated areas as they were to become a central element in Frelimo's discourse.[10]

The Portuguese colonial state underwent great changes in the decades before independence, a change described by John Saul in the following way:[11]

> Portugal's variant of the colonial state was to remain to the end of the colonial period even more labyrinthine and bureaucratized than its counterparts elsewhere in Africa - as befitted its quasi-feudal roots in a backward Portugal. Yet as it now began to collect taxes, undertake censuses of labor supplies, and enforce labor and cropping regulations, this state did move to centralize administration and establish a strong hierarchical network of control throughout the colony. The further reinforcement of the privileges and powers of the *regulos* was important.

---

[9] Saul, 1985a: 68.
[10] The term 'discourse', in the sense employed by Foucault, is described in the following manner by Philp: "a system of possibility for knowledge ... it is what allows us to produce statements which will be either true or false ... rules [which] provide the necessary preconditions for the formation of statements". (Mark Philp, "Michel Foucault", in Quentin Skinner, ed. 1985, *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.69.) The liberated areas are discussed at greater length later in this chapter..
[11] On the development of the colonial state see Newitt, 1995: chapters 15-17. Also, Vail, 1976 and Neil-Tomlinson, 1977.

not least in contributing to the creation of a stratum of privileged Africans. More generally, however, the whole structure of the state was deeply scarred by the role defined for it as, in effect, the warden of a giant labour camp. And this role was reinforced as the state became more and more militarized in defense of the old order.[12]

Upon this basis Saul endorsed the view put forward by President Machel in his Independence Day speech according to which it was necessary radically to transform the state in order to put it "at the service of the masses".[13] He also referred to the "ideological offensive" of the colonial state which was carried out mainly through the Catholic Church and the educational system. In all of this, the objections to the state which Saul puts forward, just as Frelimo thinkers were to do, referred not to methods but to objectives. The colonial system was judged evil because it favoured the interests of Portuguese and non-Portuguese capitalists, as well as those of a small group of privileged Africans, against the bulk of the peasantry. Frelimo was well situated to build a state "at the service of the masses" because, by definition, that was what Frelimo represented.

The chaotic situation in 1975 did not permit Frelimo immediately to set about building its idealized state:

> Thus Frelimo confronted a paradoxical task: keeping some aspects of the colonial economy functioning in the short term so as to avoid economic catastrophe, while simultaneously laying the groundwork for the long-term structural transformation of that distorted economy. Of course, the main tool was to be the primacy of state planning rather than the market.[14]

Saul's choice of words is curious. The economy which Frelimo inherited was, he says, "distorted", though it is not clear in relation to what. In relation to market values it certainly was, but neither he nor Frelimo wished to realize the values of the market. This would seem to suggest the possibility of some idyllic condition against which society might be measured. There also seems to be an assumption (and this was shared by

[12] Saul, 1985a: 44-45.
[13] Machel, 1975: 19
[14] Saul, 1985a: 62.

Frelimo) that Frelimo would be able to start from scratch, Independence Day being the Day of Creation. As it turned out Frelimo was unable to rid itself of the past from one moment to the next and this John Saul considered to be "paradoxical". State farms had to be set up quickly as a result of the exodus of the great majority of the settlers, he argues, or the result would be "urban catastrophe and/or vast expenditure on imported foodstuffs".[15] Furthermore, the removal of mechanisms for compulsory production had the unwelcome effect of accentuating plunging production levels:

> with the removal of colonial compulsion the peasant would now produce only as it seemed worthwhile for him/her to do so. Yet this situation emerged at the very moment when ... the marketing and transport networks fell into disarray. This created difficulties in selling crops on the one hand and in purchasing agricultural inputs and consumer goods on the other. Not surprisingly, the marketing - and actual production! - of such export crops as cashews and cotton and of such food crops as rice, maize, and groundnuts began to fall precipitously. The network of commercialization would have eventually to be resurrected.[16]

Saul argues that the peasantry, lacking direction, was not contributing to building the new state and was even creating difficulties for it. Furthermore, the crises, according to Saul, had the effect of concentrating minds upon immediate problems rather than "actually remodeling the overall pattern of agricultural production so as to establish a new more autocentric economic logic for the country".[17] This is an important component of Saul's work. Frequently he contrasts Frelimo intentions to the realities with which it had to deal, implicitly promoting the view that all would have turned out exactly as planned were it not for the intervention of exogenous factors beyond Frelimo's control.

Just as for the economy, Saul says that the immediate crisis of the moment did not permit Frelimo to reorganize the state as thoroughly as it intended:

[15] Saul, 1985a: 65. This issue is assessed in chapter 7.
[16] Saul, 1985a: 65.
[17] Saul, 1985a: 66

the extreme shortfall of trained personnel dictated the necessity of entrusting responsibilities to members of a petty bourgeoisie of whose 'class suicide' the leadership could not be entirely confident.[18]

Echoing the claims and theoretical writings of leading Frelimo personnel, Saul believed that an intensified class struggle was the solution to this problem and that this could happen through *poder popular*[19] which, he said, was

> exercised both by Frelimo as tribune of the people *and* by the people acting directly through popularly based mass organizations ... there can be no doubt that the desire to empower the people, so deeply grounded in the wartime experience, was ripe to be carried over into the period of transitional government.[20]

Saul offers no evidence that Frelimo wished to empower the people, except through the use of purely circular logic: empowering Frelimo *was* empowering the people because Frelimo represented the will of the people. The more power was concentrated in the hands of the leadership, the more power was concentrated in the hands of the people. Saul quotes approvingly from a 1971 document by Samora Machel which

> states that the movement's task "is definitely to lead, organize, guide and educate the masses," to lead and guide, "the reorganization of the life of the masses and national reconstruction, just as it guides and leads the army, setting the goals to be achieved and heightening political consciousness".[21]

This was not thought of as autocratic because it carried with it a great sense of responsibility to be honest with "the masses" and to make sure that decisions were always democratic in content and form: content implied that the "real interests" of the masses should be promoted; form meant that the masses must not feel that the decisions were being imposed from above. These notions are from Samora Machel rather than from Saul himself but there is no doubt that Saul subscribes to them. Saul does display occasional ambivalence though. At one point he quotes Rosa Luxemburg's admonition

[18] Saul, 1985a: 67.
[19] Literally 'popular power'. In post-independence Mozambique this was taken to mean grassroots democracy and decision-making.
[20] Saul, 1985a: 68.
[21] Saul, 1985a: 69.

that democracy requires free elections, free speech, free press and so on. However, it appears that Saul is giving an example of "the richness of the Marxist tradition on these matters" rather than actually endorsing Luxemburg's point of view, particularly as he then immediately returns to the work of Lenin.[22]

Saul argues that the transformation of Frelimo into a vanguard party in February 1977 and the subsequent elections for representative assemblies[23] were part of the process of institutional disentangling that was mentioned earlier. Provided that state appointments and procedures respected the political lead of the party, the state itself should not be seen as a locus of class struggle.

Saul believes that the main theme of early post-colonial Mozambique was the relationship between "leadership" and "mass action". His understanding of Frelimo is that during the first decade of independence it dedicated itself to consolidating this "positive dialectic". The "mass democratic organizations" are, in this perspective, an attempt to find a channel for "mass action".[24] "Mass action", however, should not be random and chaotic. It should obey a class logic that would impel the revolutionary process forward. The problem was that in Mozambique there were historical legacies ("traditionalism" and "obscurantism"), economic realities ("individualism") and other factors such as low levels of literacy, which impeded the appearance of "spontaneous class action from below". This meant that Frelimo had a further task which was to seek to develop the class that was to take class action and he therefore applauded Frelimo's creation of the trade union structure, OTM.[25] Saul does admit to some doubts about Frelimo's success in striking the right balance between "leadership" and "mass action". During the first decade of independence, we are told, it is arguable that the regime may have erred on the side of overemphasizing "leadership". However, this could be corrected

[22] Saul, 1985b: 320-321.
[23] This process is discussed later in this chapter.
[24] Such as the women's organization (OMM), the youth organization (OJM), and two professional organizations belonging to the journalists (ONJ) and the teachers (OPM).
[25] Saul, 1985a: 97.

with "a greater measure of autonomy for organizations of workers, of women, of peasants and the like to develop and press their own demands".[26]

Saul's later work forces him to consider a Mozambique in which the "socialist experiment ... lies in tatters"[27], but he is reluctant to make major changes to his earlier views. Saul contends, for example, that Frelimo was excessively concerned, in the early years, with technocratic solutions, meaning solutions drawn up by educated personnel in the ministries of Maputo without consultation of local people. He considers that this reflects class action by "aspirants to the bourgeoisie". However, for Saul this does not reflect badly upon Frelimo's leadership because it was the Frelimo Central Committee that first raised the issue.[28] Thus although he begins, following official Frelimo documents, to look upon the state sector as being a source of problems for "the project", he takes the analysis no further than that. An article written in 1987 is mostly devoted to the geo-politics of Southern Africa, in the belief that the causes of the Mozambican debacle lay far beyond Frelimo's control.[29] In 1990 following his first visit to Mozambique for several years, Saul remained reluctant to revise his views:

> Not that anything I heard or saw caused me to revise my earlier opinion: first and foremost amongst the causes of Mozambique's so-called "failure of socialism" has been the ruthlessness of the aggression launched against it and the destruction, quite literally of a society that has been attendant upon that aggression.[30]

Mistakes had been made, Saul admits: one strategic mistake had been to underestimate South Africa's position as an independent actor, rather than simply a component of "global capitalism". Also, there had been a personality cult around Machel, and the regime's Marxism had been less deep, intellectually, than required. Corruption had been allowed to grow in the army which should have been reformed in the early 1980s but in

[26] Saul, 1985a: 99.
[27] Saul, 1987: 109.
[28] Saul, 1987: 116-117.
[29] Saul, 1987
[30] Saul, 1990: 22

Saul's view Machel was killed by the South Africans at precisely the moment when he looked as though he were going to "transform the situation".[31] Mozambican attachment to the official Soviet brand of Marxism had also been a mistake and Saul remarks wistfully that a Frelimo veteran told him that they would have paid more attention to Saul's teachings on the matter were it not for the fact that Saul had no military equipment to sell them.[32] To be fair, Saul made references to the problems associated with copying the Soviet model as far back as 1979, albeit in a very muted form and mitigated by the following affirmation:

> Of course, no serious observer could deny the positive role the Soviet Union has played, past and present, in supporting liberation movements in Southern Africa, and Eastern bloc assistance continues to be important to Mozambique, both substantively in the present phase, and potentially, as a possible "last resort" if white regime-sponsored incursions escalate things even further.[33]

By 1985 Saul was more preoccupied with the bad examples given by the Soviets, although he felt that Frelimo was managing to override this by "demonstrating the openness and complexity of the Marxist tradition itself". Frelimo's creativity was credited by Saul as being the ultimate saving grace, the characteristic that would allow it to avoid the pitfalls of previous attempted transitions to socialism.[34]

[31] Saul, 1990: 24. The airplane crash in which Machel died remains mysterious. It may have simply been an accident caused by human error. There are indications of unusual goings-on, such as reports of a beacon emitting from hills on the Swazi-Mozambican border which might have induced the pilots into thinking they were approaching Maputo (which is on the coast) when in fact they were over land well above sea-level. There is very little publicly available evidence and the possibility that the accident was caused by the South Africans remains. The problem with this is that there appears to be no good reasons for the South African government to want him dead. Saul's suggestion that it was because they were scared Machel was going to "get a grip on things" is not plausible. It is much more probable that some of the Mozambican military dead-wood were keen on eliminating him, and there may have been co-operation between them and South African military intelligence. This is all speculative though, as all such comments will be until further information is available. Neither the South African authorities nor their Mozambican counterparts have so far been willing to release all the findings of the joint commission that investigated the crash.
[32] Saul, 1990: 22.
[33] Saul, 1979: 434.
[34] Saul, 1985b: 317-319.

Ultimately then, Saul provides us with an impression of a state fully contingent upon

? decisions taken elsewhere, in the course of his dialectic of "leadership" (party) and "mass

action" ("mass democratic organizations"). Laxity and distraction as a result of crises

might have led to abuses of power by a state elite but this could be corrected if the right

measures were implemented. Saul himself, belatedly, makes a few adjustments to the

positions that have been outlined.[35] Writing in 1993, for example, Saul cites Bayart who

emphasizes the importance of promoting "civil society" in order to push the state onto "a

positive course".[36] For Saul, this is no more than his old dialectic:

> But this is merely to suggest that the simultaneity of the need both for leadership
> *and* for mass action inherent in a process of socialist transformation frames a
> contradiction that cannot be made to disappear - and demands the construction of
> an on-going political process that takes both terms of this equation seriously.[37]

At this point Saul is prepared to accept that Frelimo lost its way, being unwilling to risk

"the democratic implications of the task of empowerment".[38] He says that the movement

kept too rigid a control over the "mass democratic organizations", though he does not

refer to what happened to these organizations when they were released by Frelimo in

1991.[39]

Saul's most recent work leaves the reader with a strong sense that things turned out as

they did mainly due to chance and ill luck. Frelimo was initially too "self-confident"

which led it to overlook the need actually to listen to the peasantry. As reversals began to

take place, Frelimo became more democratic and open, namely in the run-up to the

Fourth Congress. At this point "the Frelimo state came closest to striking the kind of

---

[35] These adjustments may be seen in Saul, 1993. They are not yet visible in his articles of 1987 and
1990.

[36] This interpretation of Bayart is Saul's (1993: 145-146).

[37] Saul, 1993: 146. Italics in the original.

[38] Saul, 1993: 150. Presumably, the main "democratic implication" is that the people might have
disagreed with the Frelimo hierarchy. How this would have affected Saul's leadership-mass action
dialectic we are not told. Saul himself appears unwilling to contemplate this democratic implication.

[39] They became almost inoperative, with the exception in some provinces of OMM, depending on the
provincial leadership. The basis for this affirmation is my own experience in March and October 1994
when I worked with OMM and OJM in Nampula, Tete and Maputo.

---

balance between leadership and mass action that might have produced both economic

advance and political support". However, by then it was too late because of the

development of the war.[40] Everything could have worked according to plan, one feels, if

only there had been some adjustments at the right moment. Still, not all is lost for

socialism, Saul feels. Greater democracy should not be seen as a bad thing, and may not

be a retreat, and furthermore "the state remains a site of struggle where some remnants of

Frelimo's socialism might still be defended".[41] Further evidence that socialism is alive in

Mozambique should be seen in the wave of wildcat strikes that hit Maputo in 1990.[42]

By 1993 Saul describes the new Frelimo state as being completely different from the

former revolutionary one. The new state, under World Bank and IMF tutelage, is geared

to the development of unbridled capitalism, aided by a change of heart in the erstwhile

revolutionary leadership. According to Saul this class now "crystallizes its identity and

self-interest around the new structure of privilege in Mozambique". The state is now seen

as an arena in which members of this class "jockey for advantage" in the new political

and economic atmosphere of a Mozambique undergoing structural adjustment. The

return of a measure of power to "rehabilitated chiefs" is, for Saul, a form of crushing

"incipient structures of grass-roots participatory democracy" in favour of a form of

indirect rule.[43] Finally though, Saul's view of the rise and fall of what he terms the

"socialist Frelimo state" leaves behind it, apart from vague promises about the future, the

possibility of the Mozambican nation-state. The decay of Frelimo's project might not

have been in vain, he says, provided that "Frelimo retains just enough credibility to keep

alive the sense of achieved nationhood that may be the one thing of importance that

remains of its original high purpose".[44]

---

[40] This argument is laid out in Saul, 1993: 152.

[41] Saul, 1990: 24.

[42] Saul, 1990: 24.

[43] Saul, 1993: 157.

[44] Saul, 1993: 158.

3. Paradigms of the Frelimo State: Michel Cahen

From the middle of the 1980s the transformations in Mozambique were shadowed by a change in the terms of the academic debates and English speaking academics began to pay attention to the work of French authors, in particular Christian Geffray and Michel Cahen. This was partly a result of the general interest in the ideas that were appearing from writers associated with the journal *Politique Africaine*.[45] In the particular case of Mozambique it was clear that mainstream English-language academics had failed to provide convincing explanations of developments in that country. Cahen's work constitutes a wide-ranging and extremely consistent set of critiques of the Frelimo state and provides the best counterpoint to the views of John Saul.

In 1992 Cahen was invited to talk in Barcelona on the topic of "the check on socialism in Mozambique". He almost declined because "after all, I have been trying for the last 15 years to explain that to talk of socialism in Mozambique has no meaning".[46] The idea that Mozambique was socialist, or that it was embarking upon a socialist transformation, is the result of the unquestioning acceptance of the country's "founding myths". He spells out what he considers these myths to be:

> the marxist-leninist credentials of the party, the socialist character of the social transformation, the popular character of power, the worker-peasant class nature of the state, and so on.[47]

The acceptance of these "founding myths" allowed only for the discussion of party "errors" and never the basic orientation.[48] Cahen goes on to argue that what the leadership had in mind was not really 'Marxism', but a specific collection of policies that had been called Marxist in other contexts. It is worth quoting Cahen's list of policies that,

[45] Jean-François Bayart in particular was beginning to gain something of a following.
[46] Cahen, 1993: 46.
[47] Cahen, 1993: 46. Also Cahen, 1987: 7.
[48] Anti-Marxist writers such as Hoile (1989 and 1994) attacked Frelimo on the basis of the "founding myths" which they also accepted.

he says, allowed Frelimo to be considered Marxist-Leninist after the Third Congress in 1977:

> a general discourse against exploitation directed equally at colonialism and capitalism and at the African social formation and 'domestic' mode of production (characterised as 'feudalism' and 'obscurantism'); the legitimation of the single party as the crucible for the forging of the nation; a bureaucratic vision of democratic centralism as a mode of internal as well as external operation and paradoxically extended to all the society; a unifying vision of the nation without ethnic divisions and without 'traditional' social relations in peasant society; and, finally, a vigourous developmentalism under the aegis of the state, ignoring the articulation of the various modes of production (capitalist and 'domestic') in which the population was to be 'transformed' but not itself to act, and was to participate in the life of the single party but not discuss the merits.[49]

Cahen argues that none of these aspects of Frelimo policy were Marxist and that the only Marxist component of Frelimo policies was the discourse. Furthermore, it is important to note that only a specific brand of Marxist discourse was employed, a brand that Cahen classifies as "stalinist manichaeism".[50] He dismisses the idea that the discourse was simply employed as a cunning manoeuvre and argues that it is necessary to search for its social roots. In order to do this he outlines the history of the Creole elites, tracing their changing fortunes over the duration of the century.[51]

Cahen's search for the social roots of the Frelimo elites, their marginalization, mobilization and radicalization, is in itself a far-reaching departure from the work of John Saul and from Frelimo's own account of its history and development. By locating the political development of the Frelimo elites in the social history of the different parts of the country, and by nuancing the colonial experience, Cahen was challenging two central tenets of the Saul/Frelimo approach. The first challenge is against the idea that colonialism was simply a period of repression that resulted in the growth of resistance to the Portuguese, gradually crystallizing around Frelimo.[52] Cahen argues that the colonial

[49] Cahen, 1993: 48.
[50] Cahen, 1993: 48.
[51] Cahen, 1993: 49-50; also Cahen, 1990 and 1992. Although Cahen does not spell it out, his use of the expression "Creole" seems to refer to social, cultural and economic rather than racial characteristics
[52] This is the view implicit, for example, in Mondlane (1983) and in Saul (1979: 23-39).

experience of the elites was profoundly different from that of the peasantries, and that the elites had different experiences amongst themselves, as did peasants from different parts of the country.[53] Simple as it may sound, this idea shakes the foundations of the Saul/Frelimo account of the birth and growth of Frelimo because it implies that the movement was actually a complex web of unadvertised interests rather than spontaneous nascent socialism. By way of analogy, Cahen reminds his readers of the work of José Capela which argues that

> resistance to colonisation was not a reaction to the Portuguese presence, but rather a class-based reaction: it came about when the colonisers threatened the vital interests of the dominant strata of the African empires.[54]

The second challenge is against the idea that the Frelimo leadership took its cue from the peasantry, committing "class suicide" in the process of its revolutionary identification with "the people". In the work of Cahen, the Frelimo leadership's Marxism (or Stalinism, he would say) arose not from their interaction with the aspirations of the peasantry in the liberated zones, but from their own need to control growing popular opposition to colonialism that was outside their "habitat". This explains, according to Cahen, why the single most important element that was gleaned from communist experiences elsewhere was the single party and the principle of "democratic centralism" which Frelimo used as a method of internal organization as well as external action.

Cahen analyses the origins of the anti-colonial struggle and the process of political development that took place during the liberation war in a way that inevitably results in a conceptualization of the Frelimo state completely different from that of John Saul. Cahen accepts the view put forward by Luis de Brito[55] that, far from being a process of harmonization and parallel ideological development between elite and peasantry, the

---

[53] It should not be forgotten that there are important differences among elites and peasantries which last to the present day. Not all elites are inside Frelimo.

[54] Cahen, 1990: 321. My translation. Note: all translations from Portuguese and from French are mine.

[55] Brito, 1988: 24-27 and 1991: 153-161.

liberation war was actually a profound misunderstanding between leaders and led in Frelimo. According to this view the elite believed that the peasantry "was ready to fight not just against Portuguese exploiters or Africans who might replace them, but also against their own domestic society".[56] The social origins of the elites (*assimilados*[57], urbanized and salaried *mestiços*[58]) led to the idealization of a European-style nationalist and modernist state which in turn demanded the eradication of what Cahen calls the "domestic mode of production" and the political claims of lineage chiefs. The weak social implantation of this elite stratum meant that it had "an absolute need to dominate the state apparatus for its own reproduction".[59] Nevertheless Cahen is careful to point out that this does not negate possible feelings of profound solidarity by this elite vis-a-vis the peasantry or their personal commitment to Frelimo's stated principles.[60]

The leitmotiv of the Frelimo leadership, throughout the liberation war and the subsequent construction of the Frelimo state, was, in Cahen's view, the need for control. This implies that the process of radicalization of the late 1960s and the early 1970s was not impelled from below but imposed from above. Cahen argues that the foundations for Mozambican anti-colonialism were purely social, and were only given a nationalist colour by the elite which was leading the movement.[61] During the war the Frelimo leadership managed to overcome tensions over lineage politics, mainly because all attention was focused upon defeating the Portuguese rather than constructing the post-colonial state, but this did not eradicate the existence of contradictory tendencies. It is certainly the case that Frelimo's posture on chieftancies was then much more ambiguous than after independence, often

---

[56] Cahen, 1990: 326.

[57] The *assimilado* status was granted to a very small proportion of black Mozambicans, namely those who applied for and passed an exam in written and spoken Portuguese, and who were in permanent employment. Most importantly, it implied exemption from forced labour and from military service. See the account in Honwana, 1989: 82.

[58] '*Mestiço*' means of mixed racial heritage.

[59] Cahen, 1990: 326.

[60] Cahen, 1993: 50 and 1990: 326.

[61] Cahen, 1993: 50.

accepting the claims of chiefs who were prepared to resist colonialism and enlisting their support.[62]

After the war, during the transition period, Frelimo's main concern was to capture all the loose political energy that had been released by the collapse of the regime in Portugal. The most visible form of loose political energy was the wave of strikes in Maputo during 1974. The workers' committees which had emerged spontaneously were targeted by Frelimo, dissolved and replaced by the *Grupos Dinamizadores* (GDs).[63] The GDs, according to Cahen, far from being the incarnation of *poder popular*, as they are represented in official Frelimo literature, were instruments used by the Frelimo hierarchy to control social movements that had commenced independently. They were not spontaneous manifestations of a popular will to be organized in a revolutionary fashion.[64] Their creation was instigated by Frelimo members who would arrive and explain what GDs were for. The secretary of the GD had to be a member of Frelimo, but the other leading members could be elected by the people who were assembled to create the group.[65] The GDs, in Cahen's interpretation, were the method used by Frelimo to allow for the state-party fusion to take place in the smallest groupings of society.

Among other measures taken by the transitional government Cahen cites the nationalization of funeral services. The ostensible reason for this was that "in free Mozambique no one was to make a profit from the personal discomfiture of his or her compatriots"[66] but Cahen discerns another intention: a number of African urban

---

[62] Consider for example how in 1965 Samora Machel and some of his men marched for 11 days in Niassa in an attempt to enlist the support of a *régulo* named Mataca. Christie. 1988: 38-41. There are numerous further examples in Coelho, 1989 and 1993.

[63] The *Grupos Dinamizadores* will be referred to in more detail in chapter 4. Cahen's comments on this matter are in 1993: 51.

[64] The ambiguous nature of the GDs is reflected, perhaps involuntarily, in the sympathetic account by Isaacman and Isaacman: they note that the GDs were supposed to "organize and mobilize" people and that they were to serve "as schools in which to learn democratic skills and class unity" (1983: 117). This description does not lend credibility to the idea that the GDs existed to channel grassroots opinion upwards.

[65] Cahen (1985: 48-49) bases his comments on this matter on an interview carried out by Isaacman & Isaacman (1983: 117).

[66] This is how Saul describes it in 1979: 84-85.

---

associations had appeared with regional memberships in order to help organize the safe return of corpses to villages. Apart from being outside Frelimo control the regional nature of these associations was threatening to the new leadership. Another autonomous association that was brought under the aegis of Frelimo was the very active Academic Association which was replaced by Frelimo's youth wing.

Cahen's analysis of the evolution of Frelimo before independence permits him to advance a description of the Frelimo state that is altogether different from that of Saul. His emphasis upon control has already been mentioned. A corollary of this is the non-democratic nature of this control. The fusion of state and party placed full authority in the hands of the leadership of the party.[67] The party leadership, however, was accountable to nobody but itself.

In the early months of independence the state apparatus was massively annexed by Frelimo: of the 15,000 members of Frelimo, 5,000 were placed in the state apparatus.[68] According to Cahen (and according to Frelimo's own analysis[69]) this presented a problem: Frelimo's structures were being weakened as people turned from party work to state work. Official Frelimo sources interpreted this as being the natural consequence of a situation in which a desperate lack of trained cadres meant that priority had been given to the administrative functions of the state rather than the political functions of the party. Cahen admits that the shortage of cadres was an important factor, but prefers to emphasize the inevitability of this process given Frelimo's self-definition as the leading force in the state. Because Frelimo had officially proclaimed that it knew best (because the source of its knowledge was "the masses" themselves) there was no further need for consultation. The result was a growing detachment between people and party. This

---

[67] Cahen, 1985: 38-39.

[68] Cahen, 1985: 39

[69] Frelimo Central Committee meeting July 1980. Saul echoes this preoccupation in 1985: 86-88

detachment was further deepened by the lack of any real opportunity for debate, given that the Constitution itself forbade any criticism of Frelimo (article 36).[70]

The elections that were held in 1977 and 1978, first for the popular assemblies and then for party membership, are sometimes held to be examples of real grassroots democracy.[71] For Cahen however these elections were a farce, given that the people were never allowed to discuss the party's political orientations, only the personal qualities of the party's candidates. Furthermore, the popular assemblies themselves had no representative functions. Their role was simply to pass on decisions taken by the party executive, respecting the principle of "democratic centralism" which extended to all party and state bodies. According to this Soviet principle, in the Frelimo interpretation[72], lower echelons of the party must accept and defend without question or hesitation all decisions taken by higher echelons. This means that alternative points of view inside the party had to be stifled when they were presented to the lower echelons, and could not be voiced if the decision had come down from a higher echelon. The result of this principle was that no debate was permitted on any item that had been debated at a higher instance. Given that the assemblies were all made up of Frelimo members, and that the executive bodies at any level were made up of the highest ranking party members at that level, "democratic centralism" emptied the assemblies of any substantive role. Their job was merely to ratify decisions already taken, and this was done automatically.

The "mass democratic organizations", so important in Saul's perspective, are discounted by Cahen as simply another means of Frelimo control. Although membership of these organizations was not limited to members of the party, their internal organization and their general orientation was certainly controlled by Frelimo. Frelimo would use these

---

[70] Cahen, 1985: 40.
[71] See Saul, 1979: 441-442 for a particularly enthusiastic description along these lines.
[72] Cahen notes that Lenin's original formulation was a different one (1985: 41). The Frelimo interpretation is in the Party Statutes (article 13 of the 1977, 1983 and 1989 versions).

---

organizations to ensure that these sectors of society were collaborating in the national project that it was creating.[73]

All of Cahen's analysis points to the creation of a state radically different from the one theorized by John Saul. Where Saul saw petty bourgeois class suicide Cahen saw the imposition of elite domination; where Saul saw nascent structures of participatory democracy Cahen saw mechanisms of control; where Saul saw voluntary and enthusiastic commitment to a common project Cahen saw the creation of means that would permit the recruitment of free labour, albeit disguised as "mobilization"; where Saul saw the creation of a nation Cahen saw the brutal suppression of differences.

Linked to these important differences is the question that for many is still the touchstone of Mozambican history in the post-colonial period: the question of whether the war that ravaged the country can be called a civil war. Those who accept that Frelimo did effectively represent the will of the people (however that might be defined) naturally have difficulty with the idea that the astonishing violence in the country between the late 1970s and 1992 was a civil war. The well-documented links between Renamo and the Rhodesian secret service, and later the South African military, are taken to be proof of the externally imposed nature of the war.[74] The "solidarity writers" were extremely reluctant to write anything critical, except with numerous caveats and usually after Frelimo itself had exercised self-criticism on the matter. To accept the civil war tag was an implicit criticism of Frelimo, for it indicated that Frelimo had lost the sympathy of a considerable portion of the population.

But there was a further reason inhibiting the conclusion that the Frelimo-Renamo war was a civil war. The vast majority of academics and journalists writing on southern

---

[73] Cahen, 1985: 49-52.
[74] Hanlon (1984, 1991) is among those who reject the label civil war. In the index to his 1991 book, the entry for 'war' says the following: "*see* Destabilization campaign; Renamo; South Africa (destabilization policy)".

Africa, with very few exceptions[75], had strong anti-apartheid commitments, and it was difficult to dissociate the history of Mozambique from South Africa's regional policy. The fact that most research was carried out in the south and centre of the country, where South African proximity is more keenly felt, accentuated this tendency. Given this regional context there was enormous academic reluctance firstly to contemplate and then actually to write that there was a civil war going on. By accepting the idea of the civil war, it was felt, one was helping to cover up Pretoria's aggression. Cahen admits to involuntary collaboration on this:

> This also applied to me, even if I was not a supporter of Frelimo: it was only in 1985 that I began to think, and only in 1987 that I began to write - still very carefully - that the war in Mozambique 'was in the process of changing from a war of aggression to a civil war'. ... looking back, I know now that the transition from a war of aggression to a civil war took place between 1980 and 1982. But I also did not wish to play the game of the enemy.[76]

Cahen's conclusions on the nature of the power exercised by Frelimo and on what he calls Frelimo's "founding myths" could not but lead him to the view that there was an element of civil war in the violence ravaging Mozambique. By contrast, those who refused to accept the possibility of civil war tended to remain faithful to official Frelimo accounts of the war and of how it had come about.[77] Any other position would leave them in the difficult situation of saying that despite Frelimo mistakes and undemocratic practices there had been no reaction from the population, even though there was an externally-supported war taking place all around. And there were some who chose to attempt that difficult balancing act.[78]

---

[75] The exceptions, people such as David Hoile, had, for good reasons, little academic credibility. See Hoile, 1989 and 1994.
[76] Cahen, 1993: 47.
[77] The nature of the war us not a subject of this thesis, although it inevitably appears from time to time. Personally I share Cahen's view that it began as an external war of destabilization and that it rapidly began to build upon local conflicts, transforming itself into a civil war. This process happened in different ways in different parts of the country. See: Vines (1991), Nilsson (1993a, 1993b), Young (1990), Hall (1990) and Cahen (1995). Important local analyses of the war have been carried out by Geffray (1990), Geffray and Pedersen (1986), Legrand (1993), Roesch (1992a) and Alexander (1994, 1995).
[78] For example Otto Roesch (1992d) and Bridget O'Laughlin (1992a and 1992c).

The development of the Frelimo state during the country's second decade of independence is no surprise for Cahen. Having begun by criticizing the arrogance of an elite that claimed to speak for the peasantry even though it had no channels of communication with that same peasantry and, having proceeded to argue that the party-state fusion was the prime location for that class to defend its interests, Cahen finds that the present state of affairs is but a logical conclusion. His argument is that Frelimo's early policies were no more than social control masquerading as socialism, and that the regime had always been interested, above all, in increasing rather than decreasing its interactions with the capitalist world. He cites the Nkomati Accord with South Africa (March 1984) as evidence of this, but he refers also to the assumptions underpinning early economic planning. Investments made in the port of Maputo, for example, could only have been made with the intention of increasing South African import and export traffic.[79] Frelimo's official abandonment of Marxism-Leninism, at the Sixth Party Congress in 1989, came several years after the removal of socialist language from official terminology. Although Cahen does not recognize this to be an alteration of the Frelimo project, he does say that there has been a change in

> *the social character of the elite in power*: taking over the government when it was still entirely cut off from the means of production and exchange, when it saw with anger other more business-oriented fractions rival it, it consists today of persons who are concerned to feather their own nests and are often simply corrupt. Almost all the ministers are now 'businessmen'.[80]

Here it is unclear what Cahen means by "social character". After all, the state elite today is composed of the same people who were the state elite ten or even twenty years ago. In the last few years ministers have changed, new people have been promoted and older ones have retired but many key people remain in the same or similar places. Mozambique does not have the sheer numbers of trained personnel that would be required to operate a transformation in the social character of the elite. The current state elite has been in the

---

[79] Cahen, 1993: 52.
[80] Cahen, 1993: 58.

service of the Frelimo state since independence despite the apparent changes in the Frelimo project. If the initial Frelimo project was not one of socialist transformation then in what way has the social character of the elite changed?

Comparing the state elite now to twenty years ago raises an interesting topic for which Cahen has provided no adequate answer. Why is it that corruption is now rampant when, by all accounts, it was at a very low level during the first years of independence? Neither Saul nor Cahen provide convincing explanations of the changing use of the state apparatus by the state elite.[81]

Michel Cahen dedicates considerable time and effort to show that the Frelimo project was never a Marxist one just as Saul and other writers (from both left and right - *vide* Henriksen and Hoile) have over the years attempted to show that it was a Marxist project. Cahen criticises Saul and others for simply accepting Frelimo accounts of the movement's political development with no analysis of social reality, and over time they themselves have reluctantly come to accept, at least in part, this criticism. From the methodological point of view, Cahen claims the Marxist high ground and it is difficult not to grant it him.[82] Where Cahen is much less secure is in his political assessment of the options available at any given moment. Constantly he chides Frelimo for decisions that do not conform to his criteria of Marxism. All deviations from his idealized Leninism are considered to be Stalinist.[83]

Indeed, one often feels that the events of early Soviet Russia play an over-heavy role in his analysis. Cahen does admit that Lenin and Trotsky made a crucial mistake in 1921 when, once the Civil War had been won, they did not move to restore pluralism at all

[81] Although this issue is not directly addressed in this thesis, the periodization which is developed here, together with the account of the construction and dissolution of the Frelimo ideology and the Frelimo state, clears the way for an understanding of the phenomenon of corruption in Mozambique.
[82] For example: "I must work with the social reality (and indeed I conclude that Mozambique remained a peripheral capitalist state) and *in this context*, I am obliged to ask myself what is *the historical function of the claim by the national elites to be marxist*." (Cahen, 1993: 48.) Italics in the original.
[83] Cahen, 1991a: 90.

levels. Beyond that, however, he considers Stalinism to have been a radical break from Leninism. One might have assumed, given his criticism of Frelimo, that Cahen would consider this mistake by Lenin to have been absolutely fatal. Cahen offers, as mitigation, the view that the Bolshevik party was really united under Lenin, and that this only became a legal requirement under Stalin.[84] This puts him on shaky ground: all the evidence suggests that there was great consensus within Frelimo for nearly all of the 1970s. Cahen's construction of Leninism is an attempt to show that his ideal is politically feasible and not merely a figment of the revolutionary imagination. The fact that he cannot point to any experience anywhere as a positive example weakens his main approach.[85]

Most importantly, by arguing that Frelimo made mistakes he is also arguing that it could have avoided such mistakes, and come closer to Cahen's own Marxism. Curiously this brings him closer to the perspectives advanced by John Saul. Cahen is right to insist upon the need to analyse Frelimo's Marxism as a discourse rather than as a project for a socialist transition.[86] However, he occasionally loses sight of this himself, concentrating his accounts of postcolonial Mozambican history on the ˙mistakes˙ that Frelimo made just as Saul and others concentrate upon the external pressures. By searching for ˙mistakes˙ he allows himself to be drawn into the discourse and to debate from within it, rather than focusing on what he (rightly in my view) considers to be the historian's main task: to identify the social nature of Frelimo as a movement and to understand the role of Frelimo's discourse and policies in that context.

Cahen considers that one of the victories of Stalinism has been to create the idea that Marxist-Leninist ideology means what Stalin made it mean: a selection of the writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin. He argues that a revolutionary Marxist tradition would also have

[84] One may debate Cahen's reading of Soviet history (Cahen, 1991a: 90, footnote 2): ˙fractionalism˙ inside the Bolshevik party was banned at the Tenth Party Congress in March 1921. Carr, 1979: 34.
[85] At one point (1990: 95) he points to Cuba as a model but he does not develop this view. Were he to do so it is difficult to imagine that he could sustain his own arguments.
[86] Cahen, 1993: 50.

to include the works of Rosa Luxemburg, Trotsky, Gramsci, Bukharin, Che Guevara and

so on. At any given point he can show that a decision by Frelimo contradicts the ideas of

Trotsky, Gramsci or Luxemburg. Where he is much less convincing is in persuading his

readers, as he tries to, that a Marxist alternative - one that he would not classify as

Stalinist - was viable in Mozambique. This is what lays him open to accusations - by

John Saul - of "ultra-left abstractions".[87]

4. The Origins of the Frelimo State-Idea

At no point did Frelimo ever challenge the colonial borders of Mozambique.[88] Indeed,

Frelimo's emergence, from the fusion of three regionally-based anti-colonial

movements,[89] happened under the banner of unity, which meant unity in the context and

within the borders established by colonialism. The insistence upon unity within the

colonial borders is of course a common theme in Africa, and indeed established African

leaders such as Julius Nyerere and Kwame Nkrumah used their influence to press for a

unified anti-colonial movement in Mozambique.[90] In the wake of its Third Congress, in

1977, Frelimo published an official historical account of its foundation and

development.[91] This document argued that the First Congress

---

[87] Saul, 1990: 20.

[88] The present frontiers of Mozambique were established by a treaty between Portugal and Britain on 28 May 1891. The only modification to these borders occurred when the Versailles Peace Treaty attributed to Portugal the small area known as the Quionga triangle, at the mouth of the Rovuma river. See Newitt, 1995: 352-355, 420.

[89] UDENAMO was founded in Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia; UNAMI appeared in Blantyre, Malawi; MANU was a conglomeration of groups of Makonde workers in Kenya and Tanganyika. Each of these movements represented a different ethnic constituency and a particular historical and cultural experience. With the exception of the slightly older Marcelino dos Santos (UDENAMO), most of the new generation that joined Frelimo had not been a member of any of the pre-existing movements. Moreover, the first leader of Frelimo, Eduardo Mondlane, came from the South. His heritage, however, was not that of the Empire of Gaza, which under Gungunhana led armed resistance to the Portuguese. Mondlane was a Chopi, and the Chopi had made an alliance with the Portuguese against their great enemy Gungunhana. The objective of building a pan-Mozambican movement was taken very seriously but this should not be taken to mean that cultural, ethnic, religious and other differences within Frelimo were unimportant.

[90] Mondlane, 1969: 119.

[91] It may be that the established account of Frelimo's creation, in which the three existing movements came together, is purely mythological. According to Teresa Cruz e Silva, who is carrying out research on this, UNAMI never signed the original document in which Frelimo was created, only joining the

---

defined the basic role played by unity in the process of national liberation: it showed that division was the major cause of the weakness of the historical resistance of our people to colonialism. The First Congress is the Congress of unity.[92]

At the time of its foundation Frelimo was united, very clearly, in its desire to overthrow

colonialism - *do Rovuma ao Maputo*.[93] Within the movement there were different

conceptions of what might come next and who might be in command but what was not

challenged were the ideas that Frelimo's struggle should be aimed at inheriting the state

and that the state should be defined, territorially, in the same way as it was under

colonialism.

Having established that the principle of territorial unity was sacrosanct Frelimo became

committed to fighting against what it considered to be fissiparous tendencies. The

country's diversity - cultural, ethnic, religious, political, linguistic - became, for the

leadership, a worrying source of potential disunity. If these diversities were allowed to

develop they might at some point threaten the territorial unity which was at the heart of

Frelimo's conception of the state. Eduardo Mondlane explained how Frelimo viewed

Mozambican diversity during the early years.

> After the union of 1962, our problem was not one of bringing together major rival groups but of preventing factions from developing within. The heterogeneous nature of the membership carried certain dangers as well as advantages. We came from all over Mozambique and from all walks of life: different language and ethnic groups were represented, different races, different religions, different social and political backgrounds. The occasions for possible conflict were unlimited, and we found that we had to make a conscious effort to preserve unity. The main form this took was education. From the very beginning we carried on political education to combat tribalism, racism and religious intolerance.[94]

movement at a later stage. If so it attests to the early importance which the Frelimo leadership attached to public relations and propaganda. Personal communication.

[92] Italics in the original. Quoted by Newitt, 1995: 522. He cites Central Committee Report to the Third Congress of Frelimo, p.4.

[93] 'From the Rovuma [the river marking the border with Tanzania] to the Maputo [a river in the far south of the country]'. This was probably the most ubiquitous and long-lasting of Frelimo's slogans. Indeed, most of the parties contending in the multi-party elections of October 1994 used this catchphrase as their own.

[94] Mondlane, 1969: 130-131.

The view that diversities were "occasions for possible conflict" can thus be seen to have been born at the earliest point of Frelimo's history. From there it was a short step, rapidly taken, to an understanding of unity as being the absence of diversity.

Frelimo's initial objective was simply to take over the state from the Portuguese.[95] Over the first few years of the armed struggle the movement developed a more detailed set of views on what it wanted to achieve once it had taken over control of the state. The early attitude towards diversity, emphasizing the dangers of disunity, persisted and became a more established part of the movement's political credo over the years. One of the factors leading to Frelimo's increasing emphasis upon unity was the appearance during the 1960s of numerous small rival anti-colonial movements, some of which were founded by dissidents from Frelimo.[96] None of these organizations ever developed into serious alternatives but they served, nevertheless, to remind the Frelimo leadership of the potential for divisiveness in the anti-colonial struggle. In October 1966 Frelimo's Central Committee issued a powerful statement against "tribalism and regionalism", showing the extent to which it was worried about disunity. It condemned

> the tribalist or regional tendencies shown by certain comrades in the execution of their work, reaffirming solemnly that such attitudes are contrary to the interests of the Mozambican people and impede the successful development of the people's liberation struggle. It emphasizes that the battle against tribalism and regionalism is as important as the battle against colonialism, such a battle being the safeguard of our national unity and our liberty.[97]

Mondlane himself was uncontested as Frelimo's first leader. His academic qualifications (he was the first and at that stage only Mozambican to have a Ph.D.) were far superior to those of anyone else and his work at the United Nations gave him an exposure to international affairs that nobody else had. Furthermore, his years abroad meant that he

[95] Marcelino dos Santos was interviewed by Joe Slovo in 1973. In response to Slovo's question "What was the minimum ideological framework in 1962?" dos Santos answered: "Just to be against the colonial oppression and for national independence. Nothing else." Santos, 1973: 35.
[96] Mondlane, 1969: 131-132; Vines, 1991: 11-15; Coelho, 1989: 61-64.
[97] Quoted in Mondlane, 1969: 164.

---

was not identified with any of the previously existing regionally-based movements. In the ranks immediately below Mondlane a careful balance had to be struck to avoid accusations that the movement was dominated by a particular group. The leadership's great preoccupation with unity may help to explain Mondlane's otherwise bizarre promotion of Leo Milas to the post of publicity secretary. Milas was a black American who claimed to be a Mozambican exile.[98] His lack of ethnic affiliation was undoubtedly a positive factor in earning one of Frelimo's top posts.

What brought people together, inside Frelimo, was the desire to get rid of Portuguese colonialism. The bedrock for the future Mozambican "nation" therefore had to be the anti-colonial struggle. The other factor which served to unite the movement was the development of an image of the future in which the existing divisions were no longer there. Anti-colonialism was therefore complemented by an idea of what post-colonialism would be and the gradual adoption of a Marxist, modernizing language fitted in well with the requirements for unity by postulating principles of equality (social, economic, racial, gender) and non-exploitation.

Given that Frelimo laid claim to the same territory that the Portuguese did, the movement had to show how it was different from the existing colonial regime. The simple fact that Frelimo represented Mozambicans rather than a foreign country was a self-evident value - to Africans and to the consensus of the "international community" at the United Nations and in other international contexts. Frelimo's commitment to the colonial borders gave the movement the blessing of other African leaders, in itself an important element for international legitimation in wider circles. But it also became clear, between the First

[98] Milas' real name was Leo Clinton Aldridge and he was born in Pittsburg, Texas, the son of American-born parents. See Christie, 1988: 35-36 and Opello, 1975: 72-73. Newitt (1995: 522) says that when Mondlane returned to the United States after Frelimo's First Congress he left Milas in charge. Opello (1975: 72), however, says that Milas was elected to the Central Committee *in absentia*, presumably upon Mondlane's recommendation, and that he was sent to Dar es Salaam from the US to quash dissent over the appointment of Marcelino dos Santos as secretary for foreign affairs. Dos Santos' appointment had been contested because he was a *mestiço*. Milas was expelled from Frelimo in 1964 when it was discovered that he had lied about his true identity. According to Vines (1991: 12) Milas entered the newly-founded Renamo in 1977.

(1962) and Second (1968) Congresses, that Frelimo needed to define its ideas more clearly in order to gain greater internal and external support.

Externally Frelimo needed to define itself in relation to the Cold War.[99] Internally it needed to define its views about "traditional power". Just like everything else, this question was analysed in the context of concerns about "tribalism and regionalism". Eduardo Mondlane described the issue in these terms:

> The power of tribal chiefs ... has its origins in the traditional life of the country, and in the past was based on a popular conception of legitimacy, not on force. For the future this therefore poses potential problems of tribalism and regionalism. In its precolonial form, such traditional government often served its purpose quite well within a limited area, providing an adequate form of organization in the interests of the majority; but even in such cases, limited in its scope and based on a small local unit, it cannot form a satisfactory foundation for the needs of a modern state. In other areas, such power already had an element of feudalism, permitting an exploitation of the peasantry which, masked by metaphysical and religious claims, was accepted. The survival of such systems is obviously a hindrance to the progress of a revolution that aims at social and political equality. The effect of colonialism, moreover, was to pervert all traditional power structures, encouraging or creating authoritarian and élitist elements.[100]

The modern state, of which Eduardo Mondlane speaks, was not thought to be compatible with "tribal authority", so Frelimo had to wage a double war: against the Portuguese and against the local systems which might or might not have some local legitimacy. Above all, Frelimo had no option but to declare war on "tribal authorities" for two separate but connected reasons: if the movement were to recognise and confer its blessing upon traditional power it would be granting recognition to what it considered to be sources of divisiveness; and secondly, it would also be granting recognition to alternative claims to power that might return to haunt it later. So Frelimo's attitude to traditional power was determined by its continuing preoccupation with unity, as well as by its claim to exclusive anti-colonial legitimacy. Mondlane's contrasting use of the terms 'traditional' and 'modern' serves to fit this into Frelimo's developing modernizing discourse.[101]

[99] This is discussed in chapters 4 and 5.
[100] Mondlane, 1969: 164.
[101] This is the subject of chapter 3.

Mondlane acknowledged that Frelimo's approach might lead to problems. In his view there were two types of traditional leaders: those who supported the Portuguese and those who did not. For Frelimo the first type were easy to deal with: they were simply to be overthrown and, during the war at least, executed.[102] In executing these chiefs the Frelimo leadership felt that it was achieving a double objective: it was contributing to the new nation-state by fighting against divisive 'traditionalism'; and it was generating support among the people, given the assumption that chiefs who supported colonialism were necessarily disliked by the people. The second type of traditional leader - those who were supportive or receptive towards Frelimo - posed a problem. Clearly their power should not be reinforced because this would go against Frelimo's general objective of avoiding "tribalism and regionalism". But the people might not understand if Frelimo simply overthrew them. Mondlane mentions this issue but fails to deal with it:

> In other instances, where the chiefs have remained neutral or even come out positively on the side of the struggle, the progress of revolutionary power has the effect that traditional power gradually fades away. Certainly, where the traditional power does not actively uphold the colonial structure or oppose the revolution, the change has to come through positive developments, the emergence of new forms of power, of new political ideas. The main weapon in this struggle is general and political education, achieved through practical experience as well as in meetings, discussions and lessons.[103]

The issue seemed to contain its own solution within it: 'traditional power' would wither in the face of revolutionary power which would be aided by "general and political education".

By the late 1960s it was therefore possible to identify three principles of Frelimo's state-idea: territory, unity, modernity. The first meant that the Frelimo state was to be coterminous with the borders of Mozambique, just like the Portuguese colonial state. The second meant that the state must seek to unite the people living within those borders into

[102] Mondlane himself (1969: 164-165) recounts an instance where a chief by the name of Nhapale, in the area of Mutarara (Tete Province), was summarily executed by Frelimo troops.
[103] Mondlane, 1969: 165.

a political unit; this was understood as suppressing all those aspects which differentiated them and emphasizing those which brought them together. The past divided people, the present (the anti-colonial struggle) and the future (independent Mozambique) united them. The third principle was that the first two elements were to be seen as components of the modern state that Frelimo wished to create, contrasting strongly with the backwardness of 'traditional' Mozambique.

The territorial principle was accepted unquestioningly by nearly everybody, inside and outside of Frelimo. For a brief period Nkavandame[104] seems to have attempted to persuade the Tanzanian authorities that it would be possible and desirable to establish an independent Cabo Delgado, using the analogy of Biafran secessionism which Nyerere supported.[105] At about the same time President Banda of Malawi was promoting an organization called UNAR which aimed at creating an independent "Rombézia", meaning the northern half of Mozambique between the Rovuma and Zambesi rivers.[106] However, these two exceptions were of marginal importance. The second aspect - unity - followed on from the first and although there were disagreements about how this should be achieved, from around 1970 there was a single dominant orthodoxy inside Frelimo which opposed the concept of unity to that of diversity. Increasingly therefore, Frelimo's attention turned to defining the third aspect - modernity - meaning the modern society that it wished to create, and the modern state that it needed for this purpose. To an important extent the preoccupation with unity made itself felt in the form of an idealized modernity.

---

[104] An important Makonde leader who was expelled from Frelimo in 1969. The Nkavandame dispute is described in chapter 4.

[105] Christie, 1988: 50.

[106] Christie, 1988: 50-52. Banda's ultimate objective, apparently, was to re-create the Maravi empire of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Hedges (1989) details Malawi-Mozambique relations from 1961 to 1987. On the Maravi see Newitt, 1995: chapter 3.

5. Frelimo and Political Legitimacy

The Frelimo leadership believed that its political legitimacy sprung from its claim to represent the people. The Frelimo leadership set out to fight for independence and assumed, probably correctly, that in this they had the overwhelming support of "the people". Frelimo's strategy determined its posture: anti-colonial, but also anti-tribal, anti-regionalist, anti-racialist and so on. And because Frelimo was carrying out its struggle in the name of the people, it imputed to the people all of the qualities that were indispensable to the movement and its struggle. Failure to be all of those things could only be attributed to a lack of education which could be corrected by political "meetings, discussions and lessons". Frelimo's political legitimacy, rooted in the people, was not thought of as temporary or subject to renewal because, the Frelimo leadership believed, there was no gap between its objectives and that of the people. Frelimo *was* the popular will. It might be that on occasion the people were not fully aware of this, but such discrepancies could be changed through education. Any gaps between the aspirations of the Frelimo leadership and those of the people were destined to disappear over time.

One of the reasons cited for this optimism was the experience of the liberated areas. This experience is frequently referred to as one of the sources of Frelimo's political practice. It is often written about but our knowledge of life in the liberated areas is limited because nearly all information was provided by Frelimo.[107] At the time, during the guerrilla struggle, Frelimo was obviously keen to provide a positive image of itself and its re-organization of life in the liberated areas - this was part of its anti-colonial campaign. Sympathetic journalists and academics would be escorted into the liberated areas, just as usually happens in such circumstances. Frelimo publications would contrast life in the

---

[107] Luis de Brito's doctoral thesis (Brito, 1991) has offered a different interpretation of the liberated zones, in which the construction of the 'nation' stands out as one of the most important elements. A great deal of further research needs to be done on the liberated zones before their role in the development of Frelimo is properly understood. Harry West, of the Department of Anthropology, University of Wisconsin, is currently carrying out PhD research on the liberated zones in Cabo Delgado.

liberated areas to life under the Portuguese. At a later stage, once they were in power, Frelimo would use its experience in the liberated areas as a justification for its policies. The liberated areas became the standard reference point - a source of political legitimation that was beyond reproach. Yañez Casal describes this well:

> For the Mozambican leadership the liberated zones were a sort of laboratory, school, source of inspiration, a compulsory and rigourous reference point for all that the Party and State proposed for Mozambican society in terms of social organization and development, but also in political terms, in resolving rural or urban problems, or problems relating to education, health, administration, etc.; it was a sort of holy and mythical place where the history of the present and the future were intertwined and recurrent.[108]

During the war it was important to build up an image of harmony and peace, people working together for a better future, enthusiastic commitment to overthrowing the colonial order. Later this image became, in the official discourse, the incontrovertible validation of Frelimo policies for the future. The liberated areas were an important part of Frelimo's mythological resource pool, a reference to a glorious past that was above all a promise for the future. The liberated zones, as described by Frelimo, became an essential tool for the legitimation of Frelimo's exercise of power.

Over the years Frelimo, and often outsiders as well, have promoted what Yussuf Adam has called the "purification model".[109] In this model Frelimo began simply as an anti-colonial organization which, through the process of the armed struggle and the experience of the liberated areas, became increasingly radical, ultimately adopting Marxism-Leninism. In each stage of its ideological and political development the movement was portrayed as becoming increasingly "pure" and clear-minded about the future. The change in discourse throughout the period of the armed struggle, and continuing up to the Third Congress in 1977, can be verified in the many published speeches and other texts produced by Frelimo. The most important point is that this

---

[108] Yañez Casal, 1991: 38.
[109] Adam, 1991: 59.

"purification" is presented as the result of contact with the people - Frelimo becoming increasingly attuned to the popular will.

The political importance of knowledge about the liberated areas, from the very earliest moments, and the limited nature of existing sources of information, means that we must have a critical approach to these sources. *Lui par lui-même* is not likely to be a recipe for great historical analysis. However, it does afford an idea of what the movement hoped it had been and, more important, what it was and what it would become. For the present purpose, which is to describe Frelimo's vision of the state, the mythology is more important than the historical experience. Here it is less important to have historical and anthropological knowledge than to have Frelimo texts which offer us a ready-made interpretation of the experience of the liberated areas, complete with lessons for the future.

Óscar Monteiro, whose views may be taken as representing officially sanctioned Frelimo positions,[110] stressed the importance of the liberated areas as a source of legitimation for the distribution of power in independent Mozambique:

> The process of transforming reality that was undertaken determined a particular form of organisation of society. It was a process of violent transformation, less for being carried out with weapons than for the huge mental leap it implied - that of leading every Mozambican to rely upon himself, to examine himself, to search and use all resources, to invent them where necessary. To mobilise reserves of intelligence and capability... What happened ... was a process of struggle involving the entire people. So the people rose in an entirely new, different and more complete way than ever before to the political life, to political will. Through meetings of the people, through elected committees there came into being a new way of seeing authority where respect and prestige of the chiefdom and of power - including the visible power of weapons - was not an entitlement to absolute power. The practice thus arose of demanding and offering accountability: I answer to society, I answer to a meeting of citizens, I offer justification, I must listen, I must explain myself, I must respect the opinions of others ... All these factors and practices, of profoundly innovative character in relation to the past, implied the need for a broad and constant social debate. The armed struggle thus became a catalyst to history and democracy was affirmed as the advanced weapon

---

[110] Óscar Monteiro was for many years a member of Frelimo's Political Bureau, Minister for Justice and later for State Administration.

of the people's resistance. Without democracy, *understood as question, discussion and understanding*, the people's participation would have been minimal.[111]

By portraying the liberated zones as the social laboratory in which Frelimo's ideas were consolidated, Frelimo sources do not seek to convey the idea that there was immediate consensus on everything in the liberated areas. The "purification model" shows that there is change over the years, and this change purports to come from the movement's contact with the people, and the decisions that it had to take in running the affairs of the liberated areas. In 1973, Marcelino dos Santos argued that

> the necessity to define a revolutionary ideology with greater precision emerged when we started to build the liberated areas, to engage ourselves in national reconstruction. As always, the task of building a society economically poses the problem of the type of production and distribution, and especially who is going to benefit from what the society produces. This life process also raises much more sharply than in the classroom the deeper questions of the type of ideology to embrace. So to summarise, there comes a stage when it becomes clear why everybody in the nation should accept the idea that the main aim of the struggle is to advance the interests of the working people.[112]

But for Marcelino dos Santos this was not so much a process of learning from the people. He argues that there were contradictory ideologies in Frelimo from the beginning and that these contradictions were allowed to coexist until practical decisions had to be made about life in the liberated areas.

> The first phase [of Frelimo] was characterised by the heterogeneity of the leadership. As I have said the latent contradictions really emerged when we started to have liberated areas and the question of the organisation of a new life arose. Which way should we follow? So it was in that phase that the contradictions appeared and those who were mainly fighting for their own individual interests or for the interests of a narrow group, came more openly to the surface. Of course, you can find many people who, in the beginning, belonged to the same social group but who, while engaging in the process of the struggle, were able to change and transform themselves. Others refused to change and were rejected by the Movement.[113]

[111] Monteiro, 1989: 12-13. Italics added.
[112] Santos, 1973: 45.
[113] Santos, 1973: 47-48.

Marcelino's description speaks only of different points of view within the leadership and how some prevailed over others. If left at that it would be problematic for Frelimo at a later stage to refer to the interaction with the people during the process of national liberation as one of the sources of its political authority and legitimacy. The intellectual sophistication of Marcelino dos Santos made him more sensitive to the question of ideological differences, and at an earlier stage, than others within Frelimo's top ranks. Samora Machel was more typical of the new leadership. A few months after becoming President of Frelimo he explained the movement's ideological development in a different manner:

> When we took up arms to defeat the old order, we felt the obscure need to create a new society, strong, healthy and prosperous, in which men free from all exploitation would cooperate for the progress of all. In the course of our struggle, in the tough fight we have had to wage against reactionary elements, we came to understand our objectives more clearly. We felt especially that the struggle to create new structures would fail without the creation of a new mentality.[114]

It was no coincidence that Machel linked Frelimo's new understanding of its objectives to the old quest for unity. A few lines later in the same speech he said that:

> To unite all Mozambicans, transcending traditions and different languages, requires that the tribe must die in our consciousness so that the nation may be born.[115]

It was thought that the only way to overcome the divisions amongst Mozambicans was to postulate a future in which existing divisions had been ruled out of existence. All those who presented an alternative vision - such as Nkavandame and Simango who had appreciable regional power bases[116] - were inevitably guilty of failing to contribute fully

[114] Samora Machel, September 1970, in a speech entitled "Educate Man to Win the War, Create a New Society and Develop our Country", delivered to the Second Conference of the Department of Education and Culture. Reprinted in Machel, 1981: 35.
[115] Machel, 1981: 35.
[116] Nkavandame's prominence among the Makonde in Cabo Delgado has been well documented. Uria Simango also came from a politically prominent family, in this case a Ndau family from the centre of the country. His intellectual prestige and his connections to the church (he was a pastor) gave him an important constituency. This has been much less documented. Michel Cahen has researched a revolt

to Frelimo's project. Moreover, alternative sources of power were rooted in the existing economic order and so it was necessary to challenge this economic order and to put forward an alternative. When Nkavandame was expelled from the party he was accused of being tribalist, regionalist and against women's emancipation. At a later stage the charge which was most often repeated in Frelimo accounts was related to his attitude to forms of production and of distribution of agricultural produce. This charge assumed much greater prominence when Frelimo came to power at a national level because historical lessons were designed to make one think about the present. As the focus of disputes shifted from the question of how to achieve unity to the question of how the economy should be organized, so the Nkavandame story shifted in tandem. In the process, the use of a Marxist language became increasingly convenient for the purpose of postulating a future devoid of divisions.

At that stage (1969) Marcelino dos Santos - who was, much more than Eduardo Mondlane, the movement's leading intellectual force, and the only Marxist member of the leadership from the beginning - had not yet succeeded in establishing the link, in official Frelimo discourse, between unity and "the end of exploitation of man by man".[117] But gradually he (and others) were able to do this because of the attractions that this offered as a great leveller, destroying all that which threatened to divide Mozambicans. The link to Marxism-Leninism was achieved because of Frelimo's primeval concern with unity. During the early 1970s the struggle for national unity led to the transformation of the concept of nationalist anti-colonialism into a concept of "class unity of the people",

led by Simango's father and grandfather in 1953 in the towns of Machanga and Mambone at the mouth of the Save river. (Cahen, 1991b.)

[117] This phrase was used by Frelimo to signify Marxism-Leninism. It was only in 1972 that the Frelimo publication *Mozambique Revolution* stated that the struggle was aimed at creating a society where there would be no more "exploitation of man by man" (Egerö, 1987: 26). By 1969 though, shortly before his death, Mondlane declared that he was moving towards socialism of the Marxist-Leninist variety. Unfortunately there is only one source for this comment: a transcription and translation by John Saul of an excerpt from a tape-recorded interview conducted by Aquino de Bragança. It is a pity that the whole interview is not available. See Saul's foreword in Mondlane, 1983: x-xi. According to Saul (1985b: 314, footnote 17), "portions of this interview have been reproduced on the phonograph record Liberdade e Revolução', Ngoma 0118, Maputo, no date".

---

defined as "ideological unity".[118] However, in 1969 this link had not yet been made, at least not overtly. The Nkavandame episode was discussed in terms of a class struggle for the first time only in a document distributed during the Third Congress in 1977.[119] Ironically, Simango was one of the first to grasp the usefulness of a Marxist language: he used it when he left Frelimo in 1969 and by 1970 he was saying that he and his followers were the real communists and therefore the "true patriots and revolutionaries" whereas Machel and others were "imperialist agents".[120] Frelimo's adoption of a Marxist language has led the movement to write its own history in the form of a series of parables, revealing how the "correct line" has gradually asserted itself and, most important of all, serving up explanations of what the future should be.

Summarizing what happened during the armed struggles, we can say that Frelimo staked its legitimacy on its claim to be the only Mozambican organization that offered a nationalist alternative within the existing borders. This was not seriously challenged by the other smaller organizations that came about. Focusing on the importance of this claim, Frelimo then set about the task creating unity which was understood as eradicating diversity. This resulted in the expulsions of several leaders, some of whom had been crucially important in the creation of the very unity that Frelimo was seeking to defend. However, by the time that they left Frelimo the leadership had successfully established unity as the source of its own legitimacy, with the result that Nkavandame, Simango and the others were incapable of taking many supporters with them.[121] Frelimo's insistence on unity then led it, gradually, to adopt a Marxist-Leninist discourse which had a logic of its own. Using this discourse, Frelimo created the myth of the liberated areas in which the movement learnt what the people truly wanted. Frelimo's two sources of political

[118] Meyns, 1981: 49.

[119] This is pointed out by Brito (1991: 111, footnote 12). Four years earlier though, Saul (1973: 25-26) had come close to using a 'class logic' to describe the conflicts. Of course, despite his proximity to Frelimo, Saul cannot be seen as an official spokesman.

[120] Christie, 1988: 73. These charges were made to the OAU Liberation Committee.

[121] The fact that Nkavandame and 35 supporters handed themselves over to the Portuguese, as did prominent Simango supporters such as Miguel Murrupa, only reinforced the nationalist credentials of the Frelimo leadership. Brito, 1991: 121 and 123.

legitimacy - unity and the people - were inescapably intertwined, and automatically excluded any alternative as being an attack upon unity and an attack upon the people.

6. Political Legitimacy and the Frelimo State

Frelimo's sources of political legitimacy naturally had an effect upon the type of policies that the movement developed and sought to implement after independence and this in turn contributed toward shaping the Frelimo state. The three main elements of Frelimo's state-idea - territory, unity and modernity - already existed to some extent under Portuguese colonial rule. The extension of the colonial state to all parts within the territorial boundaries was certainly a preoccupation; and modernity, in the last years of colonial rule, was a watchword just as much as it later became for Frelimo. What really distinguished Frelimo was its desire to cultivate, or if need be impose, unity. Frelimo, like the Portuguese, had a highly interventionist idea of the role of the state, and the nature of the state was to a degree determined by the type of policies that the movement wished to carry out. It is also true that the policies that could be carried out were to a degree determined and limited by the nature of the state.

Although there is strong evidence to suggest that Frelimo adopted a *dirigiste* approach to the questions that had to be dealt with in the liberated areas,[122] the movement's orthodoxy argued that legitimacy (and policies) came *from* the people and were essentially related to the empowerment of the people. A natural consequence of this belief was the idea of popular power - *poder popular*. During the early years of independence Frelimo stated that its objective was popular empowerment. However, once again Marcelino dos Santos, in that same conversation with Joe Slovo, had anticipated the conflicts that were to emerge, positioning himself clearly in the debate:

[122] Brito, 1991: 127-135.

Slovo: You have talked about going beyond the nationalist phase and achieving a real social revolution. How does a movement make sure that this is achieved?

Dos Santos: The main defence must be to popularise the revolutionary aims and to create such a situation that if for one reason or another at some future time some people start trying to change these aims, they will meet resistance from the masses. This must be the defence until the situation has been achieved where the truly revolutionary classes dominate all levels of power.

Slovo: It is correct to have faith in the masses in a general way, but we know that the masses were almost completely silent when Nkrumah was overthrown; we did not witness a single major demonstration. The masses were also completely silent when many other progressives in Africa were deprived of political power by cliques. It is not enough just to rely on the good sense of the masses. What has to be done is to create an apparatus, a Party capable of calling on the masses and leading them at every level.

