RACIAL INEQUALITY IN BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES: A STATISTICAL COMPARISON

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Writing in the late 1970s, comparative historian George Fredrickson observed that the study of slavery and black/white race relations forms "the most highly developed subject of comparative historical study in the United States."[1] During the 1980s, such comparisons were most likely to focus on the United States and South Africa.[2] Over the twentieth century as a whole, however, the country with which United States race relations have been most frequently compared is Brazil.[3]

The Brazil/United States comparison has a compelling logic. The two countries are the largest multiracial societies in the Americas. They share a history of plantation slavery which extends into the second half of the 1800s.[4] And over the course of the 1900s both societies have confronted the legacy of slavery in the form of deeply entrenched racial inequality.

Early comparative treatments of that inequality contrasted Brazilian "racial democracy" with American segregation, arguing that Brazilian society offered much greater opportunities than the United States for black upward mobility and advancement.[5] Following World War II, however, such comparisons began to be revised. A series of UNESCO-sponsored research projects carried out in the early 1950s, and more recent research conducted during the 1970s and 1980s, documented high levels of racial inequality in Brazil and the existence of subtle, flexible forms of racial discrimination which effectively hinder black and brown people's access to social and economic advancement.[6] Noting the changes that have taken place in both countries since 1950, some

observers have argued that American and Brazilian race relations may actually be converging and becoming more similar in character.7 While racial tensions have intensified and emerged into the open in Brazil, the overturning of state-imposed segregation and the implementation of equal opportunity and affirmative action programs in the United States have broken the back of formal, institutional racism in this country. Such programs have not eliminated discrimination from American life, however. Rather, they have driven it underground and forced it to become more subtle, unpredictable, and "Brazilian" in character.8

The comparative discussion of race relations in Brazil and the United States is thus by now reasonably well developed and has undergone substantial evolution over time. A crucial element of that discussion, however, remains missing. Any comparative examination of race relations hinges on the question of racial inequality: in what ways are blacks disadvantaged in relation to whites in each society, and in which society are those disadvantages more severe? This is in large part a statistical question, answered by data on racial differentials in employment, education, earnings, health, and so on; and indeed, evaluations and criticisms of race relations in both Brazil and the United States are often based on material of this kind, furnished by the national census or other sources. The resulting statistical indicators are readily comparable between the two countries; yet no one, to my knowledge, has ever attempted such a comparison.

This article undertakes that comparison, using statistical data to measure various forms of racial inequality in Brazil and the United States and how that inequality has changed over time. Doubtless one reason for the lack of such research until now has been the relative scarcity of racial data for Brazil. No national census was taken in that country in 1910 or 1930; the censuses of 1900, 1920, and 1970 contain no information on race; and most of the racial data from the census of 1960 were never published. Racial data are available, however, in the censuses of 1872, 1890, 1940, 1950, and 1980, and in the national household surveys of 1976, 1984, and 1987. My strategy will be to match whatever indicators are available for Brazil with similar indicators from the same year for the United States. Given the limitations of the Brazilian sources, this means that most of the comparisons presented will be drawn from the 1940-1987 period, with occasional additional data from 1872 and 1890.[9]

This comparison is based on published aggregate data. It is important to specify at the outset what these data permit us to measure, and what they do not. For the purposes of this essay, racial inequality is defined as differences between the statistical distributions of the black (or in the case of Brazil, the black and brown -- see pp. 7-9) and white populations.[10] What is the difference in each country in the percentage of black and white students completing elementary school, high school, and college? What is the difference in the percentage of black and white workers holding manual, service, and white-collar jobs?

What is the difference in black and white median incomes? Aggregate census data show these differences; but they do not permit us to measure, in any statistical sense, the causes of those differences, which consist of a complex mix of social, economic, demographic, political, and cultural factors, some documented in the census, and some not.

The tables and figures presented below therefore should not be read as comparative indicators of racial prejudice or discrimination in the two countries; they measure inequality of achievement, not inequality of opportunity. Nevertheless, the exercise of comparing how the published data have changed over time does suggest some general conclusions, presented in the essay's final section, concerning the causes of racial inequality in Brazil and the United States, and the role of discrimination in maintaining, increasing, or reducing such inequality.