Dos Santos: Yes, this is a problem of building the Party and, in the first place, politicizing the cadres in the aims of the organisation, the political line, the ideology of the organisation. Our methods of work must always allow for free and continued discussion which will facilitate communication at all the levels of the organisation and which will enable the lower levels of the organisation to express their will when we are engaged in defining our orientation, etc. The cadres of the organisation must participate fully and it is through those cadres that the aims are popularised and spread to the masses.[123]

Poder popular, however it was understood, could not be taken as a substitute for the leading role of the party. The party was not to follow the masses but to lead them and this was to be achieved through the education of cadres who in turn would educate the masses. Democracy, as Óscar Monteiro remarked, was to be "understood as question, discussion and understanding", and that was to be the nature of popular participation.

All of this had an impact upon the type of state envisaged and worked towards by Frelimo. The state was to be an instrument of Frelimo's vision and it was conceived of as having no other existence or effect. Frelimo's attitude towards the state was deeply shaped by the form in which the movement's discourse had developed over the years before independence. The dominant idea was that party and state were to be fused and this is amply expressed in independent Mozambique's new Constitution.

Article 2 of the Constitution explained that power in Mozambique belonged to the workers and peasants who were led by Frelimo.[124] Article 3 rendered it clear that Frelimo

[123] Santos, 1973: 49.
[124] Article numbers here refer to the revised Constitution of 1978 which is esentially an expanded version of the 1975 Constitution.

had the task of defining the country's "political line", and article 5 gave Frelimo responsibility for directing the armed forces. According to that article the President of Frelimo was simultaneously supreme commander of the armed forces, paramilitary forces, the police and security forces. Article 36 said that to act against the interests of Frelimo was to act against the interests of the State. In article 39 state power was vested in Frelimo and all state organs were said to have a "double subordination": to a higher state organ and to Frelimo. Article 53 stated that "the President of the People's Republic of Mozambique is the President of Frelimo" and article 55 explained that, when sworn in, the President should swear upon his honour as a member of Frelimo. Article 53 was particularly important in that it established that the Constitution itself was subordinate to Frelimo's internal rules.

The Constitution therefore expressed the line of thought about the state that Frelimo had been developing since its inception. Namely, that because of the quest for national unity, and because of the movement's own unique role in that quest, state and party could not be conceived of as autonomous units. As Frelimo had defined itself as the sole force capable of guaranteeing the continued territorial, political and social unity of Mozambique, and was in 1975 almost uncontested in that claim, it followed that any separation of state and party would be contradictory. Connected to this there was a further powerful logic. As a result of various developments during the armed struggle, and in particular as a result of the appeal of Marxism-Leninism as a unifying and levelling philosophy, Frelimo had by 1975 come to define itself as being "socialist" and opposed to "the exploitation of man by man". Soviet orthodoxy, and the example of other like-minded countries, established that the state and party should be inextricably linked in the Constitution. Mozambique's first constitution was the embodiment of these ideas.

7. Frelimo in Power

Frelimo's conceptualization of the state became visible during the transition period that went from the Portuguese revolution to Mozambican independence 14 months later. The military coup in Lisbon on 25 April 1974 caught Frelimo (and most other observers) by surprise. After a few days of hesitation Frelimo congratulated the new regime in Lisbon but announced that it would continue the armed struggle until an agreement for independence was reached.[125] Meanwhile a number of small parties appeared. They united under Uria Simango and offered their support to the settlers who were aiming at a Rhodesian-style Unilateral Declaration of Independence.[126] General Spínola, the new Portuguese President, had initially proposed a referendum on independence and there was some support for this at the 11th summit of the OAU in Mogadishu. Frelimo was implacably opposed to the referendum

> because it implied that the Mozambican people *might not* support Frelimo's demand for total independence, that there was some doubt about the moral validity of Frelimo's 10 years of armed struggle, that national independence was not an inalienable right after all.[127]

Agreement between Frelimo and the Portuguese government was reached in Lusaka on 7 September 1974, with the crucial Portuguese recognition that Frelimo was the "sole legitimate representative" of the Mozambican people. An uprising that same day, led by settlers and supported by the PCN, was put down by joint action between Frelimo and Portuguese soldiers.

[125] This statement is reproduced in Bragança and Wallerstein, 1982a: 34-37. Aquino de Bragança (Bragança, 1986) offers, from a participant's point of view, an account of the negotiations between Frelimo and the Portuguese government from May to September 1974. The armed struggle slowed down considerably during that period, particularly because Portuguese soldiers had no desire to risk their lives when it was abundantly clear that they would soon be leaving Mozambique.

[126] Simango's party, called the Partido da Coligação Nacional (PCN), included two other prominent Frelimo dissidents, Paulo Gumane and Mateus Gwenjere. Joana Simião, who had never been in Frelimo, also joined the PCN. Henriksen, 1983: 59, footnote 52; Brito, 1991: 171, footnote 5; Vines, 1991: 13-14; Newitt, 1995: 539-540; *The Observer*, September 15 1974.

[127] Christie, 1988: 82. Italics in the original.

The biggest challenge facing Frelimo during the transition period was to bring under its own control the numerous spontaneous strikes and demands that began to appear, particularly in the urban areas where Frelimo was weakest.[128] When the transitional government was sworn in, Machel sent a message saying that there was no further reason for strikes, although silent go-slows seem to have continued at least until October 1976.[129]

Although Frelimo was not contested, except by the small groups that had risen and been crushed in the rebellion of 7 September, the leadership felt threatened by the upsurge of social activism that followed the Portuguese coup and, even more, the Lusaka Accord. Frelimo scrambled to create *Grupos Dinamizadores* (GDs) which were designed to explain Frelimo's "general lines" and its particular "orientations" on any given topic. The other role for the GDs was to participate in the running of enterprises so that settlers could not easily sabotage Frelimo's plans by using enterprises to export wealth. In short, the GDs were a frenetic attempt to spread the influence of Frelimo into the interstices of an ebullient society. They were created to fill the political vacuum that had come about until Frelimo had the chance to put party cells into place. Although their role was theoretically just one of political mobilization for Frelimo, in practice they also assumed state-administrative functions. In the chaos of the transition period and early independence the GDs developed into state authority at a local level, using administrative and coercive means to impose Frelimo's lines.[130] Frelimo's state, ill-distinguished from the party, later reproduced this activity on a much larger scale.

Frelimo's unique mission - that of uniting the country and creating the nation-state - confirmed by the process of the armed struggle and by the overwhelming support of the

---

[128] Hodges (1979: 62) says that the strike by four thousand dock workers in Lourenço Marques (Maputo) in August 1974 resulted in up to eighty ships being held up waiting to unload.
[129] Hodges, 1979: 66.
[130] Meyns (1991: 56) argues that "if the level of political consciousness is still fairly underdeveloped persuasion often tends to be replaced by administrative coercion [by the GDs]". The GDs are discussed, *inter alia*, in Egerö, 1987: 65-72; Hanlon, 1984: 49-50; Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 116-121, Brito, 1991: 174-181. Cahen's view of the GDs (1993: 51) was referred to earlier.

---

population and officially recognised by the retreating colonial authorities, was now as unquestioned throughout the territory as it had become inside the movement after 1970. Independence represented the transfer of state power to Frelimo, and this in turn meant the full commitment of state power to Frelimo's project. The legitimacy of Frelimo's project was unquestionable except in terms that would be considered treasonable because Frelimo's project was the creation of the nation-state. Many years and many events later, in 1992, in an apparent reference to Simango, Nkavandame and others, President Chissano, said that some traitors had been executed. The human rights group Africa Watch described his statement in the following terms:

> On April 13, 1992, President Chissano admitted for the first time that opposition members had been executed by the security forces in the past, describing them as "traitors" who deserved their punishment. He also commented that the government should not be obliged to talk about the issue as it was "controversial" and would bring about disunity at a time when reconciliation was most needed in Mozambique.[131]

It is interesting to note how deep and pervasive the quest for unity was, that even in 1992 "controversy" was openly stifled in the name of unity. In 1967 Eduardo Mondlane had already spelled out, with precision, the logic that Chissano was repeating a quarter of a century later:

> In the context of the struggle for the national liberation of Mozambique, *which is our historic task in the present phase*, because Frelimo and only Frelimo *knows* [and] understands the real motivations of the People and clarifying their historical objectives; [only Frelimo knows how] *to organize, to unite, to educate the people politically and to prepare them militarily, because Frelimo and only Frelimo was capable of defining strategy and tactics adequate in order to unleash, to develop, to consolidate, to extend and to carry to success the armed struggle of national liberation; Frelimo* [therefore] *appears as the incarnation of the will and aspirations of the Mozambican masses, the depository of national sovereignty and leadership for the fatherland.*
> Thus, to obey Frelimo is to obey the Fatherland, to pursue an objective which is the historic task of our People in the present phase of national liberation.
> *It is not necessary to be a member of Frelimo for there to be a duty to obey the decisions of Frelimo.* In the present situation of Frelimo, since it embodies the

---

[131] Africa Watch, 1992: 158. Africa Watch says that it had evidence suggesting that Simango, Nkavandame and others were executed in May 1983, after having been at a reeducation camp in Niassa.

> historic will of the People and fulfills it in the struggle it is leading, *Frelimo*
> *appears as the will of the fatherland: its leadership cannot be questioned,*
> *because it is exercised for the sake of goals which are indisputable:*
> *independence, unity and the liberation of the fatherland.* Therefore, *it is enough*
> *to be a Mozambican to be obliged through patriotic duty to obey Frelimo.*[132]

The quote from Eduardo Mondlane brings out some characteristics of Frelimo thinking that appeared early in the armed struggle and that persisted at least until the mid-1980s and, in the minds of some, longer than that. The main point is the idea, an almost metaphysical one, that Frelimo is somehow different from any other political institution because it "appears as the will of the fatherland".[133] This is a statement that is not open to dispute and automatically sets Frelimo beyond any other political claim. As a result, it follows that Frelimo has no obligation to tolerate opposition. On the contrary, it has a duty to deal harshly with opposition because opposition to Frelimo is opposition to the fatherland.[134] Furthermore, it would be equally treasonable for anybody to disobey commands coming from Frelimo.

Frelimo's vision of its own role determined what the main function of the state should be. This underwent a degree of change at the Third Congress in 1977 when Frelimo became a "vanguard party", reducing the number of militants and restricting itself to a leadership role. As a result of this process the task of "mobilization" was passed on to the "mass democratic organizations". What Frelimo sought, meticulously, was to harness the energies of the population in the pursuit of its own objectives. Using the terminology developed in chapter 1, we can say that Frelimo sought to colonize both the institutions that composed the state and those that were beyond it. Because of the conflation of party and state, Frelimo blurred the distinction between those institutions which could have

[132] Eduardo Mondlane, 1967: 108-109. Italics in the original. The erratic grammar is presumably due to problems in the translation.

[133] Deutscher (reprinted in Ali, 1984) has shown how one of the keys to Stalin's success in imposing himself upon his peers was his ability to infuse Marxism with a metaphysical quality - which Deutscher refers to as "primitive magic". This was also an important element of Frelimo's discourse.

[134] This principle was later enshrined in the Constitution. Article 36 reads: "The State will punish, severely, all acts of treason ... sabotage and, in general, acts practised against the objectives of Frelimo and against the popular revolutionary order".

legal resort to force and those which, theoretically, did not. Which institutions were used in the harnessing of people's energies was unimportant for the project itself and for Frelimo. Organizations such as the trade union confederation (OTM)[135], the women's organization (OMM)[136], and the youth organization (OJM)[137] were created for the job of "mobilization". Their usefulness did not just correspond to the decisions of the Third Congress though. They also helped Frelimo gain access to sectors of the population that might otherwise be difficult to reach, given the under-developed nature of the state institutions and the lack of trained cadres. Through these organizations Frelimo could more easily transmit its "lines" and "orientations" to workers, women and young people. The instruments which Frelimo used were imbued with the responsibility of, simultaneously, organizing the population along the required lines and constantly reproducing the inescapable discourse of Frelimo's own power. Central to this mission of reproducing the discourse of power was the educational system.

The educational system was reorganized for the purpose of transmitting Frelimo's positions. "Educate man to win the war, create a new society and develop our country" had been one of the slogans of the liberation war.[138] Naturally, no education process is ideologically neutral and Frelimo could not permit the continuation of the colonial educational system. The opportunity therefore arose for Frelimo to write its own discourse into the textbooks.[139] In 1977 Frelimo published the history programme for secondary schools, and in the preamble explained the purpose of studying history:

[135] Organização dos Trabalhadores Moçambicanos. This was only set up in 1983. Before then workers were organized and controlled by 'Production Councils' (see below).

[136] Organização das Mulheres Moçambicanas. The OMM was set up in 1973 during the liberation war.

[137] Organização dos Jovens Moçambicanos, set up in 1977 following a decision at Frelimo's Third Congress.

[138] Marshall, 1985: 163. The use of "man" is not accidental. Frelimo's attitude to gender will be discussed in chapter 3.

[139] Richard Gray, a *cooperante* who was actively engaged in creating the new history argued that history must be seen as a tool for the "socialist transformation of society": "Re-appropriating national history is seen as only the first step to analysing it in new ways and acting on the conclusions to change the legacy of the past. Mozambicans define their activity in all sectors of life as creating a New Society and a New Personality". Gray, 1981: 8.

> A people acquires its personality when it knows its own history and roots itself in
> its own culture. As for the tasks of a people dominated for centuries by a foreign
> ideology, divided by secondary contradictions in order to be better exploited, it
> becomes fundamental and urgent that it assumes a national identity, that it finds
> points of unity between the whole population, from the Rovuma to the Maputo.
> The study of the history of Mozambique must achieve this primary objective of
> creating the sentiment of national unity in all Mozambicans. However, it is not
> enough to know your history. It is necessary for that study to take on a
> revolutionary character, so that, conscious of its reality, the Mozambican people
> is able to transform it, with the aim of creating a New society, free from
> exploitation. [140]

Like other policies, the new approach to education was said to have its roots in the

liberated areas. According to one observer, in education there was a process akin to the

"purification" that was referred to earlier. [141] One approach defended a simple

"Mozambicanization" of colonial education, whereas the other (victorious) one wanted

an education that would

> serve the people and the liberation work The studies are not part of individual
> careers but are intended to fill the needs of the organization [i.e. Frelimo] in all
> phases of its work. [142]

The new education system was designed to serve Frelimo. However, material difficulties

meant that Frelimo was not capable of creating the schools that it had planned and in

practice Frelimo's political education was usually limited to the chanting of slogans. [143]

8. Representation Under Frelimo

It is not possible to infer, from the plentiful evidence of Frelimo's authoritarianism, that

the movement lacked the support of the population. All the evidence is that Frelimo

initially had the overwhelming support of the population. Frelimo's objectives - national

unity, the destruction of the colonial order, the creation of a new society - were not

[140] Quoted in Gray, 1981: 8.
[141] Marshall, 1985: 163.
[142] Marshall, 1985: 164, quoting Mario Sive, director of the Frelimo secondary school in Bagamoyo, Tanzania.
[143] The account in Marshall, 1985 gives an idea both of the objectives and of the failures in attaining them.

openly contested, if at all, and it was also not contested that Frelimo's policies were

effective instruments for achieving those objectives.

Frelimo claimed ot have learnt from the experience of the liberated zones about the

importance of popular participation in running the affairs of society. [144] One of the forms

that this took after independence was that candidates for official posts at low levels of

power had to be approved by general assemblies of the people whose affairs they were

going to be controlling. The officials of the GDs had to be approved by the inhabitants of

the neighbourhood, the officials of the *Conselhos de Produção* [145] were vetted by the

workers, officials of OMM needed the approval of the women, and so on. In all cases

though, candidates for these posts were proposed by the Frelimo hierarchy. People were

free only to approve (or reject) candidates, not to nominate them.

Frelimo's Third Congress, held in February 1977, transformed the movement into a

"vanguard party of the worker-peasant alliance", meaning, among other things, that

henceforth membership was restricted to a much smaller group. The mechanism for

deciding whether or not a person could join the party was fairly similar to that used for

other institutions. Although candidates to the party could be self-nominated (provided

they had the support of two members) they then had to answer questions from party

members on various aspects of their lives. If they were judged to be sufficiently close to

the criteria outlined in the party Statutes, they were approved. [146]

The structures of legislative power devised by Frelimo in its Constitution - five levels of

Assemblies ranging from the national level (Parliament) to the locality level - were also

[144] For example, in 1973 in Frelimo's official organ, *Mozambique Revolution*, Machel argued that the movement's success was the result not of a good adaptation of military techniques but rather of its relationship with the people. Quoted in Meyns, 1981: 48.
[145] Production Councils. These were in charge of social relations inside the workplace. A description of their creation and attributions may be found in issue number 10 of *People's Power* (London: MAGIC) under the title "Workers' Control in Mozambique".
[146] Frelimo, 1977a, articles 7 and 9. Briefly, the main criteria were that the candidates should accept the party programme and statutes; have no past anti-revolutionary or anti-patriotic activity; and that they should have a sound moral behaviour.

approved in a similar fashion. Candidates for such posts were first selected by the hierarchy of Frelimo (or sometimes by the GDs at local level) and then submitted to a vote of approval by the relevant constituency.[147] Occasionally the official candidate would be rejected, after questioning by the constituency, and a new candidate would have to be put forward for approval. Frelimo also retained the option of dismissing such officials if they were judged to have "lost the confidence of the masses".[148] In other words Frelimo initially sought to combine Stalinist democratic centralism with populist grass-roots participative democracy. It sought to maintain enthusiastic popular participation without running the risk of losing control.

Although there was no question of the population freely choosing its preferred leaders, people did have the possibility of rejecting Frelimo's proposed candidates at the lower levels. At the national level this was not possible because members of the provincial assemblies (the electoral college) were called upon to either support or oppose a list of 226 candidates put forward by Frelimo's Central Committee. To vote against the whole list would be tantamount to an order of political self-exclusion, and in fact not a single vote was registered against Frelimo's list.[149] At the other levels though it was possible to reject candidates and out of the 27,040 candidates (for as many posts) 2,425 were rejected by the people and had to be substituted. At the level of local assemblies, the only level in which the population participated directly, 22, 230 deputies were elected and 2,182 were rejected. Elected deputies to the local assemblies then approved 3,390 candidates for the district assemblies, and rejected 206. For the municipal assemblies (for which the electoral college was also the deputies of the local assemblies) 460 candidates were approved and 26 were rejected. Candidates to the provincial assemblies were then submitted to the approval of the district assemblies, and 11 out of 734 were rejected.[150]

[147] Electoral Law (Law 1/77 of 31 August 1977), article 15. Candidates for the People's Assembly (national parliament) were approved not by universal suffrage but by a vote of the Provincial Assemblies (article 24).
[148] Electoral Law (Law 1/77 of 31 August 1977), article 10. In such cases Frelimo selected somebody to substitute the dismissed member of parliament (article 30).
[149] Monteiro, 1989: 19.
[150] Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 128-132. I am presuming here that the official figures are reliable.

Typically the candidates were presented to the electoral college (or the population as a whole in the case of the local assemblies) and the people would then be asked if they had anything to say against the candidate in question. If the candidates were contested there would be a discussion about them and finally a vote. The main reasons for rejecting candidates were that they had collaborated with the colonial regime (777) that they were "chiefs" or other wielders of "traditional power" (703) or that they were guilty of "unacceptable behaviour", meaning drunkenness, "loose morals", or thieving (945).[151] Despite the fact that the candidates were chosen by Frelimo itself, or by the GDs, most of the rejections occurred because the candidates did not conform to Frelimo's list of desired qualities, as expressed in the Electoral Law.[152] This shows that Frelimo's local structures were still extremely weak, and thus the electoral process was also designed to serve as a means of purifying the ranks.

Contrary to what some writers have argued,[153] there is nothing in this process to suggest that Frelimo was devolving power to the population at large, and creating the mechanisms whereby people at grassroots level would be able to feed their preoccupations up through the ranks and influence political decisions. Rather than popular empowerment the three main functions of the assemblies were:
- to extend the party/state to the deepest reaches of society;
- to create mechanisms for transmitting, explaining and implementing political decisions from the highest levels to the lowest;
- to recruit labour ("mobilization") for communal or state construction and agricultural projects.

Although the Constitution (article 38) endowed the assemblies at each level with the responsibility of monitoring the respective executive organ, in practice this never took

[151] Table 7.3 in Egerö, 1987: 125.
[152] Article 14.
[153] For example, Isaacman and Isaacman, who say that the process "attests to FRELIMO's commitment to create popular democratic structures" (1983: 130).

place. Nevertheless, the elections of 1977 were held with great enthusiasm and with a high level of participation, mainly because they appeared to be what they were not. Under colonialism the vast majority of the Mozambican people had been disenfranchised, so the possibility of participating in elections was greatly welcomed. Frelimo was almost uncontested in 1977, legitimated by the value of unity to which it had given so much emphasis, so its special role in choosing the candidates was generally accepted by the population. And the real possibility, open to all, of arguing against a candidate for a local assembly was understandably appealing. However, the form in which power was exercised over the next two and a half years (the duration of the mandate for locality, district and municipal assemblies) led to a decrease in the level of popular enthusiasm and participation in elections. Whereas in 1977 over three million people are estimated to have voted, by 1980 the figure was down to 2.25 million.[154]

The concept of representation applied by Frelimo began from the premise that Frelimo *was* the will of the people. The political system put in place was therefore concerned above all with creating mechanisms for setting the people to work under Frelimo's leadership. It was not concerned with working out who should represent the interests of Mozambican citizens, nor with how their interests would be represented, because these questions had already been solved once and for all by Frelimo: the people were represented by Frelimo and Frelimo, according to its internal mechanisms, would decide how the people's interests should be defended and promoted. The political structures were not designed to concern themselves with the identification of the people's interests; they were designed to make sure that the people remained committed and participative, in short, they were designed for the purpose of mobilization.

Óscar Monteiro, for example, argues that although the first People's Assembly (which sat until the elections in 1977) was appointed by Frelimo rather than elected,

---

[154] Egerö, 1987: 124-125. A new People's Assembly was elected in 1986 but just as in the past this was through indirect elections in which the electoral college was the Provincial Assemblies.

---

its democratic legitimacy lay in the Frelimo Central Committee that had been elected at a Congress during the liberation war and therefore represented the people's will.[155]

From this it follows that in the 1977 elections the most important aspect of ensuring democratic legitimacy, according to Frelimo, was the process of selection of candidates by Frelimo. Their approval or rejection by the public was in effect a form of guarding against possible human errors made by Frelimo committee members involved in selecting candidates. The selection procedure sometimes failed, for example, to root out people who had been labour recruiters under colonialism, or who had been traditional chiefs. By exposing the candidates to a public discussion of their lives and qualities these issues would probably come out into the open. In its report to the Fourth Congress the Frelimo Central Committee makes clear that the people were important in that they could vet the candidates according to Frelimo's own criteria: "The elections made our line visible and specific. The people identified with good examples of it and rejected bad representatives".[156] Frelimo's lack of local expertise in some areas during the first years of independence made this a valuable contribution.

According to Geffray this electoral operation was sometimes sabotaged by the voters who would choose the most incompetent candidates because they were not permitted to choose the people who they really wanted to represent them.[157] It is not possible to know how widespread this practice was but his testimony does serve the purpose of alerting us to the fact that already by 1977 Frelimo's plans were being eroded by people whose interests were not being taken into account.

---

[155] Monteiro, 1989: 19.
[156] Cited in Monteiro, 1989: 28.
[157] Geffray, 1990: 30-31.

9. Conclusion

The trinity of principles that lay at the base of Frelimo's state-idea - territory, unity and modernity - were fundamental in shaping Frelimo's approach to the state. Territory, the area within the colonial Mozambican borders, was sacrosanct. Frelimo's creation, which was greatly promoted by Nyerere, Nkrumah and others, sought to combat the Portuguese colonial regime at the level of the whole country. In order to do this it was necessary to bring under a single umbrella various already existing groups and to forge a new entity out of them, one which would seek to override the divisive factors that had hitherto prevented Mozambicans from being united. Colonial conquest, it was argued, had happened because the Portuguese had managed to take advantage of the tensions between Mozambicans. Reasons for these tensions were never provided, and nor were people encouraged to reflect upon what common bonds might have united Africans against the colonial intruders in the times before borders were drawn up. For Frelimo, the borders were the root principle, the source from which all else flowed. If "Mozambican" history before settled borders were agreed upon had been dominated by divisive and internecine conflict, the Frelimo leadership had to make sure that henceforth unity should be the great objective - on pain of slipping back into the squabbling of pre-border times, and no doubt losing those sacred limits.

Thus unity, the second principle, flowed from territory. Its importance was overwhelming in all Frelimo decisions, in particular as the movement was dominated from the earliest days by a young group of "modern" Mozambicans, whose personal identity, and therefore political allegiance, was wrapped up with Mozambique, the colonial construction, though not of course the regime.[158] In this sense they were Mozambicans first and foremost, unlike the great majority of their "compatriots". Many of Frelimo's young leaders - blacks, whites or *mestiços* - shared an educational and cultural background that made reference to international - "universal" - values, rather than to local ones. Cultural values

[158] This notion of "modernity" is the subject of chapter 3.

---

which were considered divisive rather than unifying were banished or they were transformed, sometimes unsuccessfully.[159] Unity required the creation and inculcation of a set of values - the values of the Frelimo leadership - that can be subsumed under the heading 'modernity', the third of our founding principles.

The use of Marxism as the language with which to effectuate the state-idea did not happen by chance: it provided a method of thinking - a discourse - that justified and made sense of the leadership's quest for control over the state, a quest that had different roots from that implied by the discourse. The Marxist language incorporated within it the values of unity and modernity, and added that everything was being done not in the interests of the petty bourgeois leadership but of the peasantry which would inherit the state. By reference to these values the leadership sought to locate the struggle for unity and modernity on a plane that was international and even global. Naturally, as Cahen frequently points out, the Frelimo leadership avoided the full richness of the Marxist tradition, selectively applying Marxist thought where it fitted the discourse.[160]

The Frelimo state built upon these principles and used a Marxist language as its main instrument of work. This resulted in the fusion of party and state and the wholesale inheritance by the Frelimo leadership of the colonial state. Diversity remained, potentially, a problem and so the instruments of the Frelimo-state were used to attempt the leveling and homogenization of the whole country, a task that was justified and rendered easier by Frelimo's application of a Marxist language. The questions of political legitimacy and representation were resolved by decree. Frelimo, it was baldly stated,

[159] After independence, in the attempt to create a national symbol of pre-colonial resistance, Samora Machel requested and obtained from Portugal the ashes of Gungunhana, the Nguni leader who mounted a spirited resistance to the Portuguese at the end of the nineteenth century. Machel even sought to locate his own ancestry at the court of Gungunhana. This gambit was not successful though because it was widely remembered that for many people Gungunhana was the raider and slaver who had terrorized their ancestors, and was not therefore entirely adequate as a proto-nationalist. As Benedict Anderson (1991: 160) points out this has parallels in many other countries.

[160] For convenience of writing this is referred to as 'Marxist language' but Cahen's point is valid. Laïdi (1988: 6) refers to "the very often fragmented manner in which the Soviet Union is used as a reference point" by Third World Marxist regimes. The Soviet Union itself, one might add, applied Marxist thought in a fragmented manner.

represented the will of the people, and no further discussion on this matter was permitted. Representation was therefore also seen as unimportant. The only point that remained to clear up was how best one could ensure that Frelimo representatives were the best representatives that Frelimo had. For that purpose candidates at lower echelons were submitted to the scrutiny of those who knew them best, revealing to all their possible moral and political failings. As it was pointed out though, this process did not always operate as intended.

Politics in Mozambique, according to John Saul, was driven forward by the leadership-mass action dialectic. Saul and Frelimo's Marxist discourse assumed that the state itself was not a source of differentiation and social class formation. The state-party fusion was thought to have provided the state apparatus with the 'correct' political line. It was assumed that the politics of the state had been resolved by decree, and that the institutions of the state were politically neutral, waiting for Frelimo to infuse them with purpose. Over the two decades since independence it has become abundantly clear that, as Saul now phrases it, the state is replete with individuals who "jockey for advantage", though Saul believes this to be a recent phenomenon.

This chapter has shown how Frelimo's social and political origins, the context in which it appeared and in which it developed during the 1960s, and its consequent emphases upon territory, unity and modernity, mediated by the astute employment of a Marxist language, led to the state which has resulted. The task attributed to the state apparatus - to destroy all vestiges of alternative sources of authority - cannot be understood except through an understanding of Frelimo's own language. In turn, Frelimo's language must be understood as part of a state-oriented project that has been in place for twenty years and that should not be seen as a complete break from what preceded it.

Chapter 3

The Ideology of Modernization

1. Introduction

The argument developed in the previous chapter showed how the leadership's concern to establish Frelimo's authority within the territorial boundaries led to a great emphasis upon unity. This in turn produced its own dynamic. By contrast with its vision of the past ("tribalism", regionalism, "obscurantism", in short, division and weakness) the Frelimo leadership developed a vision of the future in which unity would be created by means of modernization. Mozambique, as a political entity, had been created by colonialism but Frelimo had no dispute with that. Indeed it predicated all of its objectives upon the maintenance of this political entity. Frelimo's starting point was that colonial rule over that vast area had been maintained by ensuring that there were divisions between "Mozambicans". Frelimo's creation, out of the fusion of three pre-existing movements, was based upon the idea that unity had to be ensured in order to successfully combat colonialism. The objective therefore was to return that part of the world to African rule, avoiding the weaknesses and divisions of the past. The only way to overcome these divisions was to create a new set of allegiances for each person - to create Mozambicans - and the method by which this was to be achived was modernization. Modernization was therefore the third element in the principles that guided Frelimo decisions as the movement developed and eventually took power.[1]

Accounts of the development of Frelimo in the process of the liberation war usually concur, in their main outlines, with the picture presented by Frelimo itself. In this picture

[1] Frelimo publications and official speeches rarely used the term 'modernity' (though 'modernization' appeared occasionally). By the 1970s 'modernism' was no longer fashionable terminology on the left. Nevertheless Frelimo's ideology was thoroughly modernizing, in the sense in which that term is defined in this chapter.

a split began to emerge in the middle of the 1960s between old-fashioned nationalists, who wished only to replace the Portuguese and rule much as the Portuguese had done, and a new generation who, in the course of the liberation struggle, had become radicalized and wanted a complete social transformation to end all "exploitation of man by man". Gradually this younger group came to identify itself as Marxist and to adopt a Marxist vocabulary, but this only happened in the early to mid-1970s, some time after the disputes within the movement had reached a head. Eduardo Mondlane himself was killed in February 1969, before conclusively taking sides in the growing diputes inside Frelimo. His heritage has naturally been the object of dispute.[2] By 1975 Frelimo was committed to a revolutionary, Marxist transformation of society.

The argument advanced here, following on from the previous chapter, is that the Marxist language that was adopted by the victorious wing of Frelimo should be understood as a discourse of the ideology of modernization, an ideology that followed naturally upon Frelimo's other preoccupations. The victorious group in Frelimo was the modernizing group. It included some *mestiços* (for example Marcelino dos Santos, Sérgio Vieira, Jorge Rebelo) and a small group of whites (Fernando Ganhão, Jacinto Veloso), but most importantly it was dominated by a group of young people whose level of education had "modernized" them, leading them to identify themselves as Mozambicans and Africans rather than Makondes or Ndaus.[3] For this group the gradual adoption of a Marxist idiom

---

[2] Official Frelimo accounts, and those of the "solidarity writers" (e.g. Saul, 1985: 61) argue that Mondlane would have declared himself and Frelimo to be "Marxist-Leninist" if he had survived. Opponents of Frelimo such as the presidential candidate Máximo Dias or the pro-Renamo writer David Hoile (Hoile, 1989: 17-18) say that Mondlane would not have taken Frelimo in the same direction as Machel and Marcelino dos Santos did. Mondlane and his heritage is discussed further in chapter 4.

[3] Individuals can (and usually do) identify themselves in a variety of ways, so there need not be a contradiction between identifying oneself as "Mozambican" and "Makonde" for example. However, the nature of Frelimo's preoccupation with unity rendered this possibility illicit from an early stage. See, for example, Mondlane, 1969, and the speech by Machel in Munslow, 1985: 77-78. In 1981 Machel recalled that "Political-military training was the forge of national unity, of a common way of thinking, of a patriotic and class consciousness. We entered Nachingwea as Makondes, Macuas, Nianjas, Nyungues, Manicas, Shanganas, Ajauas, Rongas, Senas; we came out Mozambicans" (Munslow, 1985: 196).

---

permitted them to think in terms of the creation of a modern Mozambique, one that would overcome the great handicap of divisiveness from the past.

Modernization, like Marxism, has many different meanings and attributes. This chapter will offer a brief discussion of the concept of modernization and it will then describe the particular type of modernization that was favoured by the Frelimo leadership. The colonial regime, during its later years, was also committed to a programme of modernization so there was a degree of overlap. Frelimo's modernization was in many ways different from that of the Portuguese and to a certain extent this is the result of the use of a Marxist idiom. Although Marxism was adopted as a consequence of Frelimo's other preoccupations (rather than because the workers and the peasantry were rebelling against capitalism), this does not mean that the language was unimportant. The employment of a Marxist language lent its own dynamic to Frelimo's modernization ideology, distinguishing it from other modernizing ideologies. Moreover, as Cahen argues, a particular variety of Marxist language was employed, and this is more easily understood when analyzed in conjunction with modernization. In short, Frelimo's modernization was mediated through Marxism, and its Marxism was adapted to the demands of modernization.

2. Modernization as an Ideology

Modernity, as a consistent project, originated with the eighteenth century Enlightenment thinkers:

> The idea was to use the accumulation of knowledge generated by many individuals working freely and creatively for the pursuit of human emancipation and the enrichment of daily life. The scientific domination of nature promised freedom from scarcity, want, and the arbitrariness of natural calamity. The development of rational forms of social organization and rational modes of thought promised liberation from the irrationalities of myth, religion, superstition, release from the arbitrary use of power as well as from the dark side of our own

human natures. Only through such a project could the universal, eternal, and the immutable qualities of all humanity be revealed.[4]

This was the project to which Frelimo's young leadership subscribed for it most clearly represented their universe of values. The transition from village to Lourenço Marques and, for some, thence to Lisbon, Paris or Algiers, entailed the adoption of the modern outlook described above.[5] For young, educated, anti-colonial (or even pro-colonial) Africans there was no intellectual alternative at the time, except for the unpalatable "traditionalism" later associated with Nkavandame and Simango, members of an older generation. For the *mestiços* and whites not even this was an option. Modernity, therefore, was both an aspiration for society, and a form of social differentiation. Its juxtaposition to the dark forces of "obscurantism" or "tradition" permitted the modernizers to establish their mandate and their leading role simultaneously.

Modernizing theories have as their goal an ideal-type of the modern society.[6] This sort of society is defined by its level and type of education, its demographic variables, its economic patterns (such as levels of investment, production, consumption, trade). Above all, the people in such a modern society obey a certain kind of rationality and are motivated to respond to certain types of triggers. The ideal-type of the modern society is held to be opposite to the ideal-type of the traditional society and it was assumed that a society could be classified as modern or traditional or on the road from traditional to modern according to certain empirical criteria.[7] Both capitalism and socialism could serve as organizing principles for this ideal-type modern society.[8]

[4] Harvey, 1990:12.
[5] Anderson (1991: 116) makes a general point about the importance of bilingual literacy for the growth of national consciousness among colonial elites.
[6] For example, Toye, 1993: 31-34.
[7] This reflects a current in sociology that was particularly powerful in the 1960s. Barrington Moore's influential work describes peasants as sly and stubborn obstacles to the technological improvements of modernity, and generally represents the peasantry as incarnating the opposite of modernity. (Moore, 1966: 20-29, 72-73, 203.)
[8] Gavin Williams (1978: 925-926) points out that capitalism was initially thought (by both liberals and Marxists) to be vital for the "rationalization of the 'social relations of production'", an ultimate goal for the liberals, an intermediate one for Marxists. At a later stage socialism itself came to be seen as "a strategy of development, a means of rationalizing production and distribution. It is no longer the

The modern society, naturally, is one inhabited by modern people, men and women liberated from the shackles of a pre-rational world of time-locked underdevelopment and hoary superstitions. Notions of personal time and space in the modern world were quite different from the pre-modern notions that twentieth-century European colonialism so despised. Just like modern Europeans, modern Africans located themselves in the context of colonially-defined boundaries, and beyond that in a world in which modern forces - colonialism and anti-colonialism, capitalism and socialism - clashed with each other and each with the pre-modern forces that inhibited its broader struggles. The village, clan or region lost their places as providers of identity in favour of the country and the continent.[9] At the same time as the spatial horizons broadened, modernity implied a sense of time directed to the future and eschewing the past.[10] The Frelimo leadership was, for the most part, made up of people who were modern in this sense, people whose terms of reference coincided with the description of the modern project that was outlined above.[11]

The creation of "modern man", the inhabitant of modern societies, was an objective of state policy in much of the world from at least the 1950s and, indeed, in the Soviet Union well before that.[12] The Frelimo leadership was no exception in this regard: it was very much enamoured of a certain vision of "modern man" which corresponded fairly closely to its own way of thinking. Implicitly, modern Mozambicans were to be moulded in the image of their leaders.

realization of the possiblity of human freedom through the creative and productive activities of women and men".
[9] The proviso in footnote 2 about the possibility of overlapping providers of identity bears repeating.
[10] Harvey, 1990: 11.
[11] This is of course a very broad stroke of the brush. Work by Derluguian (1989) and above all Malyn Newitt (1995) offer intricate accounts of how colonialism, capitalist and pre-capitalist, impacted upon social organization in various regions of the area that is now Mozambique.
[12] And not only: the countries of southern Europe were dominated by the idea of "modernization" well into the 1970s and even 1980s and the term appears frequently in contemporary British political debate.

In 1974 Inkeles and Smith published *Becoming Modern* which sought to define modernity on the basis of around 6,000 interviews in six countries over ten years. They found that "modern man"[13] had a distinct set of attitudes which have been summarized into the following ten points:[14]

(1) A readiness for new experience and an openness to innovation;
(2) An interest in things other than those of immediate relevance;
(3) A more 'democratic' attitude towards the opinions of others;
(4) An orientation to the future rather than the past;
(5) A readiness to plan one's own life;
(6) A belief that we can dominate our environment and achieve our goals;
(7) An acceptance that the world is 'calculable' and therefore controllable;
(8) An awareness of the dignity of others, for example, women and children;
(9) A faith in the achievement of science and technology, albeit a somewhat simple faith;
(10) A belief in 'distributive' justice.

The image of "modern man" that seeps out of Frelimo speeches and publications corresponds closely to the list of features identified by Inkeles and Smith. Most importantly, these attitudes were exactly the opposite of those held, or assumed to be held, by the peasantry, as seen by Frelimo leaders. The modern man was therefore, in his mind-set, the anti-peasant. And accordingly Frelimo policy was directed at creating and promoting modern man and eradicating the peasant, defined not by the nature of his labour but by his assumed patterns of thought.

In all of this the Frelimo leadership was following the Soviet example, intentionally or not. In the Soviet Union there had been an enforced and rapid modernization. There was assumed to be no contradiction with the avowed intent of constructing socialism because socialism was conceived *as* industrialisation. As Zygmunt Bauman explains:

> What, in fact, took place in the Soviet Union was a modernizing revolution, complete with industrialisation and urbanisation, nation-building, construction of a modern state, towering over vast domains of public life, ruled by a narrow

[13] The concept of 'modern woman' is not referred to.
[14] Harrison, 1988: 20-21, summarized the work of Inkeles and Smith, and the ten points listed are a transcription from his work.

minority, with the masses engaged in their habitual everyday routine and rarely transcending the confines of commonsense.[15]

For those within the leadership who were committed Marxists - people such as Marcelino dos Santos, Sérgio Vieira, Óscar Monteiro and Jorge Rebelo - the Soviet Union was considered to be the guiding light of socialism. For them, the objective was to create in Mozambique an African version of the accelerated modernization of society that had taken place in the Soviet Union. Others were more sceptical of the Soviet Union - Samora Machel sometimes mockingly referred to it as the Vatican of socialism - but the idea of modernization in a socialist guise was nevertheless highly appealing.

Again Zygmunt Bauman has words that bear a familiar ring:

> ... the utopia taken over from the 'mature' Soviet system by the fascinated witnesses who felt like following the pattern was far removed from the socialist utopia ... It is no longer a utopia situated on the other side of the industrialisation process .... On the contrary, it is now a utopia of industrialisation as such: a capitalist utopia with no room for capitalists, a bourgeois utopia in which private tycoons of entrepreneurship have been replaced by the grey, smart conformity of the bureaucratic octopus, and risky initiative by secure discipline. On the other hand, the morality expounded and expatiated upon by the new utopia is bourgeois through and through. It extols as if following to the letter the Protestant recipe, the virtues of hard work, austerity, thrift; it calls for an enthusiastic self-abandonment in work which bears no resemblance to the liberated self-propelled creativity painted in bright humanistic colours by people as different as Marx and Weitling; it fulminates against idleness and disinterested enjoyment, equating them with an anti-social parasitism; it frowns upon shy mutterings about the individual's right to disobedience, for non-compliance with the rules of the game is a social sin and puts the sinner outside the community. It is, in short, a 'populist' version of the old bourgeois utopia, telescoping the tasks which the bourgeoisie performed in a comparatively leisurely 'easy' way.[16]

3. Frelimo's Modern Man: The *Homem Novo*

Frelimo created a name for the modern man that it wished to see inherit and develop modern Mozambique: *homem novo*, literally "new man" in Portuguese, a choice of

[15] Bauman, 1976: 90.
[16] Bauman, 1976: 91.

language that was in itself significant. Although Frelimo's project was one of transformation of society, Frelimo relied upon the transformation of individual men to achieve this goal.[17] The leadership believed that in the course of the guerrilla war, a new type of person had sprung up. According to this view the Frelimo guerrilla was, archetypically, self-sacrificing in favour of the common good which was defined by the political cadres. He believed that his struggle would lead to a better future for all Mozambicans and indeed for all of humanity. These characteristics made him an *homem novo*, thoroughly distinct from the peasant mentality from which he originated.

It is obvious enough that this point of view owes more to the romantic novel than to Marx, to the works of Victor Hugo for example. Marx takes Victor Hugo to task in the preface to the second edition of *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* for attributing undue importance to the role of the individual:

> The event [i.e. the coup d'état] itself appears in his work like a bolt from the blue. He sees in it only the violent act of a single individual. He does not notice that he makes this individual great instead of little [Hugo's work was entitled *Napoleon the Little*] by ascribing to him a personal power of initiative such as would be without parallel in world history.... I, on the contrary, demonstrate how the *class struggle* in France created circumstances and relationships that made it possible for a grotesque mediocrity to play a hero's part.[18]

Elsewhere Marx had specifically fulminated against what Frelimo proposed to do:

> Men do not build themselves a new world out of the fruit of the earth, as *vulgar* superstition believes, but out of the historical accomplishments of their declining civilization. They must, in the course of their development, begin by themselves *producing* the *material* conditions of a new society, and no effort of mind or will can free them from this destiny.[19]

---

[17] The use of the word 'men' rather than 'people' or some other gender-neutral term is intended to reflect both the terminology used by Frelimo and the actual way of thinking of Frelimo members and leaders. Frelimo attitudes to gender issues are examined more closely later in this chapter.

[18] Marx and Engels, 1969: 394-395.

[19] From "Die moralisierende Kritik und die kritisierende Moral", in T.B. Bottomore and Maximilien Rubel, eds, 1963: 244.

Frelimo's beliefs in the heroic role of the *homem novo* can find no justification in the works of Marx. Indeed, classical Marxism offered Frelimo few hopes for a socialist revolution in Mozambique, at least for a few generations.[20] However, Frelimo's ideological development did not proceed from the reading of Marx and Engels but from the intrinsic objectives and needs of the young leadership. At the same time, in other parts of the world, revolutions were taking place that called themselves Marxist. In Cuba, Vietnam, and most importantly in two of Portugal's other African colonies, Guinea-Bissau and Angola, revolutionary upheavals were underway, seemingly negating Marx's prognostications. These new claims to Marxism, and particularly the theoretical innovations of Amílcar Cabral, allowed Frelimo eventually to classify its push for unity and modernity as Marxism. However, Frelimo's version of Marxism was actually an attempt to provide an intellectual framework for its drive for modernization.

Symptomatically, the idea of the *homem novo* appeared first in the revolutionary poetry that much of Frelimo's top leadership used to write during the liberation struggle.[21] A poem written in 1972 and signed 'Frelimo', presumably a collective work because poems were generally signed individually, was called *Forja do Homem Novo*, Foundry of the New Man.[22] In it the anti-colonial war was considered to be "our university, the foundry of the new man, the free woman, the fraternal militant, creators of our Fatherland". Earlier the theme of conflict between old and new had appeared, forcefully, in the work of several Frelimo poets. Sérgio Vieira, for example, wrote *Porque São Como Flores Camaradas* in 1970, part of which may loosely be translated as follows:

---

[20] The "bibliographic excursion" in Williams, 1978 details sources for classical Marxist views on this matter, particularly pp.933-935.

[21] Marcelino dos Santos (who sometimes used the pseudonym Kalungano), Sérgio Vieira, Jorge Rebelo, Josina and Samora Machel, Armando Guebuza, Fernando Ganhão, Rafael Maguni all published their poetry, much of it, though not all, dedicated to the twin themes of anti-colonialism and future construction of the ideal. See the collections in Ferreira (1989), Frelimo (1974 and 1977f) and Carlos (1976). According to Herbert Shore (1983: xv) Eduardo Mondlane was also a poet, but I am not aware of any surviving examples of his poetry.

[22] My translations of the revolutionary poetry seek only to capture the sense of the poems. Apologies for the sacrifice of their literary value.

Because, comrade, the children who discover the world in the Revolution are like
flowers. Over the pestilent topsoil of old society, the new plant of tomorrow is
affirming itself ... from war is born the man who will overcome war, in the
cooperative the industry of the future is generated, in Frelimo the generations of
constructed socialism are born.[23]

The revolutionary poetry, which in its rhythm and format aspired to the ideals of

modernism[24], also brought forward other typical themes of the modernist project.

Armando Guebuza, in 1966, wrote a poem called *Obscurantismo* which is about how

religion leads only to slavery.[25] Sérgio Vieira's *Quatro Partes* tells of a radiant future in

which

in the agricultural units there will be laughter and schools, and children will draw
combine harvesters decorated with orchids, tomorrow will be the time of the
eternal conflict between new and old, propelling humanity forward.[26]

These images of modernity are frequently complemented by the themes that were

described in chapter 2, territory and unity. *Do Rovuma ao Maputo* or similar phrases

appear frequently.[27] The idea that the liberation struggle was also a battle against

"tribalism" was a theme of numerous poems.[28]

[23] Frelimo, 1977f: 89-90. Vieira was later Governor of the Bank of Mozambique, Minister of
Agriculture, Minister of the Interior and Minister for Security.

[24] Harvey emphasises what he calls the "machine myth" of "heroic modernism", which "appealed to the
image of rationality incorporated in the machine, the factory, the power of contemporary technology,
or the city as a 'living machine.' Ezra Pound had already advanced the thesis that language should
conform to machine efficiency and ... modernist writers ... modelled their writing on exactly that
proposition". (Harvey, 1990: 31,32.) The aesthetics of modernism in Frelimo's revolutionary poetry
were much less important than the political message being conveyed. Nevertheless, the best
examples of Frelimo poetry, such as some of the poems by Marcelino dos Santos and Sérgio Vieira,
are recognizably modernist in form.

[25] Frelimo, 1977f: 25-26. Guebuza's poetry is characterized by a particularly high level of violence and
aggressiveness. See for example *Que Fazer Mãe?* (Frelimo, 1977f: 24), *Os Tambores Cantam*
(Frelimo, 1977f: 27) and *As Tuas Dores* (Carlos: 1976: 65). Guebuza was later Political Commissar
of the Army, Minister of the Interior, Minister of Transport and chief Frelimo negotiator with
Renamo.

[26] Frelimo, 1977f: 73-86.

[27] For example *Guerrilheiro Guia do Povo* by Ngwembe (Frelimo, 1974: 22), *É Nosso Dever* by
Atumbwidao (Frelimo, 1974: 24), *Alvorada* by Sérgio Vieira (Frelimo, 1977f: 64-65).

[28] Examples are *Graças à Revolução* by Rafael Maguni (Frelimo, 1977f: 69) and *Hino a Moçambique*
by Maria Emilia Roby (Carlos, 1976: 99).

A further theme in the poetry is that of women's liberation, though the social content is

dwarfed by the iconic death of Josina Machel, Samora's first wife, in Dar es Salaam in

1971, when she was 25.[29] In one collection, for example, there are nine poems about the

death of Josina Machel and a couple of them touch upon the issue of women's liberation

in a vague manner.[30] That same collection contains just one poem that deals explicitly

with women's liberation, or rather the participation of women in the war of liberation,

without mentioning Josina Machel.[31] After her death Josina Machel was transformed into

a symbol of Mozambican womanhood, fighting alongside the men for the new society.

The OMM's anthem, sung at the end of every meeting, is still today a song about Josina

Machel, and all over the country there are numerous schools and neighbourhoods

(*bairros*) that bear her name. However, her short life is not documented and no specific

claims are made about her.

Frelimo's *homem novo* is "modern man" with an extra component: militant and

unconditional support for Frelimo. Although Frelimo's objective was the transformation

of society, this was to be mediated through the transformation of man, which in turn was

expected to happen fairly automatically.[32] Modern men became so by a process of

rationalization. leading them to drop their old terms of reference - "traditionalism" - in

favour of the way of the future.

[29] Josina Machel died of leukaemia. Although Josina is officially referred to as Samora's first wife, this
is true only in the formal, legalistic sense, indeed in the 'modern' sense. Between 1956 and 1963
(when he fled Mozambique to join Frelimo) Machel "settled down in an informal marriage with
Sorita Tchaiakomo, a girl from the locally prominent Nyaka clan". Machel had four children from
this relationship. (Christie, 1988: 10). The reference by Christie to the "informal" nature of this
marriage presumably means that it was not bound by signatures on paper and recognized by the state
or church. I know of no other reference to this matter.

[30] The last nine poems in Frelimo, 1977f. The first three of them were written by men: Samora Machel,
Jorge Rebelo and Sérgio Vieira.

[31] *A Mulher Moçambicana*, written by a man, Rafael Maguni, later Governor of Manica Province.

[32] Amilcar Cabral of PAIGC, certainly the finest thinker to come from Lusophone Africa, warned
against this mistake: "Always remember that the people do not struggle for ideas, for things in
the heads of individuals. The people struggle and accept the sacrifices demanded by the
struggle, but in order to gain material advantages, to be able to live a better life in peace, to see
their lives progress and to ensure their children's future. National liberation, the struggle against
colonialism, working for peace and progress - independence - all these are empty words without
meaning for the people, unless they are translated into a real improvement in standards of
living". Cabral. 1980: 241.

The Frelimo leaders, seeking to reproduce their own thought patterns - 'modernity' - on a national scale, were aware that they had a difficult struggle to wage against "peasant mentality". While claiming to take its inspiration from the peasantry, the Frelimo leadership sought to convince rural people of its own values. These values derived from three principles - territory, unity and modernity - and for reasons intrinsic to these principles the Frelimo leadership had to treat the people it came across as an undifferentiated, exploited, Mozambican peasantry, and it had to convince these people of that identity in order to mobilize them for the Frelimo project. By fighting alongside Frelimo against Portuguese colonialism, it was assumed that the peasantry had accepted the modern values that had sparked Frelimo's struggle. This is what Luis de Brito calls "the misunderstanding".[33]

The Frelimo leadership that developed this idea was not completely blind to this problem. They did not believe in an overnight transformation of the population, and undoubtedly some realized that there were a variety of motivations that might lead people to fight against colonialism.[34] However the historical development of Frelimo thinking did not allow for heterogeneity: there was but one correct line and it was defined by the Frelimo leadership. This meant that diversity could only be tolerated temporarily, while awaiting the transformation of people into a new, modernized condition. The means for achieving this transformation were simple: a small nucleus of *homens novos* would take the lead and through their example, inspiration and instruction ever larger groups of people would in turn become *homens novos*. The initial group of *homens novos* was self-declared to be the Frelimo leadership, and perhaps Mondlane himself can be thought of as Frelimo's very first *homem novo*. The following description encapsulates the idea:

[33] Brito, 1991: 153-161.
[34] Jorge Rebelo, in a poem entitled *No Povo Buscamos a Força* ("In the People we Seek our Strength"), wrote that "Some of those who joined us had a shadowy look, hidden motives, strange intentions". Carlos, 1976: 73-75.

He was a remarkable man, Eduardo Mondlane, capable of uniting disparate forces into a single vision of freedom. He was a statesman and diplomat, teacher and bush soldier, and sometimes a poet. He was an indefatigable person who left his mark on everyone with whom he came into contact. He was at home in circles of military strategy and command, in centres of political leadership and diplomacy, in revolutionary councils, at the United Nations and in the learned circles of great universities. He was a professor who looked like a guerrilla fighter, and a *guerrilheiro* who looked more like a university professor. He was a man of pride, but of touching humility, without arrogance or inflated ego, sometimes torn by inner conflict, and a man of rich humour and vibrant laughter.[35]

Of course not all *homens novos* were expected to reach quite that level, but it was expected that, like Mondlane, they should leave their mark on everyone. That is how Mozambique was to be modernized. Well before declaring itself to be a vanguard party, Frelimo had developed the idea that its militants should be agents of transformation. The *homens novos* would be the wedge for gradually transforming the remainder of society, and in particular the peasants for whom not much hope was held out in their present state. This idea of a vanguard was by no means exclusive to movements in the Leninist tradition. Much of what may be called development ideology during the 1950s and 1960s was also posited on the existence of a vanguard, though it went by other names, such as "change agents", meaning those

> who were likely to be innovators or ... to diffuse new ideas obtained from elsewhere ... Indeed, by the 1950s and 1960s, numerous manuals were issued by UN agencies, instructing fieldworkers on how to identify innovators and increase their importance and influence.[36]

Frelimo portrayed the institutions of the liberated zones as modernizing agents in the sense that Taylor gives to the term: agencies for the differentiation, rationalization and the establishment of new patterns for society.[37] Once it had come to power, Frelimo laid greater emphasis upon institutions, though the selective renovation of Frelimo

[35] Shore, 1983: xv.
[36] Harrison, 1988: 31. An interesting and influential work on how new methods of work or organization can be diffused into communities is Rogers, 1962. See particularly chapter 8, "Opinion Leaders and the Flow of Ideas", and chapter 9, "The Role of the Change Agent and the Consequences of Innovation".
[37] Taylor, 1978: 35-36.

membership when it became a vanguard party in 1977 shows that the ideal of the *homem novo* as an agent of change remained very strong.

During the war against colonialism the military need to present a united front implied greater tolerance of diversity than after independence. Once Frelimo was in power it had the means to seek to impose an accelerated drive for modernization, and this was done through the reorganization of society but also through the "correction" of individual attitudes. Just as *homens novos* were thought to have a multiplier effect upon those people with whom they came into contact, so the opposite could be true: people with anti-modern or pre-modern views could cause a regression in society. The "re-education camps", apart from dealing with specific issues of political dissent, also received numerous individuals whose attitudes, behaviour and sources of livelihood did not correspond to Frelimo's modernizing drive.

The process of "urbanization of the countryside", the term given to the creation of communal villages, was not always accepted by the rural population who had to move their homes. It therefore became clear by the late 1970s that this crucial element of Frelimo's modernization programme would not be successful unless a degree of coercion was employed. The problem was seen to be a vicious circle: people were unwilling to move into communal villages because they were still attached to old ways of thinking, but because they remained outside communal villages they could not develop modern ways of thinking. The only solution to this was to push people into the communal villages. The Frelimo leadership was confident that once people had understood that the communal villages brought with them the benefits of modernity they would develop a modern mentality. If force was to be employed then it was for the benefit of the people; if the people did not understand it at the time they would undoubtedly understand once they had been modernized.

Like Marxism, modernization has many possible versions. The Frelimo leadership was not interested only in the abandoning of "traditional" forms of thinking and organizing society; it wished to promote a particular kind of modern mentality that would lead to the development of Mozambique. The basis for Mozambique's development was agriculture and therefore the bulk of the population had to be in the countryside.[38] Through policies such as Operation Production[39] and forced villagization people were "mobilized" according to the interests of a national scheme and with the added purpose of "modernizing" them. The transformation of the population into *homens novos* was thus though of as something that could be organized by moving people around, into communal villages, onto state farms, and, in the case of a recalcitrant few, into re-education camps. The following passage provides an example of the regenerative qualities associated with a spell in the re-education camps:

> Unango represents a remarkable example of Mozambique's imaginative penal policy .... In the war it was a Portuguese *aldeamento* (strategic hamlet). After independence it became a major re-education centre, with nearly 600 inmates or *re-educados*. They comprised a variety of social misfits sent by the dynamising groups: tramps, thieves, addicts, petty criminals and drunks, as well as collaborators. In October 1979 President Machel visited Niassa ... [and] announced to a meeting of all the *re-educados* that they were to be released. They were asked to stay on in Unango where their families would be flown up to join them. Together with local people and teams from other provinces, they would start to build the new communal city of Unango, to be sited in the plain below. The response was enthusiastic. In August 1980, when I visited Unango, the families were beginning to arrive. The strict re-education regime had given way to democratic decision-making and co-operative forms of production. In the space of a few years, people who had been down-trodden and corrupted by the old system had a good future to work for.[40]

Ordinary people could be transformed into *homens novos* by committing themselves to Frelimo and Frelimo policies. Moreover, people whose activities undermined Frelimo's objectives were not necessarily lost cases. They could be "re-educated" and transformed into useful members of society.

---

[38] "Taking agriculture as the base and industry as the dynamic and decisive factor ...". Frelimo, 1977d: 20.

[39] Operation Production, in 1983, is discussed in chapter 5.

[40] Gifford, 1981: 38-39.

4. Urbanization of the Countryside: Modernizing the Peasantry

The idea that the peasantry should be promoted from its time-locked backwardness to a state of idealized modernity was a defining feature of Frelimo's thinking. Politically, the peasantry was thought of as a dead-weight and the transformation of Frelimo into a "vanguard party" in 1977 was designed to rid it of these lost causes, readmitting only those who had been on their personal voyage of transformation into the status of *homem novo*. The victory of the nationalist cause, with which Frelimo had attracted widespread support during the war for independence, was judged to have been achieved in1975 and the movement therefore no longer felt the need to maintain the political support of the peasantry purely for its anti-colonialism. For the next phase, that of socialist modernization, it was felt that the peasantry needed to be transformed, not supported or appeased. Transformation was to happen through the socialisation of the countryside and the concomitant proletarianisation of the peasantry. Then, once transformed, an individual could become a member of the party:

> ... the Party, which builds the material and ideological basis of socialist society, should be composed of vanguard cadres, of the working class and also of militant peasants, namely those who participate actively in the cooperatives and communal villages. The other workers, intellectuals, functionaries, nurses, employees, teachers, who through their struggle show that they are leaving the old mentality behind, can also be part of the Party.[41]

This implied that Frelimo was bound to have a strong urban bias, coupled with a strong mistrust of the peasantry. However, a country which was so agriculturally-based and so rural as Mozambique could not be modernized overnight and indeed the leadership had no desire to provoke a mass exodus from the countryside to the cities. The degree of urbanization was one of the factors distinguishing a modern society from a "traditional" one. The way by which the government proposed to achieve such urbanization was not by migration to the cities but by creating urban centres in the countryside. This was termed

[41] Frelimo, 1977c: 33

the "urbanization of the countryside", and essentially it referred to the concentration of rural labour in communal villages and on state farms.

The process of urbanization of the countryside was seen as having various advantages: some of the attributes of modern city life were transferred to the rural areas, thus contributing to the modernization of the peasantry; there was a process of harmonization of policies at a national level which contributed to reducing regional differentiation and therefore accelerating the process of national integration; and by bringing the people into an established framework it became possible to "mobilize" them according to a national plan which at the time was seen as being the key to development. National integration and rationalization were therefore seen as crucial elements in the process of modernization.

The first component of Frelimo plans for the countryside was to group people into manageable units. Wherever people lived in scattered groups they were to be brought together into communal villages so that their activities could be rationalized. All this modernization was an expensive proposition and extra resources were not readily available at the time. This led to the conclusion that the transformation of the countryside (and peasantry) could only come through the redeployment of 'surplus' generated by the peasantry in the state farms and cooperatives. Thus the process of modernization would, in effect, be self-financing because, by moving people to these rural centres of urbanisation and by setting them to work, Frelimo could provide the village with the accoutrements of a modern state: schools, clinics, roads, local administration and so on. The resources for this would be generated by the countryside itself. In the words of one sympathetic observer:

> Production was to be predominantly collective and the surplus generated by the production units would provide the basis for village development. Social infrastructure, schools, stores, and health posts would be built. The rest of the surplus would be directly invested in the production base of the cooperative to increase output and productivity. Furthermore, the villages would be the new

political and administrative units of the countryside, with party cells and elections to the People's Assembly being organized on a village basis. In short, the communal villages were to become the fulcrum of a new political and economic order in the countryside.[42]

Frelimo's notion of rural urbanization was well described, though in an abstract form, by Friedmann:

> When we say that a country is 'urbanizing', we can mean either that an increasing proportion of the total population comes to live and work in 'cities' ... or that an increasing proportion of the population follows distinctly 'urban' ways of living: they become more educated, healthier, increasingly tied into a money economy; they are more organized and more informed; have a wider range of social contacts; achieve class consciousness; have new and wider aspirations; and so forth. I will call the first of these meanings *ecological* urbanization ... and the second meaning *social* urbanization... Whereas ecological urbanization usually leads to social urbanization, though often with a considerable lag of time, social urbanization can be achieved, without resettlement in cities.[43]

Friedmann went on to suggest that Frelimo could and should carry out "social urbanization" without having ecological urbanization but he did remark that in China "urban population has been contained partly as a result of periodic rustification campaigns involving millions of people".[44] Friedmann does not explicitly suggest China as a model (though it is a frequent point of reference) but he does not shy away from the employment of coercion:

> If problems are encountered regarding living conditions and the willingness of cadres to move to district locations, mobilization measures should be used. Rural development is a *battle* for national survival and for laying the foundations for subsequent industrialization and collective work.[45]

Friedmann argued that the communal villages approach (which he termed the "project approach") was insufficient for the country's proper rural development and he therefore

---

[42] Dolny, 1985: 224-225.
[43] Friedmann, 1980: 98. Friedmann went to Mozambique in December 1978 for a brief period as a United Nations consultant on urbanization and housing. Although it is impossible to know his influence he certainly advised Frelimo at a high level.
[44] Friedmann, 1980: 99.
[45] Friedmann, 1980: 109. Italics in the original.

---

advocated an approach which he called "territorial".[46] This involved organizing people from district capitals which would be transformed into centres of modernization ("social urbanization"). In effect, once the communal villages project ran out of steam,[47] Frelimo did try to implement something similar to Friedmann's territorial approach, and to a large extent this approach is still visible today. Friedmann recommended that each district should have between two and five "rural monitors", the Mozambican term for what are known in francophone Africa as *animateurs ruraux*.[48] He describes the desired qualities for these monitors:

> Rural monitors require outstanding personal characteristics. They must have political, technical and executive abilities, and a clear grasp of the local situation as well as of the national structures in support; they must be able to work with peasants in the Assemblies and on the local Executive Committee for Rural Development; they must have creative ability and a clear sense of political purpose. In short, they must be able to engage in a form of social praxis that is also, at the same time, a process of social learning.[49]

What Friedmann is describing is none other than the archetypal *homem novo*. Like Frelimo's proposals for unity and modernity, plans for the transformation of the countryside relied upon the catalytic role of the *homem novo*.

Urbanization of the countryside was intended to bring selective aspects of urban modernity to the rural areas rather than to import, wholesale, all the complexity and diversity of city life. It was an attempt to redefine notions of the urban. Frelimo's vision of the urbanized countryside involved urban units small enough to control or eliminate the vices that came with all big cities. The citizens of the transformed and modernized Mozambique were to be imbued with modern, urban attitudes which had been purged of

---

[46] Friedmann, 1980: 105-109.
[47] For a variety of reasons, one of which was the spreading war.
[48] In other Lusophone African countries such as Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau the term *animadores* is used. Roberts (1981: 208-211) has described the attempts to change "peasant mentality" in Niger by the use of *animateurs*. She refers to *animation* as "a strategy based on a concept of development, central to which is the belief that the peasantry itself constitutes an obstacle to its own progress" (p.208).
[49] Friedmann, 1980: 111.

all that was judged to be modern decadence. They were to be part of city life but not contaminated by it, in touch with the world while remaining deeply suspicious and sceptical of it.

Given that much of Frelimo's early ideology was developed in the context of the war for independence, the colonial power was naturally a negative term of reference. Salazar's regime was a profoundly conservative one, imbued with an occasionally mystical faith in the presumed characteristics of Portuguese rural life. Modernization was seen as an essentially evil and corrupt phenomenon, to be avoided as far as possible. Government was considered to be the task of a narrow elite, preferably educated by the Catholic Church, and education for the rest of the population was seen not as desirable in itself but as unavoidable for the purpose of allowing necessary tasks to be carried out. Salazar aimed at what has been described as an "idyllic and timeless Arcadia".[50] Frelimo's approach was the opposite in all of these characteristics.

In 1968 Salazar was replaced by Marcello Caetano who, by comparison to Salazar, was a modernizing technocrat. Partly as a result of the war, and partly as a result of the changes in Portugal, the colonial authorities had realised that they would have to take on board various modernizing influences and began developing new approaches. Policy changes were gradual but the new approach was aimed at providing the African population with a degree of emancipation, allowing for better education and health facilities and so on. Political emancipation was not envisaged and indeed the logic was that changes had to be made in order to preserve the system. But by the time that Frelimo came to Maputo, in 1974, the colonial government was bent on a modernizing programme, some aspects of which Frelimo itself was to continue.[51]

---

[50] Birmingham, 1992: 172.

[51] On the modernizing aspects of late Portuguese colonialism: Rosas (1994: 488-495); Newitt (1981: 237-240); Abshire and Samuels (1969) particularly chapter xx by David Abshire entitled "Emerging Policies and Alternatives"; Clarence-Smith (1985: 192-224).

In one significant respect Frelimo's approach was similar to that of Salazar, namely in its idealization of a pristine morality which was threatened by the decadence of urban life. Frelimo was a rural guerrilla movement led by an urban educated elite. This elite was selective in the aspects of urbanization that it wished to see in the new Mozambique: all energies should be devoted to the project of transformation of the country rather than dissipated in socially futile activities. The war never touched Mozambique's main cities and during the decade of armed struggle Frelimo guerrillas developed an image of Lourenço Marques and Beira as the playground of Portuguese and South African whites.[52] The images of urban sexual depravation - prostitution and promiscuous behaviour - appeared frequently in the puritan speeches of Frelimo leaders.[53] Writing in February 1974, Samora Machel said that

> The enemy's corrupt mentality in regard to women leads him naturally to immorality and rape. The decadent tastes of capitalism lead to a taste for drunkenness and drug-taking, as a way of smothering and alienating consciousness.[54]

Later he developed the view that debauchery was typical of capitalism:

> We have already mentioned corruption in the secondary schools. They are also affected by drug-peddling and drug-taking. There are teachers of drug-taking who teach their charges how to smoke. Is that normal? Certainly it's normal in a colonial state, in a capitalist state. That's their character. But we are not capitalists. We seek socialism.[55]

---

[52] There was undoubtedly a factual basis for this image. South African and Rhodesian men would travel to colonial Lourenço Marques and Beira to take advantage of the more relaxed attitude towards inter-racial sexual relations in colonial Mozambique. Prostitution was a thriving industry and was greatly promoted by the growing numbers of Portuguese troops throughout the 1960s.

[53] It should not be inferred from their speeches that all of the Frelimo leaders lived up to their puritan recommendations.

[54] Machel, "The People's Democratic Revolutionary Process in Mozambique", in Munslow, 1985: 50.

[55] Machel, "Make Beira the Starting Point for an Organisational Offensive" (11 January 1980), in Munslow, 1985: 78.

But above all, this corruption and decadence was deemed to appear and thrive in the cities, the larger the more corrupt. Machel recalled the Lourenço Marques that Frelimo encountered when it entered the capital:

> Lourenço Marques was the capital of crime, delinquency, banditry, robbery, rape, begging, licensed prostitution, a city of disquiet and murder .... a city of patronage, orgies, bacchanalia, corruption, favours. It was the city where the Portuguese colonial soldier arrived and departed, bringing and leaving the seeds of vice, degradation, immorality, drunkenness, venereal disease and crime.[56]

The double-faced nature of urban life - its modern values and its moral laxity - led the leadership to develop an ambiguous attitude to the cities. The rationalization of energies promised by modernism entailed the destruction of old forms of social organization but this same process could also lead to moral degradation, and indeed there were many examples from colonial city life where this had happened. The objective, therefore, was to destroy the barriers to development that existed in pre-modern society, and to replace "traditional" morality with a new "revolutionary" morality. The military discipline of the liberation years served as a good starting point for this objective.

After Independence the movement's military discipline was imposed upon the country as a whole. In particular the "vanguard", Mozambique's small intellectual elite and the party militants, had to abide by a strict code of behaviour towards the opposite sex. Walking hand in hand or kissing in the streets could be enough to lead to a period in a re-education camp.[57] Women were obliged to dress "decently", and this was checked up on by high-ranking party officials.

> Going to work in shirt-sleeves, sandals or jeans shows a lack of respect for the place of work, for colleagues, for superiors and above all for the public. As well as the poor taste it often reveals, it leads to disrepute, liberalism and indiscipline.

[56] Machel, "We are declaring War on the Enemy Within" (18 March 1980), in Munslow, 1985: 89.

[57] These rules of behaviour were never codified in law, but they were widely known to the population, particularly in the cities. Private conversations with people now in their mid-thirties to mid-forties have provided many anecdotes about this.

> As regards women, we must urge decency and good taste. It is unacceptable to come to work in a headscarf.[58]

This approach is an eclectic one, combining the heritage of early Soviet orthodoxy, Salazarist conservatism and an ancient patriarchalism that would have been appealed (at least to the men) in most of Mozambique. The modernizing drive in the development of the *homem novo* was by no means straightforward, but it was certainly dominated by the idea that the modernization project could be directed from upon high. It contained many ambiguities and contradictions, probably the most obvious of which was the notion that it was possible to create, from childhood, Frelimo's supermen of the future by means of a straightjacketed upbringing.

5. Gender: the Reorganization of Women.

During the war against colonialism women played an important role, but the appropriate nature of their contribution to Frelimo's struggle was initially the object of intense debate inside the movement. Older leaders, such as Nkavandame, were opposed to the idea of women joining the armed struggle but the younger members of the elite managed to defeat this position.[59] There were, broadly, two reasons for having women join the armed struggle. The first was a question of military expediency. Frelimo needed to build up its numbers and women were particularly useful for military tasks that did not involve fighting: "Women were invited to stand tall and incidentally help to carry the soldiers' kits on the long march south", as one historian wrote.[60] The use of women in reconnaissance missions was much more likely to pass undetected by the Portuguese. Another reason for having women join the armed struggle was precisely because it involved restructuring social relations. By destroying erstwhile patterns of authority the

[58] Machel, "Transform the State Apparatus into an Instrument of Victory", (7 February 1980) in Munslow, 1985: 81. The reference to the headscarf is revealing because it is a symbol of rural life, unsuited to "modern" urban living.

[59] Wield, 1983: 82-83 and Johnston, 1990: 304-305. Amilcar Cabral's PAIGC, a reference point for Frelimo, had exactly the same dispute. See Cabral, 1980: 71.

[60] Birmingham, 1992: 54.

Frelimo leadership consolidated its own position as the source of all new authority. The dispute about the role of women took place in the language of tradition versus modernity and, naturally, the issue was debated and resolved between men.

Until the mid-1980s Frelimo's attitude to gender issues was taken to be one of the movement's success stories, according to the "solidarity writers". Along with "education" and "health", "women's rights" usually formed part of the list of ways in which standards of living had improved under Frelimo. The following affirmation typifies the way Frelimo's approach to gender issues was seen:

> There is still much difficult terrain to traverse before women in Mozambique achieve full liberation. But the process has been set in motion, supported by Frelimo and the Government who have acknowledged the struggle of women to be integral to the total revolutionary process which the country must follow.[61]

A closer look at gender issues raises many questions about this assessment, particularl! regarding Frelimo's own commitment to women's liberation.[62] Frelimo asserted itself as the new source of all political authority and the role attributed to women in Frelimo's "modern" new society involved their political participation according to strictly defined parameters. The oppression of women was decreed to be a thing of the past, related to "traditionalism", and because Frelimo was removing "traditionalism" there was no further need for women to organize themselves politically. The women's organization, OMM, was seen as having a dual function: to help remove "traditionalism" and to help mobilize women whenever this was required.[63]

---

[61] Urdang, 1983: 8. The quoted excerpt is part of the editorial introduction to Urdang's article and was not written by Urdang herself.

[62] An example of early and well-founded scepticism regarding Frelimo's claims may be found in Roberts, 1983: 182-183.

[63] Some sources on gender issues in Mozambique: Urdang (1983 and 1989), Arnfred (1988), Young (1977), Kruks and Wisner (1984), Davison (1988), Ong (1986). The resolutions of the OMM Second Conference (1976) are reprinted in *People's Power* no.5 (London: MAGIC).

Frelimo's use of women as guerrillas entailed the adoption of the language of women's liberation, which fit in well with the evolving Marxist-modernist language. Nevertheless, the use of heavily gender-biased terms - such as *homem novo* and *o fim da exploração do homem pelo homem* ("the end of exploitation of man by man") - were retained. There is little evidence that the emancipation of women was taken seriously by the male-dominated party at any level. Samora Machel's speech entitled "Defining Woman's Enemy", is enlightening in this regard.[64] Machel begins his speech seeking to define the problem, and the formula he finds is this: "What factors enable man to be rather more developed than woman?"[65] Machel pointed out that women were less modern than men, though he did not use that terminology:

> we find that there is a great deal of conservatism in our country. Above all among women. There is a lot of tradition among women, a lot of division among women, a lot of contempt and discrimination among women.[66]

Machel went on to criticise men for "grading" women according to their social and geographical origin but then, puzzlingly, suggested that this could be changed by "shaking up women's way of thinking".[67]

> Complexes are among woman's characteristics. Complexes that destroy her capacity for intiative. And we understand why. It is the effect of so many traumatic experiences of which woman was victim over many years. In that respect there is no White woman, no Black woman, no mulatto woman. Every woman has complexes. In Europe we find the same difficulties. Women's problems have a common point: a state of conflict, often a spirit of conflict. A heap of conflict. Inability at the same time to detect and distinguish between cases. There is a mixture of cases. And this will affect woman in her essential task. She stops being active and becomes passive. These situations of lack of tranquillity create a sense of dependence, a sense of insecurity. Conflict often diverts women from the essential tasks. So there is an inability to define the priority for tasks, to define the essential tasks, because of 'personal problems', because of individual problems.
>
> Women can very easily create conflicts between themselves. They find this easy. But they do not find it easy to rid themselves of the problem.... Here we

---

[64] Reprinted in Munslow, 1985: 169-178. This speech was delivered to a women's meeting in Maputo on 3 April 1976.

[65] Munslow, 1985: 169.

[66] Munslow, 1985: 170.

[67] Munslow, 1985: 170.

are today, but one of you may be ready to turn away her face because she is beside her 'enemy'. And suppose we were to ask: is it because your children have been squabbling there at home ... is that it? Although the press are here, we are going to be frank. Is it because of us men... is that it? ... There you are fighting, biting, scrapping with the pounding stick ... Is that the priority task? What about national reconstruction? [68]

Machel ended his speech by indicating precisely how women could contribute to national reconstruction:

> Women must organize the task of cleaning our cities. There must be hygiene in your homes, everywhere. Keeping the city clean is mainly a task for women. Are we going to take men out of the factories to come and sweep?[69]

Machel's speeches frequently contain the implicit assumption that they have a natural tendency to prostitution and "loose living" unless they are disciplined.[70] Fathers and husbands had a particular responsibility to ensure that their womenfolk behaved according to the precepts of revolutionary morality. Like peasants, women were assumed to be their own worst enemies so it was necessary to change their mentality, and through it their behaviour. Needless to say, these plans were made by men and involved the participation of women only in manners previously orchestrated. The OMM's 1984 national conference is a case in point. It was postponed for six months by the Party Central Committee because of fears that it might touch upon various delicate matters. When it did finally convene it was presided over by the all-male party hierarchy with only two women on the platform: the pliable Salomé Moiana,[71] OMM General Secretary, and the President's wife, Graça Machel, who was Minister for Education.[72]

[68] Munslow, 1985: 171.
[69] Munslow, 1985: 178.
[70] See for example Machel, "Organizing Society to Conquer Underdevelopment", (13 February 1982) in Munslow, 1985: 132. In this speech Machel begins by criticisng the sexual abuse of adolescents, then goes on to criticise their parents for sometimes seeking to marry them off, and finally ends up complaining that sometimes "the pregnant girls themselves seek abortion secretly. They want to go on with their loose living. Such situations sap the foundations of the family, destroy the parents' moral authority".
[71] Moiana is currently deputy speaker of the Parliament. On 28 March 1995 I watched her reconvene a parliamentary session after lunch with the following words: "I hope that everybody ate well, because although we are all here as members of parliament, as a woman I feel that it is my first duty to ensure that our menfolk are well cared for".
[72] Arnfred, 1988: 13-15.

Signe Arnfred has shown how the emancipation of women was a victim of Frelimo control, because such power as they had was removed and placed in the official party-controlled sphere of the OMM.[73] The OMM, like other "mass democratic organizations", was created for the purpose of controlling and directing the social and political energies of women towards the Frelimo project, in the manner defined by the leadership. This was couched in the modern language of women's liberation.[74] However, there are strong arguments suggesting that "modernization" - both colonial and Frelimo's - has eroded the power of women rather than strengthened it.[75]

6. "Modernity" Versus "Traditionalism"

Frelimo's notions of modernity took it on a collision course with existing forms of power which were condemned on the grounds that they were "traditional" or colonial or both. The notion of "Mozambicanness" was extremely weak when Frelimo came to power, and yet Frelimo depended upon it as the fount of its own political legitimacy. This meant that Frelimo had to compete with alternative sources of political legitimacy, and it did so by declaring war on those elements that were judged to be "unmodern". In rejecting these forms of local power arrangement Frelimo was clearing the way for the imposition of party rule thoughout the country, but it also displayed great difficulty in getting to grips with the country's history. The colonial authorities were clearly involved in manipulating indigenous forms of power in their favour but, in some areas at least, chiefs retained

[73] Arnfred, 1988.
[74] The following is a standard description of the role of women under Frelimo, coming from a "solidarity writer": "The expansion of education has especially affected girls. But, although more females are attending school, and Frelimo actively promotes the liberation of women, women remain in a weak position vis-a-vis men living under many customary and social constraints. Traditional society, with the important exception of the Makondes in the north, has always oppressed women in a number of ways, and it will take years to change. Child marriages, polygyny and lobolo, or bride-price, are practices that continue. Frelimo campaigns against them, and issues about the status of women are being raised publicly and discussed. The [OMM] whose objective is to integrate women in the process of national reconstruction and political life, is a mass organisation, and although it often still promotes conventional women's activities that relate to families or children, many more women are getting involved in political structures outside their homes" (Walt, in Walt and Melamed, 1983: 9).
[75] This is the argument that appears in Arnfred (1988) and Chilundo (1994).

considerable popular legitimacy. Before colonial rule, each part of the country had established mechanisms for distributing power within social groups, naturally disturbed from time to time by the expansionism of other groups and the alteration of circumstances. But Frelimo was not at all interested in invoking any pre-colonial heritage because to do so would be to create difficulties for the imposition of the all-important idea of the nation-state. In this sense chiefs represented a challenge to the first commandment of the modernizer's bible: consolidate the nation-state.

The removal of political/social power from indigenous sources was not a simple issue and could not be achieved merely by decree. The capacity for decision-making could be concentrated in the hands of the party and enforced by the state but certain social habits militated against so simple a transfer of power. The power of the spirit mediums for example, was difficult to locate and replace. Frelimo's new state was militantly atheist because it was trying to remove authority from such sources. Atheism was not an essential element in a modernizing project - Marxism and the Soviet example pointed towards official atheism not as a result of a spiritual conclusion but in order to remove power from spheres that would tend to be disposed against the power of the new party-state. Frelimo was atheist because it regarded all sources of religious/spiritual power as competitors.[76] And furthermore, Frelimo's idea of the nation-state was of pan-territorial homogeneity - in everything from agricultural prices to the organisation of villages to people's spiritual lives. All threats to this homogeneity were considered to be challenges to the idea of the nation-state and hence, by definition, to the modernizing project.

The restructuring of power relations so that Frelimo became, at every point from the government to the village party cell, the hub of all important decision-making, aimed to remove authority from structures with real or potential alternative sources of political

[76] This includes the Catholic church, which had supported Portuguese colonialism, other Christian churches, Islam, and indigenous spiritual systems. According to the pro-Renamo writer David Hoile, Machel purposefully insulted Islam by entering the mosque on Mozambique Island with his shoes on. (Hoile, 1989: 49.)

legitimacy. The discourse adopted served to legitimise this transfer of power in terms of the national project for which Frelimo claimed unique responsibility. This means that Frelimo's modernity defined itself as being "anti-traditional". "Traditionalism" was characterized as having a number of features that were at odds with Frelimo's project, but the essential target was simply any alternative source of political legitimacy and power. In the official discourse other expressions were used to refer to specific alternative sources of power: "obscurantism" referred to the power of religious or spiritual leaders; "feudalism" was the power of lineage chiefs, with particular reference to their role in the distribution of land. One of the purposes of Frelimo's modernity (which is also to say its anti-traditionalism) was to break those forms of authority that lay beyond Frelimo control.

This interpretation offers the possibility of going beyond the dispute which was opened up by the work of Christian Geffray.[77] Geffray has shown how in a particular area (the districts of Érati and Namapa in Nampula province) the arrival of Renamo precipitated the explosion of locally rooted violence, expressed in terms of the wider war between Renamo and the Frelimo state. Geffray's work has become something of a *cause célèbre*, replacing Clarence-Smith's contention that there had been a "paradigm shift" in Mozambican studies as the touchstone of one's points of view. Geffray was vehemently opposed by those parts of the Frelimo leadership that remained loyal to their initial conceptions and by the "solidarity writers" who remain active.[78] Geffray's main insights into the rebellion of peasantries actively marginalized by the Frelimo state are valuable and amply borne out by the results of the elections of October 1994.[79]

[77] Geffray, 1990.
[78] Sérgio Vieira (interview, Maputo, 22 April 1993) was extremely scathing of Geffray. The main academic critique from the "solidarity" perspective was formulated by O'Laughlin (1992a and 1992c) and repeated by Saul (1993). Two other writers who come from the same political perspective, Roesch (1992a) and Dinerman (1995) offer more nuanced and detached critiques of Geffray.
[79] For an analysis of the elections see Cahen, 1995.

The first line of attack upon Geffray was one that had already been developed during the late 1980s, namely the insistence that the civil war in Mozambique could only be understood by focusing on external destabilisation. Geffray accepts that Renamo was an external creation but argues that this aspect was widely known and that it was time to focus on Renamo's local implantation. For O'Laughlin, however, this is unacceptable because the war served imperialist interests and Renamo's actions were designed not to create or express any indigenous political problems but simply to "create conflicts between the socialist government and the peasantry".[80] This line of attack is not unduly disturbing to Geffray. South African and other interests were clearly involved but, contrary to what O'Laughlin says, that tells us little about the war at a local level. The assertion that the local dynamic sparked off as a result of global struggles is not to be taken seriously.[81]

The second line of attack suggests that the Frelimo project began to fall apart *because* of the war, and that the Frelimo abuses to which people objected were in themselves a reaction to the war.[82] This idea is dependent upon the assumption that external intervention was the sole cause of the war. It is a general argument of this thesis that Frelimo's ideology developed with no reference to rural life, and that its political praxis sought to control, direct and reshape rural life in a heavy-handed fashion. The stage had long been set for widespread abuses of power regardless of the war. The contradictions between the myriad and diverse aspirations of rural people, and the rigid model of society that the Frelimo leadership offered, had begun to erode support for Frelimo well before the war became an important factor.

[80] O'Laughlin, 1992a: 25-26.
[81] See for example the work of Legrand (1993), Derluguian (1989), Wilson (1992), Cahen (1995) and even Roesch (1992a) for patterns of internal dynamics. O'Laughlin's "evidence" of her contention is that many Renamo actions were simply inexplicable in terms of creating a local base. It is correct to point out that Geffray has failed to explain *fully* the complexity of the war, but that merely suggests that there is much that we have yet to learn and understand about the war.
[82] O'Laughlin, 1992a: 27.

A further criticism of Geffray is that he allegedly seeks to rehabilitate the "legal and administrative dualism" of colonialism, in which the rural areas were governed indirectly through *régulos*[83] and the urban areas were subject to a European code of law.[84] O'Laughlin's argument (and that of Frelimo until the mid-1980s) is that because this dualism was geared to satisfy capitalist and settler interests it was illegitimate and had to be removed: "the system of local administration which underlay forced labour and forced crops appropriated and compromised the positions of traditional chiefs and headmen".[85] It is plausible, as O'Laughlin suggests, that the stated objective of a Marxist society, however defined, required the dismantling of chiefly power. That was what Frelimo believed and sought to do. However, there is no reason to suggest that chiefly power as a system had been universally compromised in the eyes of rural people. Frelimo's attempts at centralizing all authority under its own control were certainly not seen as more legitimate. The general contention that Frelimo brought greater democracy to rural areas by removing the chiefs is highly dubious, though it may be true in particular places.[86]

At times Geffray does overstate his case. His description of wholesale rural rebellion in defence of an oppressed identity means that those who support Frelimo are, in his work, painted out of the picture for having allegiances that are external to the community.[87] His account of a rural-urban divide fails properly to account for the many interchanges across this imaginary line. Nevertheless, his powerful contribution has been to shatter the already fragile hold of the "solidarity writers" who dominated Mozambican studies for so long. The virulent critiques that his work has attracted are a testament to his achievement.

[83] The *régulos* (sometimes also called *regedores*) were chosen by the Portuguese to act as overseers of the local populations. They were the lowest form of colonial authority. Ideally, from the colonial point of view, they would be both fiercely loyal to the colonial regime and seen as legitimate leaders by "their" people. Often though it was necessary to choose individuals who had one or the other, but not both, of these characteristics.
[84] Geffray never actually suggests this in his book. O'Laughlin oversimplifies matters by implying that there was a stark choice between the colonial system and Frelimo's authoritarianism.
[85] O'Laughlin, 1992a: 28.
[86] Saul, 1993: 145, O'Laughlin, 1992a: 28 and Dinerman, 1995: 586 all defend the general contention.
[87] Dinerman, 1995: 581.

7. Conclusion

The argument in this chapter and in the previous one has been that the Frelimo leadership's concern with unity within the national territory, and with its own place in the new dispensation, led it to develop a Marxist-modernist ideology. Frelimo's modernity was defined in a number of ways, the most important of which was by juxtaposition to the leadership's notion of peasant life. The *homem novo*, Frelimo's born-again revolutionary, was imagined as the anti-peasant. The leadership's distance from rural life facilitated this simple juxtaposition in which both *homem novo* and the peasant are abstractions, but more importantly it created the ideological grounds for the destruction of all alternative sources of power and of political legitimacy.

Within this discourse of polarities - new/old, modern/traditional, *homem novo*/peasant - the rural/urban dichotomy was given particular importance. The Frelimo project sought to inject rural life with the modern attributes of urban society and administration without sacrificing the morality and discipline associated with small communities (and with the army). This delicate balancing act was to be achieved through the "urbanization of the countryside" and, above all, through the human regeneration which was to be led by the *homem novo*. Women were treated in a similar fashion to peasants. By nature they were considered to be more attached to tradition, though they were also assumed to have tendencies toward "sexual corruption" that should be kept in check by (male) discipline. Like peasants it was assumed that women had potential as members of the new society, once they had been "organized" by OMM and cured of the social evils to which they were prone.[88]

Everywhere, Frelimo's Marxist-modernizing ideology resulted in the removal of power and political legitimacy from all sources but Frelimo, and decision-making within

[88] The Resolutions of the OMM's Second Conference are a litany of these evils. (OMM, 1976).

Frelimo became increasingly centralized. Some writers have advanced the argument that colonial and pre-colonial societies were undemocratic and that Frelimo's discourse was therefore justified in the name of greater democracy.[89] However, this was not the result and nor was it ever the objective. Unless of course one accepts the starting principle that democracy is whatever the Frelimo leadership wishes because Frelimo *is* the will of the people.[90]

[89] Saul, 1993, O'Laughlin, 1992a.
[90] Eduardo Mondlane, White Paper on "The Participation of Students in the Struggle for National Liberation", reproduced in Bragança and Wallerstein, 1982a: 107-114. Parts of this text were quoted in chapter 2.

Chapter 4

Frelimo Ascendant (1970-1980)

1. Introduction

It is usual in Mozambican studies for chapters to begin or end in 1975, the year in which Mozambique became independent. However, Frelimo's ideological development, and its notions of the state, were not significantly changed by the accession to power. This chapter begins at the end of a cycle of internal conflicts in Frelimo with the consolidation in power of a young, radical, urban and educated group led by Samora Machel. Older leaders, and in particular Nkavandame and Simango, were sidelined in a process that was later to be cast as a class struggle. In 1970 the ideological contours of Frelimo's new leadership had not yet fully crystallized. Machel's entourage contained elements who were clearly pro-Soviet, such as Marcelino dos Santos, Sérgio Vieira and Jorge Rebelo, but it also contained other elements such as Joaquim Chissano, Mariano Matsinhe and Armando Guebuza who, each in their own way, were much less decided about how society should be organized.[1] During the last few years of the war various factors led to the growing intellectual hegemony of a Marxist approach, an approach which was consolidated at Frelimo's Third Congress in 1977.

The trio of principles which were referred to in the previous two chapters - territory, unity and modernity - were the backbone of all of Frelimo's policies, and the language of Marxism was apparently well suited to the promotion of these principles. Through the last years of the liberation struggle and the first years of independence, this discourse corresponded to Frelimo's needs. By the beginning of the 1980s though, it was becoming

[1] According to Simango, Mariano Matsinhe (he spells the name 'Masinye') was considered by Machel and those close to him to be part of Simango's group. Simango, 1969: 126. Joaquim Chissano has always been reluctant to commit himself in internal Frelimo disputes, as may be surmised, on this particular issue, from Chissano, 1971.

clear that the Marxist language had to be adjusted. This chapter looks at the period of ascendant Marxist language in Frelimo, starting with the rise of Machel to the leadership and ending with the first signs of self-doubt several years after independence.

These ideological factors are intertwined with the country's economic development. The second half of the 1970s saw a very rapid growth of centralized powers in the economy, backed up by ideological developments. In every sector Frelimo claimed increasing rights to control resources and decisions about them, and yet by the end of the decade the inadequacy of its administrative means had given the lie to its bold pretensions. Economic developments, which are described in this chapter, lend further weight to the decision to use the turn of the decade as a key element in the periodization of the thesis.

2. The Formation of an Ideology: Internal Conflicts

By its own accounts, and by those of people close to the leadership, Frelimo was committed to some form of socialism from the late 1960s.[2] The movement's first leader, Eduardo Mondlane, was killed by a letter bomb in February 1969[3], shortly after the Makonde activist Lázaro Nkavandame was suspended from all his functions within the movement. Nkavandame had been Frelimo provincial secretary (the highest ranking official) for Cabo Delgado, the province in which he had made his name after his return from Tanganyika in 1956, as the leader of the Mozambican African Voluntary Cotton Society. This entrepreneurial activity brought upon Nkavandame the unfavourable attentions of the Portuguese colonial authorities. Nkavandame's anti-colonial stance, his contacts with the new TANU government in Tanzania and his membership of MANU

[2] See, for example, Saul, 1973, or Santos, 1973.
[3] It has never been established who was responsible for Mondlane's death. The Portuguese, American, Soviet and Chinese secret services have all been accused, as have dissatisfied elements within Frelimo. Various hypotheses are outlined in José Freire Antunes 1992: 75-77. Henriksen (1978: 170, 180) claims that Frelimo executed Silveiro Nungu, a former Secretary for Administration, in June 1969, for having planted the bomb. According to Vines, Nungu died "from hunger strike within Mozambique". Future researchers on this topic may benefit from some detailed revelations in Savana newspaper of 11 and 18 February 1994.

(one of the three movements that came together to form Frelimo in June 1962) made him a natural founding member of Frelimo. The fact that Cabo Delgado was strategically vital to Frelimo's objective of winning a protracted armed struggle brought him early prominence within the movement. By the mid-1960s Nkavandame, and others such as Frelimo vice-president Uria Simango, were losing political weight inside the movement in favour of a group of younger and more radical activists.[4] Nkavandame, whose functions included controlling commerce in his province, was accused of profiteering at the expense of the peasantry[5] and by 1968 he was seeking to proclaim himself the representative of Makonde nationalism. Nkavandame sought at first to strengthen his position within Frelimo, but once it became clear that he had been outmanouvered he attempted to use his Makonde power base to negotiate with the colonial authorities for Makonde independence. In the end he defected to the Portuguese. After independence Nkavandame was sent to a re-education camp where he was eventually executed.[6]

Frelimo was plagued by dissidence throughout the 1960s but this was mainly restricted to the leadership circles. Those who left the movement did not manage to take a large proportion of rank-and-file members with them. In its later analyses Frelimo argued that the disputes were in fact class struggles, during which the revolutionary peasantry simultaneously rejected "capitalism" and "traditionalism". However, Uria Simango was as content as anyone else in the leadership to use a Marxist language if it was appropriate for the occasion.[7] In the document which provoked his expulsion Simango alleged that

[4] Accounts of this period depend largely upon interpretations of the official Frelimo version, written obviously by the victorious side. Sympathetic historians such as Saul, Alpers and the Isaacmans have long accepted this version, but increasingly it is being questioned. As Simpson points out (1992: 8), the radicals claim that they took their cue from discontented peasants but the nature and extent of such consultation is a matter for speculation. This is true of a large part of the pre-independence history of Frelimo. Opello (1975) has produced a different interpretation, arguing that conflicts within Frelimo were "the result of competition among elite factions for the highest power and status roles within the structure of the party and not a significant intrusion of [cultural and political] pluralism into the nationalist movement as a whole. During this period, different elites used appeals to ethnic and class cleavages in an ideological manner as they vied for the relatively few high level prestige and power positions available" (p.67).
[5] Frelimo, 1969b: 123. See also Saul, 1973: 35.
[6] Africa Watch, 1992: 158.
[7] See the two articles by Simango (1966 and 1968) which were reproduced in *African*

Machel and a number of named colleagues were "tools of imperialism"[8], a claim that sought to situate himself on the moral highground of the struggle.

It is misleading to take these debates at their face value - each side claimed to represent the interests of the masses and to be the true opponents of imperialism. The real substance of disputes was dual: whether or not Frelimo should be imposed as the sole source of political authority; and who should speak and decide for Frelimo The use of a Marxist discourse (which was developed more consistently and persistently by the group around Machel and Marcelino dos Santos) was an essential element for the first purpose because it legitimated the destruction of all other sources of political authority.[9] It is noteworthy that many of the Frelimo defectors could lay claim to alternative sources of political authority, threatening the all-important principle of unity. When the disputes inside Frelimo began to escalate, those that could resorted to other claims of legitimacy and representivity, seeking to rally behind them part of the movement. Nkavandame used his position as a Makonde grandee, an *mzee*, in a context in which Makondes formed the backbone of Frelimo's army. Simango, on the other hand, though educated and urbanized, accused the "southerners" of being anti-northern and "a clique of criminals in obedience to the imperalist plan".[10] Though Simango never explicitly claimed that he was the representative of the centre of the country, the manner in which he formulated his critiques of the "southerners" lent itself to that conclusion. Simango's father and grandfather were important anti-colonial leaders which gave him an anti-colonial prestige that spoke for itself.[11]

The various disputes that arose were all lost by those that failed to claim that they symbolized true unity. There was a clear anti-white and anti-*mestiço* racist undertone to

Communist. These articles were first delivered as speeches in London and Belgrade respectively.
[8] Simango, 1969: 127.
[9] This argument has been developed in more detail in chapter 2.
[10] Simango, 1969: 126.
[11] Cahen, 1991b.

Mateus Gwenjere's statements which were designed to gain the support of the students at the Frelimo secondary school in Dar es Salaam.[12] As far back as August 1962, just two months after Frelimo was created, Matthew Mmole and Lawrence Millinga, president and secretary-general of MANU, were expelled from the party. They were Makondes and voiced the first of many accusations that Frelimo had been taken over by southerners who were using Makondes as cannon-fodder.[13]

The interesting question about these splinter groups is why they failed. It is not surprising that leaders who had been marginalized should seek to reawaken the constituencies they believed they represented. It is also not surprising that the young, educated, urban, southern leadership should fail to take with it all of the older militants, particularly those whose political activism preceded the creation of Frelimo. What is remarkable is that, apparently, none of these crises and defections shook Frelimo deeply. The explanation which Frelimo itself favoured in its official publications, and which people like Saul put forward, was that these crises were all manifestations of a "class struggle" and that they had failed because the revolutionary peasantry recognized that its interests were best defended by the group that eventually emerged victorious. It has already been suggested that this sort of explanation is unconvincing.[14] An alternative explanation must bring out two issues. The first is that the defections were not as inconsequential as has been hitherto claimed. The second is that control over the army was the key to control over the movement by the group which coalesced around Machel and dos Santos.

[12] Gwenjere argued that non-blacks such as Mondlane's American wife Janet should be purged from positions of responsibility (she was head of the Frelimo school, the Mozambique Institute, in Dar es Salaam, where Gwenjere was a teacher). Another target of racism was the *mestiço* Marcelino dos Santos, who on account of his mixed heritage was accused of being "Cape Verdean" rather than Mozambican. This accusation should not be taken literally (in fact he was born and brought up in Lumbo, Nampula Province). In both Angola (e.g. Bender, 1978: 110, 118-120) and Guinea-Bissau (e.g. Forrest, 1987: 100-101) the colonial authorities used Cape Verdeans as overseers and go-betweens. This meant that there was a degree of resentment against racially-mixed Cape Verdeans throughout Portugal's other African colonies. Hoile (1989: 16) embellishes Gwenjere's original claim by saying that Dos Santos was actually born in Cape Verde. In doing so he misses the relevance of Gwenjere's slightly more subtle point.
[13] Opello, 1975: 72.
[14] This argument, and the points of view of John Saul, are examined in chapter 2.

One must question the received wisdom that these defections had no impact upon Frelimo below the level of the Central Committee. It clearly makes political sense for any organization to belittle defections, arguing that the people who leave or are expelled represent only themselves. Frelimo's various statements over the years have of course put forward this point of view. It is extraordinary that for so long this argument remained unquestioned. Simango's expulsion, for example, gradually led to the sidelining of many, perhaps most, of the cadres from the central provinces of Manica and Sofala.[15] At the very least then, Frelimo's claim that the power struggles of the 1960s were purely the result of the personal ambitions of opportunists, must be seen as an exaggeration.[16] The defections were important, and they were consistently centred upon claims that the movement was being dominated by "southerners".[17]

Nevertheless it is true that despite all the defections no viable alternative to Frelimo arose. Many small movements were created by defectors but none of them managed to stay the course. In the north Tanganyika was fully supportive of Frelimo and did not permit any rival movement to establish bases there, but Banda's Malawi extended some help to COREMO and the second UDENAMO.[18] Zambia permitted COREMO to have a base in Lusaka but the splinter organizations failed to attract material support from abroad. This was in part due to the growing diplomatic expertise of the Frelimo leadership[19], and also to bad strategic decisions made by the leaderships of the rival movements. The failure of those movements to embark upon a military campaign meant

[15] Brito, 1991: 123.
[16] Henriksen (1983: 51) speaks of numerous defections from Frelimo during the early 1970s though he appears to ascribe this to Portuguese military pressure rather than internal disputes.
[17] Despite being from the northern province of Nampula, Marcelino dos Santos was usually included amongst the "southerners" to whom he was close. His political activism had begun in Lisbon, where he went to study in 1947, and continued in Paris from 1952. (Hedges, 1993: 208-209.)
[18] Hedges, 1989: 621, 626. See Mondlane (1983: 130-132),Opello (1975: 78-79), Henriksen (1978: 174-182), Coelho (1989: 61-64), Vines (1991: 11-14) and Newitt (1995: 523-527) for details on some of the pre-independence defections from Frelimo, and the rival movements that were set up.
[19] It seems that when Simango joined COREMO in July 1971 he made overtures to China which caused some concern to the Frelimo leadership. Machel immediately decided to pre-empt Simango by visiting China and North Korea in August. See Christie, 1988: 72-74.

that their popular support was extremely limited.[20]

Frelimo dissidents who sought to establish an alternative movement had to start from scratch. Although in some cases they may have had a following, they did not have financial and material backing, and they did not manage to siphon off armed guerrilla detachments for their new movements. This brings us to the second point which contributes to an understanding of how the victorious group inside Frelimo managed to retain power over a reasonably cohesive movement: its control of the army.[21] When the armed struggle began the army rapidly became the most important component of Frelimo, obviously for military reasons but also for the purpose of spreading the political message - it was the military detachments that were in contact with the populations, not the leadership in exile. The most highly educated members of Frelimo rose rapidly through the ranks bringing with them a common outlook which, from the late 1960s began to find expression in a Marxist vocabulary. Their control of the most important positions in Frelimo's structure, and above all in the army, was crucial to preventing the disaggregation of the movement. The only dissident leader who seems to have had some military support of his own was Nkavandame, but his authoritarian and corrupt practices appear to have robbed him of the support he might otherwise have claimed.[22] Most importantly, two young Makonde military commanders, initially close to Nkavandame, Raimundo Pachinuapa and Alberto Chipande, threw their weight behind the "southerners".

It should not be assumed that the dominant group inside Frelimo was particularly homogeneous. It has already been mentioned that the term "southerner" was applied to

[20] COREMO had launched a military operation in Tete in 1965 but it was rapidly crushed by the Portuguese. According to Mondlane (1983: 132) this was because "no groundwork had been done on which to base such action". Another brief raid in Tete (Mukangadzi) in January 1971 is all that is known of COREMO's military activity (Henriksen, 1978: 189).
[21] This aspect is developed in more detail in Brito, 1991: 112-118.
[22] Brito (1991: 118) suggests that Nkavandame had his own militia, as well as a personal network of political support. The references to Nkavandame's corruption are well known and hinge upon his control of pricing policies in the liberated areas of Cabo Delgado. See for example Hanlon, 1984: 32-33 or Egerö, 1987: 22-24.

Marcelino dos Santos even though he was from the north of the country; Pachinuapa and Chipande were both from the region that borders Tanzania and others such as Filipe Samuel Magaia were also northerners, and yet they were considered to be in the group of the "southerners". The central region of Mozambique was only lightly represented inside Frelimo after the expulsion of Simango, but there was still considerable diversity. Several whites[23] had joined in the 1960s, and some young *mestiços*[24] were also important. Mondlane and Machel were both from Gaza but from different ethnic groups. Other young leaders - Joaquim Chissano, Armando Guebuza, Mariano Matsinhe, Pascoal Mocumbi - were also from the south of the country but this is still not convincing evidence of a southern plot, and much less of a "Shangaan" plot. A much more convincing explanation for the cohesiveness of this group lies in their relatively high level of education, and the common approach which this brought. The distribution of educational opportunities for Africans during the colonial period - sparse though it was - favoured those who lived closer to Lourenço Marques, and so this "southern" dominance should not be regarded as "ethnic". Those who were not geographically from the south, and yet shared the ideas of the southerners, were also educated people. Pachinuapa and Chipande had been teachers; Magaia had been a member of the student movement NESAM.[25] The whites and *mestiços* (who also came from different parts of the country) obviously benefited from much greater educational opportunities than the majority of the population.

Ironically, one of the big crises of the late 1960s helped to consolidate the pre-eminence of the "southerners". The disputes occasioned by Mateus Gwenjere at the Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam led to the departure from Frelimo of a number of students. Had they stayed with Frelimo, and entered the armed struggle as Mondlane intended, it is

---

[23] The most well-known are Jacinto Veloso, Fernando Ganhão, José Luis Cabaço, João Ferreira and Hélder Martins. All of them became Ministers after Independence, with the exception of Ganhão who was Rector of the University.

[24] Such as Sérgio Vieira, Óscar Monteiro, Jorge Rebelo.

[25] On NESAM see Hedges, 1993: 203-205 and 243-245.

reasonable to assume that some responsabilities and leadership posts would have been distributed amongst them. Instead, power remained concentrated in the hands of the "southerners" for a longer period of time than might otherwise have been the case.[26]

The most important key to Frelimo's survival, despite all the internal cleavages, was therefore a dual one: with few exceptions, the most highly educated members did not follow the dissidents into other movements;[27] and control over the army remained firmly in the hands of the younger and more educated militants. Saul's "class struggle" explanation was challenged by Opello as far back as 1975. However, Opello's counter-explanation - that the conflicts were the result of competition among elite factions - is only partly correct. Although the "class struggle" claim was not convincing it established itself and was repeated by a generation of historians. The reason for this lies not in its capacity to explain events but in its role as an important element in the formation and justification of Frelimo's Marxist discourse which was discussed in chapter 2.

By May 1970 Samora Machel occupied the Presidency of Frelimo and Marcelino dos Santos was his number two. The leadership of the movement was now in the hands of the most highly educated members, mostly southerners, *mestiços* and *assimilados*. This group was much more consistent and cohesive than its predecessors and its rise to power marked a gradual transformation in the discourse of the movement. Whereas in the early years national liberation was the ideal that bound the movement together, by the end of the decade the objective was "to end the exploitation of man by man".[28]

---

[26] On this dispute see the exchange between Mondlane (1967) and the National Union of Mozambican Students (UNEMO, 1968). I am not aware of any information on the geographical or ethnic origin of the students who left Frelimo.

[27] The students dispersed, some seeking employment in other countries and others securing grants to continue their studies. Some aspects of the curious career of José Massinga, who was a student in the US in the 1960s, and an opponent of Mondlane's, may be gleaned from Hanlon, 1984: 31 and Vines, 1991: 67 and 127.

[28] See the dialogue between Marcelino dos Santos and Joe Slovo, referred to in chapter 2. Santos, 1973.

3. The Formation of an Ideology: international context

Between the late 1960s and independence events in the wider world converged to both push and pull the Frelimo leadership into accepting the doctrine that colonialism was best understood as a particular form of capitalist domination and that true liberation could therefore only mean liberation from capitalism as well.

The decision to resort to armed struggle as a means for achieving independence was taken at a very early stage by the newly founded Frelimo, possibly because occasional outbursts of spontaneous violence had led the leadership to conclude that if it did not assume the initiative there would be anti-colonial violence that was beyond their control and direction, as in Angola.[29] The First Congress was held in September 1962 and in January 1963 the first Frelimo militants arrived in Algeria for military training. The decision to embark upon a military strategy was directly related to the situations in the other Portuguese colonies. In Angola UPA (later FNLA) and the MPLA had chosen armed struggle in early 1961; in Guinea-Bissau the PAIGC had begun small-scale attacks during 1962 and was fully committed to developing a military strategy.[30] Mozambicans such as Mondlane, Marcelino dos Santos and Aquino de Bragança had been in contact with Agostinho Neto, Amílcar Cabral, Mário Pinto de Andrade and others, particularly through the CONCP[31], and were in no doubt that the Salazar regime in Portugal would only cede independence under military pressure. Such was the certainty that Portugal would not even consider independence for Mozambique that Frelimo did not even attempt to enter into conversations with the government in Lisbon. The massacre that

[29] This is the argument advanced by Newitt (1995: 523). Guimarães (1992: 72-77) argues that the MPLA's first public act was to claim leadership of a popular revolt to which it was unconnected.

[30] On Angola see John Marcum (1969), *The Angolan Revolution, Volume I: Anatomy of an Explosion 1950-1962*, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press; John Marcum (1978), *The Angolan Revolution, Volume II: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare 1962-1976*, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press; also Guimarães, 1992 and Birmingham, 1992. On Guinea-Bissau see Chabal, 1983.

[31] Conferência de Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas (Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies). Founded in 1961.

took place at Mueda in June 1960 was taken to be evidence enough of Portuguese intransigence.[32] By choosing the military option it was inevitable that Frelimo would have to participate in the international diplomatic arena, and this search for allies and suppliers naturally influenced the movement's political outlook.

Portugal was a member of Nato and counted on the support of Nato countries for military equipment right up to 1974. Gradually the support given to Portugal by its allies became less enthusiastic. The Portuguese government was fortunate that public opinion in the United States was overwhelmingly focused on the Vietnam War and in most European countries Portugal's African wars were an obscure issue. However, the massacre carried out by Portuguese troops in the village of Wiriyamu (Tete) in December 1972 created great difficulties for the Portuguese premier Marcello Caetano when he visited London in July 1973, shortly after the news broke.[33] In August 1973 the Swedish government announced that it was doubling its financial aid to Frelimo. Norway also increased its donations to the liberation movement and in September of that year Willy Brandt's government in West Germany officially recognized Frelimo.[34] An earlier diplomatic success had been scored when Pope Paul VI received Marcelino dos Santos, Amílcar Cabral and Agostinho Neto in July 1970, to the amazement of the Lisbon government and the Portuguese Catholic Church.[35]

[32] This assessment was probably correct. The Mueda massacre assumed great symbolic importance in Frelimo accounts of resistance to colonialism. Mondlane (1983: 118) wrote that "after this massacre things in the north could never return to normal". Alberto Chipande, who was Frelimo's Defence Minister from 1975 to 1994, witnessed the massacre and claimed that 600 people were killed. His testimony is reproduced in Mondlane (1983: 118) and also in Isaacman and Isaacman (1983: 80). Hanlon (1984: 24) says that "as many as 600 people may have been killed". Saul (1979: 314) revises the figure to 500 but gives no reasoning for this. Newitt (1995: 521) more cautiously speaks of "large numbers" and Hedges (1993: 242) and Birmingham (1992: 66) refer to "several hundred". Cruz e Silva and José (1991) compare the two existing sources for the story of the Mueda massacre and argue that there is much space for further interviews and research. Research by Michel Cahen suggests that the number of people killed was much lower than has been indicated so far. (Personal communication. To be published in his forthcoming book *Résistances et Ethnicité: Pages blanches d'histoire mozambicaine, 1939-1960*, Paris: Karthala).

[33] See Hastings, 1974, and José Freire Antunes, 1992: 251-253.

[34] Freire Antunes, 1992: 253, fn.

[35] See Frelimo, 1970.

Despite these morale boosters, Frelimo became increasingly dissatisfied with the attitude of western countries to its struggle. The Scandinavian countries offered a measure of material support but for most of its military requirements Frelimo had to turn to the Soviet bloc. Soviet-sponsored organizations such as the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Committee and the World Council for Peace and Cooperation offered platforms from which Frelimo leaders could make their voices heard.[36] Frelimo naturally came to look upon the Soviet Union as an ally with common interests.

In the confrontational atmosphere of the Cold War Frelimo had an anti-western and pro-Soviet position although, unusually, it did manage to maintain simultaneously good relations with the Soviet Union and China. The Chinese experience was very interesting for Frelimo during the struggle for independence. Samora Machel, in July 1974, revealed why he admired Mao:

> Mao developed Marxism-Leninism in a creative way and that is the fundamental thing: how to apply Marxism given specific conditions? That is the only way to avoid making Marxism into a dogma.[37]

Frelimo's relations with China were rooted in the movement's very early days. Eduardo Mondlane visited China in 1963 and returned "convinced that the historical struggle of the Chinese people had relevance to the present struggle of the people of Africa".[38] Of particular importance was the fact that Frelimo relied heavily on Chinese instructors for training in its camps in Tanzania. Most of Frelimo's military equipment was of Soviet origin but by having Chinese instructors Frelimo lessened its dependence on Moscow.[39]

The other important international factor to influence the views of Frelimo leaders was the experience of the first generation of African states, those that had gained their

---

[36] Freire Antunes, 1992: 230, and Simpson, 1993: 314.
[37] Quoted in Luis de Brito, 1988: 19.
[38] Quoted in Simpson, 1989: 153-154.
[39] Simpson, 1989: 159-160.

independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The failures of "African socialism" was influencing political thought and policies all over Africa. The most important claim of "African socialism" was that ownership of land and other means of production in Africa had historically been "communal" and therefore "socialist".[40] Class conflict was considered to be particular to advanced capitalism. Colonialism had disrupted the African form of organization so the objective of independent policies should be to restore African societies to their pristine state. By the late 1960s these ideas were falling into disrepute. Most importantly (because Frelimo had its headquarters in Dar es Salaam) the Tanzanian experience of *ujamaa* had run into serious difficulties within a couple of years of the 1967 Arusha Declaration that set it up. As Bill Freund points out,

> At least one writer has systematically explored the striking parallels between utopian Tanzanian ideology and nineteenth-century populist thought, the socialism of wishful thinking, exactly in reaction against which Marx and Engels evolved their 'scientific', class-based analysis of socialism.[41]

By the middle of the 1970s Frelimo was, on a theoretical plane, very distant from the analyses of Nyerere and others.[42] At another level, however, the shared and yet unspoken notions of modernity were vitally important.

Frelimo's growing adherence to a more orthodox pro-Soviet Marxism[43] was partly the result of the opportunities which this discourse presented for the dominant elites inside Frelimo. It was also influenced by events on the international stage and in particular by the support that Frelimo had received from the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the Frelimo leadership was wary of becoming excessively dependent upon the Soviet Union and a

---

[40] See for example Nyerere, 1968: 305-309.
[41] Freund, 1984: 247. The writer he refers to is Suzanne Mueller, "The Historical Origins of Tanzania's Ruling Class", *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, XV (1981).
[42] As early as 1969 Mondlane (1983: 183) wrote that Frelimo was developing "forms of government ... which are essentially new, owing their origin only marginally to African traditional life and not at all to colonialism".
[43] By the mid-1970s this version of Marxism had come to be called "scientific socialism". Ruling movements in Angola, Ethiopia, the Congo and Benin also claimed to be guided by "scientific socialism".

negative experience in 1974 permitted it to widen its points of reference. The most pro-Soviet group inside Frelimo, led by Marcelino dos Santos, viewed the international arena as a battlefield between "socialism" and "capitalism". They argued that Frelimo should firmly support the Soviet Union because it led the socialist camp and because it was Mozambique's "strategic rearguard". Others were more concerned to maintain flexibility at an international level. As one former minister put it, "Samora was always very concerned with diversifying our dependencies".[44]

Between the Portuguese coup in April 1974 and August of that year Frelimo experienced great difficulties in obtaining weaponry to intensify its armed struggle. Frelimo argued that there could be no cease-fire until the colonial authorities accepted the principle of independence for Mozambique but the Portuguese Communist Party, which was closely allied to Moscow, supported the position of the new Portuguese President, Spínola, which was that decolonization should only take place once Portugal itself had been democratized.[45] In order to bring further pressure to bear on Lisbon (and in order for its troops to be seen in more areas of the country) Frelimo wanted to step up its military activities but at that point the Soviet Union was unwilling to provide further military supplies. This was a setback for the pro-Soviet group inside Frelimo but others, including Machel, saw in it an opportunity for Frelimo to 'play the China card', rejecting the idea of imitating the Soviet model.

The model that Frelimo declared it wished to follow was that of the liberated zones. Lessons might be learned from the experience of other countries - the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, Vietnam - but Machel was a firm believer that Mozambique would have to find its own route to socialism. More importantly still, Machel did not wish to tie Frelimo down to a particular path and to a particular set of alliances. In order to maintain this

---

[44] Interview with José Luis Cabaço, Maputo, 12 May 1993. Cabaço was Minister of Information and Minister of Transports under Samora Machel.
[45] Brito, 1988: 19.

flexibility Frelimo would have to develop further the model of the liberated zones. To a certain extent, for the purposes of propaganda during the war, an idyllic vision of life in the liberated zones had already been built up. How much this corresponded to reality is hard to assess and in a sense this is secondary because the importance of the image of the liberated zones lay in its political value, not its practical usefulness for the future. The political value of the image was that it established the principle of a Mozambican model, and this model could then be added to or altered at will.

4. The Formation of an Ideology: the liberated zones

Until very recently conditions in the liberated zones have been known almost exclusively through officially sanctioned sources.[46] The following description is, like all such descriptions, dependent upon the available information. Nevertheless, an interesting aspect of Frelimo's own assessment is that however accurate or inaccurate it may have been, the leadership believed it; this was the image that was used to create the model for a Mozambican route to socialism.

From the late 1960s, and particularly as the liberated areas grew in size during the 1970s, Frelimo developed an idyllic picture of a communalistic life-style in the liberated areas. The experience of Amílcar Cabral's PAIGC showed the public relations value of this exercise. At the time the main point that Frelimo sought to make was that the people in the liberated areas supported Frelimo, and that Frelimo was living up to Mao's dictum: "The people is to the guerrilla as water is to the fish". Sympathetic academics and journalists helped Frelimo to fill in the details of this picture and to make it more well known. At a later stage, and particularly in the Central Committee's Report to the Third Congress, Frelimo officials developed the argument that the experience of running the liberated zones was a defining moment for the movement, allowing for progress to

---

[46] Brito (1989: 127-135) and Coelho (1993: part II) offer new research.

another phase in its purification process.[47] The existence of liberated zones created opportunities for enrichment through the control of trade circuits which were no longer in the hands of the Portuguese. In the official accounts we find that the "new exploiters" were attracted to these possibilities like bears to honey, and this process thus separated those who were truly with the people from those who merely wished to step into the shoes of the departing colonialists.[48]

It seems to have been the case that from the beginning the question of how to organize the liberated zones was the object of disputes inside Frelimo. Nkavandame and others apparently argued that the liberated zones should be administered by the "traditional authorities". The more radical, younger and educated elements of the party believed that the liberated zones should be controlled by the *Forças Populares de Libertação de Moçambique* (FPLM), the army, which was under the direction of Samora Machel. The disputes before Frelimo's Second Congress, held in Niassa in July 1968, centred upon whether or not military personnel should participate as delegates in the Congress. Nkavandame had strong support among his "chairmen"[49] but the military personnel were increasingly faithful to Machel.[50] Mondlane threw his weight behind the "southerners" and it was decided that each province should be represented by nine military personnel and eight civilians. With the cards thus stacked against him Nkavandame chose to boycott the Second Congress. For several months he attempted to rally his fellow Makonde behind him but in March 1969 he realised that his position was untenable and, together with 35 followers, surrendered to the Portuguese authorities.

The official account offered by Frelimo in 1977 appears to be partially correct. There was effectively a dispute between different ideas of how the liberated zones should be run,

---

[47] The "purification model" that Yussuf Adam talks of is referred to in chapter 2.
[48] Frelimo Central Committee Report to the Third Congress. Kruks (1987: 242-244) repeats the official interpretation.
[49] The Tanganyikan-inspired name given to district-level Frelimo leaders in Cabo Delgado.
[50] In 1967 Machel had carried out an important reorganization of the army.

---

and this dispute was partly about the nature of the trade circuits. The dimension which is left out of the official account, and which is crucial to a proper understanding of Frelimo in the late 1960s, is that the dispute was also about rivalry for control between mutually unintelligible factions: that of the older Makonde leaders who had come from MANU and whose political support was civilian; and that of the younger and more educated "southerners" whose power base was the army. What "the peasantry" thought about all this we have no way of knowing.

By 1970 it had been decided that the army would name political figures, answerable to Frelimo's Department of Defence, to organize and direct "economic, social and administrative life" in the liberated zones.[51] According to one author,

> The liberated areas began to be seen as counter-states, negations not only of the colonial dispensation but of traditional African society. The latter, characterized by the power of the chiefs, tribalism, and the subordinate position of women, was judged to be as undesirable as Portuguese rule.[52]

At this point Frelimo's leadership began to confront the problem of chiefly power, but it did not do so in a fully consistent fashion.[53] There could be no standard line on this issue because the situation everywhere was particular. In some places the *régulos* had great popular legitimacy, in other places they were resented by the population. This had to be assessed by Frelimo's military detachments. In each case a different approach was required if Frelimo was to gain the support of the population. On the other hand, some *régulos* sympathized with Frelimo whereas others disagreed, and many waited to see which way the wind was blowing before committing themselves.[54] Mondlane argued that Frelimo would oppose all chiefs who did not join the movement, and that it would support chiefs who joined the movement only as members of the movement with no

---

[51] Brito, 1988: 23.
[52] Simpson, 1992: 9.
[53] See Mondlane, 1969.
[54] Coelho (1993: 245, 262-263) refers to the differing attitudes of a number of *régulos* and *fumos* (lower level chiefs whose authority did not derive from the colonial state).

special privileges or powers in relation to anybody else.[55] In practice though this issue was more complicated.[56]

Frelimo quickly realised that Portuguese power, exercised through the *régulos*, was fragile in that it depended greatly on the personality of these *régulos*.[57] However, there were different views on whether they should be won over or simply overthrown. If these local leaders turned and supported Frelimo, the movement benefited in the short term but it also took on board a potential problem over the longer term. Because of their leading role prior to the appearance of Frelimo, Frelimo would not be seen as the source of their political legitimacy. However, if Frelimo simply chose to remove all sources of authority that it found when it entered a new area, it could make its own task more difficult. Mondlane argued that the "traditional political structure was really destroyed by the Portuguese"[58] and that therefore Frelimo "must fill in the vacuum with new politics".[59] The reality though was that the country was certainly not a *tabula rasa* and in practice, throughout the 1960s, Frelimo acted on an ad hoc basis. Mondlane was vaguely aware that eventually a consistent policy would be necessary but felt no immediate need to establish one.[60]

Nevertheless, it was important for Frelimo to claim that it was the sole source of authority and legitimacy. It appears that the level of popular participation in decision-making increased considerably in the liberated areas, bolstering Frelimo's popular legitimacy.[61] Other changes were also taking place in the liberated zones. Frelimo put a lot of effort into training teachers, creating schools and health posts, and new agricultural

[55] Mondlane, 1969: 120.
[56] The interview given by Celestino de Sousa to João Paulo Coelho provides examples of early contacts made by Frelimo to *régulos* in Tete Province. Coelho, 1991.
[57] João Paulo Coelho (1989: 66-68) provides specific examples of this. See also Alexander (1995) on Manica Province.
[58] Mondlane, 1969: 120.
[59] Mondlane, 1969: 121.
[60] Mondlane, 1983: 164-165.
[61] We are dependent, on this particular point, upon Saul, 1979: 69-74 and Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 93-96, as well as upon Frelimo itself.

interpretation helps to explain the observation that after Independence peasants in the former liberated zones manifested no more enthusiasm for collective production than anywhere else in the country. In the liberated zones people were not organized into collective villages: they lived in scattered homesteads, and were subject to a more or less established form of political organization - the "villagers" were the inhabitants of Frelimo "circles". Frelimo feminine militias would go round collecting specified amounts of produce from each house which were used to feed the guerrillas or to exchange in neighbouring countries for cloth, soap and other goods that the "villages" needed.[65] The liberated areas were not fully secured territory - Frelimo's war was a guerilla war, not a conventional war, and so it could not afford to have clearly identifiable rearguard bases. The claim that the idea of the communal villages came from the liberated areas cannot be given credibility, except in the far-fetched sense that they can be considered to be the physical translation of a political metaphor. Coelho discounts this possibility and points instead to the influence of the Tanzanian experience.[66]

After Independence the experience of the liberated zones was held up to have been idyllic, a shining example for the socialist transformation of the country as a whole.[67] The available evidence, patchy though it is, suggests that Frelimo's later account of the liberated areas was closely connected to its political preoccupations of the moment rather than to its desire to understand the past.

5. The Transition to Independence

On April 25 1974 Portuguese army officers in Lisbon carried out a coup, overthrowing a

[65] Coelho, 1993: 330-331.
[66] Coelho, 1993: 331.
[67] See for example Samora Machel's comments to the authors of Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 100. Also, the Central Committee's Report to Frelimo's Third Congress said the following: "The Revolution demands that we extend the experience of the liberated areas to the entire country. The organization of the peasants into rural communities is essential for the development of collective life in the countryside and for the creation of the necessary conditions for socialized agriculture...".

techniques were introduced. According to Frelimo claims of the time (1966) no less than 100,000 peasants in Cabo Delgado Province were innoculated against smallpox and in that same year 10,000 students were attending Frelimo primary schools in the liberated zones. By 1970 the movement claimed there were 30,000 students at Frelimo-run schools.[62]

Research carried out in Mueda (Cabo Delgado) suggests that the experience of the liberated zones varied considerably from person to person.[63] For some, the most prominent aspect of organization in the liberated zones was the repressive apparatus. According to this view the reorganization of life only worked because anybody who failed to comply would be beaten and those who tried to escape to Tanzania were sent back. The other view was that Frelimo did take heed of people's opinions and sought always to work with the people. As Luis de Brito points out, this dual experience is probably a result of the fact that the FPLM was simultaneously fighting a guerrilla war and managing society. The conclusion to be drawn would seem to be that the alliance between the peasantry and the military had points of tension, and that it should be understood in the context of the unique circumstances arising from the war, rather than as a project for transforming society with which the local people fully identified.[64]

The importance of collective production seems to have been exaggerated in later accounts. The research cited above indicates that family agriculture remained the basis of agricultural production, with people only working collectively to provide for the soldiers, and also to have a reserve in case the Portuguese army destroyed their family plots. This

[62] It is very difficult to gauge the accuracy of these figures because the source, Frelimo, clearly had a vested interest in making the numbers as large as possible. The figures are quoted in Isaacman and Isaacman (1983: 93-95) who obtain them from the Frelimo publication *Mozambique Revolution* No.51 (1972). Henriksen (1983: 150-151) suggests that some of the "liberated areas" which were shown to foreign observers were actually located inside Tanzania. Newitt (1995: 527) repeats this allegation but it seems that the sole source for it was the Portuguese Ambassador to Washington so this was probably just part of the propaganda war.
[63] Oficina de História do Centro de Estudos Africanos (1983), "Situação Actual nas Antigas Zonas Libertadas de Cabo Delgado". This research is discussed in Brito, 1988.
[64] 1988: 25-26.

regime that had stubbornly refused to countenance any idea of independence for the five African colonies. A cease-fire was declared in Mozambique, as in Angola and Guinea-Bissau, and negotiations began for the hand-over of power to Frelimo. By September a transitional government had been set up, headed by Joaquim Chissano, and Mozambique finally became independent on June 25 1975.

The most dramatic development following the Lusaka Agreement[68] was the large-scale exodus of Portuguese settlers and expatriates. On the day of the Agreement there was a badly-coordinated uprising in Lourenço Marques, Nampula and Beira that was quashed by a joint force of Frelimo and Portuguese troops within three days.[69] The attempted *coup* resulted in 82 dead, 13 of whom were white, and several hundred wounded.[70] One of the effects of this was to heighten racial tension in the cities. Despite appeals from Samora Machel and other Frelimo officials many whites began to leave the country, some returning to Portugal, many going to South Africa.[71] A further and more brutal explosion of racial violence, apparently started by departing Portuguese troops on 21 October, quickened the tempo of the Portuguese exodus. By mid-1976 only about 5-10,000 whites remained from a figure of about 200,000 a couple of years earlier. It should be said though, that the Portuguese exodus began earlier. Around 30,000 left during 1973, and 20,000 more had left during the first four months of 1974.[72]

[68] The Lusaka Agreement, signed on 7 September 1974 by Samora Machel and then Portuguese Foreign Minister Mário Soares provided for a cease-fire, a Transitional Government dominated by Frelimo leading to independence the following year. Soares and Machel had met on June 5 and 6, also in Lusaka, but at the time Soares did not have a mandate to negotiate independence so the meeting was inconclusive. For an insider's account of the negotiations see Aquino de Bragança, 1986a.
[69] Apparently the then South African defence minister, P.W.Botha, mobilised troops to support the uprising but his invasion plans were aborted by the South African secret service, BOSS, on orders from Prime Minister Vorster who was intent on carrying out his *détente* with black Africa. See Hanlon, 1986: 136.
[70] These figures are official Portuguese statistics, quoted in *The Times*, September 16 1974.
[71] The Frelimo leadership was happy to have whites on board. It has already been mentioned that there were several high-ranking whites in Frelimo. However, in practical terms, whites during that period had to declare their political allegiance to Frelimo; Indians and *mestiços* came under a similar pressure. There are also many accounts by whites who left of being harassed by local Frelimo leaders. The interviews carried out for Cravinho 1990 and 1995 revealed many such instances.
[72] Official Portuguese figures cited in *The Times of Zambia*, September 22 1975.

During its first eighteen months in power the government sought to secure the day-to-day management of the economy through massive interventions as Portuguese colonists pulled out. The Frelimo leadership had not expected to come to power so soon and indeed it had developed the view that a protracted war would facilitate its plans for a socialist transformation.[73] It had no detailed plans and decisions were taken on an *ad hoc* basis.

At Independence the new Government was faced with an emergency situation. Very few people with any sort of technical or managerial skills remained in the country, and in any case most factories and many farms were no longer operational as the departing Portuguese had taken with them anything they could remove and destroyed many things that could not be removed. Thousands of tractors were driven over the borders to Rhodesia and South Africa and other agricultural machinery was destroyed. Much industrial machinery in factories was also destroyed and numerous subterfuges were employed to transfer money and valuables out of the country.[74] In other cases settlers simply destroyed infrastructure that they would not take with them, out of rage against the end of the Portuguese empire.

In many cases the Government "intervened", taking over the running of abandoned businesses.[75] The other instrument used by Frelimo in an attempt to stanch this drain on the economy was the *Grupos Dinamizadores* (GDs). The GDs varied greatly from place to place. They began as embryonic Frelimo party committees that sprang up everwhere (in factories, shops, government departments, farms, neighbourhoods) during the

[73] See Frelimo, 1968a, which is entitled "On the Necessity of a Prolonged War". Marcelino dos Santos (1973: 50) explained that "In the process of the struggle the individuals who are on the side of the revolution grow as human beings and this is important because we consider that there cannot be a new society without a new man". See also Saul, 1973: 25-31.
[74] Kruks, 1987: 249; Hanlon, 1984: 46-48.
[75] "Interventions" were established under the Transitional Government by Decree-Law 16/75 of 13 February 1975. After independence this legislation was maintained as Decree-Law 18/75 of 19 October 1975. Under this legislation the state could assume responsibility for managing businesses that being abandoned or were closing down partially or totally, or those in which there were suspicions of illegal transfer of funds or goods. Hanlon, 1984:48; Egerö, 1987: 71.

transition to Independence, and were pulled into the vacuum created by the retreating Portuguese. In some places they took on the functions of management, elsewhere they served as political vigilantes.[76] The GDs were essentially an attempt to impose some sort of order onto a situation of growing chaos and to widen and deepen Frelimo's political control. By 1977, once Frelimo had established itself nation-wide, the party leadership decided to rein in the GDs. In the spirit of its growing orthodoxy, the leadership began to view the GDs "as potential breeding grounds for an aspirant petty-bourgeoisie".[77] Above all though, the fact that the GDs were neither official party structures nor structures of the state meant that once the immediate chaos of transition had passed their functions and methods had to be re-assessed.[78] Furthermore, the emphasis on political mobilization that accompanied the struggle for national liberation began to give way, predictably perhaps, to a concern for taking over in an orderly fashion the administrative apparatus of a modern state.

6. Economic Reorganization

Most of the wide-ranging interventions in the economy concerned small scale businesses. At the beginning of 1977 there were 319 cases, of which 141 employed less than 20 workers, and only 47 employed more than 100.[79] The standard point of view is that these interventions were largely involuntary, the result of events beyond the control of the government.[80] Undoubtedly, in the confusion of the times, the government was mainly reacting to events rather than embarking upon a planned and coordinated attempt to transform society. Nonetheless, the form in which the government reacted was not random: it obeyed general ideas and approaches that had been developed over the years.

[76] The latter function became particularly important after a national meeting of GDs in Mocuba in February 1975. See Egerö, 1987: 65-72.
[77] Simpson, 1989: 169. Munslow (1983: 153) also makes the point that those who rose within the GDs tended to be the most articulate, most educated and most well-off.
[78] The appropriate term here, and the one that was used, is the Portuguese word *enquadrar*, meaning to place in a context.
[79] Cardoso, 1993: 133.
[80] See, for example, Hanlon, 1984: chapters 7 and 9; Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: chapter 7; Saul, 1979: chapter 15; Egerö, 1987: chapter 6.