Brazil and the United States: Economy and Population

Our analysis must take into account some salient structural differences between the two societies. The first is their respective levels of economic development. Throughout the 1900s the United States has been the world's largest industrial producer, and despite some signs of weakness in recent decades it remains a technologically advanced, highly developed economy. Brazil, by contrast, is a relative latecomer to industrialization and modernization. Not until the 1950s did its industrial output

surpass its agricultural output, a point which the United States reached in the 1880s.11 Since World War II Brazil has experienced impressive economic growth, which averaged 7.4 percent per year from 1950 through 1980, and which by the 1980s had made it the seventh-largest industrial economy in the capitalist world.12 But by 1980 Brazilian per capita GNP was still only one-sixth (16.9 percent) of American per capita GNP. By 1988, after seven years of economic turmoil set off by the international debt crisis of 1981, Brazilian per capita GNP was slightly lower in real terms than it had been in 1980, and was only one-eighth (12.4 percent) of its American counterpart.13

Not only is Brazil a much poorer country than the United States; it is also one in which such wealth as there is is badly maldistributed.14 The roots of that maldistribution can be traced back to Brazil's colonial-period and nineteenth-century reliance on slave-based plantation agriculture. But in recent decades wealth and income have become even more concentrated as Brazil has experienced the effects of the Kuznets curve.15 Economists and economic historians have noted a tendency for growth in less developed economies, and particularly those in the early-to-intermediate stages of industrialization, to increase income inequality; income data from 1960-1980 show this process taking place in Brazil (Figure 1). The United States, meanwhile, has experienced the benign effects of the other side of the curve: as societies attain higher levels of economic development, continued growth tends to reduce the concentration of income, as

happened in the United States between 1930 and 1950. Distribution of income was relatively stable between 1950 and 1975 and then started to become more unequal.16 But even by 1988, income was distributed much more evenly in the United States than in Brazil.

Figure 1 about here

The greater overall inequality of Brazilian society, and the worsening of that inequality since 1960, have struck particularly hard at the Afro-Brazilian population. Before examining the data on racial inequality in the two countries, however, it is important to note two important differences between the Afro-American and Afro-Brazilian racial groups. First, people of African ancestry have historically formed a much smaller proportion of the total population in the United States than in Brazil (Table 1). Whites were the overwhelming majority in the nineteenth-century United States, but were a minority in Brazil. Strong European migration between 1880 and 1930 resulted in the white population of both countries peaking, as a proportion of the total, in 1940, at which point whites comprised 90 percent of the US population, and 64 percent of Brazil's. The white representation in both countries then declined markedly between 1960 and 1980; but the rate of decline has been more rapid in Brazil, where whites now form a bare majority of the national population.17

Table 1 about here

A second difference between the two countries' nonwhite populations is that, while the North American model of race relations places the entire Afro-American population into a single "black" category, Brazilian society recognizes a division within the Afro-Brazilian population between "blacks" (_pretos_; people of predominantly African ancestry) and "browns" (_pardos_, or mulattoes; people of mixed racial ancestry). Ever since the first national census, in 1872, _pardos_ have formed the majority of Afro-Brazilians. Their representation in the Afro-Brazilian population has undergone considerable variation over time, however, declining from 1872 to 1940 and then rebounding from 1940 to 1980, by which point _pardos_ composed 39 percent of the national population, and 87 percent of the Afro-Brazilian population (Table 1, Figure 2). The distribution of blacks and browns among the Afro-American population has been precisely the opposite. Between 1850 and 1920 United States censuses distinguished between "Negroes" and "mulattoes." During that period people of pure African ancestry formed the overwhelming majority of the nonwhite population; and unlike Brazil, the mulatto population almost doubled its representation within the Afro-American population during the second half of the 1800s before declining sharply between 1910 and 1920.

Figure 2 about here

In both countries, the accuracy of population data on mulattoes is open to question. In Brazil censustakers are instructed to accept individuals' own assessments of their racial status, which has opened the door for many pretos to reclassify themselves as pardos. According to the censuses of 1940 and 1950, for example, the cohort of pardos born between 1910 and 1939 grew from 6.3 million in 1940 to 7.2 million in 1950. In the absence of significant non-white immigration into Brazil during that decade, or indeed at any point during the twentieth century, such an increase is theoretically impossible, and can only be explained by transfers from the preto to pardo racial category.19 And recent research by demographer Charles Wood indicates that more than a third (38 percent) of the individuals born between 1920 and 1939 and classified as pretos in the census of 1950 reclassified themselves as pardos in the census of 1980.20

In the United States, by contrast, the direction of inaccuracy has been the reverse: while Brazilian censuses have tended to inflate the size of the mulatto population, US censuses tended to undercount them. In the United States mulatto racial status was determined, not by the individuals being canvassed, but by the censustakers, who for the most part failed to recognize or acknowledge color gradations within the "black" racial group. The Census Bureau itself questioned the accuracy

of the figures yielded by this procedure, noting in 1918 that mulattoes might actually constitute as much as seventy-five percent of the Afro-American population, a proportion almost five times greater than that indicated in the census of 1920.21 Apparently many, and perhaps most, American mulattoes were being counted as "Negro"; and after 1920 <u>all</u> American mulattoes were counted as black, following the elimination of the mulatto racial category from the census.