Furthermore, some decisions were part of Frelimo's plans for transforming the whole of Mozambican economy and society. There was a political logic present, rather than simply a series of stop-gap measures. A particularly prominent measure was the nationalization of all land.[81] The main principle that was followed was that wherever possible power over resources and decisions was centralized in the Frelimo party-state. This was justified in terms of the rationalization of resources and the crackdown on private exploitation.[82]

Many large plantations and farms were abandoned in 1975 and in many cases the government assumed the responsibilities of management. About two thousand abandoned farms passed over to state control in this fashion.[83] Another area where large-scale reorganization by the state took place was in rural marketing. The bulk of rural traders had been Portuguese or Asian so when they left it became very difficult for peasant farmers to sell their crops. The continued existence in private hands of a crucial sector of the economy was unpalatable to the country's new leadership. An immediate problem was that the dearth of consumer goods reaching the rural areas meant that cash transactions became less relevant.[84]

During the last decades of colonialism the service sector of the economy was of growing importance, reaching 44.6% of GDP in 1970.[85] The bulk of this was composed of items that fell sharply after Independence: freight services from and to the Transvaal and Rhodesia; some tourist traffic; other service activities that grew up around them such as banking, insurance and import/export trade.[86] The other important element in the growth of services was the use of Mozambican labour on the gold mines of the Rand. During the 1950s and 1960s about one hundred thousand Mozambican workers were legally

[81] Constitution of the People's Republic of Mozambique, Article 8.
[82] See Central Committee Report to the Third Congress, particularly chapter 3.
[83] Cardoso, 1993: 133.
[84] Rural marketing networks and the government's intervention in this area is examined in more detail in chapter 7.
[85] World Bank, quoted in J.P.Azam et al, 1988: 90. This figure naturally excludes all non-marketed production so it is only an approximation.
[86] On the economic links between South Africa and colonial Mozambique see, for example, Hanlon, 1986: 131-135.

employed in South African mines at any one time, another hundred thousand worked on farms in Rhodesia and, according to one estimate, about 190,000 others were illegal migrants.[87] This export of labour was very profitable to the colonial state, particularly in the case of the gold mines because over half of the miner's salary was transferred directly to the colonial coffers in gold at a fixed price. Workers were then paid in escudos. When the price of gold was freed, Portugal, and later Mozambique, made large profits.[88] The new political climate after Independence meant that large reductions in the flow of labour to those two countries was inevitable.[89] Regarding the mines Mozambique had an unexpected reprieve: in April 1974 a WNLA[90] aircraft crashed killing 72 Malawian miners. President Banda temporarily suspended the supply of migrant labourers from his country and WNLA turned to Mozambique to take up the slack.[91] Ironically then, 1975 was a record year (118,030), but this was short-lived and after that no more than 45,000 went to work on the mines. In 1976 Mozambique imposed the mandatory economic sanctions that had been decreed by the UN on Rhodesia, incurring large losses of revenue and also provoking Rhodesian raids that became increasingly fierce. In short, the large service sector of the economy, mainly dependent on economic links with South Africa and Rhodesia, was drastically reduced during the first years of independence.

[87] Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 49.
[88] The gold was handed over to the colonial government at a fixed price of 29.75 rands per ounce, which was below the world market rates. The colonial authorities then paid the miners in escudos and used the difference to help finance the balance of payments deficit. The agreement should be understood as a political payment from South Africa to Portugal in return for the provision of a reliable supply of temporary labour which in turn reduced the overhead costs of the mining industry. First (1983: 212-222) describes the agreements between Portugal and South Africa. The existence of these agreements posed a problem for the new Frelimo government. To inherit them from the Portuguese would have been politically questionable as the movement had long been critical of the conditions under which labour was supplied to South Africa (see Mondlane, 1983: 91-93). On the other hand they were a very important source of foreign exchange. In the event, after several secret meetings in Swaziland (Cahen, 1987: 109-110), the South African government took the decision that Frelimo was reluctant to take and renounced the agreement which had almost expired anyway. The main reason for the South African decision was that gold was soaring on the international markets and so the fixed price agreement was becoming much more costly to South Africa.
[89] As a political measure against Mozambique, rather than as a Mozambican measure.
[90] Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, the recruiting agency for the Chamber of Mines. From 1909 WNLA had exclusive recruiting rights in the South of Mozambique.
[91] First, 1983: 55.

Another factor that further debilitated the new country's economy were the floods of 1977 and 1978. First the Limpopo and the Nkomati rivers flooded and the next year the Zambezi overspilled its banks. In each year the crops lost to the flooding were estimated at about a quarter of Mozambique's food imports and the Zambezi flood alone displaced about 220,000 people.[92] The government decided that it did not make sense to locate people back in the areas where they had come from as there was a fair chance that sooner or later the rivers would flood again and once more scarce resources would have to be deployed in rescuing them.[93] The floods thus created an opportunity for an increase in Frelimo's ongoing programme of villagization with over 100 villages created in the Limpopo and Zambezi valleys. In 1981 the rivers flooded again so the government's decision may well have saved lives. However, the level of compulsion involved also ensured that there was a political price for Frelimo.[94]

Despite these negative developments, Frelimo did manage to make big advances in some areas, notably health and education. The colonial regime had been extremely negligent in providing such services to the African population and in just a few years Frelimo succeeded in making impressive changes. Between 1975 and 1982 the number of pupils in school doubled and the literacy rate grew by 20%.[95] Between 1977 and 1981 the number of health posts grew so that the number of people served by each one fell from 16,200 to 11,600; large-scale innoculation campaigns were also launched. In urban areas infant mortality fell from 150 to 80 per thousand.[96] Thus, despite a lack of growth in GNP per capita (see below) standards of living probably improved for many people during the first years after Independence.

[92] Economic Report prepared by the National Planning Commission, Maputo, January 1984.
[93] Interview with Sérgio Vieira, Maputo, 22 April 1983.
[94] Hanlon, 1984: 128.
[95] Frelimo, 1989c: 3. On education see Marshall, 1985. The growth in literacy was exclusively in Portuguese which was to have negative consequences regarding its sustainability. See Cahen, 1990.
[96] Frelimo, 1989c.4. On health see: Walt and Melamed, eds, 1983; Hanlon, 1984: chapter 8; Barker, 1985.

Most of the service sector and the extractive industry was nationalized during the first three years of independence: the banks (apart from one bank), the insurance sector, the oil refinery, the coal mines. At no point did Frelimo state that it wanted to do away completely with the private sector, either in agriculture or in other areas, but its vigilance against "aspirants to the bourgeoisie" and "agents of international capitalism" made matters difficult for the development of entrepreneurial activity either by Mozambicans or by foreigners. Furthermore, departing settlers carried out a range of actions which were inimical to Frelimo's new order, and this provided an added urgency to the interventions.

Following Frelimo's Third Congress (1977), the National Planning Commission (CNP) was established in 1978 to function as a Mozambican *Gosplan*.[97] The CNP was regarded, just as *Gosplan* had been, as the key element of the bureaucracy into which all the data would be fed and out of which the overall strategy, and indeed many specific policy directives, would emerge as a coherent whole. At that time Frelimo believed that heavy industry was the defining characteristic of a modern economy and so the CNP's first central state plan (1979-1980) concentrated its efforts on developing this sector. Consumer industries and agricultural-processing industries were also given priority as a first step to reducing dependence on foreign imports. Apart from its economic logic, import substitution was seen as being a strategic imperative as well, given the desire to reduce dependence on Rhodesia and South Africa. However, this imperative was an ambiguous one: in security terms it clearly made sense to reduce the dependence upon South Africa but on the other hand Frelimo was interested in maximizing the foreign exchange that could accrue from exchanges with South Africa. An example of this ambiguity is that the service sector (which meant linkage with South Africa) was considered to be a growth sector for the economy. Large investments were made in the railway lines and in Maputo port, in the expectation that imports and exports for the

[97] On *Gosplan* see Nove, 1992: 94-96.

South African hinterland would provide Maputo with much needed foreign exchange.[98] This had the effect of increasing the country's economic dependence upon South Africa rather than decreasing it, and it gave Pretoria a convenient weapon which was duly used against Frelimo.

There was also a strategic/security logic in the CNP's emphasis upon the need to locate industries near their sources of raw materials and energy. At the time, industry was predominantly concentrated in the south of the country and was thus highly vulnerable to South African aggression and economic dominance.[99] The security logic therefore entailed building up industries in the north of the country, a measure that in turn might draw political dividends. This was very much a secondary consideration though, as Frelimo was not then concerned that its support was stronger in some parts of the country than in others.

Frelimo's claims to be heading a social revolution meant that it could not leave the colonial bourgeoisie untouched. One of the most important measures used in this context was the nationalization of all rental housing.[100] This was one of the prime factors behind the exodus of those whites who still remained in Mozambique in early 1976, and it put paid to the hopes of many whites who had moved to South Africa in the expectation of returning to Mozambique at some future moment. There was nothing accidental about this.[101] However, an aspect that was not given much publicity was that the legislation was just as much aimed at the weak nascent black bourgeoisie and the Asian community. Cardoso has argued that the measure should be seen as "part of the strategies to contain the growth of a local petty bourgeoisie".[102] Cahen takes this a step further and suggests that it was "a typical means of restricting the emergence of fractions of the petty

---

[98] Cahen, 1987: 112-113.
[99] See Mittelman, 1991: 94 and Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 163.
[100] Decree-Law 5/76 of 5 February 1976.
[101] As may be seen from the preamble of later legislation (Decree-Law 8/79 of 3 July 1979).
[102] Cardoso, 1993: 137.

bourgeoisie with greater investment in business than the bureaucratic elite, notably the Indian-Pakistani community".[103] Housing in urban areas became the responsibility of a state agency, APIE, which quickly gained a reputation for corruption.[104]

The first two years of independence saw a tremendous decline in all areas of the economy but between 1977 and 1981 there were signs that the government was beginning to turn the tide. The economy as a whole (GSP) grew by 12% over those four years, a rate slightly higher than the population growth rate.[105] Marketed crop production increased by 2.5% between 1977 and 1981 in terms of volume but it increased by 4.3% in terms of value during that period.[106] Industry and fisheries, which represented around a third of GSP, like agriculture, grew by 20% and there were smaller increases in the remaining sectors of the economy - construction, transport and communications, and trade. Exports grew from $US 153 million (1977) to $US 280 million (1981)[107] but, significantly, whereas in 1977 exports covered 45% of imports, by 1981 that figure was down to 35%.[108] Although these and other similar statistics were still far from Frelimo's early expectations, they appeared to offer some hope for the future. The introduction of central planning, administered through the CNP, was thought to offer the best chance of rationalizing Mozambique's weak resource base on a nation-wide basis, transforming Mozambique into a single vast and well-oiled economic machine.

In the rural areas Frelimo aimed to "urbanize the countryside" by gathering the people

---

[103] Cahen, 1993: 51.
[104] Isaacman and Isaacman, who are generally sympathetic to Frelimo, argue that the nationalization of housing "provided a new opportunity for the state bureaucracy to engage in corruption, and officials in the State Housing Authority (APIE) became notorious for allocating the best houses to their families and friends". (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 141). Another sympathizer, Barry Munslow, makes the same point (Munslow, 1983: 169-170).
[105] GSP (Global Social Product) was the measure used by many socialist countries. It represents "the sum of gross output in agriculture, industry, construction, transport, and trade. Thus, GSP excludes 'nonmaterial' services such as banking, insurance, tourism and public administration". IMF, 1985a: 3.
[106] My calculations from República Popular de Moçambique, 1986.
[107] Current prices.
[108] Ratilal, 1989: 179.

into communal villages.[109] This objectives and procedures for communal villages were not properly defined until 1977, although an important seminar held in Niassa in 1975 and the 8th Session of Frelimo's Central Committee in February 1976 had established some general principles.[110] However, it was not possible for authorities in some parts of the country to wait that long. In the north there was a political need for the speedy reintegration of populations that had been divided by the war, some in the liberated areas and others in the strategic hamlets of the Portuguese. Furthermore, in areas where Frelimo had been most influential, such as Cabo Delgado, the people had high expectations of social improvements from the communal villages and began gathering spontaneously.[111] The Nkomati, Limpopo and Zambezi floods accelerated the villagisation process. This process was severely handicapped by the lack of any popular participation in the design and location of the villages. The provincial governments took matters into their own hands and followed standard designs and recommendations which had been established in Maputo. In a large proportion of cases these designs failed to correspond to local needs and production declined as a result.[112] The villages were often a considerable distance from roads or from water or from good land.[113] Greater local participation in decisions did not materialize once the communal villages had been established because a very top-heavy chain of command was instituted from the ministries in Maputo through various commissions and provincial government departments to the communal villages.[114] The initially high expectations and promises for the "modernization" of the rural areas also failed to materialize so that by the end of the decade there was growing popular disenchantment with the communal villages. Villagers preferred to work on their individual plots of land, refraining from spending time in the

[109] Aspects of this process have already been described in chapter 3. The best and by far the most detailed assessment of the communal villages programme is in Coelho, 1993: 324-363.
[110] The Niassa Seminar was held in Marrupa from 29 May to 4 June 1975. The resolutions on communal villages from the February 1976 meeting are reproduced in *People's Power*, no.5 (London: MAGIC).
[111] Coelho, 1993: 332-333.
[112] Yañez Casal, 1988: 171-172.
[113] Coelho, 1993: 334-335.
[114] See figure 9.1 in Coelho, 1993: 343, which explains the decision-making process.

collective fields except under duress.[115] However, far from declining the process of villagization actually accelerated in the beginning of the 1980s. In the central provinces of Manica and Sofala, where the communal village programme expanded most rapidly, the underlying logic became mainly military, part of a strategy to contain Renamo activity.[116]

7. The Third Congress.

Frelimo's Third Congress was held in February 1977, and marks the consolidation of points of view that had been gaining importance for almost a decade. The Congress was held under the aegis of a Soviet-inspired Marxist discourse, tempered by frequent references to the value of Frelimo's historical experiences: the armed struggle and the liberated zones. In practical terms, the resolutions of the Third Congress attempted to put order into decisions that had been made in the heat of the moment, during the transition and the early months of independence. They represent a post hoc rationalisation, even if in many cases the philosophy that was declared at the Congress had also been present in the early decisions. In this task Frelimo was helped by Soviet and East European advisors who were largely in agreement with the dominant mood in Frelimo. The importance attached to creating a semblance of order about the past was a direct consequence of the leadership's desire to chart a course for the future.

Frelimo itself, as its name implies, had been constituted as a liberation front, and during the struggle for independence it had successfully rallied a large portion of the population to its immediate objective of securing independence. At the Third Congress it was decided that the time had come for Frelimo to transform itself into a "vanguard party",

[115] Coelho, 1993: 350, 353-4. Yañez Casal (1988) has studied the contradictions between family and cooperative production. Geffray (1990: 29-30) argues that in Nampula people spontaneously cultivated collective fields during the first year of independence but this was seen as "a sort of tribute paid for the victory" which was rarely renewed in subsequent years.
[116] Alexander (1995: 10) documents this in the case of Manica. More generally, Vines (1991: 114) and Minter (1994: 269, 271).

whereby membership and influence would hinge upon the right social background and above all a commitment to Marxism-Leninism.[117] The vanguard party had the job of taking over the state, which had served the interests of capitalism and colonialism, and transforming it.

This move towards the orthodox Soviet configuration was not unconditional or absolute. Frelimo's leaders were proud of their own revolutionary heritage, but in practice they found themselves reproducing classic Marxist formulations, with some variations. The proletariat, for example, a stratum of the population of negligible size, was accorded the role of "leading force" in society. Departing from traditional Marxist orthodoxy, Frelimo ideologues argued that the peasantry was allied to the working class, as were soldiers and progressive intellectuals (i.e. the ideologues themselves).[118]

> Frelimo is the vanguard Party of the worker-peasant alliance. Under the leadership of the working class, the Frelimo Party brings together in a voluntary and militant alliance based on Scientific Socialism, the workers, peasants, soldiers, revolutionary intellectuals and other workers forged and tempered in the struggle against the exploitation of man by man, for the victory of the people's interests. In its composition and its political line, Frelimo is the highest form of revolutionary organization of the Mozambican working classes.[119]

This alliance had the duty of carrying out a class war against the remnants of the colonial bourgeoisie, the aspirant Mozambican petty bourgeoisie and other anti-social elements such as thieves and murderers.[120] The new vanguard party would lead the worker-peasant alliance into battle.

The idea of vanguardism instituted a centralized hierarchy of command at the expense of what had come to be known as *poder popular*. The new attitude towards the GDs was

---

117 Social background was not an eliminatory criterion. Most of the leadership was made up of a radicalised urban intellectual elite, many of them white, Asian or mestiço. Following Amilcar Cabral it was argued that they had committed "class suicide". See Saul, 1973.
118 As mentioned above, this takes its cue from the ideas of Cabral about class suicide.
119 Frelimo Party Statutes (1977a): Article 1.
120 Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 121.

part of this process. Frelimo occupied the highest position in the hierarchy of command; state power was decided upon and controlled within the party. The new Constitution[121] said that Frelimo was the leading force in state and society and that it was responsible for ensuring that state policies were in the interests of the people.[122]

There is a sense in which Frelimo's new vanguardism was no more than the official legitimation and formalization of a practice that already existed. In an unpublished paper one of Frelimo's leading theoreticians, Aquino de Bragança, said that "Frelimo was essentially a peasant movement directed by ... a Marxian core".[123] In other words, the leadership was the vanguard and the peasantry was following. This raises questions about the claim that the Frelimo leadership was radicalized through its contact with the peasantry suggesting instead that the Frelimo leadership sought to radicalize a reluctant peasantry. Other evidence lends weight to this suggestion. Earlier chapters have argued that the Frelimo leadership considered that it had a mission to educate the peasantry in a variety of ways. Kruks, whose work is sympathetic to the claims of the "purification model" says that during the war of liberation, "[i]t was necessary continually to struggle against the passivity and evasion of responsibility of the mass of the peasants".[124]

Thus one form of understanding the Third Congress is as a theoretical justification for the centralization of power in the hands of a small elite. Mass participation, of which there was some evidence in the liberated areas, was relegated to the "mass democratic organizations" which were tightly controlled by the party. Democratic centralism, as Cahen has argued, came to mean not the open internal discussion that Lenin envisaged but rather the unquestioning acceptance of decisions that had been taken in higher organs of the party. The small African petty bourgeoisie was designated a class enemy. All

---

121 Adopted on 20 June 1975, altered by the Frelimo Central Committee on 28-29 August 1977 and by the Popular Assembly on 13 August 1978.
122 Constitution of the People's Republic of Mozambique, Article 3.
123 This paper was delivered to a seminar in Uppsala, Sweden, in 1976, and is cited by Kruks, 1987: 245.
124 Kruks, 1987: 244.

power and wealth was deemed unacceptable if it did not come under the aegis of the party-state. Far from being a conduit for the claims of the masses, the party was now solidly constructed as a machine for organizing the masses in a manner that excluded their own initiative.

The creation of a vanguard party allowed the Frelimo leadership to reinforce its self-defined role as the interpreter of the interests of the masses. In order to fulfill its self-designated task of leading the worker-peasant alliance, it set about reorganizing the party, wherever possible replacing the GDs by party cells. This was designed to enable Frelimo to assume control over the state, and to institute a system of dual allegiance that reached from the lowliest responsibilities of a *chefe de posto* to the highest spheres of the state. Reference has already been made to one aspect of the dual allegiance, namely the manner in which the national Constitution was in part dependent upon Frelimo party statutes. At all levels though, this ambiguity was reproduced. As Frelimo took over the state - juridically and in practice - officials became answerable to their hierarchical superior in the bureaucracy and their hierarchical superior in the party. Sometimes this was the same person, but in many cases two different people were involved, with different priorities.[125]

8. Conclusion

The decade which has been reviewed in this chapter was the decade of Frelimo's ascendance. The leadership of Samora Machel lent a new consistency and determination to the movement, which gradually came to express itself in terms of a Marxist approach. During the war there are indications that forms of democratic expression appeared in the liberated zones, and this bolstered Frelimo's popular appeal. Nevertheless there are also indications of coercion during that period, suggesting that there was no easy and uniform symbiosis between the guerrilla movement and the peasantry. Certainly there are reasons

[125] Examples of this will be given in chapter 7.

to doubt the idyllic picture which was built up about the liberated zones. That picture was promoted during the struggle against colonialism, as part of the propaganda war in which both sides engaged. Later it took on a new role (and for this purpose the picture was further refined) as a model for Mozambique's socialism. By putting forward its own home-grown model Frelimo signalled that it was not necessarily going to follow the experiences of other socialist states such as the USSR, China, Cuba or Vietnam. Frelimo also signaled that it was not going to make appeal to a mythical classless and harmonious pre-colonial past as Nyerere had done in Tanzania. Instead it would seek inspiration in the liberated zones. Little was known of the liberated zones, except that which Frelimo claimed and which was repeated by a generation of historians. Later research, incipient though it is, has provided sufficient evidence to say that the experience of the liberated zones were considerably more varied and complex than Frelimo had suggested.[126] The argument in this chapter has been that the model of the liberated zones which was put forward by Frelimo corresponded more to a need for the legitimation of Frelimo's post-independence plans than to a desire to understand the past.

In 1975 Mozambique became independent, leading to considerable upheavals in the first months. Rather than setting the agenda and controlling the pace of events Frelimo found itself responding on an ad hoc basis to urgent situations. It has been suggested by some writers that Frelimo had no option during that period except to make the decisions which it did. The point that has been made in this chapter is that there are always options, and the decisions that were made by Frelimo, even if they did not follow a premeditated plan, obeyed a logic that had been developed over the years. The main principle was that resources should, wherever possible, be centralized in the new party-state. In a previous chapter it was shown that forms of political legitimacy and authority that did not have their roots in Frelimo were contested by the movement as soon as it was in a position to do so. After independence the same principle held for forms of accumulation and control

[126] Brito, 1991 and Coelho, 1993.

of resources.

The first two years of independence were catastrophic for the economy, with the exodus of the settlers and the economic sabotage in which some of them engaged contributing enormously to a crisis that had begun before the April 1974 coup in Portugal. The following years, between 1977 and 1981 were broadly positive. The terrible decline had been halted and available indicators suggested that the government had set the country on the road to a steady if slow recovery. The following chapter will show that the economy was in fact more fragile than it seemed but until the early 1980s the economic panorama permitted Frelimo to remain ascendant and engaged in the process of centralization. Improvements in health and education reinforced Frelimo's claims to represent "the masses", and the process of villagization offered a mechanism to bring the dispersed peasantry within range of Frelimo's transformation projects.

The Third Congress, held in 1977, represents the formalization of Frelimo's power at all levels, and the institutionalization of the power of the leadership at all points within the party-state apparatus. Just as on the economic plane Frelimo's ascendancy was marked by radical centralization, on the political plane power was also centralized inside a more highly codified, stratified slimline party. In sum, the 1970s represent for Frelimo a decade of internal growth and reorganization, culminating in full control over an economy that was showing positive signs and a population that appeared acquiescent and even enthusiastic. There was still reason for optimism at the end of the decade, and even euphoria. As the next chapter shows though, the period of Frelimo's ascendancy was at an end and the euphoria that surrounded the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980 was short-lived.

Chapter 5

Dissolution of the Discourse (1980-1986)

1. Introduction

The previous chapter ended just before the first inklings of self-doubt began to appear inside Frelimo. During the early 1980s self-doubt intensified to the point where references to Frelimo's Marxism almost vanished from official speeches, even though the party remained officially Marxist until 1989. Hanlon cites November 1986 as "nearly the last time anyone talked officially about a 'basic socialist framework'".[1] Even before then the references to socialism as an objective were becoming rare. For some commentators, both from the left and the right, Frelimo's transformation was not surprising because its original commitment was dubious. Michel Cahen's views have already been described at some length. Heribert Adam has suggested that recent developments have

> reduced Frelimo's ... versions of freedom ideology to rhetorical socialism. In a crunch the elite therefore adjusts ideological interpretations as arbitrarily as they adopted them. No conversion is involved, as is frequently assumed, because a collective ideological commitment hardly existed in the first place.[2]

This chapter traces the trajectory of Frelimo and of Mozambique between 1980 and 1986, from Frelimo ascendant to Frelimo dissolute.

2. The Turning Point

In retrospect, there were already signs by about 1979 that Frelimo was having difficulties with the management of the economy. However, full recognition of this was delayed by

---

[1] Hanlon, 1991: 118.
[2] The citation appears in Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, "Interstate Relations Under South African Dominance", in Wilmot G. James, ed, 1987, *The State of Apartheid*, Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publishers. (Saul, 1990: 20 and 1993: 146).

several factors which ultimately pushed reconsideration of economic policy into the 1980s. One factor was the Lancaster House agreements of 1979. Mozambique's compliance with United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia had been costly but Frelimo believed it would pay dividends in the longer run by accelerating the demise of the minority white regime led by Ian Smith.[3] The signing of the Lancaster House agreements was greeted with great optimism in Maputo due to the belief that it signaled the end of one of the biggest barriers to economic growth for Mozambique. A second factor was that during the late 1970s it had been possible to finance the balance of payments deficit with gold reserves inherited from the colonial regime and built upon by the agreements with South Africa over mine labour. The expectation of better times to come had led the Maputo government to run down the gold reserves, with the result that the chronic balance of payments deficit had no palpable effect upon the economy until the early 1980s when the gold reserves ran out. A third factor which delayed a reappraisal of economic policy was that the terms of trade for Mozambique's exports were actually appreciating during the second half of the 1970s.[4] This means that the heavy fall in production was partially cushioned by rising unit value of exports during the first few years of independence, leading to an even more powerful shock to the economy when terms of trade began to deteriorate following the 1979 oil price rise.

The last great manifestation of Frelimo self-confidence was the PPI.[5] The PPI was a ten year plan for 1981 to 1990 which concentrated on heavy industry, agro-industry, the urbanization of the countryside, cooperative forms of production in the countryside, a rapid growth of literacy and training for large numbers of specialized jobs.[6] The ambitious scale of the PPI was such that it predicted annual growth rates of the GSP of 17%. Even though the starting point was extremely low this type of growth would have

[3] According to UN estimates Mozambique suffered direct losses of around US$ 510 million between 1976 and 1980 as a direct result of its imposition of sanctions against Rhodesia. República Popular de Moçambique, 1984: 29.
[4] Cardoso, 1993: 152.
[5] Plano Prospectivo Indicativo (Prospective Indicative Plan). The decision to draw up the PPI was taken in August 1979 and it was approved by Parliament in 1981.
[6] Cardoso, 1993: 157-159.

been astonishing. The Assembleia Popular (Parliament) considered the PPI to be "daring but attainable".[7] Its ideas for total urbanization of the countryside by 1990 and massive investment in industry reveal two crucial assumptions, neither of which were realized. The first assumption was that there would be peace. Soviet, East European and Cuban support had helped Frelimo to reshape its guerrillas into a conventional army so the leadership felt more protected against what was thought to be the greatest security threat: a South African invasion. The second assumption was that large-scale international funding would be available for the PPI.

The independence of Zimbabwe was greeted with joy in Maputo for various reasons, one of which was that it was thought to sound the death-knell for Renamo, or MNR as it was known at the time.[8] However, responsibility for the rebel movement was transferred from Rhodesia to South Africa. Throughout the 1980s the war reached devastating proportions in almost every part of the country. In the process the nature of the war underwent a gradual change, in many places reflecting and magnifying local grievances. Rather than ceasing, violence spread throughout the country in a manner that nobody could foresee in 1980.

The second crucial assumption, that of large-scale external funding, was predicated upon the belief that this would mainly come from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The decisions taken during the Third Congress in 1977 had strengthened the hand of the pro-Soviet group within Frelimo. References to the "model" provided by the liberated zones served to signal Frelimo's intention of avoiding the satellite status that some other countries had in relation to the USSR. On the other hand the actual path followed, and particularly so with the PPI, had nothing to do with the liberated zones and was

[7] This description may be found in the preamble to the Central State Plan for 1982, approved by Parliament on 17 December 1981. The PPI was never published. It was made available to the members of parliament who had to approve it only in the form of a summary which they had to return at the end of the session. (Hanlon, 1984: 85).
[8] MNR stands for Mozambican National Resistance. 'Renamo', which takes the first two letters from each word in the Portuguese version of the title, only began to appear somewhat later. (Vines, 1991 16 and fn.18)

contingent upon large-scale funding which at that time could not come from anywhere other than the Soviet Union. Some Western countries offered some aid but this was on a relatively small scale.[9] The only manner in which the PPI could be adequately financed was through joining the CMAE (Comecon). Cuba and Vietnam were both members and could therefore be considered precedents for the Mozambican application. One practical difficulty that arose was that a large portion of Mozambican trade was with OECD countries.[10] However, the Frelimo leadership saw no reason why it could not expand its trade with socialist countries and others such a Brazil while simultaneously maintaining its western trading partners.[11]

By 1979 the group which favoured joining Comecon within the Frelimo leadership had managed to make its ideas prevail, though there was by no means internal unanimity.[12] In 1980, and then again in 1981, Mozambique applied to join Comecon. The winning argument was that there was no choice because if Frelimo wished to follow a socialist line of development then it had to reduce its dependence on capitalist neighbours and trading partners, shifting the weight of this relationship to countries with planned economies. Cuban advisors in particular were strong proponents of this point of view. On the other hand some felt that joining Comecon would be a betrayal to principles of non-alignment. Although there was disagreement about whether or not Mozambique should actually join Comecon, there was broad agreement that it should apply. Proponents of joining were convinced that Mozambique would be accepted; opponents gradually came to the conclusion that an application would work in their favour because it was likely to be rejected. All round there was agreement that a direct application would force the Soviet Union to abandon its ambiguity and state clearly where it stood. Marcelino dos Santos, the strongest advocate of Mozambican accession, was sent to Moscow to put the

[9] Western aid came mainly from the Nordic countries. See Brochmann et al (1990: chapter 7).
[10] In 1981 52% of Mozambican exports went to OECD countries and 43% of imports came from those countries. (Brochmann, 1990: 22).
[11] Interview with Sérgio Vieira, Maputo, 22 April 1993.
[12] Other than where specified all information on the request to join Comecon comes from an interview with José Luis Cabaço, Maputo, May 12 1993.

Mozambican case. East Germany and Bulgaria supported the request but the Soviet Union imposed its veto saying that it was already massively subsidizing Cuba and Vietnam and could not afford to do the same for Mozambique.[13]

This subject has never been given due importance in the accounts of that period. Frelimo's official publications have been laconic about the attempt to join Comecon, partly because it was rebuffed but also because there were important internal disagreements on the subject. Other writers have simply mentioned that Mozambique applied and was rejected. In effect the rejection signaled the beginning of the end for Frelimo's commitment to socialism and it can now clearly be seen as a turning point. Initially, the decision to apply appeared to mark the supremacy of the pro-Soviet group which coalesced around Marcelino dos Santos. This may have been more apparent than real because of the tactical manoeuvering referred to above. On the other hand the Soviet veto definitely entailed a decline in the influence of the pro-Soviet group who had previously been able to attract support with the suggestion that Mozambique might be in line to receive large amounts of aid from the Soviet bloc.

The lesson learnt was that

> ... it was very indicative that the support of the USSR had its limitations. The USSR was never interested in paying a high price for the friendship, and when we were convinced that we had a "natural ally", a "strategic rearguard", this was rubbish.[14]

Indisputably the Soviet veto marked the end of hopes that the PPI might be implemented. Other problems, and notably the growth of Renamo, cast doubts upon the plan's viability in any case, but the Soviet refusal to bankroll the PPI rendered it stillborn.

The failed application to join Comecon provoked a thorough strategic reassessment of the international situation by Maputo. Mozambique was searching for strong external

[13] Hanlon, 1984: 234-235.
[14] José Luis Cabaço, interview, Maputo 12 May 1993.

assistance but Soviet support had been shown to be limited so there was no option but to seek other sources of support. Accession to Comecon would also have implied rethinking. It is improbable for example that Mozambique, as a member of Comecon, could have resisted Soviet requests for a military base on the coast.[15] Undoubtedly this would have had implications in terms of the security structure of the region, and with Ronald Reagan in the White House they might have been far reaching. Further evidence of the reassessment that went on comes from the relations with China. Although Frelimo had formally managed to maintain its pre-Independence policy of not taking sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute, much higher levels of Soviet assistance had drawn Frelimo closer to Moscow.[16] After the Soviet rebuff Frelimo sought to strengthen its relations with China and in mid-1982 a commercial agreement was signed, permitting the acquisition of agricultural implements and consumer goods from China. However, this was minor in the face of Mozambican needs. After 1981 it could only be a matter of time before Mozambique turned to South Africa and the West on their terms.

Just at the time that the Frelimo leadership was forced to rethink its international options, the economic climate was deteriorating very rapidly, partly as a result of Renamo activity which was then closely monitored and directed by South Africa.[17] Renamo attacked in accordance with South African plans which targeted Mozambican food supplies.[18] During 1981-1983 there was a terrible drought in southern Africa, affecting the south of Mozambique particularly badly. By destroying grain stores and then mining roads on which food relief lorries might travel, Renamo crippled a large part of the country. This in itself led to a rise in freelance banditry (which Renamo claimed as its own activity)

[15] Previous Soviet requests had been turned down on constitutional grounds. The Mozambican Constitution states that the country "advocates the transformation of the Indian Ocean into a nuclear free zone of peace" (Article 65.4). I would suggest that this formula was too vague to stop a Soviet base had it been judged to be in the national interest.
[16] Frelimo openly criticized the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979. Egerö, 1987: 183.
[17] A leading South African military strategist argued that "it would be naive to expect the country [South Africa] to renounce the destabilisation option for at least as long as black states remain committed to destabilise it". Deon Geldenhuys (1982) "Destabilisation Controversy in Southern Africa", *Southern African Forum Position Paper*, Vol.5, No.18., Johannesburg. Quoted by Hanlon, 1991: 20.
[18] Hanlon (1991: 20), again following Geldenhuys.

further compounding the difficulties in central and southern Mozambique. By mid-1982 Renamo was operating in four provinces (Manica, Sofala, Gaza and Inhambane) and by the end of that year, using bases in Malawi, Renamo had also launched attacks in Tete and Zambézia.

3. The Debt Problem

Of the many factors that pushed Mozambique into the arms of the Bretton Woods institutions, the debt problem was the most compelling. No other issue limited Frelimo's options as much as its incapacity to repay what it had borrowed. Western creditor governments, gathered under the auspices of the Paris Club[19] made it clear to the Mozambican government that they would not consider renegotiating Mozambique's debt until it had joined the IMF.[20] The following section looks at how debt became the dominant factor in Mozambique's external relations.

Every single year after independence Mozambique had a current account deficit which was financed by loans, by running down gold reserves, and by building up arrears on repayments.[21] At the level of 'visibles' (i.e. trade in goods), Mozambique's imports were always much greater than its exports but until 1983 there was a net surplus on 'invisibles' (services), mainly because of remittances from workers in South Africa and because of transport earnings.[22] The increasing intensity of the war led to decreasing receipts from the transport systems, both because of Renamo destruction of infrastructure and because the Pretoria government forced South African businesses to reroute much of their trade

[19] The Paris Club brings together ten creditor governments: the US, the UK, Germany (previously West Germany), France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, Canada and Japan.
[20] Hanlon, 1991: 113.
[21] This and most other statistical information comes from the IMF papers cited in the bibliography. Specific reference will only be made whereit is considered particularly relevant. It is important to be consistent about sources on the debt because different sources give widely varying estimates. I have chosen to use IMF figures because they reflect the Bank of Mozambique's most accurate figures, given that the Mozambican government was legally obliged to provide the IMF with such information.
[22] Income from foreign use of the railways and the ports of Maputo and Beira.

through other ports such as Durban and Richards Bay. In particular, high tariff cargo was moved away from Maputo.[23] The number of Mozambican workers in the South African mines also decreased drastically and a further blow was dealt when South Africa renounced the special agreement to pay part of the miners' wages in gold at a fixed price.

The colonial government had managed to balance its books thanks to its invisible exports but the reductions that Frelimo faced meant that eventually it had to borrow. Between 1980 and 1982 the Mozambican government used its accumulated gold reserves to pay for the deficit. During that period the country's gold stock fell by over 80%, the equivalent of about $176 million. The decrease in convertible reserves was such that whereas in 1980 they would have been enough to finance imports for four months, by 1983 foreign reserves would have paid only for 0.9 months of imports. Although the PPI had been effectively buried by the failure to join Comecon, Frelimo's leadership did not feel that its plans for reorganizing social and economic relations through the centralization and redistribution of resources required rethinking. Among other factors that the government failed to foresee were the war, the deterioration in the country's terms of trade, and the terrible weather conditions that prevailed during most of the early 1980s.

Gross foreign borrowing grew until 1982 and then declined rapidly as Mozambique found it increasingly difficult to obtain credit. From a level of $724 million medium and long-term borrowing in 1982, the figure fell to $399 million in 1983 and then further still to $265 million in 1984. At the same time Mozambique's debt repayment schedule was catching up so that by 1984 new borrowing was considerably less than had been earmarked for repayment ($338 million). The country's credit-rating was only partially a reflection of internal developments. The oil price rise of 1973/4 had led to enormous liquidity in the international banking system and before the consequences of this first oil

[23] República Popular de Moçambique, 1984. See also Hanlon, 1986: 135 and Cahen, 1987: 113-115. High tariff traffic included items such as steel, chromium and CKD car kits; low tariff traffic was mostly composed of coal and sulphur.

price had been mopped up (i.e. loaned out) a further increase in oil prices in 1979 led to a renewed flow of loans from the banks to Third World countries. The Mozambican government was one of many that believed that the fast route to development required large amounts of foreign capital, rather than being based upon national saving levels.[24] By 1983 though, there was much less liquid credit available and Mexico's declaration of a moratorium on debt repayments had sent shock waves through the system, leading to much more conservative lending policies. It was at this point that the Frelimo leadership recognized that the debt problem had become both urgent and unmanageable.

Frelimo eventually conceded to the various conditions which were imposed upon it and signed up to the IMF and the World Bank. A month after Mozambique joined the IMF, in October 1984, the Paris Club acceded to Mozambique's request for debt rescheduling - the same request that had been rejected in January 1984. The amount involved was $213 million in debt service arrears and current maturities, and a further $70 million in debt service for 1985. In 1985, following upon the Paris Club's decision, the OPEC countries also rescheduled Mozambican debt to the tune of $96 million in arrears for 1984 and $27 million in debt service for 1985.[25] These amounts may not seem very great for a country with a population of around fourteen million but in 1984 it was almost exactly the same as total revenue from exports and services. Normally the Paris Club would only permit debt rescheduling for countries already committed to a programme agreed upon by the IMF but in the case of Mozambique the urgency of the situation led them to agree to reschedule immediately after Mozambique's accession to the IMF. Nevertheless the rescheduling was not devoid of conditionality. Mozambique presented its creditors with a Programme for Economic Action which may be seen as a precursor to the structural adjustment programme later agreed upon with the IMF and the World Bank. Among other measures, the Programme argued for a reduction in real terms of salaries and subsidies, the privatization of some state farms, and the liberalization of some fixed

[24] On "indebted industrialization" see Körner et al, 1987.
[25] Hanlon, 1991: 115.

agricultural prices.

4. International Factors: the road to Nkomati

By 1983 it had become evident that the security situation had worsened since the independence of Zimbabwe, and furthermore South Africa's destabilization policies were not likely to disappear of their own accord. Even more worrying for Frelimo, Renamo was beginning to plant local roots, exploiting village-level conflicts and dissatisfaction with Frelimo policies. Village-level conflicts were beginning to metamorphose into Frelimo/Renamo splits, as the contending parties attempted to gain external support for their local cause. South Africa's war by proxy started to sink deep into the life of rural Mozambique, seeping into the interstices of society and spreading steadily. However, in the early 1980s Mozambican officials (and academics in general) believed that Renamo was mainly an instrument of Pretoria and that peace in Mozambique was dependent only on South African good will. Samora Machel concluded that he had no option but to instruct his officials to set about attempting to reach an agreement with Pretoria: destabilization was working.

In late 1982 ANC officials in Mozambique were warned that Frelimo was going to seek some form of truce with South Africa.[26] Mozambican government representatives met with South African counterparts in December 1982 at the border town of Komatipoort and a new meeting was held after Frelimo's Fourth Congress, also at Komatipoort, on May 5 1983. These two meetings appear to have been unsuccessful as South African planes bombed two Maputo suburbs on 23 May and there were commando raids against ANC targets in Maputo on 17 October and 7 December.[27]

In October 1983 President Machel undertook a tour of Western Europe visiting Portugal,

[26] Hanlon, 1984: 260.
[27] Hanlon, 1986: 139.

France, Britain, Holland and Belgium.[28] The tour of Western Europe had two objectives: to obtain European support for economic recovery and for diplomatic efforts *vis-à-vis* South Africa. Machel understood that he would only be able to do this if Mozambique was seen as a genuinely non-aligned country and therefore publicly distanced himself from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. One indication of this came when Mozambique signed an agreement with Germany which involved recognizing West Berlin as a state of the Federal Republic despite strong opposition from the German Democratic Republic. The upshot of the tour was that Western European countries refused to offer financial help but they did offer diplomatic support.[29] In European capitals the predominant view was that economic support only made sense in the event of Maputo reaching an agreement with South Africa. It seems that, when in November 1983 South African foreign minister Pik Botha visited Europe, pressure was brought to bear upon him to negotiate in earnest and to tone down the level of destabilization of Mozambique.[30]

The US was also putting pressure on Pretoria at about this time. It needed to show that its policy of "constructive engagement" with South Africa was having some positive result.[31] The Reagan administration was generally perceived to be very friendly towards South Africa, certainly much more so than Carter's administration had been, and this was creating difficulties for Washington.[32] Margaret Thatcher owed Samora Machel a debt of gratitude for the role that he played during the Lancaster House negotiations leading to the independence of Zimbabwe, and she was presumably also keen to show that her opposition to sanctions against South Africa was affording her some leverage in Pretoria.

[28] This European tour had initially been scheduled for mid-1982 but had been postponed because of the increasing intensity of the war. (Young, 1990: 498).
[29] In material terms Machel's tour resulted in two donations of grain: 30 000 tons from the Netherlands and 15 000 tons from the UK. (Hanlon, 1984: 253).
[30] *Africa Contemporary Record*, Vol.16, 1983-1984, p.A234.
[31] On the US position towards Southern Africa during this period see Legum, 1985: A44-A47.
[32] See for example Vivienne Jabri's account of growing US isolation in the Western Contact Group over Namibia: "European Involvement in the Western Contact Group: The Stress and Convenience of Coalition Mediation", in Chan and Jabri, eds, 1993: 60-72.

In short, several international factors converged to make the Nkomati Accord possible. Further meetings between South African and Mozambican representatives were held in December 1983 (Swaziland), January 1984 (Pretoria and Maputo), February (Maputo) and March (Cape Town). The Accord was finally signed by Samora Machel and P.W. Botha on March 16 1984. Under the terms of the Nkomati Accord Pretoria would cease its support for Renamo, and Maputo would cease to support the ANC's guerrilla activities (though the ANC was permitted to maintain a diplomatic representation in Maputo). A joint security commission was set up "with the aim of supervising and monitoring the application of [the] agreement".[33] Implicit in the agreement was the end of the economic boycott with which South Africa was crippling Mozambique and many South African businessmen visited Maputo in the aftermath of the Accord.

For the Botha government the advantages were: it had secured the expulsion of ANC guerrillas from Mozambique (which had become an important base); it had created some potential business opportunities for South Africans; and above all it had gained some international respectability in Western Europe and North America. The Nkomati Accord permitted P.W. Botha to embark on his first visit Europe, which enhanced his standing in the eyes of the white South African electorate, even if it did not bring great advances on the diplomatic front.[34] For Mozambique the advantages were not so clear-cut. According to one source, Sérgio Vieira (at the time Security Minister) was fully expecting the South Africans to violate the agreement.[35] Why then should Mozambique sign the Accord? Samora Machel himself seems to have been strongly influential in persuading his colleagues that the agreement would have a positive effect on the grounds that it would provoke divisions inside the ruling elite in South Africa.[36] The logic worked in the following manner. After Nkomati Mozambique would be able to attract many South

[33] The Nkomati Accord is reproduced in Legum (1985) and excerpts from it appear in Hanlon, 1984: 290.
[34] Botha was met by large, hostile demonstrations in London and Germany. Details on this visit may be found in *Africa Contemporary Record*, Vol.16, 1983-1984, pp.B796-B797.
[35] Hanlon, 1986: 149. The author cites a press conference given by Vieira in Maputo on September 30 1985.
[36] José Luis Cabaço cites this as an example of Machel's leadership. Interview, Maputo, May 12 1993.

African businessmen. During the negotiations of the Accord Mozambican officials had begun speaking to the IMF and the World Bank (see below) with a view to attracting foreign investment. Furthermore, in August 1984 the Foreign Investment Law was passed and the Office for the Promotion of Foreign Investment (GPIE) was created.[37] Foreign investment was desirable in its own right, being considered useful for the development of the country. However it was also seen as being of great strategic importance because it would create a group within the South African elite with a vested interest in peace in Mozambique. This argument was overstated. South African investment in Mozambique never took off and it was certainly not the case that Pretoria's foreign policy was shaped or even noticeably influenced by such economic interests as did exist in Mozambique. The appeal of this line of thought rested upon a very simplistic assumption about how capitalist interests determine the foreign policies of capitalist countries.

South Africa began to violate the Nkomati Accord shortly after signing it. It also seems that Renamo was provided with a very large quantity of supplies in the months immediately preceding the talks. This would indicate that South Africa had no intentions of abandoning the movement but also that it felt that it had to be seen to abide by the Accord, at least for a while. The supplies were designed to keep Renamo afloat until discreet support could be provided again. In the months following Nkomati, far from subsiding, the conflict actually increased as Renamo was flush with new weapons, men and equipment.[38] Final proof of the South African government's duplicity came in August 1985 when a combined force of Mozambican and Zimbabwean troops captured Casa Banana in Gorongosa, the main Renamo headquarters, on the border between Manica and Sofala provinces. A log book found there documented South African comings and goings, the close links between Renamo and SADF officials, and even three visits to Gorongosa by South African deputy foreign minister Louis Nel in June, July and August 1985.[39] The military links were no surprise but it had been assumed in Maputo

[37] Law number 4/84 of 18 August 1984.
[38] Hanlon, 1986: 145.
[39] See *Documentos da Gorongosa*, Maputo: Ministry of Information, 1985.

(presumably because this was what Pik Botha claimed) that the government was "out of the loop". Pretoria argued that if there was any military support still being extended to Renamo this was coming from private citizens (such as Portuguese who had lived in Mozambique during colonial times) and from rogue elements in the army acting without permission. It had now become clear that continued support for Renamo was an element of official (albeit secret) South African foreign policy. Destabilization had certainly not been abandoned.

Machel's tour of Western Europe in October 1983 was not very successful from an economic point of view. Indeed, this may have been a factor in pushing Mozambique into the Nkomati Accord. It was certainly a factor in leading the country towards bankruptcy. When, in January 1984, Mozambique announced that it could not meet its debt obligations, it was told by Western governments that loan rescheduling would only be granted if the country reached an agreement with the IMF.[40] This was fairly standard practice, especially after the crisis triggered by the Mexican declaration of a moratorium on its interest payments in August 1982.[41] Mozambique had made much of its independent stance, initially refusing to join the World Bank, the IMF, the Lomé Convention or Comecon. According to Sérgio Vieira there was not so much a decision to stay away as a decision to first try to work out what the country's options were going to be.[42] This is plausible: firstly because Frelimo arrived in power much earlier than expected and had no experience of international economic organizations; and secondly because the earlier wave of decolonization, which had become discredited, had involved almost automatic accession to the World Bank, the IMF and the ACP group. By September 1984 Mozambique had joined the IMF, the World Bank and the Lomé Convention.

[40] Hanlon, 1991: 113.
[41] On the Mexican moratorium see Blanca Heredia, "The Political Economy of the Mexican Crisis", in Ghai (ed), 1991.
[42] Interview with Sérgio Vieira, Maputo, 22 April 1993.

The devastating drought of the early 1980s led to a sharp fall in agricultural production in 1982 and 1983.[43] Under any circumstances these would have been difficult years for Mozambique. During the last quarter of 1983 there was a famine in Inhambane and Gaza provinces. It is impossible to judge what might have happened had the South African government adopted a neutral stance but there is no doubt that its destabilisation policies multiplied the problems for Mozambique. One author has said that there was a "man-made, South African-made famine" and it is difficult to disagree, at least so far as regards the scale of the problem.[44] At this point Mozambique was left no alternative but to 'turn to the West' for further loans and aid. The price for this was an agreement with the IMF which in turn was contingent upon an agreement with South Africa.[45]

5. The Fourth Congress

Frelimo held its Fourth Congress in April 1983, by which time it no longer had a "model" for the country, as it had had in 1977. The original confidence in that model had been deeply shaken and it was clear to all that profound changes would have to be introduced in the way the country and party were being run. The official commitment to Marxism-Leninism was not abandoned but the discussions did not focus on questions of dogma. Instead, debate crystallised around two closely related issues: the capacity of the state to fulfill the tasks attributed to it at the Third Party Congress; and the question of imbalances in state support for agriculture.

The state's effectiveness in directing the economy and in controlling surpluses had been seriously undermined by the rapid development of parallel markets, and the consequent growth of resources and production beyond its control. By 1983 it had become clear that

[43] See chart 1 in chapter 7.
[44] Hanlon (1991: 20) uses this expression as the title of a section of his book. The originator of the expression was "a US official".
[45] The US government was unwilling to accept Mozambican accession to the IMF and World Bank unless the security situation was changed, which meant an agreement with South Africa. There is evidence that the State Department participated in drawing up the Nkomati Accord. Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1994: 104.

the weak Mozambican state did not have the capacity to centralize resources and administer them according to a national logic as the earlier model required. Furthermore, even in the monetized sectors of the economy there were serious imbalances that had resulted from planning, in particular financing deficits in the public sector by printing money.[46] The weakness of the state administration was not tackled in any consistent manner and often state planning involved a rearguard action by bureaucrats to gain control over resources. This was to become a general theme over the next few years.

The other important debate of the Fourth Congress concerned state support for agriculture. Mozambican agriculture is conventionally divided into four sectors: state, cooperative, family and private. The distinction between 'family' and 'private' agriculture involves size (private farms are usually greater than three hectares) and labour (hired labourers are employed in private farming). Between 1980 and 1985 the family sector was responsible, annually, for between 20% and 28.5% of marketed agricultural production. The private sector marketed approximately the same amount. The state sector had a much larger share of marketed production, between 42% and 53%, and the cooperative sector was responsible for less than 1%.[47] The family sector was probably responsible for more than half of total agricultural production throughout the 1980s.[48] Under the PPI cooperatives were to receive 25% of state investment in agriculture (the remainder going to the state sector) and they were expected to be responsible for farming seven times the land area and produce twice the value of crops as the state sector.[49] There are interesting aspects to this, not least of which is that planners explicitly expected the cooperatives to provide a much better return for investment than the state farms for

[46] See Wuyts 1991:218; Wuyts 1989: chapters 5 and 6; Mackintosh and Wuyts 1988:151-5; Azam 1988.
[47] These figures are my own calculations from the official government statistics *Informação Estatistica 1985*. However, other sources (and even later annual editions of government statistics) provide different figures so they should be taken as approximate.
[48] The difference between officially marketed agricultural production and total agricultural production is the amount used in on-farm consumption, parallel markets and smuggling. Raikes (1984:105) estimates that the family sector produced about 70% of the total and Hanlon (1984: 110) says that the proportion was about three quarters.
[49] Hanlon, 1984:105.

which they and their colleagues were responsible. In practice the cooperatives were never allocated more than about 2% of agricultural investment. The cooperative sector occupied an important position in the government's strategic plans, in both political and economic terms, and yet it was always neglected. Between 1977 and 1983, 90% of state investment in agriculture went to the state sector, and most of this investment went into the largest scale projects. The biggest project of all, the Bulgarian-inspired CAIL (Agro-Industrial Complex of the Limpopo), absorbed no less than 50% of the agricultural capital budget in 1977.[50]

Official proclamations of support for cooperative agriculture contrasted with the low budgetary priority that it actually obtained. The explanation for this lies in the fact that the devolution of resources from the state sector was extremely unlikely to happen if there was no strong pressure for it. Strong pressure from below might have made some difference but there is little evidence that people in the rural areas were interested in cooperatives. José Luis Cabaço, for eight years a minister under Samora Machel, put it this way:

> No, it [the growth of the cooperative sector] never happened. This was because, although the government said yes to cooperatives, it had to deal daily with specific problems in society, and society never expressed any demand or desire for cooperatives. In that phase all the cooperatives were imposed from the top down. Later, in the Green Zones, some bottom-up cooperatives appeared, a few, and these are the ones that survive today. When there were capable political leaders, the cooperatives survived, with subsidies. If such a person did not appear the cooperatives sank. Although the government and the Minister of Agriculture would always talk about cooperatives, nobody ever appeared to demand them, it came from the party to the government. So it was a very administrative thing, it wasn't responding to political demands[51].

The Fourth Congress called for an end to *gigantismo*[52] and for more consistent support of

[50] Mackintosh and Wuyts, 1987:13. CAIL incorporated an area of about 16,000 hectares (40,000 acres) in the province of Gaza. Before Independence it had been farmed by about 1500 Portuguese families (the Colonato do Limpopo).
[51] Interview with Cabaço, Maputo, May 1993.
[52] Literally translatable as "giantism", *gigantismo* was coined to refer to the tendency for state agriculture to be organized on a massive and ultimately unmanageable scale. The prime examples were CAIL, which was broken up into five separate parts in 1983, and EMOCHA, which was Africa's biggest tea plantation.

the non-state sectors (including cooperatives) but this was only partly translated into practical terms. By 1983 the spread of the war, and its particularly devastating effects upon transport routes, had made any sort of policies difficult to implement.

The predominant view of the Fourth Congress is that it was "a critical watershed"[53] and a victory of pragmatism over ideology.[54] The debates leading up to and at the Congress occasioned the first public admissions that mistakes had been made, particularly in the centralization and weak administration of resources. It is also clear that by 1983 the prime objective of the Frelimo leadership was simply to increase output in any possible way.

On the other hand the party programme and statutes made no such concessions. Despite, for example, Frelimo's search for a new position in the international sphere after the Comecon rebuff, the 1983 programme reproduces parts of the 1977 programme which were clearly no longer in tune with policy:

> In the socialist countries, where the system of exploitation of man by man has been defeated, the labouring masses in power are building a socialist society under the leadership of their Marxist-Leninist parties. The socialist countries constitute the liberated zone of humanity, and are the great strategic rearguard of the people's fight.[55]

The decision to decentralize some resources and to turn to market incentives in order to raise production levels were also ignored in the party programme:

> The [current] stage of people's democracy is the historic period in which ... economic and social planning guides the development process: ... the predominance of capitalist relations of production in our country is eliminated, and socialist relations of production are developed and consolidated.[56]

[53] Wuyts, 1991: 217.
[54] Roesch, 1988a: 78.
[55] Frelimo, 1983: 12. The part of the programme dedicated to foreign policy (pp.31-32) is unaltered in relation to the 1977 version.
[56] Frelimo, 1983: 12-13.

The working class was still considered to be the leading force of the Mozambican revolution and of all history. The peasantry was still considered to be increasingly engaged in collective production, although the admission was made that "the majority are still in family production".[57] Nevertheless, some changes were made to Frelimo's programme in the Fourth Congress. The reference to the crucial role of heavy industry was eliminated. Contrary to what might be surmised from the quote above, market incentives were called for: the state should support the peasants,

> leading them to take an interest in increasing their production, with, amongst other mechanisms, a differentiated price structure, supplies of consumer goods and farm implements.[58]

Furthermore, the state sector was to be consolidated and developed but "taking into account real management capacities". This sought to remedy one of the clearest areas of failure since the Third Congress.

In short, the Fourth Party Congress contains indications of deep changes and yet it also suggests that there was to be no fundamental change in the party's orientation. The contradictions reflect the confusion of the times. It was still not clear that circumstances had rendered the 1977 plans unachievable. It was not possible to predict the future, and information circulated in a very restricted fashion even within the Central Committee.

Apart from the sheer confusion, the main reason for the contradictions is that there were real cleavages inside the party, with people falling broadly into three different camps. The pro-Soviet group believed that there had been temporary setbacks but that it would be possible to return to the 1977 plans once the immediate crisis had been dealt with. Though there were no explicit references to it, some within the leadership must have been thinking of Lenin's New Economic Policy, particularly because it was followed by

[57] Frelimo, 1983: 17. Reproduced verbatim from Frelimo, 1977b: 11.
[58] Frelimo, 1983: 20.

Stalin's massive drive for industrialization. The parallels - war, crisis in peasant production, external intervention - must have attracted the attention of those who were searching for a model in the experiences of the socialist countries.[59] A second group consisted of those who attributed the difficulties to external interference and sabotage, but also to Frelimo's lack of support for "the peasantry". According to this type of analysis Frelimo should pursue a "peasant-based" strategy for socialism by supporting the co-operatives and the family sectors. The private sector could take care of itself and the state sector should not be granted such a vast share of state resources.[60] The other group, that would gain the ascendancy within a few years, argued that there was a real need to support market forces, liberating certain types of decisions from the state. It also implied putting socialism on the back-burner but this was either not realized or not yet assumed in 1983. The collegial style of leadership in Mozambique resulted in differences being swept under the carpet in the name of unity, with each faction making its contributions to the party programme.

Soviet and East European advisors, who had played an important part during the preparations for the 1977 Third Congress were also present in the run-up to the Fourth Party Congress. By this stage their role was quite different, and considerably more controversial. In 1983 the "technical experts" sent from Moscow and East Berlin were completely sidelined, with several meetings being suspended amid acrimonious comments about the relevance of European experiences.[61]

6. Political Adjustments, 1980-1984

The new decade began with some doubts inside Frelimo about the efficacy of its mobilizational capacity. After the Lancaster House Agreements Frelimo believed that the

[59] On the NEP: Nove (1992: chapters 4-6) and Carr (1979: 30-38).
[60] Foreign observers, such as Saul (1985), Hanlon (1984) and Roesch (1986, 1988) sympathized with this point of view which argued for a change in methods rather than objectives. However, they do not justify the assumptions made about what "the peasantry" wanted.
[61] Interview with Cabaço.

main external impediment to its plans had been removed and so the leadership turned its attention to internal problems. It made use of its much-vaunted quality of self-criticism to make political adjustments.[62] The most important initiative of that period was what became known as the Presidential Offensive, which was essentially an attempt to root out corruption and bad administration through publicizing it.

The Presidential Offensive began when Samora Machel made a series of unannounced yet high profile visits to warehouses, factories, hospitals and other social and economic centres, and in them he discovered that matters were not running as smoothly as they should. The government promoted a dual track response to the problems: firstly, people found guilty of bad administration were arrested on the spot amid great publicity; secondly, emphasis was placed upon the need for greater respect for hierarchy as against "liberalism, demagogy, ultra-democracy and the principle of absolute egalitarianism".[63] In a particularly bellicose speech in Beira in early 1980 Machel warned that the party structures themselves were not performing to standard and that it was the population at large which was responsible for permitting this situation to exist.[64] Slackness, slovenliness, laziness and "hippy" attitudes were attacked in further speeches in February and March 1980.[65] These attitudes were taken to be responsible for low standards and levels of production but the speeches contained another underlying theme: the fact that people were not mobilizing themselves to deal with these issues, as it had been assumed that they would be. The official *poder popular* organs were effectively inoperational except under instructions from above. Frelimo was ambiguous about this: it was required that the people should participate in the burden of government by taking initiatives to

[62] Cahen (1985) correctly points out that self-criticism was the prerogative of Samora Machel. It was not a faculty open to any random militant: "Le seul contestataire autorisé reste Samora Machel lui-même qui dispose d'un charisme incontestable et n'hesite pas à denoncer ses propres ministres en public et à qualifier sa police d'une manière qui mériterait des années de rééducation à quiconque l'exprimerait ... avant lui."
[63] Speech by Samora Machel on 4 December 1979. Reprinted in Munslow, 1985: 156-168.
[64] This speech (reprinted in Munslow, 1985: 73-80) is interesting in that it offers clear evidence that the Frelimo leadership was highly suspicious of the population in the centre of the country, and realized that Renamo was gaining some support there. For example: "We are infiltrated. And there are many who are aware of this and do nothing because the bandits call on tribal backing" (p.77).
[65] Reprinted in Munslow, 1985: 81-85 and 86-103 respectively.

ensure that the government line was being correctly implemented; and yet Frelimo's

historic reluctance meaningfully to decentralize was itself a brake upon that process. On

the other hand, of course there is no guarantee that decentralization of power would have

resulted in its "correct" usage, from the point of view of Frelimo's leadership.

A second area where the Frelimo leadership felt that it had to implement some change

concerned party membership. When Frelimo became a vanguard party in 1977

membership was restricted to those with the right credentials to be vanguard militants.

There are reports of high-handed attitudes by those who were judged worthy of being

vanguard militants and this severely eroded the consensus that Frelimo had benefited

from in the first years of independence. As one observer pointed out,

> Village meetings where the entire population would proudly declare it belonged
> to Frelimo, only to be told by party bureaucrats that this was not possible within
> the new vanguard apparatus, did nothing to strengthen [Frelimo's] popularity.[66]

By 1982, in an attempt to regain some of its broad appeal, the selection and approval of

new members of the party had become less related to familiarity with Marxist-Leninist

teachings and more to "social behaviour", "links to the community" and "moral

conduct".[67]

The deteriorating economic situation and the growth of the war drove the Frelimo

leadership to increasingly populist measures in the hope of regaining some of the support

that it was losing. The death penalty was reintroduced in early 1983.[68] There were

summary (i.e. without trial) public executions of Renamo members, and the death

penalty was extended to cover economic crimes, specifically black marketeering.[69] An

even more radical deviation from Frelimo's early principles was the introduction of

[66] Ottaway, 1988: 214. For a general discussion of the transformation into a vanguard party and the
problems connected to this, see Egerö, 1987:112-120.
[67] Cahen, 1985: 42.
[68] There had been no death penalty between 1975 and 1979, and from 1979 only for high treason.
[69] Hanlon, 1984: 244.

---

public flogging on 31 March 1983, three weeks before the Fourth Congress. Frelimo's

foreign supporters were confused. It is worth registering the ambiguous feelings of Albie

Sachs on this matter:

> Were we simply privileged intellectuals hidebound by abstract concepts of human
> rights while the country was being engulfed by war and hunger? Were we
> completely out of touch with public opinion? Had the whole humanistic tradition,
> starting with the treatment of captured Portuguese soldiers during the
> independence struggle, been an illusion?[70]

John Saul's comments are less soul-tortured but they also show some unease:

> True, these innovations [flogging, capital punishment] have been introduced
> against the backdrop of an ongoing, even quite dramatic, attempt to democratize
> the judicial system by means of a novel system of people's tribunals. Nonetheless,
> such measures have seemed to many to stand in stark contrast to Frelimo's historic
> emphasis upon re-education rather than retribution in the penal sphere. These
> moves have been defended, in part, in populist terms, the argument being that the
> populace itself has demanded that justice be seen to be done much more visibly ...
> At the same time some leaders have suggested that such measures are
> temporary...[71]

Shortly after the Fourth Congress the government launched "Operation Production". This

was the code-name for the mass expulsion of unemployed and therefore non-productive

people from the cities. They were classified as vagrants, marginals and prostitutes,

rounded up and flown off to the far northern provinces of Niassa and Cabo Delgado, two

thousand kilometres from Maputo.[72] Saul discerned an economic logic:

> Certainly urban overcrowding, especially in the capital of Maputo, has been a
> major problem, exacerbated by the economic difficulties, drought, and enemy
> attack in the countryside. And in principle these unemployed are being plugged
> into ongoing rural development projects in their transfer areas which may
> ultimately carry the promise of a better life for them. ... Any critical evaluation of
> "Operação Produção" must ... be qualified by the fact that the question of more
> long-term solutions to such structural questions had been addressed quite centrally
> at the Fourth Congress only a few weeks earlier.[73]

[70] Sachs and Honwana Welch, 1990: 15.
[71] Saul, 1985: 98.
[72] On "Operation Production" see Africa Confidential, vol.25, no.16, 1 August 1984.
[73] Saul, 1985: 98.

Saul's comments reflect the official explanations but in fact a main objective was political. In recognition of the changing nature of the war, Frelimo had become preoccupied with the existence in Maputo of a stratum of unemployed migrants from the rural areas. Potentially this group could be extremely dangerous if the war were to reach the cities.[74] The rising crime rate was another issue that had caused heightened dissatisfaction, so Operation Production was in effect a populist "law and order" initiative combined with a pre-emptive strike in the war against Renamo.[75] And the truth was that the measures really were popular - among the urban employed though not, of course, among the victims. As Sachs points out, these laws were not introduced furtively, something "done and denied"; they were proclaimed loudly from the rooftops and greeted with popular approval.[76] Frelimo was simply using the traditional political subterfuge of seeking to exorcise failings and to deflect responsibilities by directing attention to scapegoats. This is nevertheless a measure of the extent to which Frelimo had become worried and unsure of itself during the early 1980s.

7. The Politics of Confusion: 1984 - 1986

The 1984 debt rescheduling was a lifeline for the Mozambican government but the crisis had been postponed rather than resolved. By bowing to pressure to join the IMF (with all that it entailed in terms of satisfying American demands for a rapprochement with South Africa) the Mozambican government had not bought back its sovereignty at all. It had merely bought itself some time. The steps that followed - negotiations with the IMF and World Bank and, eventually, agreement upon a structural adjustment package - were now inevitable. At the time though, the Mozambican government seems to have had very little idea of where it was heading.

[74] Howe and Ottaway, 1987: 48.
[75] Operation Production was in fact a formidable recruitment boon for Renamo. Finnegan, 1992: 69-70; Africa Watch, 1992: 29. Africa Confidential (vol.25, no.16) claims that Operation Production also provided cover for many personal vendettas.
[76] Sachs and Honwana Welch, 1990: 112. A similar description of how the measures were proclaimed and received is in Hanlon, 1984: 246.

According to one source, the Mozambican government believed that it could simply join the IMF and then set about negotiating bilaterally with each of its creditor countries. About 95% of Mozambique's debt was bilateral debt: 46% to OECD countries, 21% to OPEC countries and 27% to Comecon countries.[77] If this is correct it means that the government had not taken on board the changes in attitude towards Third World debt that had taken place in the late 1970s and early 1980s.[78] This is plausible, and is indicative of a general problem that the government faced since independence, namely that it based decisions upon very incomplete information.

Although it is clear in retrospect that the decisions made by 1984 would eventually lead to abandoning socialism as an objective, any such suggestion in the mid-1980s would have led to strong opposition from within Frelimo and within the government. In December 1985 Machel made a speech to the Popular Assembly which captures the contradictory spirit of those times.[79] It is a speech that lurches from outright condemnation of the excessively rigid command economy that had developed to exhortations to return to the voluntaristic spirit of the liberation struggle.

Machel begins by saying that ten years after independence it was time to look back and evaluate what had been achieved. On the positive side he saw various successes but, on the negative side, armed banditry, natural disasters and the international economic crisis had all contributed to the difficult situation the country was facing. However, he added, this was not sufficient to explain the current disastrous situation: "They [the difficulties] are also to a large extent the result of mistakes and even deviations that still persist". The objective of the speech was to address these issues. Two points arise immediately. The first is that Machel firmly refuses to countenance the possibility of any error in the conception of Frelimo's project: there were only "mistakes" in implementation and "deviations" from it. The second is that he does not define the concept of "deviation".

[77] Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1994: 133-137.
[78] See for example Williams, 1981: 18-19.
[79] AIM, 1986.

Unlike the grandiose plans of the late 1970s, the plan for 1986 was a modest one, aiming above all to get the family sector to produce more than it had done in the past. Machel correctly pointed out that the family sector had been alienated by the arrogant attitude of the state but he failed to take the next step which would be to give the peasantry the freedom to produce as they wished. The people have "great potential" but still they must be told what to do - although the problem in the past had been that they were told what to do and had not liked it. Machel criticised the state's high-handedness but only for not going out to the countryside to give clear orders:

> In the last analysis it [i.e. past policies] means that we have no trust in the people's capacity. This is why we are not capable of going to the countryside to talk to the peasants, to give them a programme of concrete tasks, indicate how many hectares each should cultivate and which crops.[80]

Regarding food supply, Machel argued that much of the problem could be solved by distributing fertile land to unemployed city dwellers, an echo of Operation Production:

> Many Mozambicans in the cities are unemployed, without security for their families and without prospects for the future. They spend their lives in queues. They live by doing casual jobs and very often they lose their dignity in the great warren of racketeering. The district administrators, the deputies and the mass organisations must organise the mobilisation of all the unemployed for production, distributing land to them, supplying them with the necessary means to produce for themselves and for society.[81]

Moving on to the next section Machel's intentions become clearer. The logic of forced production for the general good remained a powerful element in the government's conception of its own role:

> But the state must not limit itself only to distributing land, tools and seed. Each citizen who has land must be obliged to use it correctly. Only those who work the land have the right to have it. We have not been implementing this principle in the best way. We have not given concrete tasks to each peasant. The government, be it at the central, provincial, district or locality level, must require that each family cultivate a minimum number of hectares (2, 3, 5, 10 hectares according to

[80] AIM, 1986: 3.
[81] AIM, 1986: 5.

capacity) and produce necessary crops for food and for export and sell the surplus.[82]

By December 1985 the Mozambican government had been talking to the World Bank and IMF for about two years, and had been a member of them for over a year, so there was a clear acceptance of the importance of raising producer prices. Nevertheless price encouragements were, in Machel's speech, coupled with "organisation", an expression implying that one should enforce a decision even if the price theory indicated that people would follow that decision voluntarily. In discussing cotton though there was no reference to price incentives. Here Machel took off his kid gloves, thin though they were:

> Cotton and cashew nuts are crops that colonialism used to exploit the Mozambican people. Today cotton and cashew nuts are fundamental weapons for our independence. Cotton must be grown from Gaza to Niassa and Cabo Delgado. And it must be grown, compulsorily.... Each deputy, at every level, must become a permanent mobiliser for increasing cotton cultivation.[83]

Producer prices were not likely to function as incentive mechanisms because the government had allowed them to drop consistently. The price of cotton in real terms in 1985 was 56% of what it had been in 1980 and it was at its lowest since independence. Regarding cashew nuts Machel argued that private traders had to have the main role but he also suggested that traders should be directed to grow crops near their shops. "Thus he [i.e. the trader] carries out his job better, contributing at the same time to increased production".[84] One senses a remnant of the idea that traders were really unproductive members of society, even if they were necessary.

A frequent references in Machel's speeches was to shoes, or the lack of them. On this occasion he squarely placed the blame for this on Frelimo who, he said, had scared away the cattle breeders that provided the raw materials for shoes:

[82] AIM, 1986: 6.
[83] AIM, 1986: 6.
[84] AIM, 1986: 6.

... in many people the idea has been created that cattle farmers are dangerous, that they are enemies of the revolution. Thus for a long time we held back from encouraging citizens, private farmers, to breed cattle, to increase the size of their herds. We made the buying and selling of cattle difficult. Often we compelled the farmers to take their cattle into cooperatives. This, together with banditry, resulted in a drastic reduction in the size of herds, meat shortages, and the destruction of cattle farming infrastructures.[85]

And in a more general way he attacked his own party for exercising power in an irresponsible fashion:

Poor exercise of power, which breeds indiscipline, which breeds apathy. and which allows sabotage to be carried out with impunity, is one of the main causes of this situation. The situation of disorganisation does not have its origin only in the war being waged against us.... If we are not capable of recognising this, then we will not be capable of correcting errors and deviations with seriousness and courage.[86]

Machel then turned his attention to the burgeoning parallel market. Recognizing that "racketeering" was present in all spheres, including in the state sector, he accused the police and the judicial system of not dealing with the problem seriously. His answer to this was that other state institutions and the people themselves (though presumably not in their individual capacities) should become involved in the execution of justice:

The people's assemblies must control the activities of the courts and verify how the elected judges are exercising the judicial function for which they were invested .... There should be close collaboration and coordination among the Ministry of Justice, the organs of the judiciary, the Ministries of the Interior. Security and National Defence, and other state bodies. This is required so that speed in preparing cases is accompanied by seriousness in investigation and the preparation of cases and justice in sentencing. The citizens and institutions of the People's Republic of Mozambique have the right and the duty to participate in all phases of the administration of justice.[87]

The final pages are devoted to an attack upon the people to whom he was speaking - the members of parliament - for not representing the electorate properly. He said that their inactivity was a sign of enemy activity: "The enemy acts to make us insensitive to our

85 AIM, 1986: 7.
86 AIM, 1986: 12.
87 AIM, 1986: 14.

own problems, to the people's problems. The enemy wants to turn our instrument of power into his own instrument".[88] This metaphysical description of what the enemy does is accompanied by a description of the various physical guises the enemy might take: "the form of a woman, the form of a bottle of whisky, the form of a cheque or money".[89] The moral puritanism of Frelimo's early years was still alive, at least in the speeches of Samora Machel, as late as December 1985.

The speech shows how Machel was flailing around him, searching for the formulae which once carried with them such certainties and finding only caveats and contradictions. Economic reforms were necessary, certainly but this did not imply that there was anything amiss about Frelimo's plans. The movement's leadership was weak, so Frelimo must redouble its efforts in exactly the same direction, telling the people how and what to produce, where to live and so forth. Quite correctly, the Bretton Woods institutions have been criticized for imposing policies as if the war did not exist.[90] In many respects Frelimo was doing the same. Machel does not appear aware that Frelimo's policies might have fueled the war; by persevering, he implies, Renamo, and all that came with the war, could be overcome.

Furthermore, party leaders had yet to recognize the link between loosening control over the economy, and refraining from intervention in the choices that people make. They were still reluctant to accept that the idea that "socialism" - which largely meant government control and planning - was being abandoned. The notion of socialism had been closely aligned to that of control over what people do or produce or consume, and there were no voices calling for a relinquishing of such controls. There was however, a clear recognition that the political system was not functioning as outlined in the Constitution and that power was excessively concentrated in the hands of a few. Sérgio Vieira, at the time Security Minister, jumped on the bandwagon of Machel's speech to

88 AIM, 1986: 17.
89 AIM, 1986: 18.
90 For example Green, 1991.

proclaim that although he was a minister he had never been called to account by the parliament.[91] The parliament, which was supposed to meet twice a year, did not meet at all for the fourteen months between April 1984 and June 1985 and the Central Committee also met infrequently. In practice power rested with the Political Bureau.[92] The Frelimo leadership accepted Machel's view that there was a link between the poor performances of the economy and of the political institutions and the Political Bureau decided to hold an extended meeting with the participation of many Central Committee members and Provincial Secretaries.[93] The conclusion of this meeting was that it was necessary to strengthen the party organs so that government activities could benefit from greater control and leadership from the party. As a result there was a reshuffle involving the government and provincial governors in April 1986 in which several of the more senior figures were given special party and parliamentary responsibilities.

There was certainly no clear link between economic liberalization and political liberalization. Just when price controls were being lifted on several food items, political control was being tightened at the centre. This was not seen as a contradiction because it was felt that the desperate economic situation required radical economic solutions, not a change of political direction. To those who were familiar with the history of the early Soviet Union, Lenin's New Economic Policy was historical proof of the possibility of temporary accommodation with market forces. However, there was a great deal of debate going on inside the party at the time on this issue. Chissano, then foreign minister, called for the country to be "better informed" about the negotiations with the World Bank and IMF which was a way of arguing for explicit recognition of the change of direction which had already started several years earlier. Chissano was also comfortable with the idea of

---

[91] *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1987: B675.

[92] The eleven members of the Political Bureau during the mid 1980s were: Samora Machel, Marcelino dos Santos, Joaquim Chissano, Alberto Chipande, Armando Guebuza, Jorge Rebelo, Mariano Matsinhe, Sebastião Mabote, Jacinto Veloso, Mário Machungo and José Óscar Monteiro. Some of them were also provincial governors and therefore participated less in decision-making than their colleagues.

[93] This meeting went on for two weeks, from 18 February to 3 March 1986. On this meeting see Cahen, 1987: 39-40.

---

privatizing some of the economic sectors that had been nationalized after independence.[94] Others, such as Sérgio Vieira and Sebastião Mabote, were uncomfortable with the idea of even talking to the IMF.[95]

Apart from the liberalization of some food prices there were other economic controls that were also due to be lifted during 1985 and 1986, but most such measures ended up by being postponed until the formal introduction of the 1987 structural adjustment programme. Meeting with representatives from the private sector in May 1985 Jacinto Veloso, Minister in the Presidency for Economic Affairs, promised that companies would soon be permitted to import and export directly, that those working in priority areas such as basic consumer goods, food production and export products would benefit from tax incentives, and that the wage legislation would be reviewed to make it more flexible. Most of these measures were only introduced in 1987 or later.[96] Partly this may have been due to normal slowness in the decision-making process, but there were also other factors at work. Inside the government there was opposition from some ministers to measures of economic liberalization. It is also possible that these measures were being saved as bargaining chips in the ongoing negotiations with the IMF and the World Bank.

8. Economic Developments, 1980-1986

Several economic developments have already been mentioned, notably the weight of the debt problem and the moves towards price liberalizations in an attempt to increase production. The following section offers a more detailed picture of the economy during that period.

---

[94] *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1987: B693. Chissano defended (albeit timidly) the privatisation of some of the housing stock now under state control, a suggestion that was slapped down by Machel.

[95] Cahen, 1987: 39.

[96] *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1987: B692.

8.1 Balance of Payments

Table 1: Summary Balance of Payments (in millions of US dollars) 1980-1986

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Trade Balance	-519.3	-520.3	-606.8	-504.8	-444	-347.1	-463.6
Exports, f.o.b.	280.8	280.8	229.2	131.6	95.7	76.6	79.1
Imports, c.i.f.	-800.1	-801.1	-835.9	-636.4	-539.7	-423.8	-542.7
Services (net)	96.4	55.8	30.8	-0.2	-32.1	-92.9	-158.7
Receipts	171.3	178.5	171.3	165.7	118.1	107.1	119
Transportation	92.6	82	83.4	66.4	34.5	39.4	45
Remittances (workers)	53.4	64.5	63.5	75.2	57	40.8	50
Other	25.3	32	24.4	24.1	26.6	26.9	24
Expenditures	-74.9	-122.7	-140.5	-165.9	-150.2	-200	-277.7
Interest (total)	-6.1	-35.9	-60.3	-88.2	-80.9	-117.3	-154.7
Scheduled						-74.3	-112.1
On refinancing						-40.2	-39
On new borrowing						-2.9	-3.6
Other Transportation	-25.6	-27.4	-28.3	-32.9	-24.5	-38.7	-34
Remittances (workers)	-25.3	-29.4	-23.6	-19.9	-25.7	-25	-23
Investment Services							-50
Other	-17.9	-30	-28.3	-24.9	-19.1	-19	-16
Current Account	-422.9	-464.5	-576	-505	-476	-440.1	-622.3
Unrequited transfers	55.9	57.4	79.4	89.6	167.8	139	213
Capital Account	364.2	409	395.3	42.8	-73	-39.7	-51.5
Foreign Borrowing	503.1	718.2	724.6	399.3	264.8	228.8	284
Scheduled Amortization	-138.9	-309.2	-329.3	-296.5	-337.8	-278.5	-335.5
Errors & Ommissions	-29.6	-70.1	-42.3	9.2	25.6	-12.7	-27.2
Overall Balance	-32.4	-68.2	-143.6	-363.4	-355.7	-353.4	-488
Financing	32.4	68.2	143.6	363.4	355.7	353.4	488
Net Convertible Assets							
(negative = increase)	32.4	68.2	143.6	78.1	-63	7.7	5.8
Bilateral Payments Agreement		-2.2	-5.7	-3.3	-1.4	2.3	4.9
IMF Credit (net)							
Debt Relief					213.1	193	
Net change after rescheduling				285.3	205.6	152.7	482.2
Other Aspects							
Gross Foreign Reserves	268.7	202	61.4	46	69	48.5	72
Gross Foreign Reserves in Months of Imports	4	3	1	0.9	1.7	1.2	1.5
Current a/c deficit as % of GDP	-17.2	-20.2	-25.4	-26.2	-23.6	-23.5	-32.7
Debt Service Payments	145	345.1	389.6	99.4		50.1	8
Debt Service Ratio							
Before relief	32.1	75.1	97.3	129.4	195.9	215.4	247.4
After relief	32.1	75.1	97.3	129.4	96.2	110.4	247.4
Exchange rate (MT/US$)	32.4	35.35	37.77	40.18	42.44		
Earnings/Payments ratio	52	51.7	43.7	41.6	35.1	36.3	29.8

Source: IMF, 1988c.

Notes on the table:
(1) The debt service ratio shows debt service as a percentage of goods and total service receipts.
(2) The earnings/payments ratio is the ratio of exports and service receipts to imports and service expenditures excluding interest.

The negative impact of falling miners' remittances and decreasing revenue from transport services were two of the factors that led to the burgeoning of the debt problem. However, the biggest impact upon the balance of 'invisibles' came from the growth of interest on

---

debt itself: from just $6 million in 1980 to $154.7 million in 1986. The shift from a surplus to a deficit in services did not, as might be expected, lead to an increasing deficit of the overall current account for the simple reason that the economy as a whole was shrinking rapidly. Mozambique's exports fell from 280.8 million in 1980 to a mere 79.1 million in 1986 but, because of the drastic foreign exchange shortage, imports fell even faster: from $800 million (1980) to $543 million (1986). This meant that the deficit on the current account increased from $423 million (1980) to 576 million (1982) and then fell back to $440 million (1985). In order to achieve this, there was a severe reduction in imports in all categories (such as raw materials, spare parts and equipment) except for food. In the following year, 1986, the current account deficit jumped back up to $622 million mainly because of the growing interest on debt and because it was no longer physically possible to suppress imports to the same level. Between 1982 and 1984, when there was simply no foreign exchange available to pay for imports, about 100,000 Mozambicans died of hunger.[97]

The fall in the size of the current account deficit, because of the overall shrinkage of the economy, was hardly a matter for celebration. As a percentage of GDP, this deficit grew steadily, falling slightly (from 26.2% to 23.5%) between 1983 and 1985 but reaching 32.7% in 1986. And of course the growing burden of debt meant that the situation in the capital account was also deteriorating rapidly every year. Mozambique's overall financing gap (current account plus capital account) escalated from $32.4 million (1980) to $143.6 million (1982) to $488 million (1986).

1984 export revenue was still greater than the interest on debt but this was the last such year. By 1985 the receipts from exports came to only 65% of the interest on debt and in 1986 the percentage fell to just 51%. Another comparison that illustrates the government's difficulties is the earnings/payments ratio.[98] In 1980 total public revenue

This figure comes from Ratilal, 1989: 33. The same figure is cited in *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1988: B697.
See the notes under Table 1.

was just over half of total expenditure (52%) but the ratio got worse throughout the decade. By 1984 revenue only covered 35% of expenditure and by 1986 it covered less than 30%.

8.2 Liquidity and Production

The attitude of Mozambican planners to money was taken wholesale from Soviet theory.[99]

> [In Soviet theory] in the course of economic activity the state bank will create money through its advances to the economy and, in so far as the material plans are *de facto* feasible, these credits will be backed by material resources and therefore no 'inflationary' pressures will ensue.[100]

However, output was consistently and by a large margin below the expectations in central planning so the Mozambican government was, in practice, simply printing money to cover deficits. As a result, during the first half of the 1980s the money supply grew at a rate consistently higher than GDP.[101]

The following table compares the growth in money supply to the growth of GDP in current prices, thus providing information on the level of immediate liquidity in the economy.[102]

Table 2: Money Supply, GDP and the Immediate Liquidity Ratio

	1975	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
M1	21.4	35.3	43.7	59.5	72.5	83.6	96.5	111.5	170.4
GDP	38.7	79.5	81.5	85.9	91.4	109.1	146.6	158.4	431.6
ILR	0.55	0.44	0.54	0.69	0.79	0.77	0.66	0.7	0.39

Sources: Azam et al, 1988; IMF 1985b; IMF 1988c

Between 1975 and 1984 the money supply grew much faster than GDP.[103] This means that the immediate liquidity ratio increased, peaking at over three quarters of GDP during 1983 and 1984.[104] The fall in liquidity between 1983 and 1985 may be traced to the growth in debt service.[105] Put simply, during the first half of the 1980s there was more and more money chasing fewer and fewer goods. In particular this affected the rural areas where mechanisms of rationing were less developed than in the urban areas. The money that was being poured into the economy was not matched by material resources available to be purchased and so of course money began to lose its value as a mechanism for storing wealth.

J.P. Azam et al have identified two vicious circles linking the supply of manufactured goods to falling agricultural production.[106] The first occurs when the external deficit leads to a reduction of imports resulting in a shortage of consumer goods. Agricultural producers cannot then spend their money so they produce only for consumption and for barter or they concentrate on parallel markets. Raikes emphasizes that this is not a question of peasants voluntarily choosing an "exit option", but rather of their being pushed away from the official circuits.[107] The second vicious circle is specifically related to excess monetary liquidity. When the government responds to falling export revenue and increasing debts by printing money, in a situation where prices are controlled and the supply of consumer goods is limited, producers find that they have more money on their hands than they can spend. Azam et al suggest that producers may then reduce production

---

[99] Wuyts, 1989, in particular chapter 5.
[100] Wuyts, 1989: 98-99.
[101] Entry to the Bretton Woods institutions led the Mozambican authorities to begin calculating GDP rather than the previous measure of GSP.
[102] "Money supply" means M1. The figures for M1 and GDP are in 10^9 Meticais. Azam et al also look at the immediate liquidity ratio but I was unable to trace the source of their data for M1 and GDP so I have used the data which was used internally by the IMF. The results are similar to those of Azam et al: the trend is exactly the same but the ILR is consistently slightly higher in my calculations

[103] GDP figures are in current prices, i.e. unadjusted for inflation, so that they can be compared to the money supply.
[104] The immediate liquidity ratio is obtained by dividing M1 by the GDP.
[105] During those years GDP grew 60% in nominal terms but fell almost 8% in real terms.
[106] Azam et al, 1988.
[107] Raikes, 1984: 106-7.

or they may choose to save more. The decision to save or not will result from two factors: expectations of future supply of goods, and the amount of money already stockpiled. If the producer does not believe that he or she will be able to exchange money for goods in the future, then there is no incentive to accumulate; also, if expectations about supply are matched by the amount of money already saved, then people are less likely to want to produce for the commercial circuit. Azam et al test their hypotheses econometrically by looking at six crops in Mozambique and find them to be generally true.

This means that in the circumstances in which Mozambique found itself during the mid-1980s raising producer prices would not automatically raise production levels. Producers were not necessarily interested in obtaining more money for their crops because they were unable to obtain goods with their money. Increased availability of consumer goods was much more likely to lure producers back to the market than increased prices for their crops.

The analysis put forward by Azam et al represents the formalization of a very straightforward idea which was well understood in policy-making circles, particularly in the Ministry of Internal Commerce.[108] However, as Wuyts pointed out, the money was not simply being hoarded until it could be used. What happened was that the money was in fact circulating much more than was understood at the time, and it was serving to fuel the parallel market. Money was an active element in the country's economy, not a passive measure of value that could be altered by fiat. Along with a withdrawal of some production from official marketing circuits came an increasingly dynamic parallel market in which the official stranglehold on consumer goods was weakened by the dual means of smuggling and diverting from official circuits.

In the rural areas there was a measure of demonetization of the economy, with growing

[108] Wuyts, 1986: 200. Wuyts was in fact writing well before Azam, in response to this same idea which was making the rounds of the academic and governmental circles in Maputo.

use of barter as a response to the scarcity of consumer goods. Much more importantly though, producers chose to use alternative marketing circuits. In effect, from the early 1980s the officially established prices became minimum prices. People would sell on the official circuits when they could not get a better price on the parallel market. Consumer goods were also scarce in the parallel market during this period, but relatively less so than in the official circuits. This meant that a decreasing proportion of production came under state control during this period. Ironically, one of the unwritten and unspoken interests of government officials in an agreement with the international financial institutions, was that it promised to bring more, not less, of the economy under state control.

8.3 Terms of Trade

The terms of trade for agricultural goods *vis-à-vis* manufactured goods is one of the elements that was deemed to be central by the international financial institutions in a programme of recovery for the economy. The basic argument was that rural terms of trade had to improve in order to provide an incentive to agricultural producers to increase their output. However, the paucity of information has led to some controversy over what exactly were the terms of trade for the peasantry during the middle 1980s. The following section brings together information from various sources on the terms of trade.

Table 3, below, shows how consumer prices doubled between 1980 and 1984, with a strong acceleration between 1983 and 1984. During that period the increase in food prices was slightly below the overall price increase. During 1985 though, as a result of the liberalization of some fruit and vegetable prices, the increase in food prices was much higher than that of non-food items and services. The same happened in 1986 when there were further price liberalizations of food items.

Table 3: Consumer Price Index (1980 = 100)

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Food	100	101	123	155	194	290	326
Non-Food	100	103	117	156	208	239	285
Services and other	100	102	116	154	206	238	283
Total	100	102	120	155	202	261	305
Annual Changes (%)							
Food		1	21.8	26	25.2	49.5	12.4
Non-Food		3	13.6	33.3	33.3	14.9	19.2
Services and other		2	13.7	32.8	33.8	15.5	18.9
Total		2	17.6	29.2	30.3	29.2	16.9

Source: IMF, 1988c.

Table 4 shows the evolution in official producer prices.

Table 4: Producer Prices: Nominal, Real and Indices (1980 = base year)

		1976	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Maize	nominal	2.5	4	4	6	6	6	13	13
	real	2.48	3.74	3.67	4.65	3.61	2.78	4.66	13
	index	66	100	98	124	97	74	107	4
Beans	nominal	6.5	15	15	15	15	15	125	107
	real	6.44	14.02	13.76	11.63	9.04	6.94	23.5	23.5
	index	46	100	98	83	64	50	8.42	7.15
Rice	nominal	5	6.2	6.2	10	10	10	60	51
	real	4.95	5.79	5.69	7.75	6.02	4.63	16	16
	index	85	100	98	134	104	80	5.73	4.92
Groundnut	nominal	8.5	10	13.5	15	15	15	99	85
	real	8.42	9.35	12.39	11.63	9.04	6.94	20	20
	index	90	100	133	124	97	74	7.17	6.17
Cashew	nominal	3.5	5	5	5	5	10	77	66
	real	3.47	4.67	4.59	3.88	3.01	4.63	10	10
	index	74	100	98	83	64	99	3.58	3.08
Sunflower	nominal	7	8.5	8.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	77	66
	real	6.93	7.94	7.8	8.14	6.33	4.86	15	15
	index	87	100	98	103	80	61	5.38	4.6
Cotton	nominal	6.5	11	11	11	12.5	12.5	68	58
	real	6.44	10.28	10.09	8.53	7.53	5.79	16	16
	index	63	100	98	83	73	56	5.74	4.93
Copra	nominal	3.2	5	5	5	5	5.5	56	48
	real	3.17	4.67	4.59	3.88	3.01	2.55	5.5	5.5
	index	68	100	98	83	64	55	1.97	1.68
								42	36

Sources: Tarp, 1990; Nsubuga, 1988; IMF 1988c; AGRICOM 1989; my calculations.

Table 4 shows that producer prices were not unequivocally bad during the first decade of independence. For maize, prices rose to 1980 and then fluctuated, some years higher and some years lower than the 1980 figure. For beans, 1980 represented the high point: growing until then and declining afterwards. For rice, prices fluctuated around the 1980 figure, declining a little in the middle 1980s. Groundnut prices also fell in 1984-6 although they had been fairly secure until then. Cashew nuts had their highest point in 1980, falling considerably between 1984 and 1986. Sunflower seeds were fairly stable, again until 1984-6 when they fell. Cotton prices were low throughout the decade, except

during 1980-1982. And copra prices fell after 1983, having been reasonably stable until then. This analysis concurs with that of Finn Tarp.[109] What it shows is that there was, in broad terms, an improvement in real producer prices from 1976 until the early 1980s. Real producer prices fell after 1982 for all crops until the structural adjustment programme in 1987.

In order to discern the impact of these price changes upon urban areas, it is necessary to compare them to the trend in wages. This is a particularly difficult task because of the lack of information on the number of people in employment, but using various sources Tarp constructs a table in which it is shown that there was a considerable drop in the average monthly wage during the first half of the 1980s. In Table 4 the same methodology is employed but different figures are used for 1986.[110] According to Tarp the average monthly wage in 1986 was 57% of the 1980 figure, and the minimum monthly wage was just 36% of the 1980 minimum wage. The figures below show a slightly less drastic erosion of the purchasing power of salaries: 66 and 43% respectively. As well as declining wages there was increasing disparity, with the minimum wage declining more rapidly than the average wage.

Table 5: Employment and Wages

	1980	1986
Wage Bill (10^9 mt)	30.9	42.3
No. of Wage-earners (000)	896	597
Av monthly salary (000 mt)	2.9	5.9
Min monthly wage (000 mt)	2.7	3.5
Av salary index (nominal)	100	203
Min salary index (nominal)	100	130
Av salary index (deflated by CPI)	100	66
Min salary index (deflated by CPI)	100	43

Sources: Tarp, 1990 and Table 2.

The figures are not yet sufficient to provide solid evidence of the terms of trade between agricultural produce and manufactured goods, but they are sufficient to call into question

[109] Tarp, 1990.
[110] The difference lies in the Consumer Price Index. Tarp's figures for 1986 are provisional whereas the figures used here are final. Source: IMF, 1988c.

the often-repeated assumption that there was a greater decline in real income for the rural areas than for the urban areas.[111] Even in 1986, after the rapid fall in real producer prices of 1984-6, the indices for most crops are still above those of both average and minimum wage-earners.

9. Conclusion

The description of various aspects of the Mozambican economy has shown that in all areas the government's capacity to control events was slipping away. On the international plane the debt burden meant that Frelimo had no choice but to accept Western aid at whatever price was asked. The earlier attempt to avoid this situation by gaining Comecon support failed and from that defining moment many of the developments of the next few years can be traced. The drought and the growing intensity of the war meant that Frelimo's projections of the likely performance of the economy were consistently over-optimistic and plans made on the basis of these prognostications were therefore unlikely to result. Within a few years of the attempt to join Comecon the leadership had turned to the IMF, the World Bank and the West in general. The Fourth Congress sought to straddle both worlds, witnessing concessions to the absolute imperatives of raising dire production levels but also a revival of the idea that matters would have been different if the strictures of the Third Congress had been properly followed.

The period under discussion in this chapter witnessed the dissolution of a discourse. The certainties of the 1970s gave way to a wide range of questions during the early 1980s. On the other hand, the party was still officially committed to Marxism-Leninism, "proletarian internationalism" and the eradication of "the system of exploitation of man by man".[112] On the ideological plane, officially, Frelimo had barely changed at all from the heady days of 1977 but in reality "socialism" was fast disappearing from the country's

[111] For example, Mackintosh, 1988: 21.
[112] Frelimo, 1983: 11-13.

---

political vocabulary. The ideological confusion of the Fourth Congress and of subsequent years was due to the disappearance of a model for society, and the non-appearance of any alternative model. The reason for the depth of Frelimo's ideological crisis was that the whole justification of Frelimo's political legitimacy was wrapped up in this dissolving model, and thus there was great reluctance to abandon it even if only at the symbolic level of claiming that it was still valid in the party programme and statutes.

Inside the party there was no consensus on the way forward but there was a common acceptance that something had to be done to alleviate the crisis. The crisis was seen as being a purely economic one, unrelated to previous policies. Machel attempted to mobilize the party and people through his self-criticisms. In this context errors of implementation and even of misjudgment were sometimes denounced, but the party's long-held conviction that progress could only come through its own initiatives grew stronger rather than weaker. Despite all the evidence, there was a general refusal to talk openly of the end of the party's commitment to socialism, because the embarrassing reality was that this could only reveal that there was no longer an ideological commitment of any sort. Worse, it would inevitably open up a potentially acrimonious dispute on where precisely Frelimo stood on the whole range of questions facing the country. Socialism, therefore, provided a useful veneer behind which the arm-wrestling and tugs-of-war could play themselves out.

As the period of political indecision and confusion wore on, increasing numbers within the party leadership began to accept the idea of an accommodation with the IMF and the World Bank. However, the debates within the government were far from smooth. Writing in the middle of 1986, the correspondent for *Africa Contemporary Record,* whose work was generally very perceptive, said the following: "By May 1986 it seemed quite clear that [Sérgio] Vieira's 'no deal with the IMF' position had won the day inside the Party and the Government".[113] In January 1987 the prime minister, Mário Machungo, was

[113] Ibid: B693.

announcing the details of the Economic Rehabilitation Programme to the People's Assembly. The journalist's error was understandable: there was a great desire on all sides to get whatever help was possible on the economic front, but when Vieira and others argued (correctly) that to invite in the IMF was to begin to dismantle Frelimo's socialist heritage and plans, there was much opposition from the party. So the discussions oscillated, with members of the leadership leaning in different directions according to which aspect of the situation they were concentrating upon. Very few cogent and coherent statements survive from that period, and most of them come from opponents of an agreement with the international financial institutions. Of these Vieira was the most outspoken. Proponents of an agreement were either a little undecided, and therefore more subdued, or they were fearful of being accused of betraying all that Frelimo had stood for. Samora Machel himself never made a public declaration in favour of a structural adjustment programme and yet Mozambique's first such programme began to be prepared under his leadership.[114]

Ranged against Frelimo's indecision was the absolute certainty of the Bretton Woods institutions, and above all the fact that they held the key to further foreign credit.[115] The disastrous economic situation of the early 1980s resulted in an erosion of Frelimo's capacity to control economic decisions. Over the years this control had slipped out of the country, to donors and above all to the IMF and World Bank. To a significant extent this was a direct result of Frelimo's attempts to maintain control firmly within the realm of the state, that is, within its own hands. This in turn was the result of Frelimo's concept of socialism, dominated by the desire rapidly to modernize the country through planning and therefore the centralization of resources.

[114] The evidence for this is mainly the timing: the PRE was announced with all its details on January 14, 1987, less than three months after Machel's death on October 19, 1986. The analyses in Hanlon (1991: 118), Africa Confidential (vol.29, no.6 of 18 March 1988) and Frelimo itself (1991b: 13) concur that Machel was involved in the preparation of the first structural adjustment proramme.
[115] A recent book explores an analogy between the World Bank's certainty in its own analyses and the articles of faith that are held by religions. See George and Sabelli (1994).

Chapter 6

The Language of Change and the Erosion of Sovereignty (1987-1990)

1.Introduction

The clear contours of Frelimo's ideological options had become blurred during the first half of the 1980s as the party's application to join Comecon was rejected and overtures began to be made to the Western powers and to South Africa. From 1987 the country embarked upon a structural adjustment programme under which economic policy had to be conducted within general guidelines established by the World Bank and the IMF. At the level of language, however, much ambiguity remained. In their official pronunciations members of the government ceased to mention socialism and sought to emphasize the immediate issues that needed to be addressed rather than any long-term vision of society. And yet Frelimo's party programme retained its claims to socialism. The party programme approved at the 1983 Fourth Congress was ill-suited to guide policy several years later. However, the changes introduced to the party programme at the Fifth Congress, in 1989, were themselves very far from government practice. And government practice did not change at all as a result of the Congress. The party programme approved in 1989 was so far from seeking to justify actual policy measures that it did not even contain a reference to the PRE, and the draft theses argued that the economic analyses of 1977 and 1981 had been correct, or would have been if it had been possible to implement them.[1]

In looking at the debates of the Fifth Congress this chapter explores the changes that were introduced and looks at how these changes are a function of international pressures, and of internal party equilibria. The argument advanced is that the language of the statutes and programme is not intended to represent a commitment to a certain political

[1] Frelimo, 1989a, 1989b and 1989d.

practice. It is more instructive to think of the statutes and programme as compromise documents, incorporating the pressures for change and for no change. The language used is dotted with markers of these pressures, as though they were monuments on battlefields commemorating the victories of one side or another.

Throughout the country's independence, the issue of sovereignty has been paramount in the preoccupations of the government. Towards the end of the 1980s this preoccupation became close to obsessive as the activities of foreign governments and institutions became increasingly relevant, undermining Frelimo's claim to have developed a modern, sovereign nation-state. The government faced increasing difficulties in obscuring the extent to which it was forced to accept the advice or threats that accompanied the aid grants and loans that had become the backbone of the Mozambican economy. The exposure of the government's inadequacies in this field has led both Frelimo commentators and sympathetic observers to speak of the erosion of sovereignty and the danger that this represents for the country. The second section of this chapter looks at the debates around the issue of sovereignty, arguing that the emphasis upon sovereignty, as if it were moving from one location to another, is of little use in understanding the politics of the late 1980s. Instead, returning to the idea of Frelimo's internal heterogeneity, it argues that it is necessary to correct the work that has been done so far by stressing the internal sources of change.

2. The Economic Situation: enter the World Bank and the IMF

In January 1987 the government sought a radical new approach to deal with the disastrous economic situation. There was general agreement upon the need for changes, though not all were agreed upon the solutions that were on offer. The reasons for the economic collapse were hotly debated. Some observers emphasized the war, which by now was devastating almost every part of the country, and the destabilization policies

promoted by the Botha government in Pretoria.[2] The terrible drought that lasted between 1982 and 1985 was also considered to be a major factor. Others recognized the importance of external factors but focused instead on the need for economic reforms regardless of the war or the weather. However, internal party debate on the nature of economic policies was of minor importance as the government had no choice but to accept the guidelines of the Bretton Woods institutions.

The Economic Recovery Programme (PRE, in its Portuguese acronym) announced by the prime minister on January 14 1987 was a fairly standard package of measures designed to reactivate production and to reduce financial imbalances.[3] The main outline of the PRE was drawn up by the Bretton Woods institutions who had been engaged in detailed policy discussions with the Mozambican government since 1984. However, it is of some symbolic importance that the PRE was actually announced independently by the government before a final agreement with the IMF and the World Bank. This served several purposes, the most important of which was that it permitted the government to claim full authority for governing the country. It was a vivid example of behaviour that became increasingly common: the use of a symbolic gesture to deny that Frelimo needed to heed the views of others. On the other hand this gesture was also evidence of Frelimo's diplomatic expertise. The government had put forward a plan that was sufficiently close to IMF and World Bank proposals to merit their approval, and yet it also contained elements that would have been whittled away in further rounds of bargaining with the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). It is questionable, for example, whether they would have approved a budget in which 34% of expenditure was earmarked for defence.[4] Thus, Frelimo was taking a risk, but it was heartened by the knowledge that the IFIs were

---

[2] On the spread of the war see the maps in Vines, 1991: 98.

[3] AIM, 1987. See also the article entitled "Currency Devalued by 400%" in *The Star* (Johannesburg) of 2 February 1987. On the history of World Bank structural adjustment loans see Mosley, Harrigan and Toye, 1991: 32-45.

[4] In percentage terms this was down from 42% in 1986, but the 1987 budget was three times as large as that of 1986. See "Defence Dominates Budget" in *The Guardian*, 20 January 1987. During the period in question the World Bank applied pressure on both Zimbabwe and Tanzania to reduce their expenditure on troops which were supporting Frelimo in Mozambique (Green 1991: 242).

keen to have a structural adjustment programme in a (former) socialist country.[5] This might open the way for others, such as oil-rich Angola.

During the remainder of the decade, and indeed up to the time of writing, macro-economic policy has been mainly drawn up in Washington, headquarters of the IMF and World Bank, and in Paris where the Mozambican government has an annual meeting with the leading donors. Economic policy has had to conform to principles that the IMF and World Bank consider universal. Some of these principles have changed over the years, but there has been a reluctance to accept policies that do not fit into the pattern of solutions offered by these institutions on a global level. A particularly notorious example of this has been the existence of a war in Mozambique which was studiously ignored in the plans put forward by the World Bank and the IMF.[6]

Ironically then, one of the effects of the structural adjustment programmes has been to reinforce a tendency that has been apparent in Frelimo policy from the earliest days: the imposition of abstract solutions upon the country which is described in a manner that conforms to the solutions.[7] Under the IFIs the war became "noises offstage"[8], just as in an earlier stage the proletariat had been the country's "leading force".[9]

3. Prelude to the Fifth Congress

On 17 July 1989, one week before the official opening of Frelimo's Fifth Congress, President Chissano broadcast on national radio the news that religious leaders had been talking to Renamo officials.[10] This was by no means a novelty. Frelimo officials had

---

[5] Hanlon, 1991: 120-121.

[6] Green (1991: 243) has sought to explain why the IFIs are reluctant to advocate policies for a context of war.

[7] A similar process in Lesotho is the theme of Ferguson, 1990.

[8] Green, 1991: 243.

[9] Frelimo, 1977b: 7.

[10] For an account of the involvement of religious (particularly Catholic) mediators, see Venâncio 1993, and Vines 1991: chapter 5.

---

personally been in touch with Renamo representatives as far back as 1982,[11] and had even gone some way towards negotiating a cease-fire in 1985.[12] In public Frelimo officials had never admitted to entering into negotiations.[13] On this occasion the discussions were between Renamo and religious leaders but by announcing it Chissano was giving his blessing to the discussions. From that moment on the Fifth Congress was to be dominated by the theme of negotiations. Profound changes were introduced into the party's programme during the Congress almost without discussion.

From mid-1988 Frelimo's political life was dominated by the forthcoming Congress. In November 1988 the Political Bureau published draft theses which were then discussed at provincial and district level.[14] The debates that went on in preparation for the Congress focused on very practical issues: the rapidly growing scale of corruption within the state apparatus, abuses of power by those in positions of authority and, of course, the economic situation under the structural adjustment programme. The draft theses also aired the possibility of officially abandoning the commitment to Marxism-Leninism in favour of a vague socialism. The suggestion (ultimately approved) was that Frelimo should abandon its claim to be "the vanguard of the worker-peasant alliance", in favour of being "the vanguard organization of the Mozambican people".[15] The abstract ideological discussions were not greatly debated as party members preferred to use the opportunity to discuss more specific issues.[16] As far as most delegates were concerned, the conceptual debates were of little consequence. From the nature of the pre-Congress

---

[11] The first contact between the two parties of which I am aware occurred in 1982 when Manuel António, at the time Governor of the Province of Manica, established contact with Renamo. Private communication with Alex Vines.

[12] Accounts of these negotiations, held in Pretoria, are varied. See for example Cahen, 1987: 89 and Vines, 1991: 21-24.

[13] *Africa Contemporary Record* (Vol.21, pp. B596-B597) contains several references to speeches by government officials in 1988 which reject any possibility of dialogue with Renamo. *SouthScan* reported on 30 November 1988 that the Justice Minister, Ossumane Ali Dauto, denied the existence of a group of churchmen seeking to mediate between the government and Renamo.

[14] The draft theses were the result of discussions within the party leading up to the Second National Conference held from 19 to 24 July 1988. Frelimo, 1989a: 3-4.

[15] The new formula is to be found in Article 1 of the Frelimo Party Statutes approved by the Fifth Congress, Frelimo 1989b: 6.

[16] Marshall, 1989: 5-6.

debates, observers were expecting the Congress to focus on the economic situation, corruption and the war. President Chissano's radio broadcast on July 17 meant that only the war and possible avenues to peace were discussed at length.

President Chissano fully understood that his radio broadcast would become the great topic of discussion. Part of the reason for his timing was the pace of events on the international plane, which he could not fully control.[17] But Chissano's timing was also occasioned by the Congress. If he had so preferred, he could have postponed such statements for a couple of weeks, but he wanted the Congress to debate the question of negotiations. First, because he felt that the Congress would give him a mandate sufficiently strong to overcome opposition to peace talks from within the government and the army. And secondly, because he wanted to push discussion away from the course it was taking during the pre-Congress debates.

Corruption and the economic situation were both topics that left him uneasy, the first because it implicitly called into question his consensus-building and anti-confrontational style of leadership and the second because it was largely in the hands of the international financial institutions rather than of the Mozambican government. As for the ideological questions Chissano already had his mind made up on the need to abandon the official language of Marxism-Leninism. Nonetheless, Chissano did not want to have a potentially divisive open discussion on the matter. Chissano's long diplomatic experience may be one of the roots of his preference for consensus over confrontation.[18] However, it fits into the Frelimo tradition, begun under Mondlane and continued (though with a different style) under Machel, which attaches great importance to internal unity.

[17] On 9 July 1989 Chissano met with President Mugabe of Zimbabwe; on 11 July US Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Herman Cohen, flew into Maputo; one week later Kenyan President Arap Moi visited Maputo. All of these meetings were related to the question of negotiations with Renamo.

[18] Chissano was foreign minister from 1975 until Samora Machel's death in 1986.

By 1989 the only practical significance of Mozambique's official commitment to the principles of Marxism-Leninism was that it provided right-wing activists in the United States with a stick to beat the regime and drum up support for Renamo.[19] Removing Frelimo's references to Marxism had no effect at the level of policy-making because in government circles the language of Marxism had long given way to the discourse of the World Bank. The issue was, however, still important for some activists, particularly the urban elites (and amongst these especially the whites and *mestiços*) from which Frelimo's leadership had traditionally been recruited. There was undoubtedly an emotional attachment to the language of Marxism-Leninism which Frelimo had been officially committed to for twenty years and under normal circumstances it would not have been possible to slip through such changes without fierce debate. A more general problem arose in that Frelimo's Marxist language had been an important part of its whole discourse; the removal of references to Marxism exposed all the more clearly that Frelimo no longer had a discourse at all. President Chissano's radio broadcast was intended to make the question of negotiations the big issue of the Congress and to smother the possibility or probability of debates that would have been uncomfortable for the party leadership.

4. Statutes and Programme: the changes of the Fifth Congress

Much of what was subsequently written about Frelimo's Fifth Congress stressed the ideological changes introduced into the Party's Statutes and Programme. The changes themselves were introduced by omission so that they were only visible by comparison with previous party texts. Furthermore the changes were apparently subtle, far removed

[19] On Renamo's supporters in Washington see Minter 1994: 155-159 and Vines, 1991: 42-50. Hanlon (1991: 48-49) cites Jorge Rebelo (Political Bureau member) as explaining the issue of "Marxism" in terms of relations with the US: "At a meeting between US Congressmen and President Chissano, the key point was: 'Are you a Marxist? If so, you are our enemy.' The argument used by the reactionary forces is that Frelimo is Marxist-Leninist and so must be destroyed. And the socialist countries say we are not Marxist-Leninist either. So we are being attacked for something which we are not. Therefore, the new party statutes will not mention Marxism-Leninism, firstly in order to be coherent with ourselves, and secondly so as not to give ammunition to the enemy".

from the concerns of all but a highly educated elite. It is erroneous to assume that the changes represented an ideological shift given that the government paid no heed to the party programme in the first place. The changes represented an acceptance of external pressure and the consolidation of a realignment within the party. However, this realignment was not in itself about ideology, although ideological flags were used to stake out positions. The following paragraphs briefly describe the statutory and programmatic changes introduced in the Fifth Congress.

In the Fourth Congress Frelimo had defined itself as being "guided by the synthesis of the experience of the Mozambican people's revolutionary struggle with the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism". In the Fifth Congress the text was altered so that it now said that the Party "has its roots in the Mozambique Liberation Front, and in the people's struggle for national liberation. It seeks the creation of a democratic society of general well-being, social justice, progress and freedom". A comparison of the Statutes and Programme produced by the two Congresses shows that several other terms and expressions were dropped. Instead of promising to build socialism "by means of radical action" (1983), Frelimo now said that it would now do it "by promoting the necessary transformations" (1989). Wherever the expression "scientific socialism" was used in the Fourth Congress it was shortened to "socialism" in the Fifth Congress; "proletarian internationalism" was simply dropped; references to the labouring (or working) classes grew rare, in favour of vaguer language. The section on party members was mostly unchanged except for the apparently minor excision of the phrase detailing that party members should live "exclusively from the fruits of their work". What this implied was that membership of Frelimo was now open to those whose income came from the work of others, in other words employers. Naturally it also meant that Frelimo party members were now free to employ as many people as they wished and could. The condition that party members should be of "sound moral behaviour" was retained.[20] A further alteration

[20] However, the Central Committee's report suggested that "traditional laws" on polygamy should be taken into account in ascertaining whether candidates for membership obeyed "a certain morality". In

was the introduction of a new article (Article 15) which said that "in constituting Party bodies, the principle of renewal and continuity must be observed". This permitted President Chissano to remove some of the older members of the Party while placating the fears of some that he might seek to remodel the Party with the new generation that had played no role in the pre-independence struggles. There was apparently little concern that this article conflicts with Article 13 that states that "all party bodies, at all levels, must be democratically elected".

The Party Programmes, in both 1983 and 1989, were preceded by an introduction that sought to show that Frelimo had always been what it purported to be at that moment. The introduction to the 1983 Programme contains the following description of Frelimo's foundation:

> With the foundation of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) on 25 June 1962, and its First Congress in September of the same year, the people had, for the first time in their history, a vanguard organization to struggle in a united manner against Portuguese colonialism and against imperialism. Thus began the final phase of the centuries-long resistance by our people to foreign domination.[21]

The equivalent paragraph from 1989 reads as follows:

> Frelimo was the first political formation of a patriotic nature and on a national scale to exist in our country. The colonial-fascist system prevented and repressed the emergence of democratic organizations. As a result, political activity could only unfold clandestinely, or in the process of the advance of the armed struggle in the liberated areas. The Frelimo Party is the vanguard of the Mozambican people.[22]

The contrast is clear: whereas in 1983 the emphasis is upon Frelimo as a vanguard organization against colonialism and imperialism, by 1989 it is merely a vanguard "of the Mozambican people" and "of a patriotic nature"; moreover these qualities are referred to

the past anyone who had married polygamously after 1977 was automatically excluded from party membership. Frelimo, 1989c: 18.

[21] Frelimo, 1983: 8.

[22] Frelimo, 1989d: 17.

as perennial ones, present at the moment of creation and carried throughout the movement/party's existence. Further on, the 1983 version explains that at the Second Congress (1968) Frelimo had to defend its implicitly innate political line against "those who merely sought to expel Portuguese colonialism in order to substitute it as an exploiting force". The 1989 version does not refer to the Second Congress (or indeed to any other) and seeks to define Frelimo's socialism in only the vaguest of terms: "the rejection of social injustice and of all forms of discrimination ... social liberation ... justice and equality among men".[23] Later in the Programme Frelimo offers up its credo, but in a form that is open to the widest-ranging of interpretations:

> In socialism we express our desire for a real and profound social transformation, based on a scientific analysis of reality, on the definition of the social base of the revolution, on the need to ensure that the interests of the broad masses predominate and to guarantee a just distribution of the fruits of labour. This is the content of the Frelimo Party's political line.[24]

At the level of political philosophy there was a clear shift from the Fourth to the Fifth Congress. The earlier version (handed down with few changes from 1977) was clear in its attachment to the model of 'scientific socialism'. The use of language was designed to establish the party as an member of the fraternity of socialist nations led by the Soviet Union including, on the African continent, Angola and Ethiopia.[25] The 1989 Programme was designed to explain that Frelimo was not (indeed never had been) a member of this fraternity. The objective was simply to repudiate the link that the party had previously sought to establish because there was no longer any benefit to be gained and, on the contrary, as President Chissano explained, "this Marxism business was beginning to cause problems for us".[26] The lesson learnt was that by keeping the Party's Programme vague and essentially meaningless, it was possible to avoid alienating donors for no good

---

[23] Frelimo, 1989d: 18. As is clear from this quote, Frelimo in 1989 still retained (as it did at the 1991 VI Congress) the habit of referring to people as "men". In essence this was not misleading: Frelimo's policy *was* essentially directed to and by men.

[24] Frelimo 1989d: 19

[25] On the relationship between the Soviet Union and these countries see Simpson, 1989.

[26] Interview to the Portuguese weekly *Expresso*, 12 May 1990. Cited in Cahen, 1991: 87.

---

reason. This is why the 1989 Programme persistently refuses to use terminology that might allow the reader to categorize Frelimo's political philosophy in the simple terms that gained currency during the Cold War.

An interesting aspect of the 1989 Programme is the way it speaks of the World Bank and IMF-sponsored Economic Recovery Programme (PRE), which had begun in January 1987. In the draft theses the Political Bureau claimed that "the general lines of development as laid down at the 1977 Third Congress and the Ten Year Plan adopted in 1981 are still valid".[27] It went on to say that the PRE "is subordinate to the Frelimo Party programme, and strategically the Party's line in economic policy must be upheld".[28] In other words, the draft theses advanced the patently false view that economic policy was following the 1977 and 1981 plans which were anathema to the PRE, the country's current macro-economic guiding principles. And they further suggested that the PRE was in fact based upon these plans. The need to sustain the fiction of sovereignty and Frelimo control over economic policy was such that the Political Bureau was ready to advance even the most far-fetched arguments. The Programme which was approved at the Congress avoids the issue by refraining from mentioning the PRE at all, but in the Central Committee's report the PRE is described as springing from the Social and Economic Directives of the Fourth Congress. Frelimo never underestimated the importance of writing its own history.

5. Statutes and Programme: the politics of language

The Soviet-inspired orthodoxy of the language used at the 1977 Third Congress was barely challenged in 1983, despite the policy changes that were occurring around then. By contrast, at a time of policy continuity (1989) the language was changed, though with no impact upon policy-making. Whereas 1983 was tumultuous in political and economic

---

[27] Frelimo, 1989a: 10.

[28] Frelimo 1989a: 11.

terms, 1989 was a year of no great changes. Not only was the language of the programme irrelevant to policy-making, policy-making itself had little impact upon the language of the programme.

In deciding in which language the programme should be couched, the Frelimo leadership had to take into account two levels of influences. The first, and at crucial times the most important, was the international environment. The second was the internal balance of different groups within the party, who used the Programmes and Statutes as one of the mechanisms for establishing relative strengths. A third and much more rare level occurred when the terminology of the Programmes was used in a specific debate within the Party.

Frelimo has frequently drawn applause for its ability on the diplomatic scene, playing off one country or group of countries against another. It thrived in the competitive international environment of the Cold War and even benefited from the Sino-Soviet split and more recent disputes between western countries.[29] Very often this diplomatic competence was achieved with a blatant disregard for consistency. In conversations with the governments of Eastern Europe, Frelimo officials would refer to the national and Party constitutions as proof of their "socialist orientation", while at the same time they would tell the governments of Western countries to pay no attention to the constitutions because they did not represent Frelimo practice. This worked only up to a certain point. As early as 1982, for example, Stasi (East German secret police) information on Mozambique began to be re-filed under the category of "non-communist countries",[30] despite protestations from Samora Machel that Frelimo was "Marxist".[31] And by the late

---

[29] In a non-attributable comment, a well-placed British military officer said that at the Rome peace talks between Renamo and Frelimo, the Mozambicans (both parties) proved adept at extracting concessions from the British and Portuguese governments who were vying to be chosen to train the new unified army.

[30] Private communication from Alex Vines. The Stasi decision was possibly related to Comecon's rejection of Mozambique's application for membership. It may also have been related to Mozambique's recognition of West Berlin as part of the Federal Republic of Germany.

[31] For example, his speech "Every Revolution is a Contribution to Marxism", delivered in East Berlin on 11 April 1983. Reprinted in Munslow, 1985: 104-108.

1980s Washington-based opponents of US aid to Mozambique were making mileage out of drawing attention to Marxist aspects of Mozambique's constitution. International factors had been important in the choice of language at the Third Congress in 1977; at the Fourth Congress the Party's inconsistencies were a positive advantage on the international plane; by 1989 they had become a burden so, once more following an international logic, the language was changed.

The second level of influences concerned the internal balance of factions within the party. Some of these factions were constituted on the basis of ideological commitments but usually they were also crossed with personal friendships, rivalries and loyalties that stretched back many years. Ethnic, educational and generational differences also played their part in the complicated mosaic of internal Frelimo politics.

Policy-making rarely played a specific role in devising and interpreting the Statutes and Programme though there were occasions when this did happen. One such occasion was when, in July 1988, President Chissano declared that henceforth "all Mozambicans, without any exception", should take part in the war against Renamo. The national Constitution and Frelimo's statutes had always said this but in practice people of Portuguese, Indian or mixed ancestry had not been recruited into the army. This issue had always been politely overlooked in public statements with rare exceptions.[32] When President Chissano seized this issue and promised to make sure that the Constitution was respected, he was sending a message to various groups within the party. For those who resented the continued privileges of whites Chissano was attempting to throw off his image as an appeaser, too cautious to make decisions that might offend whites and Asians. Most importantly, Chissano was telling the military leaders (who felt threatened by the prospect of whites and more educated people entering the army) that he was not willing to continue tolerating their excesses and abuses. In this case the Constitution

---

[32] One such exception was when the second national conference of the Mozambican Youth Organization (OJM) criticized the importance of racial origin in deciding who went into the army. Maputo, March 1986.

offered a useful instrument in internal politics. Although the Frelimo Party Programme had a legal obligation to respect the Constitution (and in some respects vice-versa) this issue was spelled out in the Party Programme because it had attracted internal discussion. Thus, the Programme approved at the Fifth Congress said that the party should make sure that all citizens "irrespective of their social, ethnic, racial or religious origin" should undergo military service.[33] Rarely were the Constitution, Party Statutes and Programme valued for their own sake as the considered and agreed opinion of those who had approved them.

There is no doubt that Frelimo's use of language was motivated by more than simply a desire to explain the situation. Above all, it was motivated by a desire to control. Through its use of language one can find, in Frelimo party texts, traces of the need for a dominant group or groups to assert control. During the early years of Independence language was one of the instruments used by Frelimo to extend its control into parts of society that it had not reached earlier: language was the passport to social promotion and Frelimo controlled and vetted the correct use of language. In the 1980s words were fought over for their symbolic value, like flags or battle standards, and through these words different sets of people asserted their power.

At an early stage the party invested in Marxism a scientificity with which it sought to enhance the party's legitimacy and power. Foucault had the following to say about attempts to establish the scientific credentials of Marxism:

> When I see you straining to establish the scientificity of Marxism I do not really think that you are demonstrating once and for all that Marxism has a rational structure and that therefore its propositions are the outcome of verifiable procedures; for me you are doing something altogether different, you are investing Marxist discourses and those who upheld them with the effects of a power which the West since Medieval times has attributed to science and has reserved for those engaged in scientific discourse.[34]

[33] Frelimo, 1989b: 19. Samora Machel had also tried to raise the educational standards within the armed forces but was killed before being able to put this into practice. See *The Guardian*, 17 June 1987.
[34] Foucault, 1980: 85. (From a lecture given in January 1976).

Frelimo's attempts to explain its political philosophy in terms of "scientific laws" were connected to notions of the indisputable nature and power of science. Even when it was no longer talking of Marxism, at the Fifth Congress, Frelimo found it necessary to argue that its original (1977 and 1981) economic thinking had been correct (because it was scientific) but had not had the intended effects because it had been badly applied. By laying claim to scientific infallibility the party was of course claiming to be infallible itself.

Over the years the official documents emanating from congresses and conferences were less and less concerned with devising a strategy to apply to the governing of the country. Increasingly they became fields in which factions sought to lay down their claims to authority. Chissano managed to defeat the slogans in which the army was described as being an army "of the peasants and the working class". He did so because he was seeking to break the power of a group of high-ranking military officers (such as Sebastião Mabote and Eduardo Nihia) who had risen through the ranks during the war of liberation despite having very little formal education.[35] These officers were worried about being sidelined with the appearance of a set of younger officers, trained in military academies abroad, and they were worried about the conscription of university and secondary-school students. They therefore sought to use slogans that staked their claims as true representatives of the revolutionary classes. Language was controlled not in order to control policy or even to limit the realm of the thinkable, but as a medium for the distribution of power among the many factions and interests that made up the party.

Although "socialism" was no longer referred to in official speeches after 1985, the word still appeared frequently in the party documents, including in the Programmes that appeared after the 1989 and 1991 Congresses. At the Fifth Congress the concept was defined in a purposefully vague manner; at the Sixth Congress it was left undefined but

[35] Characteristically Chissano compensated for his remodelling of the army by elevating Nihia to Frelmo's Political Bureau which was expanded from 10 to 12 members.

qualified by the adjective "democratic". The discrepancy comes from the existence within the party of a vocal minority (led by Marcelino dos Santos and Sérgio Vieira) for whom the language of official Marxism is their banner. They are not represented in government (which is why socialism is a word never heard in government circles) but they retain some influence within the party. Their influence is being eroded year by year, and the party's changing use of language is a measure of this.

To what extent does this battle over language hinge upon different conceptions of society? Up to a certain point it does. Vieira and dos Santos believed that they were building socialism, in the Soviet sense of the word. That was official policy but even at an early stage other high officials such as Chissano and Mocumbi were content to pay no more than lip-service to this idea. More importantly, the policies actually followed by Vieira, dos Santos and others[36] were not significantly different from those of their colleagues. Sérgio Vieira's strong-armed tenure as Security Minister was what permitted Guebuza to launch Operation Production; Marcelino dos Santos' governorship of Sofala Province was marked by the activities of press-gangs in the streets of Beira, much as Manuel António was forcing people into communal villages in neighbouring Manica. Within the party, however, Vieira and dos Santos belong to a thoroughly different group from that of Guebuza and António.[37]

[36] Such as Óscar Monteiro who was Minister in the President's Office (1975-1983), Minister of Justice (1983-1986) and Minister of State Administration (1986-1989).

[37] Guebuza, António and others such as Teodato Hunguana are sometimes thought of as representing a '*négritude*' current inside Frelimo. In the weeks between Machel's death and Chissano's appointment as his successor, a letter purportedly written by anonymous "veterans and founders of the Republic" circulated in Frelimo and diplomatic circles. It claimed that Mozambique should be led by "people of Mozambican origin and stock" (i.e black Mozambicans). The letter suggested that Chissano should be President, Chipande (the Defence Minister) should be Vice-President and Guebuza should be prime minister. The letter added that Guebuza should be responsible for choosing the government but it advanced a list of suggestions for ministerial posts. The authorship of this letter has never been established. It is extremely doubtful that Guebuza himself was involved as the letter was something of a crude bombshell in the middle of Frelimo's delicate internal political balancing acts. It is possible that the letter was a forgery designed to harm Guebuza, but this interpretation is weakened by the sheer number and variety of people mentioned in the letter who could also be affected. My favoured interpretation is that the letter did come from veterans of the armed struggle, people who had been overtaken by technocrats who played no role in the liberation war, and by *mestiços*, whites and people of Asian ancestry. They considered Guebuza to be their natural leader and felt that Machel's death presented a unique opportunity to have their voice heard before Chissano established his new position. If my assumption is correct, the letter was probably drafted by a handful of colonels and generals. It is

In short, the key to understanding the internal party disputes, which were partly mediated through the language of official documents, does not reside exclusively in differences over ideological interpretations. There is no single clear-cut factor, such as ethnic, regional, ideological or generational loyalties, that defines positions within the party. These factors, as well as others, all contribute. Ideological interpretations are often a function of such loyalties, rather than an agglutinating factor. The party was certainly not homogeneous, fully committed to a single identified project. But on the other hand it is also misleading to talk of factions because of the variety of links that people had to each other in the higher ranks. The different groups that appeared on any single issue were usually transitory, dissolving rapidly into new formations when other issues appeared. In a vague way the less educated veterans of the armed struggle sought to protect each other and to block the ascent of others to key posts, particularly in security and defence. However, the crossing of that concern with a range of other concerns led to a degree of flexibility and fluidity in internal alliances. Another factor that was of some importance in determining alliances within Frelimo was that of accumulation. Opportunities for accumulation during the 1980s depended to a large degree upon the capacity to patronize state officials, and this in turn was naturally partly dependent upon political influence within the party. Old and new loyalties were active with a view to profiting from the desperate economic situation of the country. This was particularly, but not exclusively, evident in policy circles that were making decisions about the army and the war.

6. The Fifth Congress: Peace Negotiations

Frelimo's long-standing public refusal to enter into negotiations with Renamo led to a situation in which the Fifth Congress expressed a desire for peace but made no mention of how this was to be achieved. The Central Committee's report said that Frelimo fought

significant that the authors are opposed to ideological and international interpretations of the war, and it is the first time that a Frelimo source refers to it as a civil war. As a solution to the war they proposed that each side should jettison its non-black militants, clearing the way for a government of unity. This letter is listed under 'Anonymous, 1986' in the bibliography.

a war "in order to end the war [and] in order to conquer peace".[38] It also said that the party was undertaking political and diplomatic measures to seek an end to the war. The 'political measures' referred to an amnesty for Renamo guerrillas that gave themselves up, but the diplomatic initiatives were not explained. The Mozambican government was frantically using international contacts to try to put an end to the war that was tearing the country apart but the Congress was not informed of this.[39]

The resulting declaration, although negotiated over a marathon final session of the Congress lasting until six in the morning,[40] was extremely vague. For President Chissano, the decision to make peace the big issue of the Congress served the purpose of alerting Frelimo party members to the possibility that negotiations with Renamo might be imminent. The Soviet Union had recently (June 1989) announced that it was phasing out its military advisors to Mozambique; more importantly it was also beginning to curtail the military hardware that Mozambique was receiving.[41] Furthermore, questions were beginning to be raised in Zimbabwe over the expense and efficacy of military aid to Frelimo.[42] This weakened those within Frelimo who were set against negotiations and permitted Chissano to have the subject openly aired. The opponents of negotiations had a variety of reasons. Some opposed any sort of concession to Renamo on the grounds that it was not morally acceptable to reward terrorism; others felt that it would be a betrayal to the Revolution that they still believed in, despite the structural adjustment programmes; others still were profiting from a war that had created many opportunities for transferring state funds to private pockets. Frelimo incorporated powerful entrenched forces ranged against a negotiated settlement to the war. President Chissano, who, despite what he said in public, had long come to the conclusion that only negotiations could bring the war to an end, seized the opportunity to lay the question out publicly and thus weaken still further those who had previously succeeded in making it into a taboo subject.

[38] Frelimo, 1989c: 55.
[39] Vines, 1991 and Venâncio, 1993
[40] Marshall, 1989:9.
[41] Alden and Simpson, 1993: 115.
[42] Alden and Simpson, 1993: 115.

7. Revision of the Constitution

After the changes of the Fifth Congress Frelimo commissioned a new national Constitution, one that would be more in line with the alterations of the party statutes and with political practice. Above all it was important, for the sake of donors, that the dictatorial powers attributed to Frelimo be removed. The party approved a draft in early 1990 and the final version was approved by the Parliament in October 1990. The 1975 Constitution, which had undergone two relatively minor revisions, institutionalized Frelimo as the "leading force" in society, and was therefore dependent upon Frelimo party statutes for many specific issues affecting the country as a whole.[43] Furthermore, the chapter dedicated to the rights and duties of citizens concentrated heavily on duties and was vague about rights.[44] Duties were absolute but rights always contained escape clauses.[45] The new Constitution institutionalized the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers, proclaimed the country's respect for human rights and guaranteed the people's freedom to associate in different political parties.[46] Universal suffrage by secret ballot was established for the election of the President and the Parliament.[47] In sum, the new Constitution was a liberal one, removing any traces of Marxism to which the United States and the IFIs might object.[48]

[43] Article 3.
[44] Articles 26-36.
[45] For example article 33: "Individual rights are guaranteed by the State ... and may not be violated except under the terms of the law"; or article 36: "The State forbids any abuse of human and individual rights, which acts against the interests of the People", the implication being that the interests of the People (defined by Frelimo) might justify the abuse of human rights.
[46] Part III, chapters 2, 3 and 6; Part II, chapters 1, 2 and 4.
[47] Following an agreement with Renamo signed in Rome on 4 October 1992, elections were held on 27-29 October 1994. Chissano gained 53% of the vote for the Presidency, ahead of the Renamo leader, Afonso Dhalakama, who received 34% of the vote. For the parliamentary elections Frelimo received 44% and Renamo 38%. Frelimo won easily in the four southernmost provinces but it lost in five provinces: Manica, Sofala, Tete, Nampula and Zambézia. At the time of writing the only available in-depth analysis of the elections is Cahen, 1995.
[48] In the United States Congress the influential senator Jesse Helms was the strongest advocate of an anti-Frelimo stance, and this occasioned disputes between Congress and the Administration. See Isaacman, 1987a; Morrison, 1987; Hanlon, 1991: 46-47; Vines, 1991: 48-49. For the IFIs, chapter IV of the new Constitution (articles 35-58) established that "all types of ownership" (article 41) were permitted and encouraged in Mozambique.