These divergences in the statistical treatment of the brown and black populations in Brazil and the United States underline the central importance for comparative analysis of the mulatto racial group in the two countries. Carl Degler states the case most forcefully. "The key that unlocks the puzzle of the differences in race relations in Brazil and the United States is the mulatto escape hatch": the ability of Brazilian nonwhites to achieve upward mobility by leaving the "black" racial category and acquiring an intermediate "brown" racial status which was "neither black nor white."22 However, recent research using Brazilian income data from the 1960s, 70s, and 80s has questioned this formulation, showing that brown racial status is not "neither black nor white," but is in fact quite similar to that of blacks. <u>Pardo</u> earnings are only slightly higher than those of <u>pretos</u>, while both groups rank far below the white and "yellow" (Asian) racial groups. As one such study concludes, "the 'color line' [in Brazil] seems to be located between whites and nonwhites, and not between mulattoes and blacks, as it is

sometimes believed to be."23

The earnings and education data presented in this article tend to confirm those findings. Other indicators show significant differences between the _pardo_ and _preto_ populations, but not always in the anticipated direction. On some the _preto_ population approximates the white population more closely than do the _pardos_; and on yet others the relative relationship among _pardos_, _pretos_, and whites undergoes substantial variation over time.

In order to deal with these complexities, the remainder of this essay compares measures of black/white inequality in the United States to similar measures of brown/white and black/white inequality in Brazil. The topics examined include spatial distribution, demographic indicators, education, and employment and earnings.

Spatial Distribution

One of the major factors obstructing black upward mobility in both Brazil and the United States has been the black population's concentration in less economically dynamic geographic locales: in the former plantation zones of the American South and the Brazilian Northeast; in rural areas as opposed to cities; and within cities, in racially segregated neighborhoods. This section compares indices of black/white inequality for regional distribution, urban/rural distribution,

and residential segregation within major Brazilian and American cities.

Table 2 about here

Table 2 provides information on white and nonwhite regional distribution in Brazil and the United States and uses that information to calculate indices of dissimilarity among the various racial groups.24 Those data indicate that at the end of the nineteenth century the black and white populations of the United States were far more dissimilar in their regional distribution than the white and nonwhite populations of Brazil. The American black population was overwhelmingly concentrated in the South, and the white population in the North. In Brazil, by contrast, the *pardo* population was concentrated in the Northeast, but not nearly to the same degree as American blacks in the South; and the regional distribution of *pretos* actually approximated that of whites fairly closely.

By 1950 racial disparities in regional distribution had increased substantially in Brazil while declining in the United States. *Pardo*/white difference in Brazil was now slightly greater than black/white difference in the United States. And by 1980 racial dissimilarity in the United States had fallen to less than half the level of *pardo*/white dissimilarity in Brazil, and was at essentially the same levels as those separating *pretos* and Brazilian whites.

These data reflect very different patterns of internal migration in the two countries. Between 1890 and 1970 the United States experienced massive black migration out of the South, with most of those migrants heading north, and substantial white migration out of the North, with most of that migration heading west. The result of those migratory flows was to reduce racial imbalances in regional distribution, particularly in the North. In Brazil, by contrast, the dominant tendency has been migration out of the Northeast and into other regions, but migration in which whites apparently participated at a higher rate than browns and blacks. By 1980 the center of _pardo_ settlement was still in the Northeast, while the center of white settlement had moved southward.

Because of the enormous regional disparities in levels of economic development in Brazil, those _pardos_ who remained in the Northeast paid dearly for their decision to do so. As of 1987 they had on average less than a third of the education acquired by _pardos_ in the more economically developed Southeastern states: 1.0 year of schooling versus 3.2 in the Southeast. (Whites obtained on average 2.7 years of schooling in the Northeast, and 4.0 in the Southeast.) The median earnings of _pardo_ wage-earners in the Northeast were only half those of _pardo_ workers in the Southeast: US$ 33 per month, versus US$ 67 per month in the Southeast. (White workers in the Northeast earned on average $47 per month, versus $107 for white workers in the Southeast.)25 In the United States, by contrast, strong economic growth in the

South since World War II has come close to eliminating regional disparities in income, education, and other indicators.26 By 1988 black residents of the South received almost the same level of education as Afro-Americans in the North and West (11.3 years of schooling, versus 11.6; whites received 11.5 years of schooling in the South, 11.7 in the North and West) and earned median incomes that were 84 percent of their Northern and Western counterparts.27 Thus pardos suffer much graver consequences from their continuing concentration in the Northeastern states than do Afro-Americans from their concentration in the American South.