By altering the Constitution Frelimo was responding to pressure from donor countries[49] but it was also seeking to maintain the illusion that it remained firmly in control of the country's future. The negotiations with Renamo meant that a multiparty system would have to be introduced for the new post-war settlement. However, if a new Constitution were hammered out as part of the negotiations, Renamo would be able to claim credit for the changes. Frelimo therefore jumped before it was pushed, just as it had done with the introduction of the PRE in 1987, and rewrote the Constitution alone. Ironically this slowed the pace of negotiations with Renamo because it removed a number of possible demands and concessions from the negotiating table.[50]

The approval of the new Constitution did not provoke immediate change in the political life of Mozambique. The first independent newspaper, *Savana*, only appeared in early 1994. Several political parties were created but none had much popular appeal. Political life in Mozambique only underwent a profound change with the signature of the General Peace Accord and the end of the war. Myriad local conflicts that had expressed themselves through the war began to re-emerge in a less violent form, sometimes taking on the guise in which they had appeared in colonial times, on other occasions metamorphosing into new lines of dispute.[51] The vast population movements that took place after the end of the war, with refugees and dislocated people moving back to where they had come from, or to new areas of settlement, also brought about local political changes on a scale unprecedented since independence.[52]

Just as with the party statutes and programme, the rewriting of the Constitution should not be regarded as the cause of change in itself nor even as an obvious consequence of changes. In its previous form it had become an uncomfortable burden and it was changed as a result of external pressure. As always, there was no unanimity inside Frelimo about

[49] Hanlon, 1991: 241.
[50] Unattributable comment by a Portuguese diplomat.
[51] See Alexander, 1994 and 1995; Cahen 1995.
[52] Wilson, 1994; Coelho, 1995; Myers, 1994.

the decision to alter the Constitution.[53] The small group of committed Marxists were against the change on ideological grounds. Their long-standing intellectual leadership meant that they had a weight inside the party that went beyond their numbers. Even greater opposition, however, came from those who believed that it was wrong to submit to external pressure in this manner. Questions of principle regarding the desirable nature of a Constitution were in fact sidelined by the debate between those who said that the Constitution should not be changed as an indication of Mozambique's sovereignty, and those who said that material benefits should not be forsaken because of an attachment to meaningless phrases. President Chissano managed to impose the latter point of view on the grounds that one should be pragmatic. However, the concern with sovereignty remained extremely important.

8. The Erosion of Sovereignty

The government's attempts to establish de facto sovereignty over the country, both internally and externally, has been a constant theme since Independence. Internal sovereignty, according to convention, is "supremacy over all other authorities within that territory or population". External sovereignty means "not supremacy but independence of outside authorities".[54] The applicability of either of these concepts anywhere in the world is open to question. Their all-or-nothing character renders them of dubious use except as juridical propositions.[55] The question that we are concerned with is not of legally constituted authority but of power, which is of an entirely different nature. Sovereignty, according to the traditional definitions of international relations theory, is absolute but clearly when one speaks of the erosion of sovereignty one is dealing with a relative concept. Both the traditional and the everyday use of 'sovereignty' concur in assuming that it is to be found (or not) in the state.

[53] Marcelino dos Santos, in an unattributable private conversation, said that there was no need for a multiparty democracy because "we already have a multiparty system inside the Politburo and the Central Committee".
[54] Bull, 1977: 8.
[55] See the discussion in Beitz, 1991.

In Mozambique, as in most countries, it is not possible to make a clear-cut distinction between internal and external sovereignty. Internal forces which seek to remain beyond the government's reach ally themselves to external forces, and external forces which seek to shape the outcome of events within Mozambique use and are used by pockets of resistance to government authority. For the purpose of analysis we may consider threats to internal and external sovereignty separately. The question of internal sovereignty concerns, at least from about 1982, the history of the war, coupled with the retreat from official economic circuits of substantial portions of the population. This issue goes beyond our immediate concerns and is addressed elsewhere.[56]

The question of external sovereignty began with the rebuttal of early and very vague attempts by the new regime in Portugal to influence events in Mozambique. Portugal rapidly became irrelevant and the focus of Frelimo's attempts to impose external sovereignty turned to Ian Smith's Rhodesia and the apartheid regime in South Africa. The Frelimo leadership believed, correctly, that it would not be able to assert full control over the country (i.e. internal sovereignty) while the white regimes in those two neighbouring countries made a mockery of its claims to external sovereignty. When Zimbabwe became independent in 1980 the rejoicing was not just due to an outpouring of feelings of solidarity: it was also occasioned by the belief that Frelimo had equally been liberated. At this point Frelimo concentrated its efforts to establish external sovereignty upon South Africa, eventually reaching what it hoped would be a *modus vivendi* by signing the Nkomati Accord in 1984. The first article of the Nkomati Accord lays down that Mozambique and South Africa "undertake to respect each other's sovereignty and independence and ... to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the other".[57] Nevertheless, South African support for Renamo continued, tapering off towards the end of the decade as political authority in South Africa began to shift away from the military. By that point however, the nature of Frelimo's battle to establish sovereignty had

[56] Chapters 5 and 7.
[57] The text of the Nkomati Accord is reproduced in full in Legum, 1985.

changed. The threat was no longer from external governments, but from the IFIs and from non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Because the former in particular operate at the level of economic planning, whatever academic pretensions there were to distinguish between internal and external sovereignty fall away into irrelevancy.

The IFIs used their powers of conditionality to push economic policy in their preferred direction, to the extent that the Mozambican government's capacity to choose its own economic policy was limited to tinkering at the margins. The Economic Recovery Programme (PRE) and its successor, the Economic and Social Rehabilitation Programme (PRES), were negotiated between the government and the IFIs but the Mozambican government's capacity to respond to the IFI suggestions was extremely curtailed. IMF approval was essential for Mozambique to keep its creditors at bay and the World Bank's assent was just as vital for credit, investment and other forms of aid from a number of Western countries. The non-existence of other sources of aid meant that there was no option but to reach an agreement with the IFIs on their terms. The participation of the Mozambican government in drawing up the programmes was necessary because the programme would have to be implemented by the government. It was also a response to the Bank's concern that there should be local "ownership" of the programme so that there would be greater commitment to it. This contributed very little to giving the government a sense of being in control of economic decision-making.

Apart from the way that economic policy decisions were reached the actual content of these decisions also represented an erosion of the government's powers. Many of the policies contained in the IFI-sponsored structural adjustment programmes were concerned with dismantling state intervention in the economy. Sovereignty, in as much as it was interpreted by the government as being government or state capacity, was therefore limited by the programmes which the government was being obliged to make its own. From the mid-1980s the Bank was increasingly open about its objective of reducing state intervention in Africa and it began to admit that its conditionality was political and had

political effects. The word "governance" began to appear in its justifications of increasingly overt interventions in matters of government policy; the term seemed to offer a vague reassurance that the Bank was not in fact getting involved in politics, an activity forbidden under its Articles of Agreement.[58]

On the other hand an element of ambiguity arose in that World Bank aid, and indeed much of the bilateral aid that followed in the wake of agreement with the Bank, was channeled through the government.[59] Given that most of that funding was tied to very specific purposes, the government's capacity for independently disposing of the resources that were available to the state remained limited but it did contribute to strengthening some of the aspects of the state that the IFIs were keen to curtail in the first place. The IFIs are directly opposed to the state's quest for control over foreign resources entering the country, or for that matter over Mozambican resources. However, because they often work through the state they do create possibilities for funding to be diverted to uses other than those for which they were earmarked.

The NGOs, many of whom had a heritage of political support for Frelimo during the early years of independence, were shifting away from supporting official government-controlled channels and structures. Instead NGOs increasingly sought to support "grassroots" organizations, or "civil society". By doing this they were effectively saying that they preferred to reserve the right to decide exactly who in what area was going to benefit from their support and in what manner, denying that role to the government. These NGO projects inevitably involved themselves in local political issues and in many cases failed to achieve their objectives because of this. Whether the investment would better have been channeled through official sources is open to question. The government certainly felt that it was becoming increasingly sidelined, and that the NGOs were setting

[58] See, for example, Mosley, Harrigan and Toye, 1991.
[59] This is a recurring contradiction of IFI lending. See Williams, 1981: 25.

---

up their own structures which were competing with the government's, thus weakening even further the state's capacity.

During the early years of independence Frelimo was unwilling to allow foreign NGOs to work in the country, mainly through fears that they might prove subversive to the Frelimo project. The country's security establishment felt itself to be vulnerable and foreigners were all assumed to be potential spies. Technical assistance was channeled through other governments and multilateral organizations, such as those in the UN system. This provided the Mozambican authorities with a sense of being able to understand the agendas, hidden or not, of the funding bodies: East European governments, Nordic governments, the FAO, UNIDO, etc. Only a very small group of trusted NGOs, friends of Frelimo since the liberation struggle, were allowed to work in the country. In 1980 there were just seven NGOs working in Mozambique; by 1985 there were 70; by 1990 there were up to 180.[60] Most of these sought to safeguard their independence by maintaining maximum control over their projects so a growing number of economic agents were exercising their activities outside the direction of the Mozambican authorities.

There is no doubt that this constituted a serious preoccupation for the Mozambican government although in public a diplomatic façade was maintained. Prakash Ratilal, former Governor of the Bank of Mozambique and coordinator of the National Emergency Executive Commission (CENE), touches upon this issue only very gingerly in his book. He says that some people would argue that "NGOs cherish their independence overmuch" but he counterbalances this with the alternative view that NGOs are much more capable of responding to grass-roots needs than other institutions.[61] And he

[60] The earlier figures come from Brochmann et al. 1990: 58; the 1990 figure is cited by Hanlon, 1991. Hanlon's figure for 1990 is now widely used but Brochmann et al say that in 1989 there were less than 140. Part of the discrepancy (if indeed there is one, given that the figures refer to different years) may be due to differing interpretations of what constitutes an NGO. None of these authors provide sources or lists of NGOs. Minter (1994: 275) provides a different set of figures for 1990: 143 foreign NGOs from 23 countries, 44 bilateral donors from 35 countries, and 32 multilateral agencies.
[61] Ratilal, 1989: 143-144.

proceeds by saying that "In Mozambique, in a general way, NGOs and the Government have developed effective collaborative relations".[62]

There are several further ways in which the growth of NGOs has resulted in a weakening of state structures. The first is through the drain on state resources caused by the need to organize numerous daily meetings with NGOs, each of which is responsible for a relatively small proportion of total aid. Invariably the NGOs fly over their directors or higher-ups who have to be appropriately received and briefed. Another way in which there has been a bleeding of the state structures is through NGO competition for staff. In their home countries NGOs like to point out that they are not staffed only by expatriates. However, the Mozambicans whom they hire tend to come, originally at least, from the state sector. They tend to be drawn from amongst the most capable, and the salaries offered by NGOs ensure that such people avoid returning to the state sector at all costs.[63] A further example of the weakening of state structures through contact with NGOs is the creation of dependency at a local level. State structures at a local level are usually starved of resources and the presence of an NGO project in the district is often an opportunity for local offices and personnel to be propped up. When the main source of funding is no longer the state hierarchy, the local governmental institutions are naturally likely to devote much of their time to ensuring that the NGOs are content and likely to stay in the district. Of course NGOs are not accountable to local authorities for their activities.[64] On the other side of the balance sheet, the proliferation of NGOs, coupled with their compulsion to devise and implement projects as often as possible, has actually provided Mozambican authorities with the opportunity to 'play off' NGOs and agencies against each other, increasing the stakes and naturally the benefits for whoever is negotiating, either individually or in name of the state.

[62] Ibid: 144. Given that Ratilal was, for a period, responsible for these relations, it is unlikely that he would have argued otherwise. Nevertheless, his approach cannot justify the extrapolation made in Hanlon, 1991: 207-208 who cites only the first point of view provided by Ratilal and does so as if it were Ratilal's definitive opinion.

[63] Ratilal (1989: 140) makes this point from a semi-official perspective.

[64] Jocelyn Alexander (1995: 45) has written about the implications of NGO non-accountability in Manica for proposals to decentralize power in the 1990s.

In 1991 Joseph Hanlon published *Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots?*, the main argument of which was that the IFIs, donor countries and NGOs were in effect "re-colonizing" the country.[65] The NGOs were described as "new missionaries" who act as contractors for donor governments rather than establishing priorities based on local needs. He put forward the view, held by many in government, that the government's capacity to intervene in society was being deeply eroded by the activities of the IFIs and NGOs and this in turn provided the international bodies with the excuse they needed to intervene even further. Once more, the issue of sovereignty was central to the debate of the appropriate nature of Mozambique's relations with foreign bodies. Profoundly sensitive to the limited nature of its sovereignty, the Frelimo government has, since the late 1980s, used every opportunity at its disposal to seek to affirm that its position under international law affords it unique rights and privileges within the country. The IFIs and the NGOs have generally interpreted this as unreasonable and inexplicable behaviour, or sometimes (and sometimes correctly) as an indication that the government was seeking to protect vested interests within the state apparatus.

The changing pattern or relations between the Mozambican government and IFIs and NGOs is in large measure a reflection of a much wider change in the philosophies of those two types of organizations. Almost every country in Africa encountered increasingly severe conditionality from the IFIs from the middle of the 1980s. World Bank Vice President for Africa, Edward Jaycox, explained the growing importance of the World Bank in both financial and intellectual terms:

> The Bank has become the principal mobilizer of resources for Africa, both because of the stamp of approval provided by its lending program and through forums like the Special Program of Assistance to Africa (SPA). Furthermore, the Bank has, however unintentionally, assumed the dominant intellectual role on African economic issues. It has issued a series of seminal progress reports and strategic plans of action ... and it is involved in 90 percent of the analytical research on Africa. *The World Bank may indeed be too much involved in African development. The proportionate role of external assistance in the region is too large. However, given Africa's dismal economic condition, aid is a fact of life.*

[65] Hanlon, 1991.

The Bank is working in a disenabling environment where African governments often have not been able to meet their development commitments to their people or to donors, and where donors have often had difficulty acting effectively and sustaining their commitment. And so the Bank has become the focal point of aid to Africa.[66]

Although Jaycox gives the impression that the Bank's growing power occurred, like the British Empire, "in a fit of absent-mindedness", there can be no doubt that the Bank's disproportionate bargaining powers are displayed prominently during its negotiations with African governments.

Within the NGO community debate centered upon regaining an independence that, it was felt, had been compromised by excessively close collaboration with governments. This was happening in a wide range of NGOs and over a wide range of countries. The Bank's near-monopoly on intellectual production and long-term strategic thinking[67] has influenced NGOs who have responded to the recent emphasis upon governance by seeking to bypass state structures as much as possible.[68] NGOs value their independence from state structures and consider it to be one of their main assets in reaching their target populations. However, this non-accountability weakens state structures, for which NGOs do not consider themselves individually responsible. The emphasis in the neo-liberal literature upon the "rent-seeking" possibilities of official positions has served to justify the weakening of state structures, but there is no evidence that this process has created greater levels of democratic accountability in the distribution of resources.[69]

---

[66] Jaycox, 1993: 2-3. Italics in the original.

[67] The UN Economic Commission for Africa and the Institute for African Alternatives attempt to respond to the Bank's intellectual hegemony but the volume, quality and resonance of this work is far removed from what the Bank produces. Furthermore, the ECA and IFAA have been unable to develop plausible alternative proposals and their publications tend to be responses to World Bank initiatives.

[68] Bowen (1991: 46) puts the point very directly: "the goal of many NGOs and aid agencies is to reduce the role and power of state institutions".

[69] For examples of the neo-liberal position on "rent-seeking": Rowley and Tullock, 1988; Krueger, 1992 and 1993; Bauer in Meier and Seers, eds, 1984; Meier, 1991. Colclough and Manor, eds, 1991, is entirely devoted to a refutation of many of the assumptions of "rent-seeking". A summary of the main issues may be found in Mosley, Harrigan and Toye, 1991: 13-21.

Another phenomenon led to a further accentuation of this tendency: the increased difficulty, for NGOs, of raising money in their home countries in Europe and North America. Throughout the 1980s NGOs became more concerned with their public image and capacity to present themselves to the public. Large amounts of money were spent on advertising and NGOs became increasingly competitive in relation to each other. Whereas NGOs traditionally prided themselves on their small scale and capacity to respond rapidly to crises, the more successful NGOs were now embarking upon a strategy of expansion. Indeed, success was increasingly measured in terms of size. A British NGO ran an advertising campaign proclaiming itself to be the "biggest" (and therefore presumably the best) in the country.[70] The logic of this increase in inter-NGO competition for scarce resources led them to be more concerned to carve out highly visible individual fiefdoms than to meld into the environment in which they were operating. Likewise, certain types of projects were more likely to attract support than others, namely the ones that were of good publicity value. A second feature of the increased competition for resources was that NGOs were less likely to present a critical alternative to official bilateral and multilateral aid when an increasing proportion of their resources was coming from those sources. NGOs were, many of them, negotiating a difficult path in the attempt to retain their original advantages as NGOs, while at the same time conforming to the general analysis of problems promoted by the donor governments and institutions that were paying for them. In either case, there was no incentive for NGOs to increase their coordination with official local structures.

The changing attitudes of foreign donors, and their increasing importance and willingness to intervene in internal political arrangements was a characteristic of most of the 1980s, and particularly the second half. This was not directed specifically at Mozambique. It was a movement led by the World Bank and echoed, in their own way, by NGOs and other donors. However, the weakness of the Mozambican state in human and physical infrastructures, together with the desperate situation of the economy, and

---

[70] Save the Children Fund.

the fact that the country depended on foreign donations and loans for over two thirds of its GDP,[71] meant that the effects of the changing attitudes upon Mozambique were more profound than in most places. For the Mozambican government, which had spent much of its first decade in power attempting to assert its sovereignty against the white regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia, this new erosion of its sovereignty was much more insidious and difficult to deal with.

This argument has been developed at length by, among others, Joseph Hanlon and Merle Bowen.[72] There is clear evidence that decision-making power has been transferred away from the state to international forces and in this sense state sovereignty has suffered an erosion. However, to look at the issue in so linear a manner ("Mozambican state versus international forces") is merely to scratch at the surface. The focus upon sovereignty is misleading in that it suggests that sovereign authority should be vested in an entity, the state, which is unified, uni-directional and with an identifiable interest of its own. This is the modern nation-state to which Frelimo aspired. The functional existence of such a state is highly questionable; certainly, at no point in Mozambique's short history as an independent country has such a nation-state existed.

The emphasis upon sovereignty depends upon a particular concept of it, and it depends also upon a particular concept of the state. The reification of the state has in fact served to dissimulate an understanding of the forces that are in power and who use the concept of the state to promote their aims. By equating, as we did above, the concept of sovereignty to that of power, and by denying that the state has any independent existence of its own, we are decoding the idea of eroded sovereignty into something much more

[71] The figures on foreign assistance as a proportion of Mozambique's GDP vary according to source. Every year there is a discrepancy between the amount of aid calculated by UNDP and the amount announced by the Mozambican government. The Mozambican government figures are invariably much lower. Part of this discrepancy may be due to double accounting by donor countries and part of it may be the result of aid being channeled through non-official sources. The OECD's Development Assistance Committee provides figures that are lower than those of UNDP but higher than those of the government. See for example Plank, 1993: 408 and Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1994: 138.
[72] Hanlon, 1991 and Bowen, 1991 and 1992. See also the reviews of Hanlon by Ken Wilson (1991) and Judith Head (1992) and the arguments in Grest (1994), Plank (1993) and Graham (1993).

intelligible: the declining power of the elite which dominates the state-system to consolidate its position in society through the state-system and to develop and promote the state-idea which serves to buttress the state-system.

This is the context in which the question of sovereignty is seen as vital to the regime. However, it would be a misleading simplification to suggest that sovereignty/power was shifting from one location to another. Even considering Frelimo to be the source of all sovereign authority in Mozambique (for which there is a coherent legal basis given the fact that the country's first constitution identifies Frelimo as the leading force in government and state) it would be very different to sustain an argument about sovereignty passing cleanly from one location to another. Within Frelimo there has always been a variety of different groups and over the 1980s these groups grew more diverse and more influential. Authority passed between these groups as much as it passed from Frelimo to the World Bank. Indeed there were those within Frelimo who viewed the World Bank interventions as a means of strengthening their own positions, personally and politically. The portrayal of 'Mozambique' as a victim, incapable of defending itself in the face of rapacious foreign donors is of little use in helping to understand the late 1980s. Interestingly, this point of view is advanced by those who were most closely identified with the original formulations of the Frelimo project. Whereas the early Frelimo project offered up a portrait of a government and party so determined and committed that it could transform even the nature of people - from peasants to *homens novos*, or indeed criminals to *homens novos* - the same commentators, now defenders of the 'lost sovereignty' idea, portray Frelimo as helpless, blown hither and thither by the capricious winds of global capitalism.

There is some merit in the view that an increasing proportion of decisions about the country's economic policies are taken outside of Mozambique, or by foreigners inside Mozambique. It is true that the government of Mozambique has to consult with the World Bank and other institutions regarding many of its proposals. And it is true that the

government would be unable to develop a political project that was anathema to the IFIs. However, by looking only at the question of lost sovereignty one runs the risk of obscuring the nature and importance of internal politics. 'Mozambique', 'Frelimo', 'the state', 'the government', are not homogeneous and impersonal entities with clearly defined objectives, agendas and methods. All of them are convenient terms for an agglomeration of interests, some of which are contradictory to others. Simultaneously, they are instruments for mobilizing resources in different ways. Ultimately, politics in Mozambique must be understood within this web rather than in isolation from it.

The contradiction referred to above, whereby at one moment Frelimo was seen as the all-powerful motivating force of society and by the next it was portrayed as incapable of making even minor decisions, serves as the logical line of defence for those who do not wish to emphasize the internal dynamics of Frelimo's trajectory. By focusing on lost sovereignty it is possible to preserve the pristine image of the revolution betrayed. There is no need to consider the possibility of intrinsic shortcomings in the project itself if one has shifted the blame for its failure to external forces. It is not necessary even to contemplate the fact that not all of the population was behind the project, or that not all of the officials charged with carrying out the project were acting in accordance with the established principles. The growth, throughout the 1980s, of that portion of the population which rejected the Frelimo project and of that portion of officials which used their position for personal gain, may thus be seen as no more than a natural consequence of South African destabilization and creeping capitalism. "Destabilization works", proclaimed one author.[73] Indeed it does, but the point is to try to understand what other factors were working as well. Talking of the Nkomati Accords, the same author chose to finish his book with the following sentence: "Even if the shooting stops, the revolution will still be under fire".[74] The proposition that there was such as thing as "the revolution", which Mozambicans were fighting for and South Africans, Americans and

[73] This is the title of the postscript to Hanlon's 1984 book *The Revolution Under Fire*.
[74] Hanlon, 1984: 265.

"the West" in general were fighting against, serves to limit analysis and not to stimulate it.

9. Conclusion

The two issues that are most frequently discussed in accounts of the late 1980s are the changes introduced during the Fifth Congress and the idea of the erosion of sovereignty. Both of these issues are more complex than is normally allowed for. The standard approach is to assume that there were "ideological changes" and that there was, and still is, an erosion of the country's sovereignty, and that the meaning of these concepts is self-explanatory.[75] Because the concepts are never disentangled and inspected it is extremely rare for the analysis to go much beyond this unhelpful and not very interesting point.

The argument advanced here began with the evidence that the alterations in the party statutes and programme, and in the Constitution, lagged far behind or ahead of the political changes that they prescribed. It also pointed out that the alterations had no consequence upon policy and that it is therefore necessary to seek a different explanation for why these alterations came about. The fact that the documents from the 1983 Congress no longer described reality was of minor importance: in many respects they did not describe reality in 1983 either, and the 1989 documents also contained claims that few could have taken seriously.[76]

The single most important factor in the alteration of the statutes and programme was the fact that the United States government took exception to the idea of socialism. In undertaking this revision President Chissano used the issue of negotiations with Renamo to divert attention. This avoided the spectre of public internal dissent and disunity which, from the earliest days of Frelimo's existence, has terrorized the leadership. Disunity has

[75] For example, Hanlon, 1991, Bowen 1991 and 1992, Marshall 1989, Roesch, 1989.
[76] Such as the claim, already referred to, that the structural adjustment programme was a natural successor to the PPI (Ten-Year Plan). Frelimo, 1989a: 10.

always been seen as the greatest threat to the movement's hegemony over the population, at least until the appearance of the IFIs, NGOs and other foreign bodies during the late 1980s. The revision of the Constitution was also undertaken under duress. An agreement with Renamo, which was being worked on, implied a new Constitution and the Frelimo leadership wanted to ensure that it was in full control of that process; furthermore, it provided the opportunity for the removal of sections of the previous Constitution that offended major donors.

By the late 1980s the external threats to Frelimo's hegemony were growing in intensity. Renamo was rendering the country ungovernable, and the IFIs and NGOs were, each in their own fashion, taking over larger portions of the state's responsibilities. Frelimo's intense struggle to retain the control that it had painstakingly sought to develop during the first two decades of its existence met with decreasing levels of success in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The proliferation of sources of authority, where previously there had been only one, permitted the development of patterns of political behaviour that were increasingly varied.[77]

This chapter has sought to move beyond the facile uses of the concepts of "ideological changes" and "loss of sovereignty". As a result of this exercise both the idea that the Fifth Congress marked ideological changes in the regime, and the idea of the erosion of sovereignty, were questioned. The many studies which sought to promote a view of the Frelimo regime mired in battle for its own right to chose a socialist alternative in southern Africa can now be understood in a clearer light. They are the (often unwitting) result of an analysis which Frelimo developed during the 1970s according to which any assault upon the revolutionary project must be of foreign origin for Frelimo itself incarnated the will of "the people". The loss of sovereignty is real, but it should not be

[77] To be more precise, the argument developed in earlier chapters was that Frelimo never managed to become the sole source of political authority that it sought to be. For some years its authority was preponderant but by the late 1980s this was no longer the case. On the heterogeneous nature of political behaviour, compare for example: Geffray, 1991; Roesch, 1992; Hermele, 1988; Alexander, 1994 and 1995.

simplistically equated with Frelimo's ideological changes and the end of its socialist project. As ever, the reality was considerably more complex than the simple explanations that were offered.

Chapter 7

Marketing in Mozambique: From Colonialism to Structural Adjustment

1. Introduction

During colonial times, just as after independence, the authorities in Mozambique took a keen interest in regulating agricultural production and marketing, and this involved both political and economic considerations. Economic life in Portugal was closely monitored and controlled, and in the colonies the government was certainly not interested in allowing the free play of unbridled market forces. Instead, with heavy-handed regulatory laws and institutions, the authorities sought to determine the nature of agriculture in Mozambique, according to their best interests. In the seventeenth century Lisbon attempted to regulate patterns of land distribution in the Zambezi valley;[1] the concession companies were to a great extent attempts to secure Portuguese sovereignty over large tracts of land after the doctrine of "effective occupation" gained currency at the end of last century;[2] throughout this century legislation pertaining to agriculture has been a function of changing concepts of the kind of society that the metropolitan government wished to create in the colonies. The following section looks briefly at colonial intervention in agricultural production from the 1930s.

During the last decade of colonialism the government in Lourenço Marques established the IAM (Mozambican Cotton Institute) and the ICM[3] (Mozambican Grain Institute) as agencies for intervention in the market.[4] The ICM was generically supposed to stimulate (*fomentar*) production but its main task was to create stocks that would permit a higher

[1] Isaacman and Isaacman, 1991; Newitt, 1995: chapter 10.
[2] Vail, 1976 and Neil-Tomlinson, 1977.
[3] Instituto do Algodão de Moçambique and Instituto de Cereais de Moçambique, respectively. The ICM was established in 1962. See: Adam and Cruz e Silva (1989: 19) and Mackintosh (1987: 248-249).
[4] The history of colonial intervention in cotton goes back many decades and is well documented by Pitcher (1993) and Fortuna (1993).

degree of food security as well as reducing seasonal and regional price fluctuations. The middle decades of this century were a period of large-scale migration from Portugal to the colonies and the government was concerned to make sure that the growing urban population in Mozambique had a secure and inexpensive supply of agricultural produce. On the other hand it was also keen to support the newly arrived Portuguese settlers who chose to set up farms and the various institutions referred to above had the responsibility of providing rural extension services. Both of these functions were taken over by the institutions that were created after independence. The expansion of agricultural production was one of the objectives of the large investment in settlement schemes during the 1950s and 1960s but more importantly there were political reasons for this investment. This included concerns over the future of the colony and the desire to relieve demographic (and political) pressures in stagnant rural Portugal.[5]

The regulation of cotton production has a long history in Mozambique. The global depression of the 1930s stirred the colonial lobbies in Lisbon into a search for new ways of promoting and protecting their interests.[6] For several decades this involved a regime of forced labour. Between 1938 and 1961 legislation imposed by the colonial authorities made cotton production compulsory in large parts of the country, and similar legislation had been in place for areas in the centre of the country as early as 1915. Colonial legislation stipulated who had to produce, who had the monopoly rights for marketing (concession companies), and at which price the cotton was sold to the Portuguese textile industry.[7] Far from believing in the benefits of the free market, the colonial government

---

[5] See Birmingham (1993: 156-178) and Rosas (1994: 488-495).
[6] Rosas, 1994: 105-106.
[7] See, for example, Pitcher, (1993), Fortuna (1993),Isaacman (1987), and Clarence-Smith (1985). Production of cotton in Angola also rigourously obeyed the government's decisions. Although never more than a fifth or a quarter of production in Mozambique, the policies there led to a famine in the Luanda corridor in 1945 and subsequently to rebellion. When the Angolan war of independence broke out in 1961, forced cotton production was, once again, one of the main causal factors.

---

sought to control practically every aspect of cotton production through the Junta de Exportação do Algodão Colonial (JEAC), the predecessor of the IAM.[8]

In short, any analysis of government intervention in agriculture since independence must start by remembering that this was also the norm before independence.[9] Colonial interventions were dictated by metropolitan and settler interests; post-colonial interventions had a different set of objectives, and some different methods; however, for those affected by these policies the results were sometimes very similar. This chapter looks at the evolution of marketing practices in Mozambique since independence, and the impact that marketing has had upon rural populations.

2. Frelimo Intervention in Agriculture

When Frelimo came to power it justified agricultural interventions in terms of its Marxist ideas and terminology; a more important, and yet unacknowledged, heritage was the legacy of centuries of intervention in agriculture by a central government attempting to impose its control over the territory. Intervention in the economy with a view to consolidating power and sovereignty was what the central government had been doing ever since Mozambique acquired that name. Frelimo's ideal society was different from that of the colonial government but both required large-scale intervention and direction, shaping people's lives by regulating how and what they were to produce, and at what price.

---

[8] Created in 1938. See Pitcher (1993: chapter 6). Irene van Dongen (1969: 270) wrote that under the JEA[C], "a system of concessionaries arose cooperating with local administrators, who prodded the Africans to work harder".
[9] Birmingham (1993: 164-166) summarizes the basic colonial objectives of Salazar's government.

2.1 The Trading Network

The first and most immediate crisis that the new government had to face after independence was the result of the collapse of the rural trading networks: what to do with the small-scale rural entrepreneurs that had been so important a feature of colonialism? The question was ideological, practical and also urgent.

At independence in 1975 the country's private rural trading network consisted of around 6000 traders, nearly all of whom were Portuguese or Asian.[10] These private traders would travel from towns to rural areas and back, trading on both legs of the journey. From the towns they would take basic consumer goods such as soap, salt, cloth (*capulanas*) and batteries, as well as agricultural implements such as hoes, machetes (*catanas*), seeds and sacks. On the return journey they would bring agricultural produce (maize, manioc, cashews, groundnuts, beans) back to the towns. Other agricultural goods, such as rice, cotton and tobacco would generally reach the market through large-scale concession companies with exclusive rights for buying peasant production in specific areas. A third type of agricultural production (e.g. of tea and sugar) was carried out by large European-owned estates.

The mass departure of the Portuguese and the migration of most of the Asians to the cities led to the collapse of much of the private trading network, leaving the rural population with great difficulties in getting its produce to market and in buying the consumer goods and agricultural implements that it needed. During the colonial period the commercial network was very often also the provider of rural credit, (and in some cases it came close to establishing a de facto system of bonded labour), and this supply of credit also disappeared in 1975. When the traders left in 1975 many of them took their

[10] This figure is not precise. A figure of 5000 is sometimes cited but 6000 is the latest reference I have been able to find (SIDA, 1990b). Given that the same authors had earlier used a figure of 5000 (SIDA, 1990a) I am presuming that they have a good reason for changing their estimate. The larger figure also appears in Grupo de Estocolmo, 1990:1.

vehicles, driving them over the border into South Africa and Rhodesia.[11] In one stroke the country lost most of the people involved in rural trading and much of the vehicle fleet with which this trading was carried out. By 1976 there were less than 2000 traders left.

Private trading was never made illegal in Mozambique. Private traders were allowed to continue operating but they were legally bound to follow the established prices, under the terms of the 1979 Private Trade Law.[12] During the early years of independence private traders were viewed with great suspicion by the new authorities for several reasons. In the first place, most private traders were people who had had no role in the armed struggle. While those who had been with Frelimo had been fighting against colonialism, the private traders still operating had been making money in the context of a system that Frelimo considered unjust. For those who had fought in the war, which included much of the new governing elite, traders were effectively collaborators with the regime. Furthermore, during the colonial period they had frequently been capable of exerting monopsonistic and monopolistic powers which made them particularly mistrusted and disliked. Secondly, memories were still fresh of Frelimo's Second Congress in 1968, in which the private trading activities of Nkavandame and his followers had led to their expulsion on the grounds that they were "new exploiters". Whether this was the reason or simply the justification for the purge of Nkavandame is a moot point; either way the idea of private trading became closely linked in the regime's vocabulary to the idea of exploitation. Thirdly, private trading removed revenue from the sphere of the state; it reduced the level of political control over society and its development threatened the socialist project. Furthermore, private trading and indeed any form of profit-making, was seen as something distasteful in the early years of independence. To use the words of Lenin during the 'War Communism' years, private trading was viewed as "monstrous

[11] Hanlon, 1984. Munslow (1983: 165, footnote 19) quotes an official study (VIAK *National Transport Survey* 1978) that says that 25 000 vehicles "disappeared" between 1973 and 1977. It is not clear whether this figure includes vehicles that were scrapped. Another source (SIDA, 1990a: 9) says that between 1973 and 1976 the number of heavy vehicles in the country decreased from 11,000 to approximately 6,500.

[12] Law no. 7/79 of 3 July 1979.

speculation".[13] Yet it was also clear that there was no immediate possibility of replacing the private traders. The state did not have the resources to replace them and those that remained had not only to be accepted but encouraged.

At independence the Frelimo leadership was in no mood to compromise. The main leaders used every occasion to reiterate that the end of colonialism was but the first step towards full liberation, a condition that was defined as one in which there would be no more "exploitation of man by man". Traders fit uneasily into this vision. Frelimo's ambiguous objective was therefore to ensure that in the short run those that remained continued to function, albeit within strict limits, while building up conditions to replace them in the more distant future. One of the ways in which their role was to become increasingly marginal was through the growing importance of production on state farms and on cooperatives. In Frelimo's vision of society, independent peasant production, which is what the traders concentrated on, was to become less and less important, and rural traders would therefore lose relevance as well.

In 1981, according to official statistics, there were 3630 registered traders and 743 consumer cooperatives.[14] This figure fluctuated throughout the 1980s, mainly in response to the war. Renamo's objective of destroying the country's economy extended to the summary execution of traders, and as the war spread to most parts of the country fewer and fewer people were willing to risk the increasing dangers of traveling. By 1989 (two years into the structural adjustment programme) there were no more than 1800 private traders operating, down from about 2600 the previous year. Most of these were concentrated close to the safer urban areas, and the "war tax" that they charged was a substantial part of the final price. In other words, because they ran a risk to their stock and to their own lives when they transported goods, traders needed a relatively high profit

[13] Lenin in 1918, quoted in Nove, 1992:48.
[14] Nsubuga 1988: appendix 1.8. See also Levin et al, 1990b and SIDA 1990a. See table 7 below.

margin to stay in business; in many areas traders were also monopsonists, and were therefore able to buy from the producers at very low prices.[15]

2.2 Price and Food Policies

Colonialism in Mozambique had produced a skewed demand structure for agricultural produce. The large influx of settlers during the 1950s and 1960s, as well as the growing presence of the Portuguese army, had resulted in an increasing demand for expensive "white" foodstuffs: wheat flour, meat, dairy produce, rice, fresh vegetables. Although prices were subsidized few Africans could afford these items which, for the most part, were grown by Portuguese settlers. In 1975 the new government decided to freeze the prices of most foodstuffs in the midst of inflationary pressures and of rapidly falling production levels. Urban demand for these goods consequently grew out of all proportion to supply, leading to shortages, increased imports and pressure upon the government to step into the breach.[16]

The government sought to please both producers and consumers by increasing farm-gate prices and decreasing consumer prices, subsidizing at both ends. The net result was that the government came under four distinct sources of pressure: the demand to provide favourable prices for producers; the demand to keep prices low for consumers; the demand to keep private traders in business (i.e. maintaining some margin between producer and consumer prices); and the demand to maintain some sort of limit on the extent of its subsidies. Subsidies were extended to the point where the government simply printed money to cover its costs. The margins permitted to private traders were in any case very low and any slack between supply and demand was taken up by the almost instant growth of a parallel market. At points, over the years, the government attempted to crack down on the parallel markets that were growing beyond its reach but by the early

[15] Gibbon et al, 1993:43.
[16] Raikes, 1984: 97.

1980s it was clear that it simply did not have the capacity to manage all four sources of pressure. By the early 1980s the whole system was breaking down: levels of production had fallen dramatically,[17] consumer goods, including agricultural implements, were no longer reaching the rural areas; on-farm consumption and barter increased in response to the futility (for the peasantry) of selling excess produce in exchange for money that had no purchasing power. The introduction of public flogging for black marketeering, and the public execution of an Asian trader in 1983 were a brutal part of a last desperate attempt to impose government control of marketing.[18]

In 1975 Frelimo chose to try to maintain the consumption pattern which it inherited at independence, using large subsidies to do so. Raikes has argued that the social composition of Frelimo's bureaucracy made it unlikely to question the types of food that were subsidized.[19] Furthermore, Frelimo's commitment to improving the livelihood of the majority of the population had to be met with measures that had immediate effect. This decision may have been taken in isolation, without much thought as to its place within the overall framework, but it was to have long-term consequences. The type of foodstuffs that the Portuguese had produced, and which Frelimo now decided should be available to the majority of the population, were mostly produced within the 'modern' sector. They were produced cn large farms, with a relatively high degree of mechanization and a liberal use of chemicals and other imported inputs. After the departure of the Portuguese only the state had the resources to direct this form of agriculture. If Frelimo's objective of providing such foodstuffs to the majority of inhabitants of urban areas was to be respected, then there was no alternative but to invest heavily in the state farms. In other words, what had originally been intended as a gesture of triumphalism from the new

---

[17] See chart 1 below.

[18] Goolam Nabi was tried by a military tribunal and found guilty of smuggling prawns and bribing the customs staff at Namaacha, on the border with Swaziland. (Hanlon, 1984: 208.) At exactly the same time the Tanzanian government was launching a similar crackdown against private traders, entitled the "National Economic Sabotage" campaign. (Bryceson, 1993: 24.)

[19] Raikes, 1984: 98.

regime became an important factor in the complex of decisions about what kind of agriculture the new regime should favour.

Prices were established for buying and selling at all points: from the producers, from intermediaries, from warehouses and from retail establishments.[20] The desire to standardize on a nation-wide basis, which is apparent in many areas of policy since independence, was also apparent in agricultural marketing. After independence Frelimo took over the colonial crop pricing system and made it less flexible by eliminating price differences based on quality, seasonality and geography. By abolishing these distinctions the government was hoping to contribute towards the creation of a unified and homogenous state *do Rovuma ao Maputo*.[21] What it actually did was to favour agriculture close to the urban markets over agricultural production in more remote areas; and it led to a fall in quality by favouring the production of cheap but poor quality produce over more expensive but better quality crops.

In 1979 a new institution for regulating prices was set up, the National Commission for Salaries and Prices (CNSP).[22] This body, chaired by the Minister of Finance, had representatives from the Ministries of Commerce, Agriculture and Industry and Energy, as well as from the Bank of Mozambique. Civil servants from specialized departments could also be invited to participate. Initially the CNSP was mandated to develop and specify Frelimo's price policy. Later, in 1982, the Council of Ministers defined the responsibilities of each participant in establishing the price levels, and gave the CNSP the task of "proposing the prices policy and the main decisions to be taken in the field of prices".[23] The Ministry of Agriculture would propose the level of producer prices, mainly by looking at the costs of production, and the Ministry of Commerce would propose the price margins for traders. In order to suggest the margins for traders, the Ministry of

---

[20] Tickner, 1985: 27.

[21] "From the Rovuma to the Maputo", the northernmost and southernmost rivers in the country. This slogan was (and still is) omnipresent.

[22] Resolution 20/79 of the Assembleia Popular.

[23] Decrees 10/82 and 11/82. The citation comes from Decree 11/82 article 1 (a).

Commerce would, until 1987, receive proposals from Agricom, the state marketing board that was actually responsible for implementing many of the prices. The final decisions on prices belonged to the Ministry of Finance which would take account of the government's need for revenue, its desire to keep producer prices down and other factors such as international prices and the evolution of terms of trade. The exact weight of each of the components in the price-fixing scheme would vary as there was no established procedure. The data used in this process was very weak and varied from year to year. Prices were reviewed irregularly, about every two years, with new prices usually being announced in May just before the marketing season.[24]

Two problems that have resulted from this pricing system have already been mentioned - the fall in quality and the fall in agricultural production in more remote areas. Other problems also arose. In practice the CNSP took little or no account of the effects of previous decisions, partly because of a shortage of feedback, and partly because of an inability to feed such information into the process. The legislation approved in 1982 about the functioning of CNSP specifically mentions the institution's responsibility to inform the Council of Ministers of such effects[25] but this was never followed through in practice.[26] In more general terms the information used by all of those involved in price-fixing was inadequate and misleading. The establishment of very low profit margins at each stage meant that unforeseen costs (e.g. with mined roads) led to losses for at least one of the parties in the production and marketing process. Private traders would usually have a stronger negotiating position and manage to pass on such costs to the producer which of course acted as a disincentive. Where it was possible for farmers to sell directly to Agricom then Agricom would carry the unforeseen costs. At a later stage this led to grave liquidity problems in Agricom. A further problem with the prices was that in any case the government was incapable of properly monitoring them. Many producers would

[24] On the CNSP see Nsubuga (1988), Grupo de Estocolmo (1990), Tarp (1990),Tickner (1992).
[25] Decree 11/82, article 1 (c).
[26] Grupo de Estocolmo, 1990: 18.

have to accept prices lower than those officially stipulated because they only had one trader to whom to sell their goods.

Chart 1: Total Marketed Production in Nine Main Agricultural Commodities, 1975-1992

Unit: thousands of tons
Sources: DNE 1985, 1988, 1989, 1991, 1992, Agricom 1989

Officially marketed agricultural production declined drastically during the early 1980s. Chart 1 provides a picture of the trends in marketed production levels in nine important commodities.[27] The commodities chosen provide us with a reasonably accurate image of agriculture as a whole. The immediate post-independence decline was reversed between 1977 and 1981, with production levels climbing slowly, and then after 1981 there was a rapid and severe decline until 1986. Between 1982 and 1983 (i.e. during the 1982-3 agricultural year) there was a fall of 45%, the biggest single fall since independence, which explains some of the panic and despair that appeared during Frelimo's Fourth Congress in April 1983. Since 1987, during the structural adjustment period, marketed output has grown slowly, but to levels that are still well below the 1981 high-water mark. In 1991, the best year since the structural adjustment program began, production was still

[27] Rice, maize, sunflower, raw cotton, beans, citrus fruits, copra, tea and cashews. The crops chosen are the only ones for which data is available for all years; the addition of other crops such as sugar would not substantially affect the trend.

only 55% of the 1981 level, and in 1992 production had fallen back to just under half of the 1981 figure.

The Bretton Woods institutions have always been keen to stress that the fall in marketing during the early 1980s was much greater than the fall in total production.[28] The World Bank offers a figure of 50% for the proportion of agricultural trade that took place through the parallel market during that period.[29] The IMF has argued that

> Between 1981 and 1985, adverse weather, transport problems, scarcity of agricultural inputs and incentive goods for producers, and unremunerative producer prices led to a one fifth reduction in agricultural production and an even sharper decline in marketed output.[30]

The IMF's argument is based on official Mozambican statistics but there is a large amount of guesswork involved in compiling these statistics.

Table 6: Evolution of Total Agricultural Production (Value) and of Total Marketed Agricultural Production (Volume)

	1975	1977	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Value (10^6 contos)	24.8	29.8	30.8	31.1	30.8	24	24.4	24.6
Volume (thousands tons)	971.1	778.6	790.6	770	631.1	403.7	463.4	323.1

Source: My calculation from DNE 1985 (value at constant 1980 prices)

The figures tell us that marketed production fell by 57% whereas total production fell by only 20% between 1981 and 1985, but the information on non-marketed agricultural production is simply not reliable. It may pinpoint the trends correctly or it may not. The implicit argument put forward by the IMF in the passage quoted above is that the government is to blame for not allowing the market to function. "Adverse weather" is ideologically neutral, but the other factors are not. The war, which was becoming ever more devastating during that period, is swept out of view. Roads were mined; trucks were attacked, looted and burned; drivers were killed; traders became increasingly reluctant to

---

[28] There are no figures for production that was not officially marketed, i.e. production that was consumed on farm or used for barter or sold on parallel markets.

[29] Gibbon et al, 1993: 45.

[30] IMF, 1986a: 3.

---

travel. All this falls into the category of "transport problems". Clearly the IMF is keen to stress the other factors: the lack of agricultural inputs and of incentive goods, and the low producer prices. If people were becoming less interested in getting their produce to market, then the logical thing to do was to look at reasons for market failure, and the IMF found several aspects of government intervention which it could focus on, such as fixed prices. The Bretton Woods institutions were reluctant to incorporate analyses of the war into their assessments and this greatly weakened their work.

Given the information that is available, we can say that in the first half of the 1980s there probably was a considerable fall in total as well as in marketed agricultural production. It is almost certainly the case that over that period an increasing proportion of production went through non-official channels (on-farm consumption, barter, parallel markets, smuggling). Several factors caused this. The first of these is the war. The lack of transport and storage security affected the ability of rural producers to get their goods to markets, and they also reduced the availability of agricultural inputs and consumer goods which in turn decreased the willingness of producers to exchange their produce for money. The war also led to a reduction in the number of traders operating in rural areas. As the war spread people moved to safer areas and the amount of land available for cultivation decreased. Natural calamities (droughts and floods) also affected production levels. In areas that were not affected by the war, the government's pricing policies had negative effects upon marketing. The government's policy of villagization (which was more important in some areas than in others) also had negative effects upon production.

2.3 The Creation of Agricom

The government's first response to the trading crisis was to establish DINECA, the National Directorate for Agricultural Marketing and Economics, within the Ministry of

Agriculture.[31] DINECA absorbed what remained of the colonial cotton and cereals institutes although most of the qualified administrative staff had left the country. Using the ICM and IAM infrastructures that were still operational, DINECA created fixed collection points and mobile brigades for buying agricultural produce from the family sector. They would also buy from private traders and state shops.

In 1978 it was decided that DINECA should come under the authority of the newly-created Ministry of Internal Trade[32], though the Ministry of Agriculture retained responsibility for cotton and cashews with two new Secretarias de Estado (under-ministries) being set up for the purpose. The state also claimed responsibility for the other side of the former operations of private traders: the supply of basic consumer goods for the rural population, including agricultural implements. This was done through the People's Shops[33], a chain of state shops established by using rural shops abandoned by their previous owners. Other agricultural inputs were imported and distributed by state enterprises also newly created for the purpose.[34] In 1980 the People's Shops were dismantled and most of their responsibilities were absorbed by DNCA (as well as most of their staff). This reorganization was finalized in 1981 with the transformation of DNCA into a state-owned enterprise, Agricom, also under the Ministry of Internal Trade.

2.4 People's Shops

Although private traders in the rural areas were never outlawed Frelimo's project for socialist transformation rendered it extremely difficult for a private trading class to thrive, at least within the confines of the official markets. The extent to which government intervention in rural markets was necessary just to keep the trading circuits

[31] DINECA was the Direcção Nacional de Economia e Comercialização Agricola, and it was established in 1976.
[32] With a modified title: DNCA - Direcção Nacional de Comercialização Agricola. Perhaps because of its easy pronunciation the acronym DINECA remained in daily use.
[33] *Lojas do Povo.*
[34] See Levin et al, 1990: 10.

in existence has never been fully established in the literature. Most articles on the subject have taken the official line, which is to say that the exodus of the Portuguese created a vacuum and Frelimo was left with no alternative but to intervene on a large scale. However, there has been very little, if any, empirical research on the subject and there are certainly other possible explanations. One such alternative explanation is that the People's Shops were created because this was in keeping with Frelimo's hegemonic project rather than because of the purely practical objective of keeping the shops running. The alternative argument runs as follows: upon departure many Portuguese maintained hopes of returning to Mozambique; during their last months in the country, in 1974-75, they sought to cash in as much of their working capital as possible and in some cases they provided a trusted employee with power of attorney over whatever remained; at some later stage they hoped to be able to come back and take up where they had left off. Had this happened the trading circuits in rural areas would have suffered a considerable blow from the large-scale withdrawal of working capital, but they would have remained operational, in the hands of people who had been heavily involved in the day-to-day running of the shops during the colonial period. Even though many employees were illiterate, and some would have been ignorant of certain aspects of shop management, many were familiar with the demands of daily business. This raises the possibility of an alternative interpretation for the intervention of the state and the creation of the People's Shops. Rather than seeking to resuscitate rural markets, the objective of the People's Shops may be understood as bringing into the sphere of state management a part of economic life that would have led to increasing social differentiation and stratification in the countryside.[35]

Given the lack of empirical research on the subject, a definitive conclusion will have to wait. However, it is certainly the case that many Portuguese left for South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal in 1975 in the hope that they might someday return to

[35] Private communication with Roberto Tibana.

Mozambique.[36] Under these circumstances it would make sense to seek to create a situation which might be salvageable. Some of the Portuguese certainly gave power of attorney to their employees but it is not possible to say whether this was a generalized practice or whether it happened only in isolated cases. When the People's Shops were created the people who ran the shops were very often those who had been employees of the former owner and were for this reason familiar with shop management. And many of the private retailers that remained in operation during the second half of the 1970s were also former shop employees.[37] Although at the national and provincial level Frelimo would place its own political appointees in charge of the People's Shops structure, at district and locality level the only people who could effectively run the shops were the former employees. These same people could have done the same job on a private basis without needing the apparatus of the state enterprise, so there are good reasons to suggest that Frelimo was making a conscious choice, rather than simply stepping in to fill a vacuum.

A third possibility combines the two hypotheses outlined above. In some cases the departure of the Portuguese left enormous gaps in the rural trading networks and in other areas there were plenty of people who were willing and capable of taking up the slack. However, given its distrust of traders, and its desire for national homogeneization, the Frelimo hierarchy decided to intervene everywhere as this would provide better foundations for the socialization of the countryside. The People's Shops state enterprise could kill two birds with one stone: it could ensure that supplies to and from rural areas were kept up all over the country, and it could put a stop to any capitalist accumulation by Mozambicans taking over the shops. As President Machel was fond of saying at the time, Frelimo should "kill the alligator in the egg", meaning that it should seize the opportunity to prevent the emergence of an African trading class. Furthermore, Frelimo's

---

[36] In 1990, in Johannesburg, I conducted numerous interviews with former Portuguese settlers in Mozambique. The overwhelming impression was that they would very much like to return if they considered the circumstances to be right. See Cravinho, 1990.
[37] FAO, 1985: 23.

policies presented, in a very literal way, opportunities for carrying out "politics of the belly".[38]

As in other sectors of the economy, it soon emerged that Frelimo's policies were far too ambitious for the capabilities of a state that was badly depleted of both human and material resources.[39] Within a few years, the People's Shops were, according to Samora Machel, taking up too much of the state's energy and resources and in March 1980 it was decided to abolish them:

> The state cannot go on paying wages to thousands of workers in the People's Shops enterprise, many of whom produce nothing. The present People's Shops must be changed or handed over to the consumer cooperatives or private traders. Some will have to be closed because they have no customers or no one to rent them. Let us draw up a plan to transform the People's Shops. Private enterprise has an important role to play in our country. This was stated in clear terms at the Frelimo Third Congress. The state cannot go on being involved in hundreds and hundreds of People's Shops. The state cannot go on running small businesses. [40]

And yet in the same speech Machel reemphasized Frelimo's great zest for control of every aspect of society. Referring to the food crisis in the towns, Machel explained how they aimed to overcome the problems:

> First in Maputo, Beira and Nampula, we shall launch a major campaign to survey the situation, and this will later be extended to other towns. We shall form people's brigades in each neighbourhood to go from house to house finding out who lives there and registering them. Each neighbourhood must have a complete register of its residents. Any newcomers to the neighbourhood must report to the Dynamizing Group for registration.[41]

The decision to privatize the People's Shops opened the question of foreign participation and with it came concerns about sovereignty. In order to qualify for a loan from the Bank of Mozambique people were supposed to put up 20% of the capital themselves, but few

---

[38] J-F Bayart, 1993. Bayart makes few references to Mozambique but many of his ideas might sound familiar to students of local politics in Mozambique. See for example Alexander, 1994.
[39] See for example Alpers, 1994 and Grest, 1994.
[40] Speech by Samora Machel in Beira, 18 March 1980. Munslow, ed. 1985: 99-100.
[41] Machel in Munslow, 1985: 99.

Mozambicans could afford that. Sérgio Vieira, at the time Governor of the Bank of Mozambique, explained the dilemma:

> We could hand over all the shops and trade in the country to the few groups that did have the money, many of which were foreign, and then we had the problem of guaranteeing the national interest. Of course foreigners can trade in the country, but when all the national trade was dominated by foreigners, some of whom were of dubious trustworthiness in terms of national sovereignty, then we were in a difficult situation. So we chose instead to lend money knowing that we were not going to be able to recover it.[42]

At the time Frelimo was hoping to be able to maintain full overall state control of the economy and yet pass on to the private sector the burden of administering the small businesses within carefully defined parameters. However, because Frelimo did not trust the small private sector that existed, it sought to create a new one. This new private sector, which according to Vieira was expected to develop into a "middle class", would owe everything to Frelimo and, presumably, it would harness the energy of private business for the project of Frelimo's socialist transformation.

This period of Mozambique's history is usually dealt with very superficially in the literature. It is taken for granted that everywhere the rural trading network was in a state of collapse and that it could not revive itself without ubiquitous state intervention. This interpretation, which is the official Frelimo interpretation, rules out any alternative action by the government, and it has two advantages from the point of view of presentation: it safeguards Frelimo's reputation for independence because it implies that the Mozambican government was following the Soviet and East European orthodoxy merely because it had no option; and it absolves the government from blame as the People's Shops experiment began to go wrong. However, this interpretation runs into other problems, namely by portraying the Mozambican government as a purely reactive entity, incapable of assuming the initiative. Furthermore, there is no reliable evidence for this and we are asked to believe that the state of collapse of the rural trading network was so advanced

[42] Interview, Maputo, 22 April 1993.

all over the country that there was no other alternative. A different explanation is easier to accept: that the rural trading network was collapsing in some parts and weak in other parts, and that this presented Frelimo with various options. It chose to seek full control of marketing, (rather than to revive a flagging private sector, or to give real autonomy to consumer cooperatives for example) because this was what fitted in best with its own long-term plans for the economy.

The government's attitude towards trading can be summarized as follows. In the immediate aftermath of independence it decided to intervene heavily in rural trading by creating the chain of People's Shops. These shops were located on the premises of former privately owned shops and were very often run by former employees of the Portuguese or Asian colonial owner. Whether Frelimo decided to do so to fill a vacuum or to prevent the growth of a class of Mozambican traders, it was seen as a transitional step. The government's long-term objective, at least until the early 1980s, was to move rural people into communal villages and have them working on state farms or on cooperatives. Concentrating the population in this manner would serve several purposes: it would, according to the prevailing theories, allow for more efficient agricultural methods and therefore better results; it would make it easier to organize the population politically; it would make it easier for the state to organize the transport network that would take agricultural produce to the cities and bring consumer (manufactured goods) to the rural areas; and it would neutralize the private traders whose function in society did not sit easily with the Frelimo project. In 1980 the government decided that its resources were being excessively stretched and eventually it handed over part of the responsibility of rural marketing to Agricom, but the future of trading was seen as a function of wider developments, particularly regarding the ongoing process of villagization.

3. Agricom

When Agricom was created in 1981 it took over much of the staff of the People's Shops (who had in the meantime been transferred to DINECA) and it was seen as a form of dealing with the marketing crisis in both directions: to the rural areas and from the rural areas. It was hoped that Agricom would be able to dedicate itself to economically efficient marketing and to Frelimo's political priorities at the same time. The People's Shops had lacked the flexibility needed to be able to respond to local specificities. The political context of that period, and the project to which Frelimo had dedicated itself, are crucial to an understanding of the history of Agricom.

Agricom appeared in a given context and its form and subsequent development have been shaped by this context. The idea at the time was that Agricom would eventually focus exclusively on cereal wholesaling but during an initial phase it would fill in the gaps in the national marketing network. What was never specified was how, in the longer run, the national marketing network was intended to function. Frelimo's other policies gives us some indication though: with the concentration of the population in communal villages, and the detailed gathering of information, it was hoped that at some stage in the future it would be possible to coordinate national supply and demand through the National Planning Commission, Mozambique's *Gosplan*. Several aspects of this global plan were still far from being ready so for the time being Agricom would have to shoulder the responsibility of rural marketing, both buying and selling.

Although Agricom was not designed to assume exclusive responsibility for marketing, it was seen as being the leading institution in that field. Private traders, consumer cooperatives and others all had a role but they were to fall in line behind Agricom which was responsible for "regulating, directing and supporting"[43] agricultural marketing in general. However, Agricom never had any autonomy regarding the first two of these

[43] Lindberg et al, 1984: 12.

tasks; and as for supporting others involved in marketing, Agricom was to use any resources of its own that it could spare such as transport, sacks and warehouse space. Basically, Agricom was to be a tool for resource extraction from the agricultural sector and, above all, reallocation within it. Writing about parastatals in the Sahel, Barbara Harriss said the following:

> ... in order to sustain non-agricultural development, resources have to be extracted from the agricultural sector - physical resources to guarantee supplies of food, and of raw materials for agro-industry, and financial resources for investment in all aspects of the non-agricultural economy as well as for reinvestment in agriculture. Taxation by the state is one way of transferring resources. So is the action and relationships of the internal terms of trade as mediated by the exchange systems as affected by State intervention in pricing.[44]

This applies also to Mozambique and the role of Agricom. Agricom was envisaged as an element of a wider plan but, for reasons that occupy the remainder of the chapter, this role was never realized.

Agricom was to collect agricultural produce from (and take consumer goods and agricultural inputs to) parts of the country where private traders would not venture. In other words Agricom had to travel to areas where it would be making a loss, or where the risks associated to the war were exceptionally high (or both). It was accepted that Agricom should be a loss-making institution, bearing the costs of transport and warehousing even though they could not be passed on to the consumer. There is nothing unique about the experience of Agricom in this regard. In the same study Harriss wrote:

> Parastatals are required to pay more than the free market, to sell to consumers at less than the free market prices and to trade where private trade either cannot or will not go, all this with the social aim of reducing the cost of marketing.[45]

[44] Harriss, 1979: 364. The countries that she was referring to were Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Senegal.
[45] Harriss, 1979: 366.

Ironically, private traders also benefited from Agricom's obligation to buy as this meant that they never had to worry about off-loading their produce. Provided they could persuade rural producers to sell to them below the officially fixed prices, they could then go to the nearest Agricom warehouse or buying point and hand over the crops at the official prices. Agricom would then bear the responsibility and cost for warehousing and further transport. Where the mark-up was below the real cost of transport, for example, private traders would sell to Agricom at the beginning of the journey and then buy crops back at the end of the journey, allowing Agricom to carry the transport costs as well as the security risks.

3.1 Warehousing and Transport.

Agricom carried out its activities through the network of fixed collection points and warehouses that it inherited. Agricom also operated mobile brigades that would travel to parts of the country where there was known to be surplus produce. At the end of 1984 Agricom was operating about 150 collection points and 90 mobile brigades, and it had warehouses totaling about 136.8 thousand metric tonnes.[46] By the end of 1987, mainly as a result of the war, Agricom had been reduced to 63 mobile brigades and 98 collection points, and its storage capacity was down to less than 90 thousand metric tonnes.[47] Several major warehouses were burnt down in the mid-1980s when the war was at its most ferocious and widespread. The biggest single loss for Agricom occurred in November 1987 when Renamo attacked and burnt down the warehouse in Iapala, western Nampula province. At the time the warehouse was full of cashews, maize and beans.

As Table 7 shows, Agricom's commercial network was never numerically preponderant, and this was true of all parts of the country. Nevertheless, Agricom had a much more

[46] Nsubuga, 1988: 7 See also Lindberg et al, 1984: 13.
[47] Nsubuga, 1988: appendix 4.

important role than might be inferred from the numbers as it was often used for storage or for transport by private traders and by consumer cooperatives.

Table 7: National Commercial Network (1981-1989)

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Agricom Brigades	56	66	74	92	100	100	63	57	67
Agricom Posts	179	235	169	149	150	124	98	69	76
Private Traders	3630	3582	2249	2605	2452	3190	1908	1459	1738
Cons coops	743	705	539	765	1008	964	508	396	273
Others	131	393	58	219	94	74	108	96	na

Source: SIDA 1990a: Appendix 9.

Agricom's transport fleet was inherited from the People's Shops and other government sources, and aid programmes also provided Agricom with used and some new vehicles. Nordic support was particularly important in this sector, as indeed with much of Agricom over the years.[48] All in all, transport is the sector which benefited most from foreign aid. In February 1983 Agricom had 214 vehicles, of which about 150 were operational.[49] Several years later, in July 1989, the situation had improved a little: there were 229 vehicles, 185 of which were operational. However, whereas in 1983 the vehicles were all trucks, by 1989 over half were tractors.[50] Given the state of the roads in most rural areas tractors were very appropriate but they were only useful for "Level I" transport.[51] Average utilization of the transport fleet does not go beyond about 150 to 200 days out of the year but this figure alone is misleading. At peak times the fleet was insufficient to handle all of the requirements and private vehicles had to be hired. Apart from the inevitable seasonal variations, the under-utilization of much of the vehicle fleet can be attributed to a lack of coordination between Agricom's provincial transport sections and the respective commercial sections.[52] Furthermore, most return journeys were made with empty trucks so transport costs were higher than they would be if there were more consumer goods going to the rural areas.

[48] Through Monap - Mozambique Nordic Assistance Project.
[49] Monap, 1983: 13.
[50] SIDA, 1989: 76.
[51] "Level I" transport refers to the basic network that goes from the fixed collection points and mobile brigades to the district centres. "Level II" includes transport between districts (i.e. to the provincial warehouses) and between provinces.
[52] MONAP, 1983: 11.

Although there is no consistent evidence on crop losses it is clear from conversations with those involved that physical losses during storage have been consistently high. There are four typical forms of losses that Agricom incurred all over the country during the 1980s. The first, and probably the most important, resulted from the war. Renamo guerrillas, who targeted anything that bore any relation to the state, burned down a number of warehouses. Sometimes they would steal the stored crops but more frequently they would simply destroy whatever they found. A second source of losses came from stealing that was not directly related to the war - either by outsiders or by the corruption of Agricom staff. A third form of losses came in the form of the undocumented requisitioning of stocks for official purposes, usually the army. And the fourth resulted from grains becoming damaged during storage and having to be destroyed.

The first three forms of losses are not always clearly distinguishable. The security situation was always conditioning other aspects of economic life and the existence of a war was for some people an economic opportunity to be taken advantage of. Furthermore, the phenomenon of 'Frelimo by day, Renamo by night' also played its part in Agricom losses. The fact that Agricom came under the influence of several different sources of authority (an aspect that shall be dealt with later) meant that it was possible for political authorities to requisition crops that were then registered as having been "lost". The following anecdote illustrates this problem. In 1986 the then provincial director of Agricom in Nampula was summoned to the offices of the Provincial Governor, Gaspar Zimba. Zimba told him that there was about to be an offensive against Renamo and that the army needed several tons of beans and maize. The Agricom director had that amount in stock and had been having difficulties finding a buyer, so he said that of course Agricom could sell the produce to the army. The Governor explained that he was not intending to pay for the maize and beans: they were to be registered as "lost". When the director of Agricom began to protest he was cut short by the Governor, the supreme political authority in the province, who informed him that "the conversation is

over".[53] It is impossible to tell how much of this produce found its way to other sectors of the state and how much was sold on the parallel market. At a lower level, the looting of Agricom warehouses became so widespread and commonplace that one may even find occasional references to the culprits in official reports. For example, a report of a visit by a *brigada de dinamização*[54] to two districts in Nampula province in July 1987 explains candidly that they found about 76 million meticais of crops to be marketed, that the armed bandits (Renamo) had stolen about 5 million, and that their own escort troops had stolen a further 1.5 million.[55] Given that there was a general shortage of food, that soldiers were usually paid late when they were paid, and that markets had disintegrated to the point where money could not always be exchanged for food, it was unofficially accepted that troops could engage in moderate pillaging.

The fourth type of loss incurred by Agricom - damage during storage - would happen for several reasons. One reason is the faulty conditions of many warehouses. Attacks from Renamo, combined with neglect and lack of repair materials, meant that in fact there are very few warehouses that do not need some investment in them. Another reason is that Agricom did not distinguish between different quality grains when buying.[56] In fact Agricom would usually only reject crops when they were obviously damaged and very often the mobile brigades and collection points were not equipped to sample the crops. Private traders and farmers who had other sources to which they could sell sometimes off-loaded their poorest quality crops to Agricom and sold the remainder of their produce to more choosy intermediaries. Another aspect is that Agricom would usually buy maize in May when the humidity level was highest. For reasons to be discussed later it would then have to maintain the maize in storage for several months; when it was finally allowed to sell, the maize was much drier and therefore lighter. During this process the

[53] Recounted to me by Fernando Duarte, the Agricom official involved. Interview, Nampula, 4 May 1994.

[54] Brigades sent by provincial governments to promote agricultural production in the districts.

[55] República Popular de Moçambique - Provincia de Nampula, 1987: 3.

[56] Apparently there were cases when, on an *ad hoc* basis, a lower price would be agreed for lower quality grains. SIDA 1990: 26.

maize could lose up to ten per cent of its weight. Finally, Agricom would often not weigh the sacks that it was buying. Private traders would sometimes put only 82 to 85 kilograms in the 90 kilogram sacks, but they would always insist on having the sacks weighed when they were buying from Agricom.[57]

3.2 Agricom Purchases: Sectors of Production

Throughout its existence Agricom has primarily bought from the family sector, though it has also maintained commercial links with other sectors of the economy. As may be seen from the chart, the private and cooperative sectors provided a small proportion of Agricom's purchases during the mid-1980s, with the state sector reaching a high point of over thirty per cent in 1984 and then declining to well below ten per cent.

Chart 2: Agricom Purchases by Sector (1983-1988)
(Percentage of total volume of Agricom purchases)

Source: Agricom, 1989

The rest of Agricom's purchases (63% at its lowest in 1984 and over 90% in 1988) came from the family sector. The small proportion coming from the cooperative sector is in

[57] Interview with Fernando Duarte, regional director of Agricom for Niassa, Nampula and Cabo Delgado provinces. Nampula, 4 May 1994.

---

line with the low proportion of total produce that came from the cooperative sector at a national level; the private and state sectors represent a higher proportion of the national total than they do of Agricom purchases and conversely the family sector represents a higher percentage of Agricom purchases than of the national marketed output. The state and private sectors are most likely to have alternative means of marketing their produce and therefore part of their output reaches the consumers by other means. The family sector is dependent upon Agricom or private traders for collection and marketing of their surplus produce and if there are no private traders in the area, or if the prices they offer are below those of Agricom, family producers seek to sell to Agricom.

3.3 Agricom Purchases: Annual Variations

Throughout the 1980s Agricom's level of total annual purchases varied by a considerable amount. In 1986 for example they were about a third of what they had been in 1984.

Chart 3: Total Marketed Production and Total Agricom Purchases
**Unit: thousands of tons**

Source: Agricom, 1989

As might be expected, there is a close correlation between the total level of marketed agricultural output and the amount bought by Agricom. Thus, if we plot the level of total

marketed production and the level of Agricom purchases on the same graph we find that they run approximately parallel to each other for most of the 1980s. The first two years of Agricom's activity, 1981 to 1983, represent an exception: while total marketed agricultural production was falling rapidly, Agricom's acquisitions were increasing. The reason for this is simply that Agricom was newly created and was therefore establishing its position. For the remainder of the period under consideration the trends are similar: when total marketed output increases, Agricom's purchases increase. This is to be expected: Agricom purchases increase with availability.

A more revealing configuration appears when one compares total marketed output with Agricom's share in this output. By plotting the two sets of figures against different Y-axes it is possible to see what happens to Agricom's share as total marketed output varies. The right-hand axis represents the percentage of total marketing for which Agricom was responsible and the left-hand axis represents total marketed production.

Chart 4: Total Marketed Production and Agricom's Share
Unit: thousands of tons

Source: Agricom, 1989

During the first two years, 1981-1983, as we saw in chart 3, the two lines moved in different directions. Agricom's purchases were growing as total production levels were

falling so the percentage of total production for which Agricom was responsible was growing very steeply. After that though, the two lines behave in a similar fashion. Agricom's percentage varies according to the size of total marketed output. When production falls - between 1984 and 1986 for example - Agricom's proportion also falls; when output increases - for example from 1986 to 1988 - the proportion marketed through Agricom also increases. What this tells us is the following. When marketed levels are low the real value of crops are at their highest; in this situation private traders will take a higher proportion of crops. When output is high, the real value of crops is lower and private traders lose market share to Agricom. In theory both producer and consumer prices (and others in between) were meant to be fixed, but if this were the case then relative scarcity should not have an impact upon the private/state breakdown of marketed output. Apparently what was happening was that in years of lower output private traders were buying more because the mark-up in the parallel markets was greater. The state's fixed prices, which Agricom was bound to follow, were only attractive to those who could not sell to private traders, namely those who were in more remote and dangerous areas to which private traders would not go. For the others the private traders could offer better prices which they could then recoup by selling on the black market. This means that a sizeable proportion of officially marketed production was being transacted at prices that were different from the official ones. In practical terms, during years of scarcity, the official prices (the prices at which Agricom would buy from the producers) functioned as minimum prices. Private traders would offer producers prices that were equal or slightly higher than what they would receive from Agricom, but then they would sell to consumers at rates much higher than the official prices (for which quantities were rationed). The official prices were such that frequently the mark-up between farm-gate and consumer prices would be less than the marketing costs (transport, warehousing, handling) so the state (Agricom) would operate at a loss. Clearly, private traders, who had no obligations to market crops, would not be operating if they were losing money so we must assume that part of the officially marketed production was reaching the consumers at prices well above the official ones, indicating

that crops bought officially were being sold on the black market. In other words, the state sector (production marketed through Agricom) functioned in response to the parallel markets rather than vice-versa. People would use official channels only after ascertaining what the conditions were in the parallel channels.

This enables us to question the standard interpretation which places Agricom's annual variation of purchasing levels in the context of the security situation.[58] The war undoubtedly had a powerful impact upon the level of marketed output as a whole but the changes in Agricom purchases are more accentuated than the changes in global output so there are other factors influencing Agricom's activities as well. Unfortunately there is very little information available on prices being practiced in the parallel markets.

3.4 Distribution of Inputs and Consumer Goods

Agricom did not just buy produce; from the beginning Agricom had the task of supplying rural producers with agricultural implements and consumer goods that would maintain their interest in the monetized economy.

Table 8: Agricom sales of agricultural tools
Unit: thousands of tools

Year	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Total	1381.7	949.4	1807.6	2889	2590	2327.1	1619.1

Source: SIDA 1990

The main types of tools distributed, in order of quantity, were: hoes, machetes, axes, files and sickles. Although far from achieving the projected objective of distributing 3.5 to 4 million hand tools per year during the second half of the decade to meet pent-up demand, the actual levels attained are remarkable. Most of these tools were sold but when tools began to be distributed free of charge during the Emergency Programme (after 1987) it

[58] All the analyses of Agricom's purchases that I have come across refer only to factors that explain the level of *total* marketed production, not the question of why Agricom's share in this varies. See, for example: Nsubuga 1988 and SIDA 1989 and 1990.

became difficult for Agricom to continue selling in the areas targeted by donors. Just as with other easily transportable items the beginning of a donor programme had a considerable impact upon the market. Because they were unevenly distributed, tools were soon being sold at low prices in areas that had not received them so it was not possible, for periods of time, for Agricom to sell its tools. Furthermore, donated tools were often imported because locally produced ones were relatively expensive. This made it even more difficult for local manufacturers to be competitive. There is also evidence that large companies, who would usually import their own tools for distribution to their workers, started to use their contacts in the large expatriate aid community to find out when shipments of tools were due to arrive. When the timing of shipments suited them they would buy cheaply from the temporarily glutted local market instead of importing.[59]

Apart from hand tools, Agricom would also sell sacks and seeds. However, the quality of seeds distributed by Agricom was deteriorating from year to year. After some years, unless new seeds are introduced, seeds lose qualities such as the rate of germination. New varieties have a higher yield potential but they are more vulnerable to local diseases and insects so ideally there should be a mixture of old and new varieties, with new varieties being added at least every three or four years, depending on the crop. Maize varieties deteriorate particularly rapidly. In practice very few new varieties in very few areas were introduced in Mozambique after independence.[60] This problem was compounded when Agricom failed to sell all of its seeds and carried them over to the next planting season.[61] When this happened germination rates would fall even more rapidly.

As well as agricultural inputs, Agricom would transport basic consumer goods to the rural areas, very often consisting of donated second-hand clothing. Depending on the

[59] Several such instances have been recounted to me by people involved in aid from Europe to the agricultural sector.
[60] Private communication from Peter Wagermeyer, agronomist working in Nampula province.
[61] SIDA 1990: 24.

donor and on the programme these consumer goods were sometimes sold by Agricom and other times distributed free of charge. Agricom's transport fleet was also frequently used for food aid distribution, again sometimes at low prices and other times free of charge. Often Agricom operated at a loss as it was unable to pass on transport and handling costs to the consumers, and nobody paid it for this work as donors would frequently just hand over the clothes or goods at the port.

3.5 Financial Aspects

From its formation in 1981 until 1984 Agricom was financed directly from the state budget as part of the Ministry of Commerce. After 1984 it was supposed to finance its activities as if it were a private company, from the mark-up between prices at the farm-gate and the consumer or factory. In recognition of the fact that the mark-up in the officially established prices was often insufficient to cover marketing costs, the government was also supposed to support Agricom by providing it with specific subsidies - per kilogram of maize for example. In practical terms very little of this money would find its way back to Agricom, either because the rules for claiming subsidies were too complex for Agricom's weak administrative capacities[62], or because Agricom was given a very low priority by a government that had serious budgetary limitations and numerous competing claims.[63] During the period of fixed prices there was no expectation within Agricom that the organization might be able to generate a profit through trading. On the contrary, budgets were drawn up in the expectation of making a loss that would later be covered by the state. When Agricom failed to recoup substantial portions of its losses from the state it would negotiate advances from the Ministry of Finance, part of which the Ministry considered as loans. Apart from the Ministry of Finance there were other important sources of funding: foreign donors and commercial borrowing. In short, one of

---

[62] SIDA, 1990: 28

[63] This is the interpretation favoured by Fernando Duarte, regional director (North) for Agricom until its dissolution in 1994.

---

the most serious contradictions to hamper Agricom was between what it was supposed to do and how it was supposed to be financed.

Foreign donors have been a crucial source of income throughout Agricom's history. In particular the Nordic countries (through Monap and SIDA) have offered strong support.[64] This support has primarily been directed at meeting the costs of foreign staff and of transport. In order to make up for the shortfall in revenue from the government, Agricom turned to the Bank of Mozambique which, under political orders, would each year make the necessary loans at the prevailing interest rates. The bank loans to Agricom were not assessed according to Agricom's credit-rating. Because they were necessary for Agricom to remain in operation, and because the government considered Agricom to be an essential part of its strategy in the rural areas, the Bank of Mozambique had no option but to respect the political orders coming from the Ministry of Finance. Given that Agricom's running costs were covered by foreign aid and irregular government subsidies, which paid the costs of the negative returns from trading, it seems that there was never a serious plan to repay the bank loans. Agricom began borrowing from the Bank on a large scale when the producer price rises that came with the structural adjustment programme reduced its capacity for buying crops with its existing working capital. Inflation in the cost of other inputs - salaries, fuel, services - further reduced Agricom's capacity to operate without large loans. As a result, since the beginning of the structural adjustment programme Agricom's debts to the banking system have rocketed.

Apart from the trading operations in which it was involved, another chronic source of financial losses for Agricom was the *de facto* obligation of maintaining strategic reserves at a provincial level. Agricom was supposed to be directed on a national, not provincial, basis, responding to directives that came from the headquarters in Maputo which in turn were under the Ministry of Commerce. For reasons that shall be discussed later, this

---

[64] SIDA is the Swedish International Development Agency (often known by its Portuguese acronym ASDI).

chain of command never functioned and at the behest of provincial governments Agricom would maintain a sizeable stock in each surplus-producing province. Agricom would purchase from the rural areas, transport the crops to district or provincial warehouses, and then it would not be permitted to sell for six months or so. During the period of storage Agricom would naturally be accountable to the banking system or to the government for interest on loans or advances it had taken out to buy the crops. One way in which Agricom has sought to deal with this problem is by obtaining advance payments from buyers. The restrictions on internal credit imposed by agreements between the Government of Mozambique and the IMF have made Agricom's access to banking credit more difficult and this in turn means that Agricom's theoretical obligation to buy from the rural producer moved further and further from reality. Agricom began to buy only when it had successfully identified someone to sell to. The high (and constantly growing) levels of poverty in the country meant that Agricom was unable to pass on the costs of its debts to the consumer because in the final analysis the consumer was unable to buy except at relatively low prices. The existence of food aid, arriving with little notice, provided consumers with an alternative and disrupted the markets for crops grown inside Mozambique.

A further drain on Agricom's resources came from the government's desire both to promote producer prices and keep down consumer prices. On occasions this would mean that Agricom was selling crops to retailers at prices below those it had paid to producers. When this happened retailers would quickly take advantage of the gap by circulating the crops: re-selling to Agricom and then buying back from them.[65] The appearance of food aid, the timing of which was nearly always related to the donor's needs and not to those of the targeted area, also led to the rapid circulation of crops with private traders taking advantage of Agricom's lack of flexibility and adaptation to the market.

[65] Interview with Fernando Duarte, Nampula, 4 May 1994.

3.6 The Political Accountability of Agricom

The discussion of Agricom so far has identified a number of weaknesses in the structure and functioning of the organization, but the key problem with which it has had to grapple throughout its existence was the political environment. It has been argued that the creation of Agricom should be placed in the political context of the time. It was part of Frelimo's plan to change social and economic relations under direction of the state. Over the years the political context changed and Agricom began to lose its original purpose. Whereas at first it had been envisaged as an instrument for transformation, gradually it came to have other meanings. First it became an emergency organization, attempting desperately to sustain marketing from the rural areas throughout the years of the war and offering (sometimes unwitting) support to the private traders and the consumer cooperatives that remained in business. Later, when the structural adjustment programme was introduced, price changes combined with demands from provincial governments to make Agricom unviable as a self-sustaining operation, although the organization continued to function within the context of the emergency.

The distribution of political power within Mozambique meant that Agricom was incapable of functioning as a single organization with a unified set of policies and priorities, and with a coherent strategy. The following diagram shows the flow of political and administrative responsibility within and surrounding Agricom.

Chart 5: Political and Administrative Hierarchy of Agricom

Source: interviews and observation

At the provincial level the provincial government (the head of which is the Governor, appointed by the President) was the highest political entity. Agricom's provincial delegate was appointed by the Agricom director-general who in turn was appointed by the Minister of Commerce. The Minister of Commerce was also responsible for appointing the provincial director of commerce. However, both the provincial director of commerce and the provincial director of Agricom also responded directly to the Governor. The Governor was also the first party secretary for the province. Thus although the provincial delegate of Agricom was theoretically subordinated only to Agricom's director-general, in practical terms the Governor could and did intervene whenever he felt that it was in his or the province's interests to do so. The same pattern reproduced itself at district level. Agricom's district delegate was theoretically only answerable to Agricom's provincial director, but in practice he would respond first to the district administrator who was also the Frelimo party secretary for the district. Conflicts that appeared in this dual subordination were invariably resolved in favour of the Frelimo hierarchy:

> When a district delegate received an order from the district administrator he simply obeyed. To get on the phone and ask permission from the provincial delegate would be considered an act of insubordination. The provincial delegate would only find out about such activities when the annual report was submitted. The same for orders received by provincial directors [of Agricom] from the provincial government: Maputo was not even informed except afterwards.[66]

One example has already been mentioned: the practice of holding emergency stocks was the result of a conflict of interests between Agricom and provincial governments, in which the provincial governments invariably proved stronger. Many of the management problems which beset Agricom have their roots in this dual subordination. References in reports to "bad coordination" between different parts of the organization often mask local interests that cannot be overruled by the hierarchy.

Legislation was ambiguous because although Agricom came under the Ministry of Commerce, there was an overarching law which established how all state enterprises (*empresas estatais*) should function.[67] This law indicated that at all levels issues regarding the functioning of such enterprises should be resolved "in accordance with the policy of Frelimo and the general interests of the state ".[68] By definition, the highest-ranking interpreter of Frelimo policy (and therefore the interests of the state) was always the highest ranking party official. At the level of the district this meant that the Agricom representative was *de facto* and arguably *de jure* subordinated to the district administrator. At the provincial level the same relationship pertained between the provincial delegate of Agricom and the Provincial Governor.

The authority of Agricom's head office extended only as far as the provincial governments allowed it to. The strategies and priorities identified by the head office would only be put into practice where there was administrative capacity at a provincial level and where they did not conflict with the strategies and priorities of the provincial

[66] Interview with Fernando Duarte, Nampula, 4 May 1994.
[67] Law 2/81, of 30 September 1981.
[68] Article 14.

governments. The provincial director of commerce (who was a member of the cabinet of the provincial governor) would usually be able to impose his will upon the local Agricom provincial delegate and if need be he could resort to the authority of the Governor. The district delegates of Agricom, according to the statutes, had considerable decision-making powers because they were responsible for proposing objectives and a budget for each year. Nearly always though, the district delegates would be people with low levels of education who would defer to the district administrator. The district administrators (who were simultaneously the first secretaries of Frelimo in the district) were appointed by the Governor so in effect the Governor's control over Agricom was considerable.

With the structural adjustment programme the government (and donors) began to expect Agricom to act as a commercial trader, according to normal market rules, and yet it continued to impose upon it social obligations, sporadically and according to circumstances. On top of this provincial governments would have their own priorities.[69] The Bretton Woods institutions initially viewed Agricom with great hostility. Admitting that it had some temporary relevance as an emergency institution they were nevertheless convinced that once the emergency was over it would be possible to abolish Agricom as it had no place in a liberalized market economy. Private traders, who relied on Agricom for their own activities, did not share that view and by and large considered Agricom to be essential for the functioning of the market. By around 1989 or 1990 the World Bank and the IMF had come to accept this analysis and yet the tightening of public credit was eroding Agricom's capacity to fulfill its objectives, or the ones that others laid out for it.

If the Bretton Woods institutions were ambiguous in their attitude towards Agricom, blowing hot one moment and cold the next, Frelimo was no less so. Agricom was devised in the context of a global centralization of the economy and though this idea was abandoned the opportunities that Agricom presented for social control remained

---

[69] In either 1988 or 1989, for example, Agricom in Nampula was instructed to buy quantities of medicinal plants (*era caraca, calumba* and *gloriosa superba*) for Medimoc, the state pharmaceutical company. This was never paid for by Medimoc and it seems unlikely that it ever will.

---

tempting. Similarly, in a context of declining government capacity to intervene anywhere (because of ever more restrictive budgetary controls and general erosion of sovereignty), local government structures were loath to cease using Agricom as they always had done, as an instrument for their own purposes. In the meantime report after report stressed Agricom's need for greater autonomy but the only area in which the government was prepared to concede autonomy was in relation to the repayment of Agricom's accumulated debts. Agricom was finally abolished in 1994, to be substituted by the newly created Instituto de Cereais de Moçambique (ICM).[70] The name, ironically, resurrects that of the colonial institution which was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.

4. Conclusion

The story of Agricom, and that of agricultural marketing in general, illustrates some of the contradictions of Frelimo's attempts to control and direct, by a process of centralization, all change to society. It also illustrates some of the consequences of the Frelimo ideology which was described in the first part of the thesis. The pan-territorial nature of pricing and agricultural directives in general, for example, is closely connected to the concern with fabricating national unity. The decision to ostracize those traders who would have been willing to continue operating is also evidence of the Frelimo leadership's conviction that those who were not within the movement were ultimately a danger to it, and by definition also a danger to the country's unity and sovereignty. This conviction was equally present when, some years later, the government sought to reactivate private trading: it sought to create a whole new group of traders that would fill the gaps that the state had not succeeded in filling. The creation of Agricom corresponded to the same ambiguous need, which was to unburden the state without relinquishing control.

---

[70] The new ICM, which comes under the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries rather than that of Commerce, gave jobs to less than half of the personnel of Agricom.

Numerous deficiencies within Agricom have been highlighted, but the most important aspect weighing down upon the organization was that it rapidly became paralyzed in the confusion of authority and responsibility that was illustrated in chart 5. The vested interests which quickly colonized Agricom - through Frelimo and through the provincial and national governments - meant that it was never capable of functioning as a national organization with a defined strategy and a clear chain of command. In turn, this meant that it was incapable of changing over time as the political environment and the economic and social context developed.

The experience of Agricom has been used to describe a general phenomenon. Everywhere in the state administration, from district to national level, one may see the same confusion of authority and hierarchy, and the dissipation of energies and resources that inevitably resulted. The irony is that, by attempting to centralize all decision-making when it did not have the resources and capacity to do so, Frelimo ultimately weakened the central state by providing conditions for the creation of myriad local fiefdoms.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

Clarence-Smith's proclamation of a "paradigm-shift" in Mozambican studies appears in retrospect to have been precipitate.[1] His comments reflected the widespread unease that was felt about existing treatments of Frelimo and its history but ultimately they fell short of enunciating a new paradigm. The gathering weight of localized studies Clarence-Smith referred to left no doubt about the inadequacy of the accounts which had hitherto dominated the literature, but the new consensus has gone no further than to discard the previous paradigm.[2]

Looking at Frelimo's history with new eyes was not an easy task. The particularly repulsive nature of the regime in South Africa, and the fact that Frelimo had suffered from that regime's destabilization policies, meant that observers were frequently indulgent with Frelimo, discounting any criticism that did not originate from within Frelimo itself. The juxtaposition of Frelimo and Renamo offered further respite to the earlier paradigm. The fact that Renamo was created by the Rhodesian secret services and supported by Pretoria provided sufficient reason for many to believe that whatever it was fighting against must be worthy of support. Evidence of Renamo's extreme violence compounded the belief that the movement had no local roots and no political project except to destroy a regime that proclaimed itself to be a threat to apartheid. By contrast, Frelimo's apparently humanitarian tradition, even though tarnished by the reintroduction of public floggings and executions, placed it on the side of enlightenment and civilization in the fight against the forces of darkness and barbarism. Frelimo's urbane and sincere top leadership presented the regime in an attractive light to academics and other observers, particularly when compared to the shady manoeuverings of Renamo's uneducated

[1] Clarence-Smith, 1989.
[2] As is evident from chapter 2, Saul was the leading exponent of this discarded paradigm, but a number of other writers followed his lead.

leadership in a world populated by military intelligence officers and sanctions-busting businessmen. In short, various factors made observers reluctant to revise their views of Mozambique, and for an unnaturally long time Frelimo's own accounts were uncritically accepted, repeated and even embellished.

The critique offered of the work of John Saul in chapter 2 was accompanied by a critique of an alternative paradigm represented by the work of Michel Cahen. Cahen's work is pioneering and, as I have argued, offers a much deeper and more satisfying understanding of Frelimo. Its failure, thus far, to attract widespread support is partly a function of the slow acknowledgement of French-language writing by anglophone academia but Cahen's work also contains shortcomings that have been referred to in my critique. The development of a new paradigm for Frelimo and Mozambique's post-colonial history requires that the central issues of ideology and the state be tackled directly, as they were by subscribers to the previous paradigm. This thesis offers a contribution to that task.

The difficulty in rethinking Frelimo and post-colonial Mozambique has not belonged exclusively to foreign academics. Some Mozambican academics have offered prescient analyses of aspects of Frelimo's history and their work offers an excellent basis from which to review our understanding of Frelimo, or at least components of it.[3] However, Frelimo itself as a movement has had great difficulty in rethinking its own history. One of the points that has been made in this thesis is that on several occasions Frelimo rewrote its history in order to substantiate a given policy innovation. The general framework - the *discourse* - within which Frelimo operated had a certain elasticity which made revisions of earlier approaches possible without altering the framework. From the early 1980s though, the elasticity of Frelimo's discourse was stretched beyond its limits. Unable adequately to incorporate new developments into the old framework, Frelimo's public claims increasingly failed to offer any understanding of contemporary Mozambique. By

[3] In this context I would particularly like to draw attention to the work of Yussuf Adam, Luis de Brito, João Paulo Coelho, Teresa Cruz e Silva and Alexandrino José which are listed in the bibliography.

the Fifth Congress in 1989 the discourse had become so inadequate that the draft theses from the Political Bureau were claiming that the structural adjustment programme was no more than a logical continuation of the Third Congress resolutions of 1977 and the 1981 ten-year plan.[4] The study of Frelimo's ideology presented here permits an understanding of the limitations of the discourse by referring back to the founding principles that underlie Frelimo's intellectual and political development: territory, unity and modernity.

Overt challenges to the first basic principle - that of territorial integrity - were defeated at an early stage. However, this principle was perceived to be precarious as long as Mozambique's considerable diversity persisted. The construction of unity - the second basic principle - was thought to offer a simple solution to this problem: if diversity was a threat to territorial integrity, then national unity had to mean the absence of difference. This interpretation of unity may be traced back to a leadership suspicious of any notion of political communities on a scale smaller than its own national-based ideas. Since the Frelimo leadership's objective was the eradication of any 'imagined community' that might threaten the national one, a transformation of popular consciousness was required and this transformation was understood as being from 'tradition' to 'modernity'. Through the artefact of the *homem novo* the people were to be taught to leave their 'peasant mentality' behind and to adopt the mental traits of the Frelimo leadership itself. The objective was the transubstantiation of Mozambique's rural population into "modern" Mozambicans.

The Marxist language adopted appeared to satisfy all the requirements of the Frelimo leadership and served as the medium of the discourse that was constructed throughout the 1960s and the 1970s. However, internal and international changes gradually rendered the Marxist medium less useful and eventually it was strongly challenged by the United

[4] Frelimo, 1989a: 10-11.

States.[5] Frelimo was forced to abandon its official commitment to Marxism in 1989, a step that has been consistently misunderstood. It was not the final nail in the coffin of Frelimo's revolutionary project because, as this thesis points out, the government had long ceased to pay attention to the Marxist commitments of the Constitution and its party programme.[6] On the other hand, the statutory, programmatic and constitutional alterations were by no means irrelevant either.[7] The language chosen for communication inevitably helps to shape what is said. Frelimo's Marxist-modernizing language was adopted in the late 1960s and the early 1970s and, ever since, the movement had explained itself to the population through this language. The language had helped to shape what Frelimo had become. By abandoning Marxist references Frelimo was not so much casting doubt upon Marxism, as upon itself.

The three basic principles to which this thesis has referred - territory, unity and modernity - were explained, justified, fought for and thought about in terms that were permitted and developed within the Marxist language. The survival of official Marxism until 1989 is explained by the difficulty of simply excising offending terms. In order to present a coherent discourse that would defend and promote these basic principles it was necessary for Frelimo to develop a new language. The deep identity crisis into which Frelimo plunged in the mid to late 1980s is the result of its failure so far to develop this new language. Territory, unity and modernity remain today the central elements of Frelimo's political thinking. However, as this thesis has shown, the manner in which these principles have been constructed and understood is closely tied to Frelimo's Marxist language. Frelimo's rewriting of history to make points relevant to the present has led ultimately to a situation in which the movement can no longer make sense of the present because it fails to understand the past. John Saul expressed the hope that at least "the

[5] Other international interlocutors, be they foreign governments or international financial institutions, were not particularly concerned with Frelimo's use of a Marxist language.
[6] Abrahamsson and Nilsson (1994: 65-66) consider that Fifth Congress marks the decision to "abandon the route of socialist development in favour of a market economy and a multiparty system".
[7] Frelimo officials explained the changes as being simply the shedding of language that was neither truthful nor advantageous. As Jorge Rebelo said, the changes were "firstly in order to be coherent with ourselves, and secondly so as not to give ammunition to the enemy". Cited in Hanlon, 1991: 49.

sense of achieved nationhood" might survive the demise of the rest of Frelimo's initial project.[8] The implication of this thesis is that a crucial factor in this regard is whether Frelimo can develop a new understanding of 'unity' and the means for achieving it.

Alongside its Marxist language, or rather with and through its Marxist language, Frelimo built up a resource pool for a national mythology. The anti-colonial memory, the pre-colonial heritage and the liberated zones were each described and nurtured so that they might become keystones in the edifice of a Mozambican sense of nationhood. There is nothing unique to Mozambique about this process. On the contrary, the creation and consolidation of a national mythology is one of the most widespread of political phenomena.[9] In Mozambique (as in many other countries) founding myths were designed so as to be inseparable from the victors of the war for independence. Jean Copans has argued that this is a general characteristic of African emulation of the Soviet Union:

> It is because the USSR as a state building socialism in one country establishes national strategies for political consolidation that its message has so much success with the independent African states. The attractiveness of the model has nothing to do with any aesthetic of politics but everything to do with the social logic of the bureaucratic preservation of clearly defined class interests.[10]

In Mozambican studies there is much to be learned before we can claim to understand the class interests that have played themselves out through Frelimo's history.[11] But an argument of this thesis is that Frelimo's construction of nationhood deposited national political legitimacy exclusively in its own hands. The Frelimo state which resulted from the combination of this ideological construction and the colonial heritage certainly had, to rephrase Copans, everything to do with the social logic of the bureaucratic preservation of power within the party.

[8] Saul, 1993: 158. Saul's choice of terminology is questionable, though a full discussion of the issue would go well beyond the scope of this thesis.
[9] See Centeno (1993) for an excellent analysis of some aspects of Portugal's national mythologies.
[10] Copans, 1988, 25-26.
[11] Derluguian (1989), Cahen (1987, 1993), Bowen (1992) have attempted to think about Mozambican history in terms of classes.

Frelimo's rapid infusion and adaptation of the colonial state-system that it inherited gave rise to the Frelimo party-state, which failed ever to function according to the logic that had been ascribed to it.[12] The movement's deep-rooted tendency to centralization led to results opposite to those intended because the incipient bureaucracy did not have the administrative and organizational capacity to deal with its multiple responsibilities. Consequently, a growing proportion of social and economic life took place beyond the purview of the party-state throughout the 1980s. In tandem with the growing evidence of the state-system's failure, Frelimo's state-idea was also losing its appeal. The widespread acclaim and enthusiasm which greeted Frelimo's accession to power declined during the late 1970s and early 1980s to the point where the regime responded with a sharp increase in coercion. The extent to which coercion is necessary for any state is a measure of the failure of the respective state-idea.

This account offers a perspective of change over time which has not been adequately dealt with in previous accounts. One of the points made in the first chapter was that the state-civil society distinction was of little if any analytical use, and this common metaphor was therefore abandoned. The 'hegemonic drive' has however been a feature of the Frelimo-state. The centralization of resources and the consequent centralization of opportunities for accumulation in the party-state is a central characteristic of Mozambique's post-colonial experience. This was justified by Frelimo's claim to exclusive political legitimacy that can be traced back to the movement's ideological roots. Whereas at an early stage this claim to political legitimacy met with widespread acceptance, the gradual erosion of support for Frelimo led to an erosion of the credibility of its whole discourse. There is a direct connection between the declining credibility of Frelimo's discourse (which establishes an unbreakable link between the construction of the nation-state and the party's political legitimacy) and the growth of senses of political community and loyalty that are much smaller and more localized than the idea of

[12] I refer to the logic which is discernible in the 1977 Party Congress documents.

278

'Mozambique'.[13] Frelimo's notions of modernity, unity and territory have suffered the same erosion as the rest of Frelimo's political project.

The manner in which Frelimo's ideology was constructed and presented allowed for no other possibility. Frelimo's discourse was essentially a discourse of polarities which was aimed at emphasizing the single basic polarity of a totalizing project: either one was for Frelimo or against it. Zaki Laïdi argues that this is central to what he calls the 'Soviet discourse':

> The cardinal principle of the 'Soviet discourse' is to formalize, in Manichean terms, 'the basic contradiction'. This process is necessary before what Bourdieu calls 'the closure effect' can share the political arena. Thus all social and international reality is reduced to an irreducible conflict between 'the people' and 'imperialism', drawing for references on the Leninist grammar based on the fusion of Marxist and military discourse.[14]

Frelimo's discourse developed over the 1970s into a collection of polarities which fed into an overriding polarity between 'capitalist exploitation' and 'freedom from exploitation of man by man'. The latter was taken to be the genuine desire of the people of Mozambique and the former was what some western countries, former settlers and a handful of infiltrated agents would like to see. For most of the 1980s the overriding polarity juxtaposed an independent sovereign Mozambique with the Renamo stooges of apartheid. From its earliest days Frelimo claimed that it was the incarnation of the will of 'the people'.[15] Any opposition to Frelimo must therefore represent something foreign. However, the sharp distinctions that appeared in Frelimo's discourse gradually grew blunter and overt references to Marxism (which were, of course, always selective) were eventually forcibly removed. The Manichean nature of Frelimo's discourse, throughout its history, can no longer be reproduced, and it is due to the dissolution of this discourse that

[13] Alexander (1994, 1995), Wilson (1992), Geffray (1990), Cahen (1995) may be read in support of this statement. My own experience as an electoral observer in Tete in October 1994 coincides with that of numerous other observers from different parts of the country to whom I spoke, which is that people voted for local reasons and according to a local logic, rather than according to a national logic.
[14] Laïdi, 1988: 20.
[15] See Mondlane, 1967, an excerpt from which is quoted in chapter 2.

279

Frelimo's rapid infusion and adaptation of the colonial state-system that it inherited gave rise to the Frelimo party-state, which failed ever to function according to the logic that had been ascribed to it.[12] The movement's deep-rooted tendency to centralization led to results opposite to those intended because the incipient bureaucracy did not have the administrative and organizational capacity to deal with its multiple responsibilities. Consequently, a growing proportion of social and economic life took place beyond the purview of the party-state throughout the 1980s. In tandem with the growing evidence of the state-system's failure, Frelimo's state-idea was also losing its appeal. The widespread acclaim and enthusiasm which greeted Frelimo's accession to power declined during the late 1970s and early 1980s to the point where the regime responded with a sharp increase in coercion. The extent to which coercion is necessary for any state is a measure of the failure of the respective state-idea.

This account offers a perspective of change over time which has not been adequately dealt with in previous accounts. One of the points made in the first chapter was that the state-civil society distinction was of little if any analytical use, and this common metaphor was therefore abandoned. The 'hegemonic drive' has however been a feature of the Frelimo-state. The centralization of resources and the consequent centralization of opportunities for accumulation in the party-state is a central characteristic of Mozambique's post-colonial experience. This was justified by Frelimo's claim to exclusive political legitimacy that can be traced back to the movement's ideological roots. Whereas at an early stage this claim to political legitimacy met with widespread acceptance, the gradual erosion of support for Frelimo led to an erosion of the credibility of its whole discourse. There is a direct connection between the declining credibility of Frelimo's discourse (which establishes an unbreakable link between the construction of the nation-state and the party's political legitimacy) and the growth of senses of political community and loyalty that are much smaller and more localized than the idea of

[12] I refer to the logic which is discernible in the 1977 Party Congress documents.

'Mozambique'.[13] Frelimo's notions of modernity, unity and territory have suffered the same erosion as the rest of Frelimo's political project.

The manner in which Frelimo's ideology was constructed and presented allowed for no other possibility. Frelimo's discourse was essentially a discourse of polarities which was aimed at emphasizing the single basic polarity of a totalizing project: either one was for Frelimo or against it. Zaki Laïdi argues that this is central to what he calls the 'Soviet discourse':

> The cardinal principle of the 'Soviet discourse' is to formalize, in Manichean terms, 'the basic contradiction'. This process is necessary before what Bourdieu calls 'the closure effect' can share the political arena. Thus all social and international reality is reduced to an irreducible conflict between 'the people' and 'imperialism', drawing for references on the Leninist grammar based on the fusion of Marxist and military discourse.[14]

Frelimo's discourse developed over the 1970s into a collection of polarities which fed into an overriding polarity between 'capitalist exploitation' and 'freedom from exploitation of man by man'. The latter was taken to be the genuine desire of the people of Mozambique and the former was what some western countries, former settlers and a handful of infiltrated agents would like to see. For most of the 1980s the overriding polarity juxtaposed an independent sovereign Mozambique with the Renamo stooges of apartheid. From its earliest days Frelimo claimed that it was the incarnation of the will of 'the people'.[15] Any opposition to Frelimo must therefore represent something foreign. However, the sharp distinctions that appeared in Frelimo's discourse gradually grew blunter and overt references to Marxism (which were, of course, always selective) were eventually forcibly removed. The Manichean nature of Frelimo's discourse, throughout its history, can no longer be reproduced, and it is due to the dissolution of this discourse that

[13] Alexander (1994, 1995), Wilson (1992), Geffray (1990), Cahen (1995) may be read in support of this statement. My own experience as an electoral observer in Tete in October 1994 coincides with that of numerous other observers from different parts of the country to whom I spoke, which is that people voted for local reasons and according to a local logic, rather than according to a national logic.
[14] Laïdi, 1988: 20.
[15] See Mondlane, 1967, an excerpt from which is quoted in chapter 2.

the party now has such difficulty in transmitting any notion of what it stands for. In turn this has further compounded the dissolution of the discourse because Frelimo has become whoever Frelimo happens to be at the local level, and thus fragmentation rather than 'Mozambicanization' has been the consequence of attempts to retain and reinforce party-state control over resources and their distribution.

The state which Frelimo created was inevitably deeply tinged with the movement's general ideological concerns. The state was inherited and adapted from colonialism so many examples of continuity in state practice may be found, but the Frelimo-state was highly influenced by the basic principles of the party's ideology and discourse. In some respects there was no contradiction between the colonial and post-colonial political roles for the state. Looking back at the twenty years since independence it is striking to see how often the Frelimo-state contributed to the unraveling its own discourse. The discussion in chapter 7 of one particular aspect of the Frelimo-state (its relation to agricultural marketing) brought out a number of issues that may be traced back to the Marxist-modernizing discourse and to concerns over national unity and territory, as well as to colonial concerns. Frelimo's ambiguity over traders, for example, seeking their continued practice and yet attempting to limit their role, has its roots in a classic Marxist suspicion of traders (Lenin's "monstrous speculators") but it is also a result of Frelimo's suspicion of all sources of accumulation that were beyond the party's control. By the mid 1980s private traders were benefiting from the state's rigidity and incapacity to respond to changing circumstances. The pan-territorial standardization that Frelimo established in its agricultural pricing (and in many other policies from villagization to education) was supposed to iron out differences in Frelimo's quest for uniformity. In practice this accentuated pre-existing advantages and disadvantages and fueled the growth of parallel markets. The decision to send Agricom to areas where private traders would not go was also linked to the desire to establish territorial uniformity, but the main beneficiaries were the private traders who would choose at which point of a journey they should buy or sell from Agricom, thus leaving all risks in the hands of the state. The issue of dual

subordination in every area of the party-state was designed to subordinate the state to the party at each stage of policy-making but it led instead to conflicting loyalties and responsibilities that ultimately weakened the hold of the party-state. Agricom itself, the state agricultural marketing organization, provides an example of how the changes in political circumstances, and the much slower rate of change in the Frelimo party-state discourse, created a situation in which the state institution was not equipped to carry out its new functions. These examples are typical of problems that appeared in various guises, increasing greatly during the period of the dissolution of Frelimo's discourse.

Society does not stand still. The inappropriate or anachronistic nature of Agricom as an institution led to its being used for purposes other than those for which it was conceived, and which were beyond the control of the party-state. The vested interests of private traders and local party bosses quickly asserted themselves over the institution's initial role as an instrument of Frelimo's social transformation. The centralization of resources and control in the institutions of the party-state did not imply that there was a centralized system for distributing the benefits of those resources. The state-system was far too weak to police itself and the state-idea had long lost its capacity to motivate (or "mobilize" in Frelimo's language) without employing coercion. Frelimo's political project - territory, unity, modernity and all that they implied to Frelimo - became a memory confined to the higher ranks of the party in Maputo.

The process of disaggregation of Agricom's political functions was typical of most if not all sectors of the Frelimo party-state. In the middle of a civil war of growing proportions the level of corruption inside the army was one of the highest of any sector of the party-state. Renamo was overtly attacking Frelimo's modernizing project. The war itself was a violent and blatant negation of the idea of unity and at times it threatened the very concept of territorial integrity. And yet even in such circumstances considerable energies and resources were diverted from the army to private pockets. The dissolution of Frelimo's discourse has had two general and widespread consequences within Frelimo.

The first is that in the absence of a national project Frelimo has become fragmented in a multiplicity of ways - for example ethnically, regionally, generationally and as a result of business alliances. This fragmentation reorganizes itself constantly, never crystallizing into a fixed pattern. The second consequence is that the basic principles of Frelimo's ideology are no longer as crucial as they were, particularly in decisions that are made at district or provincial levels. Frelimo's so far unsuccessful search for a meaningful discourse with which it might reassert these principles has led to no more than a continued emphasis upon the need to defend the country's sovereignty.[16]

The process that Bayart calls the "reciprocal assimilation of elites"[17] has not taken place in Mozambique and there is now a strong and legal opposition to Frelimo inside the country. This thesis has shown how the quest for centralization and unity (understood as uniformity) has in fact led to dissent and fragmentation. The decentralization of political power[18] would lead to greater popular participation and this might allow Frelimo to find a new anchor for its political legitimacy and the roots of a new discourse. However, such a move would run counter to all of Frelimo's political practice and its understanding of itself.

---

[16] Discussed in chapter 6.

[17] Bayart, 1993: 150-179.

[18] The Municipalities Law of September 1994 purports to promote the decentralization of power but its precise functioning has yet to be defined. See Alexander, 1995.

Bibliography

Books, Chapters and Articles

Abrahamsson, Hans and Anders Nilsson (1994), *Moçambique em Transição. Um estudo da história de desenvolvimento durante o período 1974-1992*, Maputo: Padrigu/CEEI-ISRI.

Abrams, Philip (1977), "Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State", paper delivered to the 1977 British Sociological Association annual conference, published in *Journal of Historical Sociology*, Vol.1, No.1, pp.58-89.

Abshire, David M. and Michael A. Samuels (1969), *Portuguese Africa: A Handbook*, London: Pall Mall Press.

Adam, Yussuf (1989), "V Congresso: implicações para o desenvolvimento rural", in *Extra*, No.2, pp.2-8.

Adam, Yussuf (1991a), "Guerra, Fome, Seca e Desenvolvimento: Lições de Changara, Moçambique", *Arquivo*, Boletim Semestral do Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique, No.10: Maputo, pp.185-207.

Adam, Yussuf (1991b), "Historiadores e Ideólogos", in Alexandrino José and Paula Maria G. Meneses. *Moçambique - 16 Anos de Historiografia: Focos, Problemas, Metodologias, Desafio Para a Década de 90*, Maputo: Colecção Painel Moçambicano, pp.51-72.

Africa Watch (1992), *Conspicuous Destruction: war, famine and the reform process in Mozambique*, New York and London: Human Rights Watch.

Alden, Chris and Mark Simpson (1993), "Mozambique: A Delicate Peace", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.31, No.1, pp.109-130.

Alderman, H, D.E. Sahn, and J. Arulpragasam, (1991), "Food subsidies and exchange rate distortions in Mozambique", *Food Policy* (Oxford), Vol.16, No.5, pp.395-404.

Alexander, Jocelyn (1994), "Land and Political Authority in Post-War Mozambique: A View from Manica Province", ms. Translated and published as "Terra e Autoridade Política Pós-Guerra em Moçambique: o caso da Província de Manica", *Arquivo*, Boletim Semestral do Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique, No.16: Maputo, pp.5-94.

Alexander, Jocelyn (1995), "Political Change in Manica Province, Mozambique: Implications for the Decentralization of Power", ms.

Ali, Tariq, ed (1984), *The Stalinist Legacy. Its Impact on Twentieth-Century World Politics*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.

Almeida Serra, A.M. (1993), *Moçambique: da Independência à Actualidade. Evolução económica e social, 1975-1990*, Lisboa: CESA.

Alpers, Edward A. (1979), "The Struggle for Socialism in Mozambique, 1960-1972", in Carl G. Rosberg, and Tjomas M. Callaghy. *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa: A new assessment*, Berkeley, Ca.: Institute of International Studies, University of California, pp.267-295.

Alpers, Edward A. (1984), "'To Seek a Better Life:' The Implications of Migration from Mozambique to Tanganyika for Class Formation and Political Behaviour", *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol.18, No.2, pp.367-388.

Alpers, Edward A. (1994), "'A Family of the State': Bureaucratic impediments to democratic reform in Mozambique", paper presented to the History Workshop Conference on 'Democracy: Popular Precedents, Popular Practice and Popular Culture', University of the Witwatersrand 13-15 July 1994.

Anderson, Benedict (1991), *Imagined Communities: reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism*, (revised edition), London: Verso.

Anonymous (1975), "Report on Labour Conditions in the Province of Mozambique, Portuguese E.A.", *South African Labour Bulletin*, Vol.2, No.2, pp.14-27.

Anonymous (1986), "Lettre des Anciens Combattants" [translated by Michel Cahen], *Politique Africaine*, no.29, pp.115-130.

Arnfred, Signe (1988), "Women in Mozambique: Gender Struggle and Gender Politics", *Review of African Political Economy*, no.41, pp.5-16.

Azam, J.P. et al (1988), *The Supply of Manufactured Goods and Agricultural Development. The case of Mozambique*, Paris: OECD.

Azevedo, Mario (1991), *Historical Dictionary of Mozambique*, Metuchen, N.J. and London: The Scarecrow Press Inc.

Barber, James and John Barratt (1990), *South Africa's Foreign Policy: the search for status and security, 1945-1988*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Barker, Carol (1985), "Bringing Health Care to the People", in John S. Saul, ed, *A Difficult Road: the Transition to Socialism in Mozambique*, pp. 316-346.

Barya, Jean B. (1993), "The New Political Conditionalities of Aid: An Independent View From Africa", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol.24, No.1, pp.16-23.

Bates, Robert H. (1981), *Markets and States in Tropical Africa: the political basis of agricultural policies*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Bates, Robert H. (1989), "The Reality of Structural Adjustment: A Sceptical Appraisal", in Simon Commander, ed, *Structural Adjustment & Agriculture: theory and practice in Africa and Latin America*, London: ODI in association with James Currey, pp.221-227.

Bates, Robert H. (1991), "A Critique by Political Scientists", in Meier (ed), 1991, *Politics and Policy Making in Developing Countries*, San Francisco: International Center for Economic Growth, pp.261-272.

Bates, Robert H. and Amy Farmer Curry, (1992), "Community Versus Market: A Note on Corporate Villages", *American Political Science Review*, Vol.86, no.2, pp.457-463.

Bates, Robert H. and Paul Collier (1993), "The Politics and Economics of Policy Reform in Zambia", in Robert H. Bates and Anne O. Krueger (eds), *Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy Reform*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp.387-443.

Bates, Robert H. and Anne O. Krueger, eds, (1993), *Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy Reform*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Bauman, Zygmunt (1976), *Socialism, the Active Utopia*, London: George Allen and Unwin.

Bauzon, Kenneth E. (1992), *Development and Democratization in the Third World: myths, hopes and realities*, Washington: Crane Russack.

Bayart, Jean-François (1983), "La revanche des societés africaines", *Politique Africaine*, No.11, pp.87-127.

Bayart, Jean-François Bayart (1986), "Civil Society in Africa", in Patrick Chabal, ed, *Political Domination in Africa*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bayart, Jean-François (1993), *The State in Africa: the politics of the belly*, London: Longman.

Beckman, Björn (1993), "The Liberation of Civil Society: Neo-Liberal Ideology and Political Theory", in *Review of African Political Economy*, No.58, pp.20-33.

Beitz, Charles R. (1991), "Sovereignty and Morality in International Affairs", in David Held, ed, *Political Theory Today*, Cambridge: Polity Press, pp.236-254.

Bender, Gerald J. (1978), *Angola Under the Portuguese: the myth and the reality*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Bernstein, Henry (1981), "Notes on State and Peasantry: the Tanzanian Case", *Review of African Political Economy*, No.21, pp.44-62.

Bernstein, Henry (1990), "Agricultural 'Modernisation' and the Era of Structural Adjustment: Observations on Sub-Saharan Africa", *Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol.18, No.1, pp.3-35.

Bienefeld, Manfred (1988), "Dependency Theory and the Political Economy of Africa's Crisis", *Review of African Political Economy*, No.43, pp.68-87.

Birmingham, David (1992), *Frontline Nationalism in Angola and Mozambique*, London: James Currey.

Birmingham, David (1993), *A Concise History of Portugal*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bottomore, T.B. and Maximilien Rubel (1963), *Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy*, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin.

Bowen, Merle L. (1989), "Peasant Agriculture in Mozambique: The Case of Chokwe, Gaza Province", *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol.23, No.3, pp.355-379.

Bowen, Merle L. (1991), "Mozambique and the Politics of Economic Recovery", *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, No.15, pp.45-55.

Bowen, Merle L. (1992), "Beyond Reform: Adjustment and Political Power in Contemporary Mozambique", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.30, No.2, pp.255-279.

Bragança, Aquino de (1986), "Independência Sem Descolonização", *Estudos Moçambicanos* (Maputo), No.5/6, pp.7-28.

Bragança, Aquino de and Jacques Depelchin (1986), "Da Idealização da Frelimo à Compreensão da História de Moçambique", *Estudos Moçambicanos* (Maputo), No. 5/6, pp.29-52.

Bragança, Aquino de and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds, (1982a), *The African Liberation Reader. Volume 1: The Anatomy of Colonialism*, London: Zed Press.

Bragança, Aquino de and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds, (1982b), *The African Liberation Reader. Volume 2: The National Liberation Movements*, London: Zed Press.

Bragança, Aquino de and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds, (1982c), *The African Liberation Reader. Volume 3: The Strategy of Liberation*, London: Zed Press.

Brito, Luis de (1988), "Une Relecture Nécessaire: la genése du parti-État FRELIMO", *Politique Africaine*, No.29, pp.14-27.

Brito, Luis de (1991), *Le Frelimo et la Construction de l'Etat National au Mozambique: le sens de la référence au marxisme (1962-1983)*, thèse de doctorat, Université de Paris VIII (Vincennes).

Brittain, Victoria (1988), *Hidden Lives, Hidden Deaths: South Africa's crippling of a continent*, London: Faber and Faber.

Brochmann, Grete et al (1990), *Moçambique. A Ajuda Norueguesa num Contexto de Crise*, Bergen, Norway: Christian Michelsen Institute.

Bryceson, Deborah Fahy (1993), *Liberalizing Tanzania's Food Trade*, London: James Currey.

Bukharin, N. and E. Preobrazhensky (1922), *The ABC of Communism. A Popular Explanation of the Program of the Communist Party of Russia*, London: The Communist Party of Great Britain.

Bull, Hedley (1977), *The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics*, London: The Macmillan Press.

Cabral, Amílcar (1980), *Unity and Struggle: speeches and writings*, London: Heinemann.

Cahen, Michel (1983), "Corporatisme et Colonialisme: Approche du cas mozambicain, 1933-1979", *Cahiers d'Études africains*, 92, XXIII-4, pp.383-417.

Cahen, Michel (1984), "Corporatisme et Colonialisme: Approche du cas mozambicain, 1933-1979", *Cahiers d'Études africains*, 93, XXIV-1, pp.5-24.

Cahen, Michel (1985), "État et Pouvoir Populaire dans le Mozambique Indépendant", *Politique Africaine*, no.19, pp.36-60.

Cahen, Michel (1986), "Le Portugal et l'Afrique: Le cas des relations luso-mozambicains (1965-1985). Étude politique et bibliographique", *Afrique Contemporaine*, no.137, pp.3-55.

Cahen, Michel (1987), *Mozambique, La Révolution Implosée: Etudes sur douze ans d'indépendance (1975-1987)*, Paris: L'Harmattan

Cahen, Michel (1988a), "La Crise du Nationalisme", *Politique Africaine*, no.29, pp. 2-13.

Cahen, Michel (1988b), "A Economia Política de Democracia em Moçambique, 1975-1984", *Revista Internacional de Estudos Africanos*, (Lisbon) no.8-9, pp.307-312.

Cahen, Michel, ed, (1989), *"Vilas" et "Cidades": Bourgs et Villes en Afrique Lusophone*, Paris: L'Harmattan.

Cahen, Michel (1990), "Le Mozambique: Une Nation africaine de langue officielle portugaise?", *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, vol.24, no.3, pp.315-347. Also published in *Studia Africana*, (Barcelona) no.1, pp.5-25.

Cahen, Michel (1991a), "Le socialisme, c'est les Soviets plus l'ethnicité", *Politique Africaine*, no.42, pp.87-107.

Cahen, Michel (1991b), "Les 'Mutineries' de la Machanga et de Mambone (1953): Conflits Sociaux, Activisme Associatif et Tension Religieuse dans la Partie Orientale de la 'Zone Vandau'", paper presented to the Third International Meeting of Social Sciences Specialists on Portuguese-Speaking Africa, Bissau, April 1991.

Cahen, Michel (1992), "Unicidade, Unidade ou Pluralismo do Estado?", unpublished paper prepared for the conference "Moçambique: Desafios do Pós-Guerra" held in Maputo, 14-18 December 1992.

Cahen, Michel (1993), "Check on Socialism in Mozambique - What Check? What Socialism?", *Review of African Political Economy*, no.57, pp.46-59.

Cahen, Michel (1995), "'Dhlakama é maningue nice!' Une Ex-Guérilla Atypique Dans la Campagne Électorale au Mozambique", *L'Afrique Politique*, (Bordeaux), pp.1-43.

Callaghy, Thomas M (1984), *The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Cammack, Diana (December 1987), "The Human Face of Destabilization: the war in Mozambique", *Review of African Political Economy*, No.40, pp.65-75.

Capela, José (1993), *O Escravismo Colonial em Moçambique*, Porto: Edições Afrontamento.

Cardoso, Fernando Jorge (1988), "Fermes d'état et développement rural", *Politique Africaine*, No.29, pp.41-50.

Cardoso, Fernando Jorge (1993), *Gestão e Desenvolvimento Rural. Moçambique no contexto da África sub-sahariana*, Lisbon: Fim de Século.

Carlos, Papiniano (1976), *As Armas Estão Acesas nas Nossas Mãos. Antologia breve da poesia revolucionária de Moçambique*, Porto: Edições "Apesar de Tudo".

Carnoy, Martin and Joel Samoff, eds, (1990), *Education and Social Transitions in the Third World*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Carr, Edward Hallett (1979), *The Russian Revolution: from Lenin to Stalin (1917-1929)*, London: Macmillan.

Casimiro, Isabel and Ximena Andrade (1992), "Construindo Uma Teoria do Género em Moçambique", *Estudos Moçambicanos* (Maputo), No.11/12, pp.93-110.

Centeno, Yvette Kace, ed, (1993), *Portugal: Mitos Revisitados*, Lisbon: Edições Salamandra.

Chabal, Patrick (1983), *Amílcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People's War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chabal, Patrick, ed, (1986), *Political Domination in Africa: Reflections on the limits of power*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chabal, Patrick (1991), "Pouvoir et violence en Afrique postcoloniale", *Politique Africaine*, no.42, pp.51-64.

Chabal, Patrick (1992), *Power in Africa. An Essay in Political Interpretation*, London: Macmillan.

Chabal, Patrick (1994), "Democracy and Daily Life in Black Africa", *International Affairs*, Vol.70, No.1, pp.83-91.

Chan, Stephen and Vivienne Jabri, eds, (1993), *Mediation in Southern Africa*, London: The Macmillan Press.

Charney, Craig (1987), "Political Power and Social Class in the Neo-Colonial African State", *Review of African Political Economy*, No.38, pp.48-65.

Chazan, Naomi, Robert Mortimer, John Ravenhill and Donald Rothchild (1988), *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.

Chazan, Naomi (1992), "Africa's Democratic Challenge", *World Policy Journal*, vol.9, no.2, pp.279-307.

Cheru, Fantu (1989), *The Silent Revolution in Africa*, London: Zed Books.

Chilundo, Arlindo (1994), "Gender Relations Under the Impact of the Transportation Revolution in the Northern Mozambican Province of Nampula (1913-1961)", ms.

Chissano, Joaquim (1971), "Frelimo's Ideology", in Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds, *The African Liberation Reader, Volume 2*, p.103.

Christie, Iain (1988), *Machel of Mozambique*, Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House.

Clapham, Christopher (1994), "The *Longue Durée* of the African State", *African Affairs*, Vol.93, No.372, pp.433-439.

Clarence-Smith, Gervase (1985), *The Third Portuguese Empire, 1825-1975*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Clarence-Smith, Gervase (1989), "The Roots of the Mozambican Counter-Revolution", *Southern African Review of Books*, vol.2, no.4, pp.7-10.

Clough, Paul and Gavin Williams (1987), "Decoding Berg: The World Bank in Rural Northern Nigeria", in M. Watts, ed, *The State, Oil and Agriculture in Nigeria*, Berkeley: Institute of International Studies.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cruz e Silva, Teresa and Alexandrino José (1991), "História e Problemática das Fontes", in Alexandrino José and Paula Maria Meneses, eds, *Moçambique - 16 Anos de Historiografia*, Maputo: Colecção Painel Moçambique, pp.17-27.

Darmau, Michel (1991), "Mozambique: un pas timide vers la paix", *Afrique Contemporaine* (Paris), No.158, pp.69-76.

Davidson, Basil (1979), "Mozambique: Five Images of Progress", *People's Power*, No.14, London: MAGIC, pp.23-31.

Davidson, Basil (1992), *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the curse of the nation-state*, London: James Currey.

Davidson, Basil (1994), *The Search for Africa: a history in the making*, London: James Currey.

Davison, Jean (1988), "Land Redistribution in Mozambique and Its Effects on Women's Collective Production: Case Studies from Sofala Province", in Jean Davison, ed, *Agriculture, Women and Land: the African Experience*, London: Westview Press, pp.228-249.

Derluguian, Gueorgui (1989), "Les têtes du monstre: du climat social de la violence armée au Mozambique", *Année Africaine 1989*, Bordeaux, pp.89-127.

Derluguian, Gueorgui (1993), "Dogma and Heresies: Soviet Debate on the Social Nature of the Third World and the Legacy of Vladimir Krylov", *Année Africaine 1992-1993*, Bordeaux, pp.445-462.

Deutscher, Isaac (nd), "Marxism and Primitive Magic", reprinted in Tariq Ali, ed, (1984) *The Stalinist Legacy. Its Impact on Twentieth Century World Politics*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, pp.106-117.

Dinerman, Alice (1994), "In Search of Mozambique: The Imaginings of Christian Geffray in *La Cause des Armes au Mozambique. Anthropologie d'une Guerre Civile*", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol.20, No.4, pp.569-586.

Doeleman, Elma (1991), *"Não se Pode Parar o Vento Com as Mãos". As mudanças em Moçambique*, Amsterdam: Fundação Eduardo Mondlane.

Dolny, Helena (1985), "The Challenge of Agriculture", in John S. Saul, ed, *A Difficult Road: the Transition to Socialism in Mozambique*, pp.211-252.

Dongen, Irene S. van (1969), "Agriculture and Other Primary Production", in D. Abshire and M. Samuels (eds), *Portuguese Africa: a Handbook*, London: Praeger.

Duffy, James (1959), *Portuguese Africa*, London: Oxford University Press.

Duffy, James (1962), *Portugal in Africa*, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin.

Coelho, João Paulo Borges (1989), *O Início da Luta Armada em Tete, 1968-1969: a primeira fase da guerra e a reacção colonial*, Maputo: Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique.

Coelho, João Paulo Borges (1991), "Entrevista com Celestino de Sousa: A Actividade da Frelimo em Tete, 1964-1967", *Arquivo*, Boletim Semestral do Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique, No.10: Maputo, pp.133-168.

Coelho, João Paulo Borges (1993), *Protected Villages and Communal Villages in the Mozambican Province of Tete (1968-1982): A History of State Resettlement Policies, Development and War*, PhD Thesis, Department of Social and Economic Studies, University of Bradford.

Coelho, João Paulo Borges (1995), "Pilot Study on Demobilization and Re-Integration of Ex-Combatants in Mozambique", Refugee Studies Programme, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford.

Colclough, Christopher and James Manor, eds, (1991) *States or Markets?*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Collier, Paul (1991), "From Critic to Secular God: the World Bank and Africa. A commentary upon 'Sub-Saharan Africa: From crisis to sustainable growth'", *African Affairs*, Vol.90, No.358, pp.111-117.

Commander, Simon, ed, (1989), *Strucutural Adjustment and Agriculture. Theory and practice in Africa and Latin America*, London: Overseas Development Institute in association with James Currey.

Copans, Jean (1988), "The USSR, Alibi or Instrument for Black African States?", in Zaki Laïdi, ed, *The Third World and the Soviet Union*, London: Zed Books.

Copans, Jean (1990), "La Banalisation de l'Etat africain. A propos de L'Etat en Afrique de J-F Bayart", *Politique Africaine*, no.37, pp.95-101.

Coulson, Andrew (1982) *Tanzania: A Political Economy*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Cravinho, João Gomes (1990), "Portugueses na África do Sul: retrato político de uma comunidade emigrante", CIDAC, Lisbon; reprinted in *Année Africaine 1992-1993* (1993), Bordeaux: Centre d'Etude d'Afrique Noire, pp.411-430.

Cravinho, João Gomes (1995), "La communauté luso-sud-africaine dans la tempête post-apartheid", *Lusotopie: enjeux contemporains dans les espaces lusophones* (Bordeaux).

Cruz e Silva, Teresa (1990), "A 'IV Região' da Frelimo no Sul de Moçambique: Lourenço Marques, 1964-1965", *Estudos Moçambicanos* (Maputo), No.8, pp. 125-141.

Cruz e Silva, Teresa and Alexandrino José (1991), "História e Problemática das Fontes", in Alexandrino José and Paula Maria Meneses, eds, *Moçambique - 16 Anos de Historiografia*, Maputo: Colecção Painel Moçambique, pp.17-27.

Darmau, Michel (1991), "Mozambique: un pas timide vers la paix", *Afrique Contemporaine* (Paris), No.158, pp.69-76.

Davidson, Basil (1979), "Mozambique: Five Images of Progress", *People's Power*, No.14, London: MAGIC, pp.23-31.

Davidson, Basil (1992), *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the curse of the nation-state*, London: James Currey.

Davidson, Basil (1994), *The Search for Africa: a history in the making*, London: James Currey.

Davison, Jean (1988), "Land Redistribution in Mozambique and Its Effects on Women's Collective Production: Case Studies from Sofala Province", in Jean Davison, ed, *Agriculture. Women and Land: the African Experience*, London: Westview Press, pp.228-249.

Derluguian, Gueorgui (1989), "Les têtes du monstre: du climat social de la violence armée au Mozambique", *Année Africaine 1989*, Bordeaux, pp.89-127.

Derluguian, Gueorgui (1993), "Dogma and Heresies: Soviet Debate on the Social Nature of the Third World and the Legacy of Vladimir Krylov", *Année Africaine 1992-1993*, Bordeaux, pp.445-462.

Deutscher, Isaac (nd), "Marxism and Primitive Magic", reprinted in Tariq Ali, ed, (1984) *The Stalinist Legacy. Its Impact on Twentieth Century World Politics*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, pp. 106-117.

Dinerman, Alice (1994), "In Search of Mozambique: The Imaginings of Christian Geffray in *La Cause des Armes au Mozambique. Anthropologie d'une Guerre Civile*", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol.20, No.4, pp.569-586.

Doeleman, Elma (1991), *"Não se Pode Parar o Vento Com as Mãos". As mudanças em Moçambique*, Amsterdam: Fundação Eduardo Mondlane.

Dolny, Helena (1985), "The Challenge of Agriculture", in John S. Saul, ed, *A Difficult Road: the Transition to Socialism in Mozambique*, pp. 211-252.

Dongen, Irene S. van (1969), "Agriculture and Other Primary Production", in D. Abshire and M. Samuels (eds), *Portuguese Africa: a Handbook*, London: Praeger.

Duffy, James (1959), *Portuguese Africa*, London: Oxford University Press.

Duffy, James (1962), *Portugal in Africa*, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin.

Coelho, João Paulo Borges (1989), *O Início da Luta Armada em Tete, 1968-1969: a primeira fase da guerra e a reacção colonial*, Maputo: Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique.

Coelho. João Paulo Borges (1991), "Entrevista com Celestino de Sousa: A Actividade da Frelimo em Tete, 1964-1967", *Arquivo*, Boletim Semestral do Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique, No.10: Maputo, pp.133-168.

Coelho, João Paulo Borges (1993), *Protected Villages and Communal Villages in the Mozambican Province of Tete (1968-1982): A History of State Resettlement Policies, Development and War*, PhD Thesis, Department of Social and Economic Studies, University of Bradford.

Coelho, João Paulo Borges (1995), "Pilot Study on Demobilization and Re-Integration of Ex-Combatants in Mozambique", Refugee Studies Programme, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford.

Colclough, Christopher and James Manor, eds, (1991) *States or Markets?*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Collier, Paul (1991), "From Critic to Secular God: the World Bank and Africa. A commentary upon 'Sub-Saharan Africa: From crisis to sustainable growth'", *African Affairs*, Vol.90, No.358, pp.111-117.

Commander, Simon, ed, (1989), *Structural Adjustment and Agriculture. Theory and practice in Africa and Latin America*, London: Overseas Development Institute in association with James Currey.

Copans, Jean (1988), "The USSR, Alibi or Instrument for Black African States?", in Zaki Laïdi, ed, *The Third World and the Soviet Union*, London: Zed Books.

Copans, Jean (1990), "La Banalisation de l'Etat africain. A propos de L'Etat en Afrique de J-F Bayart", *Politique Africaine*, no.37, pp.95-101.

Coulson. Andrew (1982) *Tanzania: A Political Economy*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Cravinho, João Gomes (1990), "Portugueses na África do Sul: retrato politico de uma comunidade emigrante", CIDAC, Lisbon; reprinted in *Année Africaine 1992-1993* (1993), Bordeaux: Centre d'Etude d'Afrique Noire, pp.411-430.

Cravinho, João Gomes (1995), "La communauté luso-sud-africaine dans la tempête post-apartheid", *Lusotopie: enjeux contemporains dans les espaces lusophones* (Bordeaux).

Cruz e Silva, Teresa (1990), "A 'IV Região' da Frelimo no Sul de Moçambique: Lourenço Marques, 1964-1965", *Estudos Moçambicanos* (Maputo), No.8, pp. 125-141.

Cruz e Silva, Teresa and Alexandrino José (1991), "História e Problemática das Fontes", in Alexandrino José and Paula Maria Meneses, eds, *Moçambique - 16 Anos de Historiografia*, Maputo: Colecção Painel Moçambique, pp.17-27.

Darmau, Michel (1991), "Mozambique: un pas timide vers la paix", *Afrique Contemporaine* (Paris), No.158, pp.69-76.

Davidson, Basil (1979), "Mozambique: Five Images of Progress", *People's Power*, No.14, London: MAGIC, pp.23-31.

Davidson, Basil (1992), *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the curse of the nation-state*, London: James Currey.

Davidson, Basil (1994), *The Search for Africa: a history in the making*, London: James Currey.

Davison, Jean (1988), "Land Redistribution in Mozambique and Its Effects on Women's Collective Production: Case Studies from Sofala Province", in Jean Davison, ed, *Agriculture. Women and Land: the African Experience*, London: Westview Press, pp.228-249.

Derluguian, Gueorgui (1989), "Les têtes du monstre: du climat social de la violence armée au Mozambique", *Année Africaine 1989*, Bordeaux, pp.89-127.

Derluguian, Gueorgui (1993), "Dogma and Heresies: Soviet Debate on the Social Nature of the Third World and the Legacy of Vladimir Krylov", *Année Africaine 1992-1993*, Bordeaux, pp.445-462.

Deutscher, Isaac (nd), "Marxism and Primitive Magic", reprinted in Tariq Ali, ed, (1984) *The Stalinist Legacy. Its Impact on Twentieth Century World Politics*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, pp. 106-117.

Dinerman, Alice (1994), "In Search of Mozambique: The Imaginings of Christian Geffray in *La Cause des Armes au Mozambique. Anthropologie d'une Guerre Civile*", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol.20. No.4, pp.569-586.

Doeleman, Elma (1991), *"Não se Pode Parar o Vento Com as Mãos". As mudanças em Moçambique*, Amsterdam: Fundação Eduardo Mondlane.

Dolny, Helena (1985), "The Challenge of Agriculture", in John S. Saul, ed, *A Difficult Road: the Transition to Socialism in Mozambique*, pp. 211-252.

Dongen, Irene S. van (1969), "Agriculture and Other Primary Production", in D. Abshire and M. Samuels (eds), *Portuguese Africa: a Handbook*, London: Praeger.

Duffy, James (1959), *Portuguese Africa*, London: Oxford University Press.

Duffy, James (1962), *Portugal in Africa*, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin.

Dutkiewicz, Piotr and Gavin Williams (1987), "All the King's Horses and all the King's Men Couldn't Put Humpty-Dumpty Together Again", *IDS Bulletin* (University of Sussex), Vol.18, No.3, pp.39-44.

Egerö, Bertil (1982), "Mozambique Before the Second Phase of Socialist Development", *Review of African Political Economy*, No.25, pp.83-91.

Egerö, Bertil (1986), "People's Power: The Case of Mozambique", in Barry Munslow, ed, *Africa: Problems in the Transition to Socialism*, London: Zed Books, pp.114-139.

Egerö, Bertil (1987), *Mozambique: A Dream Undone. The Political Economy of Democracy, 1975-84*, Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.

Eliseu, Julieta (1994), "The Land Tenure Issue and Land Conflicts in Angonia", paper presented to the Second National Land Conference, Maputo, 25-27 May 1994.

Ellis, Stephen (1993), "Democracy in Africa. Achievements and Prospects", in Douglas Rimmer (ed), *Action in Africa: Experience of People Involved in Government, Business and Aid*, London: Royal African Society in association with James Currey, pp.133-143.

Elster, Jon (1991), "The Possibility of Rational Politics" in David Held, ed, *Political Theory Today*, Cambridge: Polity Press, pp.115-142.

Ensminger, Jean (1992), *Making a Market: the institutional transformation of an African society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fauvet, Paul (1983), "Frelimo's IV Congress", *People's Power*, No.21, London: MAGIC, pp.13-18.

Fauvet, Paul (1984), "Roots of Counter-Revolution: The Mozambican National Resistance", *Review of African Political Economy*, no.29, pp.108-121.

Ferguson, James (1990), *The Anti-Politics Machine: 'Development', Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ferreira, Manuel (1989), *50 Poetas Africanos*, Lisbon: Plátano Editora.

Findlay, Ronald (1991), "The NPE: Its Explanatory Power for LDCs", in Meier, ed, *Politics and Policy Making in Developing Countries*, San Francisco: International Center for Economic Growth.

Finnegan, William (1992), *A Complicated War: The Harrowing of Mozambique*, Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press.

First, Ruth (1983), *Black Gold: The Mozambican Miner, Proletarian and Peasant*, London: Harvester Press.

Fitzgerald, E.V.K, and Marc Wuyts, eds, (1988), *Markets Within Planning. Socialist Economic Management in the Third World*, London: Frank Cass.

Forbes, Dean and Nigel Thrift, eds, (1987) *The Socialist Third World: Urban Development and Territorial Planning*, Oxford: Blackwell.

Forjaz, José (1985), "Research Needs and Priorities in Housing and Construction in Mozambique", *Habitat*, vol.9, no.2, pp.65-72.

Forrest, Joshua B. (1987), "Guinea-Bissau Since Independence: A Decade of Domestic Power Struggles", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.25, No.1, pp.95-116.

Fortuna, Carlos (1993), *O Fio da Meada: O Algodão de Moçambique, Portugal e a Economia-Mundo (1860-1960)*, Porto: Edições Afrontamento.

Foucault, Michel (1976), "Disciplinary Power and Subjugation", reprinted in Steven Lukes, ed, (1986), *Power*, New York: New York University Press, pp.229-242.

Foucault, Michel (1980), *Power Knowledge. Selected Interviews and Other Writings*, edited by Colin Gordon, Hemel Hempstead: The Harvester Press.

Freire, Marcos, Lorenzo Raffi and Paulo Fernandes (1994), "Land Use, Tenure and Conflict in Monapo and Ribáue Districts in Nampula Province and in Montepuez in Cabo Delgado Province", paper presented to the Second National Land Conference in Mozambique, Maputo, 25-27 May 1994.

Freire Antunes, José (1992), *Os Americanos e Portugal, 1969-1974: Nixon e Caetano, promessas e abandono*, Lisbon: Difusão Cultural.

Freund, Bill (1984), *The Making of Contemporary Africa: the development of African society since 1800*, London: Macmillan.

Friedmann, John (1980), "The Territorial Approach to Rural Development in the People's Republic of Mozambique: six discussion papers", *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Vol.4, No.1, pp.97-115.

Galli, Rosemary E. (1987), "A crise alimentar e o estado socialista na África Lusófona", *Revista Internacional de Estudos Africanos* (Lisbon), No.6-7, pp.121-163.

Garvey, Jennifer (1994), "Mozambique's Land Law: Contradictions Within the Legislative Framework", paper presented to the Second National Land Conference, Maputo, 25-27 May 1994.

Geffray, Christian (1988), "Fragments d'un discours du pouvoir (1975-1985): du bon usage d'une méconnaissance scientifique", *Politique Africaine*, No 29, pp.71-85.

Geffray, Christian (1990), *La cause des Armes au Mozambique. Anthropologie d'une guerre civile*, Paris: Karthala.

Geffray, Christian and Mogens Pedersen (1986), "Sobre a Guerra na Província de Nampula: elementos de análise e hipóteses sobre as determinações e consequências socio-económicas locais", *Revista Internacional de Estudos Africanos* (Lisbon), No.4-5, pp.303-318.

Geffray, Christian and Mogens Pedersen (1988), "Nampula en Guerre", *Politique Africaine*, No.29, pp.28-40.

Gellner, Ernest (1994), *Encounters with Nationalism*, Oxford: Blackwell.

George, Susan and Fabrizio Sabelli (1994), *Faith and Credit: The World Bank's Secular Empire*, London: Penguin.

Gerth, Hans H. and C. Wright Mills, eds, (1974), *From Max Weber*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Ghai, Dharam. ed, (1991), *The IMF and the South*, London: Zed Books.

Ghai, Dharam and Lawrence D. Smith (1987), *Agricultural Prices, Policy, and Equity in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner

Gibbon, Peter (1992), "The World Bank and African Poverty, 1973-91", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.30, No.2, pp.193-220.

Gibbon, Peter, Kjell J. Havnevik and Kenneth Hermele (1993), *A Blighted Harvest. The World Bank and African Agriculture*, London: James Currey.

Giddens, Anthony (1971), *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory. An analysis of the writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gifford, Tony (1981), "Criminals into 'New Men': Penal Justice in Mozambique", *People's Power*, No.17, London: MAGIC, pp.37-43.

Graham, Lawrence S. (1993), "The Dilemmas of Managing Transitions in Weak States: the case of Mozambique", *Public Administration and Development*, Vol.13, No.4: 409-422.

Gramsci, Antonio (1971), *Selections from Prison Notebooks*, edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Gray, Richard (1981), "Khalai-Khalai: People's History in Mozambique", *People's Power*, No.18, London: MAGIC, pp.3-17.

Green, Reginold H. (1991), "Neo-Liberalism and the Political Economy of War: Sub-Saharan Africa as a Case Study of a Vacuum", in Christopher Colclough and James Manor, eds, 1991, *States or Markets?*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp.238-259.

Green, Reginold H. (1993), "The IMF and the World Bank in Africa: How Much Learning?", in Thomas Callaghy and John Ravenhill, eds, *Hemmed In: responses to Africa's economic decline*, New York: Columbia University Press. pp.54-89.

Grest, Jeremy (1994), "Urban Management. Local Government Reform and the Democratization Process in Mozambique: A Maputo City Case Study (1975-1990)", paper presented to the History Workshop Conference on 'Democracy: Popular Precedents, Popular Practice and Popular Culture' at the University of the Witwatersrand, 13-15 July 1994.

Grindle, Merilee S. (1991), "The New Political Economy: Positive Economics and Negative Politics", in Meier, ed, 1991.

Guimarães, Fernando Andresen (1992), *The Origins of the Angolan Civil War: International Politics and Domestic Political Conflict 1961-1976*, University of London: PhD Thesis.

Haggard, Stephan and Robert Kaufman, eds, (1992), *The Politics of Economic Adjustment*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hall, Margaret (1990), "The Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo): A Study in the Destruction of an African Country", *Africa*, Vol.60, No.1, pp.39-68.

Hanlon, Joseph (1978), "Does Modernization Equal Mechanization?", paper given to a seminar at the University of Edinburgh, December 1978.

Hanlon, Joseph (1984), *Mozambique:The Revolution Under Fire*, London: Zed Books.

Hanlon, Joseph, (1986), *Beggar Your Neighbours. Apartheid Power in Southern Africa*, London: Catholic Institute for International Relations in association with James Currey.

Hanlon, Joseph (1991), *Mozambique. Who Calls the Shots?*, London: James Currey.

Harries, Patrick (1981), "The Anthropologist as Historian and Liberal", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol.8, no.1, pp.37-50.

Harrigan, Jane and Paul Mosley (1992), "Evaluating the Impact of World Bank Structural Adjustment Lending: 1980-1987", in Lodewijk Berlage and Olav Stokke (eds), *Evaluating Development Assistance: Approaches and Methods*, London: Frank Cass, pp.147-180.

Harris, Laurence (1980), "Agricultural Co-operatives and Development Policy in Mozambique", *Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol.7, No.3, pp.338-352.

Harris, Marvin (1966), "Race, Conflict and Reform in Mozambique", in Stanley Diamond and Fred G. Burke, eds, *The Transformation of East Africa: Studies in Political Anthropology*, New York: Basic Books Inc, pp. 157-183.

Harrison, David (1988), *The Sociology of Modernization and Development*, London: Routledge.

Harriss, Barbara (1979), "Going Against the Grain", *Development and Change*, Vol. 10, No.3, pp.363-384.

Harvey, Charles, ed (1988), *Agricultural Pricing Policy in Africa: Four Country Case Studies*, London: Macmillan.

Harvey, Charles (1991), "Recovery from Macro-economic Disaster in Sub-Saharan Africa", in Christopher Colclough and James Manor, eds, *States or Markets?*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp.121-147.

Harvey, David (1990), *The Condition of Postmodernity: An enquiry into the origins of cultural change*, Oxford: Blackwell.

Hastings, Adrian (1974), *Wiriyamu*, London: Search Press.

Hastings, Adrian (1974), "Some Reflections Upon the War in Mozambique", *African Affairs*, Vol.73, No.292, pp.263-276.

Hayter, Teresa, and Catherine Watson (1985), *Aid: rhetoric and reality*, London: Pluto Press.

Hawthorn, Geoffrey (1991), "'Waiting for a Text': Comparing Third World Politics", in James Manor, ed, *Rethinking Third World Politics*, London: Longman.

Head, Judith (1992), "Paying the Piper", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol.18, No.2.

Healey, John and Mark Robinson (1992), *Democracy, Governance and Economic Policy: Sub-Saharan Africa in Comparative Perspective*, London: Overseas Development Institute.

Hedges, David (1989), "Notes on Malawi-Mozambique Relations, 1961-1987", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol.15, No.4, pp.617-644.

Hedges, David (coordinator) (1993), *História de Moçambique, volume 3: Moçambique no Auge do Colonialismo, 1930-1961*, Maputo: Departamento de História, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane.

Henriksen, Thomas H. (1983), *Revolution and Counterrevolution. Mozambique's war of Independence 1964-1974*, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.

Henriksen, Thomas H. (1978), *Mozambique: A History*, London: Rex Collings Ltd.

Herbst, Jeffrey (1990), "The Structural Adjustment of Politics in Africa", *World Development*, Vol.18, No.7, pp.949-958.

Herbst, Jeffrey (1993), "The Politics of Sustained Agricultural Reform in Africa", in Thomas Callaghy and John Ravenhill, eds, *Hemmed In: responses to Africa's economic decline*, New York: Columbia University Press, pp.332-356.

Hermele, Kenneth (1988a), *Land Struggles and Social Differentiation in Southern Mozambique*, Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of International Affairs, Research Report No. 82.

Hermele, Kenneth (1988b), "Guerra e Estabilização. Uma Análise a Médio Prazo do Programa de Recuperação Económica de Moçambique", *Revista Internacional de Estudos Africanos* (Lisbon), No.8-9, pp.247-293.

Hermele, Kenneth (1990), *Mozambican Crossroads. Economics and Politics in the Era of Structural Adjustment*, Bergen, Norway: Christian Michelsen Institute.

Heyer, Judith, Pepe Roberts and Gavin Williams, eds, (1981), *Rural Development in Tropical Africa*, London: Macmillan.

Hill, Polly (1986), *Development Economics on Trial. The Anthropological Case for a Prosecution*, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.

Hirsch, Robert (1990), "Ajustement Structurel et Politiques Alimentaires en Afrique Subsaharienne", *Politique Africaine*, no.37, pp.17-31.

Hobsbawm, E. and T.O. Ranger, eds, (1983), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hodges, Tony (1979), "Mozambique: The Politics of Liberation", in Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara, eds, *Southern Africa: the Continuing Crisis*, London: The Macmillan Press, pp.57-92.

Hoile, David (1989), *Mozambique, A Nation in Crisis*, London: The Claridge Press.

Hoile, David (1994), *Mozambique, resistance and freedom. A case for reassessment*, London: The Mozambique Institute.

Honwana, Raúl Bernardo (1989), *Memórias*, Lisbon: Edições Asa.

Howe, Herbert and Marina Ottaway (1987), "State Power Consolidation in Mozambique", in Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild, eds, *Afro-Marxist Regimes: Ideology and Public Policy*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, pp.43-65.

Hume, Cameron (1994), *Ending Mozambique's War: the Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Hyden, Goran (1983), *No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in Perspective*, London: Heinemann.

Hyden, Goran and Michael Bratton, eds, (1992), *Governance and Politics in Africa*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Isaacman, Allen with Barbara Isaacman (1979), *A Tradição de Resistência em Moçambique. O Vale do Zambeze, 1850-1921*. Porto: Edições Afrontamento.

Isaacman, Allen, Michael Stephen, Yussuf Adam, Maria João Homem, Eugénio Macamo and Augustine Pililao, (1980), "Cotton is the Mother of Poverty - Peasant Resistance to Forced Cotton Production in Mozambique, 1938-1961", *International Journal of African Historical Studies,* Vol.13, No.4.

Isaacman, Allen and Barbara Isaacman (1983), *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900-1982*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

Isaacman, Allen (1987), "Chissano's Friends and Enemies", *Africa Report* (US), no.34, pp.48-51.

Isaacman, Allen (1987), "Régulos, Diferenciação Social e Protesto Rural: O Regime do Cultivo Forçado do Algodão em Moçambique, 1938-1961", *Revista Internacional de Estudos Africanos* (Lisbon), No.6-7, pp.37-82.

Isaacman, Allen and Barbara Isaacman (1991), "Os Prazeiros como Trans-Raianos: Um Estudo Sobre Transformação Social e Cultural", *Arquivo*, Boletim Semestral do Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique, No.10: Maputo, pp.5-48.

Jacquemot, Pierre (1991), "La Planification a-t-elle un avenir en Afrique au sud du Sahara?", *Afrique Contemporaine*, no.160, pp.39-54.

Jaycox, Edward V.K. (1993), "Africa: From Stagnation to Recovery", Washington DC: World Bank.

Jenkins, Paul (1990), "Mozambique", in Kosta Mathéy, ed, *Housing Policies in the Socialist Third World*, London: Mansell Publishing Limited, pp.147-179.

Johnston, Anton (1990), "The Mozambican State and Education", in Martin Carnoy and Joel Samoff, eds, *Education and Social Transitions in the Third World*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp.275-314.

José, Alexandrino and Paula Maria G. Meneses, eds. (1991), *Moçambique - 16 Anos de Historiografia: Focos, Problemas, Metodologias, Desafios Para a Década de 90*, Maputo: Colecção Painel Moçambicano.

Keller, Edmond J. and Donald Rothchild, eds, (1987), *Afro-Marxist Regimes: Ideology and Public Policy*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.

Killick, Tony (1989), *A Reaction Too Far: Economic theory and the role of the state in developing countries*, London: Overseas Development Institute.

Killick, Tony, Moazzam Malik and Marcus Manuel, (1991), "What Can We Know About the Effects of IMF Programmes?", Overseas Development Institute: Working Paper 47.

Körner, Peter, Gero Maass, Thomas Siebold and Rainer Tetzlaff (1986) [original German edition 1984], *The IMF and the Debt Crisis: a guide to the Third World's dilemma*, London: Zed Books.

Krueger, Anne O. (1992), *The Political Economy of Agricultural Pricing Policy. Vol. 5: A Synthesis of the Political Economy in Developing Countries*, A World Bank Comparative Study, London and Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press for the World Bank.

Krueger, Anne O. (1993), *Economic Policies at Cross-Purposes. The United States and Developing Countries*, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution.

Kruks, Sonia and Ben Wisner (1984), "The State, the Party and the Female Peasantry in Mozambique", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol.11, No.1, pp.106-127.

Kruks, Sonia (1987), "From Nationalism to Marxism: The Ideological History of Frelimo, 1962-1977", in Irving Leonard Markovitz, *Studies in Power and Class in Africa*, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.237-256.

Kyle, Steven (1994), "Structural Adjustment in a Country at War: The Case of Mozambique", in David E. Sahn, ed, *Adjusting to Policy Failure in African Economies*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, pp.234-259.

Laïdi, Zaki, ed (1988), *The Third World and the Soviet Union*, London: Zed Books.

Legrand, Jean-Claude (1993), "Logique de Guerre et Dynamique de la Violence en Zambézia, 1976-1991", *Politique Africaine*, no.50, pp.88-104.

Legum, Colin (1985), "The Continuing Crisis in Southern Africa: Pax Praetoriana or Pax Africana?", *Africa Contemporary Record, Vol.16, 1983-1984*, New York and London: Africana Publishing Company, pp.A3-A60.

Lemos, Manuel Jorge C. de (1992), "O Fundo do Algodão (1952-1961)", *Arquivo* (Maputo), No.11, pp.67-81.

Littlejohn, Gary (1988), "Central Planning and Market Relations in Socialist Societies", *Journal of Development Studies*, Vol.24, No.4: 75-101.

Loxley, John (1988), "Economic Reform in Mozambique: Strategic Defeat or Tactical Retreat?", *Southern Africa Report* (Toronto), October 1988, pp.3-5.

Loxley, John (1990), "Structural Adjustment in Africa: Reflections on Ghana and Zambia", *Review of African Political Economy*, No.47.

MacGaffey, Janet (1987), *Entrepreneurs and Parasites: the struggle for indigenous capitalism in Zaire*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

MacGaffey, Janet, ed, (1991), *The Real Economy of Zaire: the contribution of smuggling and other unofficial activities to national wealth*, London: James Currey.

Machel, Samora (1975). "Independence Day Speech", *Review of African Political Economy*, no.4.

Machel, Samora (1981), *Mozambique: Sowing the Seeds of Revolution*, Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House.

Mackintosh, Maureen (1986), "Economic Policy Context and Adjustment Options in Mozambique", *Development and Change*, Vol.17, No.3: 557-581.

Mackintosh, Maureen (1987), "Agricultural Marketing and Socialist Accumulation: A Case Study of Maize Marketing in Mozambique", *Journal of Peasant Studies*, Vol.14, No.2: 243-267.

Mackintosh, Maureen (1988), "Mozambique" in Charles Harvey, ed, *Agricultural Pricing Policy in Africa: Four Country Case Studies*, London: Macmillan, pp.10-65.

Mackintosh, Maureen and Marc Wuyts, (1987) *Accumulation, Social Services and Socialist Transition in the Third World: Reflections on decentralised planning based on the Mozambican experience*, Development Policy and Practice Working Paper No.9, Milton Keynes: The Open University.

Manor, James, ed, (1991), *Rethinking Third World Politics*, London: Longman.

Marleyn, Oscar, David Wield and Richard Williams (1982), "Notes on the Political and Organisational Offensive in Mozambique and its Relationship to Agricultural Policy", *Review of African Political Economy*, No.24, pp.114-120.

Marsh, Jan (1982), "Views of Nampula", *People's Power*, No.20, London: MAGIC, pp.8-15.

Marsh, Jan and Barry Munslow (1983), "Beware the Trojan Horse", *People's Power*, No.22, London: MAGIC, pp.3-16.

Marshall, Judith (1985), Making Education Revolutionary", in John S. Saul, ed, *A Difficult Road: The Transition to Socialism in Mozambique*, pp. 155-210.

Marshall, Judith (1989). "On the Ropes: Socialism and Frelimo's Fifth Congress". *Southern Africa Report*. (Toronto), November 1989. pp.4-9.

Marshall, Judith (1990), "Structural Adjustment and Social Policy in Mozambique", *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 47, pp.28-43.

Marshall, Judith (1992), *War, Debt and Structural Adjustment in Mozambique: the social impact*, Ottawa: The North-South Institute.

Marshall, Judith and Otto Roesch, (June 1993), "The 'Green Zones' Agricultural Cooperatives of Nampula City: A New Phase in the Mozambican Cooperative Movement?", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol.19, No.2, pp.240-272.

Martins, Margarida (1994), "Presentation to the National Seminar on Land in Mozambique organized by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Land Tenure Centre", paper presented to the Second National Land Conference, Maputo, 25-27 May 1994.

Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels (1969), *Selected Works in Three Volumes: Volume One*, Moscow: Progress Publishers.

Mazive, José Julai (1989), *Legislação Económica. Compilação de Legislação com Notas Remissivas*, Maputo.

Meier, Gerald M. and Dudley Seers, eds, (1984), *Pioneers in Development*, published for the World Bank, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Meier, Gerald M., ed, (1987), *Pioneers in Development. Second Series*, published for the World Bank, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Meier, Gerald M. ed, (1991), *Politics and Policy Making in Developing Countries*, San Francisco: International Center for Economic Growth.

Meillassoux, Claude and Christine Verschuur (1985), "Les Paysans Ignorés du Mozambique", *Le Monde Diplomatique*, October 1985.

Mendes, João (1994), *A Nossa Situação, O Nosso Futuro e o Multipartidarismo*, (with Ivo Garrido, Malangatana, Hilário Matusse, António Sopa. Jamisse Taimo and Leite de Vasconcelos), Maputo: author's edition.

Mendes, Maria Clara (1989), "Les Répercussions de l'Indépendance sur la Ville de Maputo", in Michel Cahen (ed), *"Vilas" et "Cidades": Bourgs et Villes en Afrique Lusophone*, Paris: L'Harmattan, pp.283-296.

Mersha, Gebru (no date, circa 1993), *State Farms and State-Centred Accumulation Strategies in Socialist Africa. The Rationale and a Critique*, thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Development Studies of the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, The Netherlands.

Metz, Steven (1986), "The Mozambique National Resistance and South African Foreign Policy", *African Affairs*, Vol.85, No.341, pp.491-507.

Meyns, Peter (1981), "Liberation Ideology and National Development Strategy in Mozambique", *Review of African Political Economy*, No.22, pp.42-64.

Minter, William (1989), *The Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) as Described by Ex-participants*, Ford Foundation and Swedish International Development Agency.

Minter, William (1994), *Apartheid's Contras: an inquiry into the roots of war in Angola and Mozambique*, London: Zed Books.

Mittelman, James H. (1988), *Out From Underdevelopment: Prospects for the Third World*, London: Macmillan.

Mittelman, James H. (1991), "Marginalization and the International Division of Labour: Mozambique's Strategy of Opening the Market", *African Studies Review* (US), Vol.34, No.4, pp.89-106.

Moiane, Eugénio (1994), "Consuetudinary and Statutory Land Law and Administration in Mozambique", paper presented to the Second National Land Conference, Maputo, 25-27 May 1994.

Mondlane, Eduardo (1962), "Mozambican Contract Labour in South Africa", in Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds, *The African Liberation Reader, Volume 1*, pp.188-192.

Mondlane, Eduardo (1964), "Development of Nationalism in Mocambique", in Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds, *The African Liberation Reader, Volume 2*, pp.15-20.

Mondlane, Eduardo (1967), "Participation of Students in the Struggle for National Liberation", in Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds, *The African Liberation Reader, Volume 1*, pp.107-114.

Mondlane, Eduardo (1968a), "How Mozambique is Being Liberated", *Cambridge Opinion*, No.52: pp.16-18.

Mondlane, Eduardo (1968b), "The Evolution of Frelimo", in Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds. *The African Liberation Reader, Volume 2*, pp.121-122.

Mondlane, Eduardo (1969), "The Tribal Question in the Advanced Stage of the Struggle", in Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds, *The African Liberation Reader, Volume 2*, pp.119-121.

Mondlane, Eduardo (1983), *The Struggle for Mozambique*, (original edition: 1969), London: Zed Press.

Monteiro, José Óscar (1968), "Mozambique in the Framework of Southern Africa", in Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds. *The African Liberation Reader, Volume 3*, pp.42-46.

Monteiro, José Óscar (1989), *Power and Democracy*, Maputo: People's Assembly.

Moore, Jr, Barrington (1966), *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*, Boston: Beacon Press.

Moore, David (1994), "Back to Africa", *Southern African Review of Books*, Issue 32, July/August 1994.

Morgan, Glenda (1990), "Violence in Mozambique: Towards an Understanding of Renamo", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.28, No.4, pp.603-619.

Morrison, J. Stephen (1987), "The Battle for Mozambique", *Africa Report* (US), no.34, pp.44-47.

Mosca, João (1992), "O Papel do Estado no Pós-Guerra e num Contexto de Ajustamento Estrutural", *Estudos Moçambicanos* (Maputo), No.11/12, pp.51-63.

Mosca, João and Felisa Ceña Delgado (1994), "Alguns Aspectos Sobre o Efeito do PRE na Agricultura", *Estudos Moçambicanos* (Maputo), No.13, pp.53-72.

Mosley, Paul, Jane Harrigan and John Toye (1991), *Aid and Power. The World Bank and Policy-based Lending. Volume 1*, London: Routledge.

Mosley, Paul (1992), "Policy-making without facts: a note on the assessment of structural adjustment policies in Nigeria, 1985-90", *African Affairs*, vol.91, no.363, pp.227-240.

Mozambique, Angola and Guine Information Centre (1977), "How the Enemy Acts - translation of a booklet issued by the Council of Ministers for mass study", *People's Power*, No.9, London: MAGIC, pp.24-35.

Mozambique, Angola and Guine Information Centre (1977), "Workers' Control in Mozambique", *People's Power*, No.10, London: MAGIC, pp.21-29.

Mozambique, Angola and Guine Information Centre (1978), "Mozambique: Youth Organisation Formed", *People's Power*, No.11, London: MAGIC, pp.19-21.

Mozambique, Angola and Guine Information Centre (1978), "Structures of Power in Mozambique", *People's Power*, No.11, London: MAGIC, pp.22-28.

Mozambique, Angola and Guine Information Centre (1978), "Building a Marxist-Leninist Party", *People's Power*, No.12, London: MAGIC, pp.41-45.

Mozambique, Angola and Guine Information Centre (1978), "Sena Sugar, A Case of Economic Sabotage in Mozambique", *People's Power*, No.12, London: MAGIC, pp.46-50.

Mozambique, Angola and Guine Information Centre (1979), "A Case of Economic Sabotage - How the Portuguese State Tried to Swindle Mozambique", *People's Power*, No.14, London: MAGIC, pp.32-38.

Mozambique, Angola and Guine Information Centre (1982), "Vanguard Workers: The Party in Mozambique", *People's Power*, No.19, London: MAGIC, pp.15-22.

Mozambique, Angola and Guine Information Centre (1982), "No Army is Neutral: Political Education in Mozambique's Armed Forces", No.19, London: MAGIC, pp.24-26.

Munslow, Barry (1983), *Mozambique: the Revolution and its Origins*, London: Longman.

Munslow, Barry (1984), "State Intervention in Agriculture: The Mozambican Experience", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.22, No.2, pp.199-221.

Munslow, Barry, ed, (1985), *Samora Machel: An African Revolutionary*, London: Zed Books.

Munslow, Barry, ed, (1986), *Africa: Problems in the Transition to Socialism*, London: Zed Books.

Munslow, Barry and Phil O'Keefe (1984), "Rethinking the Revolution in Mozambique", *Race & Class*, Vol.XXVI, No.2, pp.15-31.

Museveni, Yoweri T. (1971), "Fanon's Theory on Violence: Its Verification in Liberated Mozambique", in Nathan M. Shamuyarira, ed, *Essays on the Liberation of Southern Africa*, Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, pp.1-24.

Myers, Gregory W (1994), "Land in Mozambique: Is There Enough for Everyone?", paper presented to the Second National Land Conference, Maputo, 25-27 May 1994.

Myers, Gregory W (1994), "Competitive Rights, Competitive Claims: Land Access in Post-war Mozambique", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol.20, No.4, pp.603-632.

Neil-Tomlinson, Barry (1977), "The Nyassa Chartered Company: 1891-1929", *Journal of African History*, Vol.18, No.1. pp.109-128.

Nelson, Joan M. (1990), *Economic Crisis and Policy Choice. The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World*, Princeton University Press.

Newitt, Malyn (1981), *Portugal in Africa: The Last One Hundred Years*, London: C. Hurst & Company.

Newitt, Malyn (1995), *A History of Mozambique*, London: Hurst & Company.

Nilsson, Anders (1993a), "From Pseudo-terrorists to Pseudo-guerrillas: the MNR in Mozambique (Part 1)", *Review of African Political Economy*, No.57, pp.60-71.

Nilsson, Anders (1993b), "From Pseudo-terrorists to Pseudo-guerrillas: the MNR in Mozambique (Part 2)", *Review of African Political Economy*, No.58, pp.34-42.

Nkrumah, Kwame (1973), *Revolutionary Path*, London: Panaf Books.

North, Douglass (1986), "The New Institutional Economics", *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 142, 230-237.

Nove, Alec (1992), *An Economic History of the USSR, 1917-1991*, London: Penguin Books (third edition).

Nyerere, Julius (1968), *Freedom and Socialism, Uhuru na Ujamaa. A Selection from Writings and Speeches, 1965-1967*, Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press.

O'Laughlin, Bridget (1992a), "Interpretations Matter: Evaluating the War in Mozambique", *Southern Africa Report* (Toronto), January 1992, pp.23-33.

O'Laughlin, Bridget (1992b), "Mozambique: What is to be Done?", *Southern Africa Report* (Toronto), March 1992, pp.32-33.

O'Laughlin, Bridget (1992c), "A Base Social da Guerra em Moçambique", *Estudos Moçambicanos* (Maputo), No.10, pp.107-142.

O'Laughlin, Bridget (1995), "Past and Present Options: Land Reform in Mozambique", *Review of African Political Economy*, No.63, pp.99-106.

Ollivier, Claire (1988), "Le Colosse Paralysé", *Politique Africaine*, no.29, pp.51-57.

Ong, Bie Nio (1986), "Women and the Transition to Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa", in Barry Munslow, ed, *Africa: Problems in the Transition to Socialism*, London: Zed Books, pp.72-94.

Onimode, Bade (1992), *A Future for Africa: beyond the politics of adjustment*, Earthscan Publications in association with the Institute for African Alternatives.

Opello Jr., Walter C. (1975), "Pluralism and Elite Conflict in an Independence Movement: FRELIMO in the 1960s", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol.2, No.1, pp.66-82.

Organização da Mulher Moçambicana (OMM) (1976), "Resolutions of the Second Conference", reprinted in *People's Power*, No.5, London: MAGIC, pp.5-26.

Ottaway, David and Marina Ottaway, (1981), *Afrocommunism*, London: Holmes and Meier.

Ottaway, Marina (1980), "The Theory and Practice of Marxism-Leninism in Mozambique and Ethiopia", in David E. Albright, ed, *Africa and International Communism*, London: Macmillan, pp.118-144.

Ottaway, Marina (1988) "Mozambique: From Symbolic Socialism to Symbolic Reform", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.26, No.2, pp.211-226.

Oxfam (1992), "Oxfam Mozambique 1992-95 Strategic Plan", ms.

Palmer, Robin (1992), "Thoughts on Mozambique", ms.

Parfitt, Trevor W. (1993), "Which African Agenda for the Nineties? The ECA/World Bank Alternatives", *Journal of International Development*, Vol.5, pp.93-106.

Patel, Hasu H. (1993), "Zimbabwe's Mediation in Mozambique and Angola, 1989-91", in Chan and Jabri, eds, *Mediation in Southern Africa*, London: The Macmillan Press, pp.117-141.

Payer, Cheryl (1982), *The World Bank. A Critical Analysis*, New York: Monthly Review Press.

Pélissier, René (1979), *Le Naufrage des Caravelles. Etudes sur la Fin de l'Empire Portugais (1961-1975)*, Orgeval, France: Editions Pélissier.

Penvenne, Jeanne (1993), *Trabalhadores de Lourenço Marques (1870-1974): antologia de artigos*, Maputo: Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique.

Pickett, James, (1989), "Reflections on the Market and the State in Sub-Saharan Africa", *African Development Review*, Vol.1, No.1, pp.58-86.

Pinsky, Barry (1985), "Territorial Dilemmas: Changing Urban Life", in John S. Saul, ed, *A Difficult Road: the Transition to Socialism in Mozambique*, pp.279-315.

Pitcher. M.Anne (1993), *Politics in the Portuguese Empire: the State, Industry and Cotton, 1926-1974*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Plank, David N. (1993), "Aid, Debt, and the End of Sovereignty: Mozambique and its Donors", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.31, No.3: 407-430.

Powell, Mike (1992), "Review of 'Who Calls the Shots?' by Joe Hanlon", *Review of African Political Economy*, no.53, pp.117-119.

Raikes, Philip (1984), "Food Policy and Production in Mozambique Since Independence", *Review of African Political Economy*, no.29, pp.95-107.

Ratilal, Prakash (1989), *Enfrentar o Desafio. Utilizar a ajuda para terminar com a emergência*, Maputo: Globo.

Reis, Maria do Céu (1992), "A Sociedade Civil como Objecto de Pesquisa Sociológica", *Estudos Moçambicanos*. (Maputo). No.11/12. pp.29-48.

Richman, Naomi (1977), "Mozambique: Politics at the Base", *People's Power*, No.9. London: MAGIC, pp.21-24.

Riddell, J. Barry (1992), "Things Fall Apart Again: structural adjustment programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.30, No.1, pp.53-68.

Rimmer, Douglas (1973), *Macromancy. The Ideology of Development Economics*, London: Institute of Economic Affairs.

Rimmer, Douglas (1989), "Growth Versus Transformation Revisited", *African Affairs* No.354, pp.119-124.

Roberts, Pepe (1981), "'Rural Development' and the Rural Economy in Niger, 1900-1975", in Judith Heyer, Pepe Roberts and Gavin Williams, eds, *Rural Development in Tropical Africa*, London: Macmillan, pp.193-221.

Roberts, Pepe (1983), "Feminism in Africa; Feminism and Africa", *Review of African Political Economy*, No.27/28, pp.175-184.

Robinson, Mark (1993), "Will Political Conditionality Work?", *IDS Bulletin*, Vol.24, No.1, pp.58-65.

Roesch, Otto (1984), "Peasants and Collective Agriculture in Mozambique", in Jonathon Barker, ed, *The Politics of Agriculture in Tropical Africa*, London: SAGE Publications.

Roesch, Otto (1986), "Mozambique's Agricultural Crisis: A Second Look", *Southern Africa Report* (Toronto), December, pp.18-20.

Roesch, Otto (1988a), "Rural Mozambique Since the Frelimo Party Fourth Congress: The Situation in the Baixo Limpopo", *Review of African Political Economy*, No.41, pp.73-91.

Roesch, Otto (1988b), "Economic Reform in Mozambique: Classes in Formation?", *Southern Africa Report* (Toronto) October, pp.6-10.

Roesch, Otto (1989), "Nampula: What's Left?", *Southern Africa Report* (Toronto), November.

Roesch, Otto (1992a), "Renamo and the Peasantry in Southern Mozambique: A view from Gaza Province", *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, vol.26 no.3, pp.462-484.

Roesch, Otto (1992b), "Reforma Económica em Moçambique: Notas Sobre a Estabilização, a Guerra e a Formação das Classes", *Arquivo* (Maputo), No.11, pp.5-35.

Roesch, Otto (1992c), "Mozambique Unravels? The Return to Tradition", *Southern Africa Report* (Toronto), May, pp.27-29.

Roesch, Otto (1992d), "A Paradigm Shift? Rethinking Renamo's War", ms.

Rogers, Everett M. (1962), *Diffusion of Innovations*, New York: Macmillan.

Rosas, Fernando (1994), *História de Portugal (Direcção de José Mattoso). Volume 7: O Estado Novo (1926-1974)*, Lisbon: Editorial Estampa.

Rowley, Charles K. and Gordon Tullock (1988), "Introduction", in Charles K. Rowley, Robert D. Tollison and Gordon Tullock, eds, *The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking*, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Sachs, Albie and Gita Honwana Welch (1990), *Liberating the Law: creating popular justice in Mozambique*, London: Zed Books.

Sahn, David E. and Alexander Sarris (1994), "The Evolution of States, Markets and Civil Institutions in Rural Africa", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 32, No.2: 279-303.

Samudavanija, Chai-Anan (1991), "The Three-Dimensional State", in J. Manor, ed, *Rethinking Third World Politics*, London: Longman.

Sandbrook, Richard (1990), "Taming the African Leviathan", *World Policy Journal* vol.7, no.4, pp.673-701.

Sandbrook, Richard (1991), "Economic Crisis, Structural Adjustment and the State in Sub-Saharan Africa", in Dharam Ghai, ed, *The IMF and the South*, London: Zed Books, pp.95-114.

Sandbrook, Richard (1993), *The Politics of Africa's Economic Recovery*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Santos, Marcelino dos (1973), "Frelimo Faces the Future", *African Communist*, No.55, pp.23-53.

Santos, Marcelino dos (1970), "A Bourgeoisie?", in Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds, *The African Liberation Reader, Volume 1*, pp.72-73.

Sato, Makoto (1994), "Japanese Strategy in Africa: the Case of Mozambique", *Review of African Political Economy*, No.53: 105-110.

Saul, John S. (1973), "Frelimo and the Mozambique Revolution", *Monthly Review*, Vol.24, pp.22-52; also published in Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul, *Essays in the Political Economy of Africa*, New York: Monthly Review Press, pp.378-405.

Saul, John S. (1979), *The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa*, London.

Saul, John S., ed. (1985a), *A Difficult Road: The Transition to Socialism in Mozambique*, New York: Monthly Review Press.

Saul, John S. (1985b), "Ideology in Africa: Decomposition and Recomposition", in Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara, eds, *African Independence: The First Twenty-Five Years*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp.301-329.

Saul, John S. (1987), "Development and Counterdevelopment Strategies in Mozambique", in Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild (eds), *Afro-Marxist Regimes: Ideology and Public Policy*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp. 109-153.

Saul, John S. (1990), "Mozambique: The Failure of Socialism?", *Southern Africa Report* (Toronto), November, pp.20-24.

Saul, John S. (1993), "Rethinking the Frelimo State", in Ralph Miliband and Leo Panitch, eds, *The Socialist Register 1993*, London: The Merlin Press, pp.139-165.

Saul, John S. (1994), "Liberation Without Democracy? Rethinking the Experiences of the Southern African Liberation Movements", paper presented to the History Workshop Conference on 'Democracy: Popular Precedents, Popular Practice and Popular Culture' at the University of the Witwatersrand, 13-15 July 1994.

Schutz, Barry (1995), "The Heritage of Revolution and the Struggle for Governmental Legitimacy in Mozambique", in I. William Zartman, *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, pp.109-124.

Scott, Catherine V. (1988), "Socialism and the 'Soft State' in Africa: an Analysis of Angola and Mozambique", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.26, no.1, pp.23-36.

Segall, Malcolm (1978), "The Communal Villages of Gaza", *People's Power*, No.11, London: MAGIC, pp.12-18.

Serapião, Luis B. and Mohamed El-Khawas (1979), *Mozambique in the Twentieth Century: From Colonialism to Independence*, Washington D.C.: University Press of America.

Serra, Carlos (coordinator) (1988), *História de Moçambique, volume 1: Primeiras sociedades sedentárias e impacto dos mercadores (200 300 - 1886)*, Maputo: Tempo.

Shaw, Timothy (1993), *Reformism and Revisionism in Africa's Political Economy in the 1990s: the dialectics of adjustment*, London: Macmillan.

Shore, Herbert (1983), "Resistance and Revolution in the Life of Eduardo Mondlane", in Eduardo Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique*, London: Zed Press, pp.xiii-xxxi.

Sidaway, James (1992), "Mozambique: destabilization, state, society and space", *Political Geography Quarterly*, vol.11, no.3, pp.239-258.

Sidaway, James (1993), "Urban and Regional Planning in Post-Independence Mozambique", *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, vol.17, no.2, pp.241-259.

Sidaway, James and David Simon, (1993), "Geopolitical Transition and State Formation: the changing political geographies of Angola, Mozambique and Namibia", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol.19, no.1, pp.6-28.

Sidaway, James (1993), "Society, Space and Uneven Development in Mozambique: from colonialism to neo-colonialism?", ms.

Sidaway, James and Marcus Power (1995), "Socio-spatial transformation in the 'post-socialist' periphery: the case of Maputo, Mozambique", forthcoming in *Environment and Planning: International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*.

Simango, Urias (1966), "Mozambique, My Country", *African Communist*, No.25, pp.51-57.

Simango, Urias (1968), "The Liberation Struggle in Mozambique", *African Communist*, No.32, pp.48-61.

Simango, Urias (1969), "Gloomy Situation Inside Frelimo", in Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds, *The African Liberation Reader, Volume 2*, pp.125-127.

Simon, Roger (1991), *Gramsci's Political Thought: an introduction*, London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Simpson, Clare (1978), "Life in a Frelimo school", *People's Power*, No.12, London: MAGIC, pp.34-40.

Simpson, M.S.C. (1989), *The Soviet Union and Afro-Marxist Regimes: the path to the treaties of friendship and cooperation*, University of London: PhD Thesis.

Simpson, Mark (1992), "Political Decompression and Historical Revisionism in Mozambique", South African Institute of International Affairs (Johannesburg).

Simpson, Mark (1993), "Foreign and Domestic Factors in the Transformation of Frelimo", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol.31, no.2, pp.309-337.

Sketchley, Peter (1979), "Problems of the Transformation of Social Relations of Production in Post-Independence Mozambique", *People's Power*, no.15, London: MAGIC, pp.28-40.

Sketchley, Peter (1982), "Fishing Co-operatives on Lake Niassa: Seeds of a New Socialist Society or New Roots for an Old Exploiting Class?", *Review of African Political Economy*, no.24, pp.85-95.

Sketchley, Peter (1985), "The Struggle for New Social Relations of Production in Industry". In John S. Saul, ed, *A Difficult Road: the Transition to Socialism in Mozambique*, pp.253-278.

Skocpol, Theda (1979), *States and Social Revolutions: A comparative analysis of France, Russia and China*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Stein, Howard and E.Wayne Nafziger (1991), "Structural Adjustment, Human Needs, and the World Bank Agenda", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol.29, no.1: 173-189.

Stirrat, R.L. (1993), "Developing Africa?", *African Affairs*, vol.92, no.367, pp.294-300.

Sundet, Geir (1994), "Beyond Developmentalism in Tanzania", *Review of African Political Economy*, no.53, pp.39-49.

Susungi, N.N. (1993), "The Origins of the Debt Crisis and its Aftermath in Africa", in Douglas Rimmer (ed), *Action in Africa: Experience of People Involved in Government, Business and Aid*, London: Royal African Society in association with James Currey, pp.107-114.

Tarp, Finn (1990), "Prices in Mozambican Agriculture", *Journal of International Development*, vol.2, no.2, pp.172-208.

Taylor, John G. (1979), *From Modernization to Modes of Production: A Critique of the Sociologies of Development and Underdevelopment*, London: Macmillan.

Temu, Peter Eliezer (1984), *Marketing, Board Pricing, and Storage Policy with Particular Reference to Maize in Tanzania*, New York: Vantage Press.

Tibana, Roberto (1994a), "Structural Adjustment and the Manufacturing Industry in Mozambique: Some Problems of Transition", ms.

Tibana, Roberto (1994b), "Trade and Exchange Rate Policies in Mozambique: their impact on agriculture", paper presented at the African Economic Research Consortium, Abidjan, Ivory Coast.

Tickner, Vincent (1992), "Structural Adjustment and Agricultural Pricing in Mozambique", *Review of African Political Economy*, no.53, pp.25-42.

Tordoff, William (1993), *Government and Politics in Africa*, second edition, London: The Macmillan Press.

Torp, Jens Erik (1989), "Mozambique: economics, politics and society" in *Mozambique, São Tomé & Principe*, Marxist Regimes Series, London: Pinter Publishers, pp.1-117.

Toye, John (1989), "Can the World Bank Resolve the Crisis of Developing Countries?", *Journal of International Development*, vol.1, no.2, pp.261-272.

Toye, John (1993), *Dilemmas of Development. Reflections on the Counter-Revolution in Development Economics*, 2nd edition, Oxford: Blackwell.

Urdang, Stephanie (1983), "The Last Transition? Women and Development in Mozambique", *Review of African Political Economy*, No.27/28, pp.8-32, reprinted in John S. Saul, ed, (1985), *A Difficult Road: the Transition to Socialism in Mozambique*, pp.347-388.

Urdang, Stephanie (1989), *And Still They Dance: women, war and the struggle for change in Mozambique*, London: Earthscan.

Vail, Leroy (1976), "Mozambique's Chartered Companies: the rule of the feeble", *Journal of African History*, vol.17, no.3, pp.389-416.

Vail, Leroy and Landeg White (1980), *Capitalism and Colonialism in Mozambique. A Study of Quelimane District*, London: Heinemann.

Valente de Matos, Alexandre (1982), *Provérbios Macuas*, Lisbon: Instituto de Investigação Científica Tropical / Junta de Investigações Científicas do Ultramar.

Venâncio, Moisés (1993), "Mediation by the Roman Catholic Church in Mozambique, 1988-91", in Chan and Jabri, eds, *Mediation in Southern Africa*, London: The Macmillan Press, pp.142-158.

Vieira, Sergio and Immanuel Wallerstein, (1992), *How Fast the Wind? Southern Africa 1975-2000*, New Jersey: Africa World Press.

Vines, Alex (1991), *Renamo: Terrorism in Mozambique*, London: James Currey

Vines, Alex (1994), *'No democracy without money'. The road to peace in Mozambique (1982-1992)*, CIIR briefing paper, London: Catholic Institute for International Relations.

Von Burgsdorff, Sven Kühn (1989), "The Political Dimension of Structural Adjustment", *Development and Cooperation* (Frankfurt), no.5, pp.12-14.

Walt, Gillian and Angela Melamed, eds, (1983), *Mozambique: Towards a People's Health Service*, London: Zed Books.

Wardman, Anna (1985), "The Co-operative Movement in Chokwe, Mozambique", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol.11, no.2, pp.295-304.

White, Gordon (1993), "Towards a Political Analysis of Markets", *IDS Bulletin*, vol.24, no.3, pp.4-11.

Wield, David (1983), "Mozambique - Late Colonialism and Early Problems of Transition", in Gordon White, Robin Murray and Christine White (eds), *Revolutionary Socialist Development in the Third World*, Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf, pp.75-108.

Williams, David (1993), "Liberalism and 'Development Discourse'", *Africa*, vol.63, no.3, pp.419-429.

Williams, Gavin (1976, second edition 1985), "Taking the Part of the Peasants: Rural Development in Nigeria and Tanzania", in P. Gutkind and I. Wallerstein (eds), *The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa*, London: Sage Publications, pp.144-179.

Williams, Gavin (1978), "Imperialism and Development: A Critique", *World Development*, vol.6, no.7-8, pp.925-936.

Williams, Gavin (1980), "The Brandt Report: A Critical Introduction", in *Review of African Political Economy*, no.19, pp.77-86.

Williams, Gavin (1981), "The World Bank and the Peasant Problem", in J. Heyer, P. Roberts and G. Williams, eds, *Rural Development in Tropical Africa*, London: Macmillan Press, pp.16-51.

Williams, Gavin (1983), "The World Bank and Nigeria's 'Green Revolution'", *Review of African Political Economy*, no.27/8, pp.192-196.

Williams, Gavin (1993a), "Modernizing Malthus: the World Bank, population control and the African environment", *South African Sociological Review*, vol.4, no.2.

Williams, Gavin (1993b), "Structural Adjustment: why it is necessary and why it doesn't work", *Review of African Political Economy*, no.60, pp.214-225.

Williams, Gavin (1994), "Africa: Retrospect and Prospect", *Africa South of the Sahara 1995*, London: Europa, pp.3-9.

Williams, Richard (1980), "Mozambique's Presidential Offensive: 'We are declaring war on the enemy within'", *People's Power*, no.16, London: MAGIC, pp.30-39.

Wilson, Ken (1991), "The New Missionaries", *Southern African Review of Books*, July 1991.

Wilson, Ken (1992), "Cults of Violence and Counter-Violence in Mozambique", *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol.18, no.3, pp.527-582.

Wilson, Ken (with Jovito Nunes), (1994), "Repatriation to Mozambique: refugee initiative and agency planning in Milange district, 1988-1991", in T. Allen and H. Morsink (eds), *When Refugees Go Home*, London: James Currey, pp. 167-236.

Wolfers, Michael (1982), "New Ways of Working", *People's Power*, no.20, pp.3-8, London: MAGIC.

Wuyts, Marc (1981), "The Mechanization of Present-Day Mozambican Agriculture", *Development and Change* (London), vol.12, pp.1-27.

Wuyts, Marc (1985), "Money, Planning and Rural Transformation in Mozambique", in A. Saith, ed, *The Agrarian Question in Socialist Transitions*, London: Cass.

Wuyts, Marc (1989), *Money and Planning for Socialist Transition. The Mozambican Experience*, Aldershot: Gower.

Wuyts, Marc (1991), "Mozambique: Economic Management and Adjustment Policies", in Dharam Ghai (ed), *The IMF and the South*, London: Zed Books, pp.215-235.

Wuyts, Marc (1992), "Um Apontamento Estatístico Sobre a Tendência do Desenvolvimento Económico", *Estudos Moçambicanos* (Maputo), no.10, pp.63-74.

Wynter, Pauline (1992), "Propriedade, Mulheres Pescadoras e a Luta Pelos Direitos da Mulher em Moçambique", *Estudos Moçambicanos* (Maputo), no.10, pp.7-17.

Yañez Casal, Adolfo (1988), "A Crise de Produção Familiar e as Aldeias Comunais em Moçambique", *Revista Internacional de Estudos Africanos* (Lisbon), no.8-9, pp.157-191.

Yañez Casal, Adolfo (1991), "Legitimação Política-Ideológica da Socialização Rural em Moçambique (Frelimo, 1965-1984), *Revista Internacional de Estudos Africanos* (Lisbon), no.14-15, pp.35-76.

Young, Sherilynn (1977), "Fertility and Famine: Women's Agricultural History in Southern Mozambique", in Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons, eds, *The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa*, London: Heinemann, pp.66-81.

Young, Tom (1988), "The Politics of Development in Angola and Mozambique", *African Affairs*, vol.87 no.347, pp.165-184.

Young Tom (1990), "The MNR/Renamo: External and Internal Dynamics", *African Affairs*, vol.89, no.357, pp.491-509.

Zacarias, Agostinho, ed., (1991), *Repensando Estratégias Sobre Moçambique e África Austral*, Maputo: Instituto Superior de Relações Internacionais.

Official Documents and Reports

AGRICOM E.E. (May 1989), *Some Statistical Extracts on Agricultural Marketing from 1981 to 1988*, Maputo.

AIM (1986), *Mistakes and Deviations Persist*, a speech by President Samora Machel during the debates on the laws for the state budget and plan for 1986 in the December 1985 session of the People's Assembly. Maputo: supplement to Mozambique News no.114, January 1986.

AIM (1987), *The Economic Recovery Programme*, an extract from the presentation of the economic recovery programme made by Prime Minister Mário Machungo to the People's Assembly meeting in Maputo. 14 January 1987. Maputo: supplement to Mozambique News no.127.

Centro de Estudos Africanos (August 1989), *Mercados e Preços nas Zonas Rurais*, by Yussuf Adam and Teresa Cruz e Silva, Maputo.

CONCP (1962), "To the Nationalists of Mozambique", in Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds, *The African Liberation Reader, Volume 2*, pp.116-119.

Duarte, Fernando (1988), *Análise Retrospectiva da Comercialização Agrícola na província de Nampula 1973-1987*, Nampula: Agricom E.E.

Food and Agriculture Organization (1985), *Report of the WCARRD Follow-up Inter-Agency Mission to Mozambique*, Rome.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (November 1989), *The Mozambican National Resistance Movement (Renamo)*, Research Department Note, London.

FRELIMO (1962), "To the Portuguese People", in Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds, *The African Liberation Reader, Volume 2*, pp.76-77.

FRELIMO (1964), "To the Mozambican People", in Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds, *The African Liberation Reader, Volume 2*, pp.77-78.

FRELIMO (1968a), "On the Necessity of a Prolonged War", in Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds, *The African Liberation Reader, Volume 3*, pp.146-149.

FRELIMO (1968b), "Statutes and Programmes", mimeographed.

FRELIMO (1968c), "Resolutions of II Congress", mimeographed.

FRELIMO (1969), Communique on Urias Simango, in Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds, *The African Liberation Reader, Volume 2*, pp.127-128.

FRELIMO (1969b), "Self-Criticism", in Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds, *The African Liberation Reader, Volume 2*, pp.127-128.

FRELIMO (1970), "Change of Policy in the Vatican?", in Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds, *The African Liberation Reader, Volume 1*, pp.180-183.

FRELIMO (1971), "Poetry and the Revolution", in Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds, *The African Liberation Reader, Volume 3*, pp.179-180.

FRELIMO (1972a), "The First Steps", in Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds, *The African Liberation Reader, Volume 3*, pp.149-153.

FRELIMO (1972b), "Revolutionary Education", in Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds, *The African Liberation Reader, Volume 3*, pp.194-197.

FRELIMO (1972c), "Caetano's Reforms Sink in a Sea of Contradictions", in Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds, *The African Liberation Reader, Volume 3*, pp.32-42.

FRELIMO (1974a), *Poesia de Combate*, Lisbon: Publicações Nova Aurora.

FRELIMO (1974b), "The Coup d'Etat of April 25", in Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds, *The African Liberation Reader, Volume 1*, pp.34-37.

FRELIMO (1975), "To Produce is to Learn. To Learn Through Producing is to Struggle Better", *South African Labour Bulletin*, vol.2, no.2, pp.28-42.

FRELIMO (February 1976), "Central Committee Resolution on Communal Villages", reprinted in *People's Power*, No.5, London: MAGIC.

FRELIMO (1977a), *Estatutos da FRELIMO*, Maputo.

FRELIMO (1977b), *Programa da FRELIMO*, Maputo.

FRELIMO (1977c), *Explicação das Teses do III Congresso*, Maputo.

FRELIMO (1977d), "Economic and Social Directives", Frelimo III Congress, reprinted in *People's Power*, No.7/8, London: MAGIC.

FRELIMO (1977e), "The Party: Vanguard Force and Leading Force", Frelimo III Congress, reprinted in *People's Power*, No.7/8, London: MAGIC.

FRELIMO (1977f), *Poesia de Combate, Volume 2*, Maputo: Edição do Departamento de Trabalho Ideológico, Frelimo.

FRELIMO (June 1983), *Frelimo Party Programme and Statutes*, Maputo.

FRELIMO (1989a), *Forward to the 1990s. Draft Theses for the Frelimo Congress*, Maputo.

FRELIMO Boletim da Célula (1989b), *Quinto Congresso: Documentos*, Maputo.

FRELIMO Boletim da Célula (1989c), *Quinto Congresso: Relatório do Comité Central, (1)*, Maputo.

FRELIMO (1989d), *Frelimo's 5th Congress Documents, Statutes and Programme*, Maputo.

FRELIMO Boletim da Célula (January 1990), *Quinto Congresso: Relatório do Comité Central, (2)*, Maputo.

FRELIMO (August 1991a), *Sexto Congresso: Estatutos e Programa*, Maputo.

FRELIMO (August 1991b), *Sexto Congresso: Relatório do Comité Central*, Maputo.

Government of Mozambique (in collaboration with the staffs of the IMF and the WB) (October 1992), *Mozambique. Policy Framework Paper 1992-94*, Maputo.

Grupo de Estocolmo para Estudos de Desenvolvimento (January 1990), *A Intervenção no Mercado e as Políticas de Preços Para a Comercialização Agrícola em Moçambique*, Stockholm.

International Monetary Fund (June 3, 1985), *Mozambique - Staff Report for the 1985 Article IV Consultation*.

International Monetary Fund (June 14, 1985), *Mozambique - Recent Economic Developments*.

International Monetary Fund (October 21, 1986), *People's Republic of Mozambique - Staff Report for the 1986 Article IV Consultation*.

International Monetary Fund (November 4, 1986), *People's Republic of Mozambique - Recent Economic Developments*.

International Monetary Fund (February 25, 1988), *People's Republic of Mozambique - Request for Second Annual Agreement Under the Structural Adjustment Facility*.

International Monetary Fund (October 21, 1988), *People's Republic of Mozambique - Staff Report for the 1988 Article IV Consultation*.

International Monetary Fund (November 10, 1988), *People's Republic of Mozambique - Recent Economic Developments*.

International Monetary Fund (April 14, 1989), *People's Republic of Mozambique - Request for Increased Access Under the Structural Adjustment Facility*.

International Monetary Fund (November 6, 1989), *People's Republic of Mozambique - Staff Report for the 1989 Article IV Consultation*.

International Monetary Fund (May 4, 1990), *People's Republic of Mozambique - Request for Arrangements Under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility*.

International Monetary Fund (February 14, 1991), *Republic of Mozambique - Staff Report for the 1990 Article IV Consultation and Midterm Review of the First Annual Arrangement Under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility*.

International Monetary Fund (March 8, 1991), *Republic of Mozambique - Recent Economic Developments*.

International Monetary Fund (March 22, 1991), *Republic of Mozambique - 1990 Consultation*.

International Monetary Fund (August 19, 1991), *Republic of Mozambique - Request for Second Annual Arrangement Under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility*.

International Monetary Fund (June 1, 1992), *Republic of Mozambique - Statistical Appendix*.

International Monetary Fund (July 21, 1993), *Republic of Mozambique - Staff Report for the 1993 Article IV Consultation and Midterm Review Under the Third Annual Arrangement Under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility.*

International Monetary Fund (July 22, 1993), *Mozambique - Recent Economic Developments.*

Jacobson, Ruth (November 1994), "Dancing Towards a Better Future? Gender and the 1994 Mozambican Elections", a report prepared for the Norwegian International Cooperation Agency (NORAD).

Kappel, Rolf (August 1991), *Monitoring Adjustment and Rural Poverty in Mozambique: Results from the Swiss monitoring programme in the Province of Cabo Delgado*, a report on behalf of the Swiss Development Cooperation.

Lindberg, Ole, Erik Mortenson, Bertil Egerö (March 1984), *Agricom: Avaliação da Proposta de Apoio por 5 Anos 1985-89* [Report for MONAP], Maputo: mimeo.

MONAP (March 1983), *Agricom Transport Study*, Maputo: mimeo.

Nordic Project for Support to AGRICOM, Semi-annual Report, 1st Semester 1989.

Nsubuga, Robert Alec (September 1988), *Agricultural Marketing Policy Adjustment in Africa - a Case Study of Mozambique*, submitted to Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

Refugee Studies Programme (1995), *Workshop Report on Demobilization and Re-integration in Mozambique*, Oxford: Queen Elizabeth House.

República Popular de Moçambique (1978), *Constituição da República Popular de Moçambique*, Maputo: Instituto Nacional do Livro e do Disco.

República Popular de Moçambique (1984), *Economic Report*, Maputo: National Planning Commission.

República Popular de Moçambique (1986), *Informação Estatística 1985*, Maputo: Comissão Nacional do Plano, Direcção Nacional de Estatística.

República Popular de Moçambique - Provincia de Nampula (1987), *Relatório da Brigada de Dinamização do Processo de Comercialização e Preparação da Campanha Agrícola 1987 88*, Nampula: mimeo.

República Popular de Moçambique (1988), *Legislação Sobre o Uso e Aproveitamento da Terra*, Maputo: Imprensa Nacional de Moçambique.

República Popular de Moçambique (1989), *Informação Estatística 1988*, Maputo: Comissão Nacional do Plano, Direcção Nacional de Estatística.

People's Republic of Mozambique (1989), *Strategy and Program for Economic Rehabilitation 1989-92*, Maputo: for the meeting of the Consultative Group for Mozambique, Paris, November 1989.

República Popular de Moçambique (1990), *Informação Estatística 1989*, Maputo: Comissão Nacional do Plano, Direcção Nacional de Estatística.

República Popular de Moçambique (June 1990), *Estudo Sobre as Condições Actuais de Produção e Consumo de Alimentos em Cinco Províncias. Relatório Principal, (Volume 1)*, Maputo: Comissão Nacional do Plano and Ministério do Comércio.

República de Moçambique (1990), *Constituição de Moçambique*, Amsterdam: AWEPAA.

Republic of Mozambique (October 1991), *Strategy and Program for Economic and Social Development 1992-94*, Maputo: for the meeting of the Consultative Group for Mozambique, Paris, December 1991.

Republic of Mozambique (October 1992), *Policy Framework Paper 1992-1994*, (prepared in collaboration with the staffs of the IMF and the World Bank), Maputo.

República de Moçambique (1992), *Anuário Estatístico 1991*, Maputo: Comissão Nacional do Plano, Direcção Nacional de Estatística.

República de Moçambique (1992), *Acordo Geral de Paz de Moçambique*, Amsterdam: AWEPAA.

República de Moçambique (February 18, 1994), *Bulanço Final da Campanha de Comercialização de Cereais e Oleuginosas 1993*, Nampula: Ministério do Comércio, Direcção Provincial de Nampula.

Sharpley, Jennifer (November 1991), *Macroeconomic Evaluation of Sweden's Import Support to Mozambique*, Oxford: Food Studies Group.

SIDA (February 1989), *Terms of Reference for Comprehensive Study of Market Intervention and Price Policies for Agricultural Products Under Agricom's Responsibility*, by K Pehrsson and T Thomsen, Maputo: mimeo.

SIDA (August 1990), *Evaluation of AGRICOM E.E. - A Mozambican Agricultural Marketing Organization*, by Göran Levin, Teresa Cruz e Silva and Johan Toborn, Gothenburg: SIDA.

SIDA (October 1990), *Estratégia Alternativa de Desenvolvimento Agrário*, by J. Carrilho, M. Martins, J. Trindade, L-E Birgegard and M. Fones-Sundell, Maputo: mimeo.

SIDA (November 1990), *Joint Assessment of Possibilities for Support to Rural Traders in Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Nampula and Zambezia*, by Göran Levin, Teresa Cruz e Silva and Guillermo Cuellar, Gothenburg: SIDA.

UNAR (1968), "Rumbezia, Not Mozambique", in Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds, *The African Liberation Reader, Volume 2*, pp.174-176.

UNEMO (1968), "Mozambique Needs Elites", in Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds, *The African Liberation Reader, Volume 1*, pp.114-115.

Wilson, Ken (November 1992), *Internally Displaced, Refugees and Returnees from and in Mozambique*, Stockholm: SIDA.

World Bank (several years), *World Development Report*, Washington D.C..

World Bank, (November 1989), *The Social Dimensions of Adjustment. A policy agenda*, Washington D.C., draft.

World Bank, (1990), *Making Adjustment work for the Poor. A framework for policy reform in Africa*, Washington D.C..

World Bank (October 1990), *Mozambique: Poverty Reduction Framework Paper*, Washington D.C..

World Bank (in collaboration with staff from the IMF) (November 1990), *Mozambique: External Debt and Financing Requirements*, Washington D.C..

World Bank (August 1991), *Mozambique: Policy Framework Paper. 1991 to 1993*, Washington D.C..

World Bank (October 1991), *Mozambique Capacity Building Study*, Washington D.C..

World Bank (January 1993), *Country Strategy for Mozambique*, Washington D.C..

World Bank (in consultation with the Government of Mozambique) (December 1993), *From Emergency to Sustainable Development*, Paris.

Other Periodic Publications

Africa Confidential, London: Miramoor Publications.

Africa Contemporary Record, London: Africana Publishing Company.

Facts and Reports, Amsterdam: Holland Committee on Southern Africa.

Principal Legislação, Maputo: Ministério da Justiça.

Notícias, Maputo.

Savana, Maputo.