Another obstacle to Afro-Brazilians' upward mobility is their concentration in rural areas, where incomes, educational opportunities, and material living conditions are much poorer than in the cities.28 Historical data on urban and rural residence by race are unavailable for Brazil, but figures from 1980 show that pardos lag well behind whites in their tendency to live in urban areas. As in regional distribution, pretos occupy an intermediate position between pardos and whites (Table 3).

Table 3 about here

Like Afro-Brazilians, Afro-Americans have historically been more likely than American whites to live in the countryside. Over the course of the 1900s, however, black Americans have moved to urban areas at rates higher than the white population. By 1950 blacks and whites had achieved relative parity in

urban/rural distribution, and by 1980, in a reversal of Brazilian patterns, the black population was considerably more urban than the white. This is all the more noteworthy given that the percentages of white people living in urban areas in 1980 were virtually the same in the two countries (74 percent in Brazil, 71 percent in the United States).

When Afro-Americans moved to the cities, they encountered a much more excluding and segregated urban environment than was the case in Brazil. Historical data on residential segregation in Brazilian cities are not available; but research using the census of 1980 has generated indices of dissimilarity for a number of Brazilian cities. Table 4 compares measures of segregation (as in Table 2, indices of dissimilarity) for the ten largest American metropolitan areas with the ten largest Brazilian metropolitan areas. Those data indicate that residential separation of the races does exist in Brazilian cities, but is much less pronounced than in the United States. _Pretos_ are somewhat more segregated from whites than are _pardos_, particularly in the North and Northeast (Fortaleza, Belem, Recife); and the Northeastern city of Salvador, often referred to as the capital of Afro-Brazil, emerges as the most residentially segregated of Brazilian cities. But overall residential segregation is only about half as high for Brazilian _pardos_ as for Afro-Americans, and 60 per cent as high for _pretos_.29

Table 4 about here

Demographic Indicators

Black life expectancy has consistently lagged behind white in both Brazil and the United States. As in regional distribution, however, the United States began from a position of greater inequality in the first half of the 1900s and moved to a position of lesser inequality by 1980. In 1950 the difference between white and black life expectancy in the United States was 8.3 years, while in Brazil it was 7.5 years. By 1980 life expectancy in both countries had increased, and black/white differentials had declined. However, the decline had been more rapid in the United States, where the difference between white and black life expectancy was now 6.3 years, than in Brazil, where it was 6.7.

Table 5 about here

A similar trend appears in fertility rates, where racial differentials were greater in the United States up until 1960, after which they were greater -- much greater, in fact -- in Brazil. In the United States, total fertility rates (total number of children born per woman) rose rapidly for both races during the baby boom years of the late 1940s and 1950s, and then declined sharply during the 1960s and 1970s. In Brazil, rates rose somewhat between 1940 and 1960 (remaining lower for <u>pretos</u>

than for whites), and then began to decline after 1960. That decline was much more pronounced for the white population than for the *pardos* and *pretos* -- reflecting, demographic theorists would argue, Afro-Brazilians' lower levels of education and urbanization. The result was that, by 1984, the differential between white and nonwhite fertility rates in Brazil (1.4 child per woman for *pardos*, 1.3 for *pretos*) was over three times greater than the black/white differential in the United States (.4 child per woman).

Table 6 about here

Higher fertility rates and lower life expectancies have meant that, in both countries, the black and brown populations tend to be younger than the white population. From 1940 to the present, racial differences in median age have been greater in the United States than in Brazil, but since 1960 those differences have declined in the former country while increasing in the latter. The difference between white and *preto* median ages remains small, but has changed in direction since 1960, from negative to positive; and by the late 1980s the *pardo*/white differential was pulling close to the American black/white differential. In percentage terms those differentials are already approximately equal: in 1987-1988 the *pardo* median age was 82 percent that of Brazilian whites, while the Afro-American median age was 83 percent that of American whites.

Table 7 about here

Fertility and median age are indicators in which racial disparities in the United States have declined in recent years while racial disparities in Brazil have tended to increase. The story is different with marriage, the only demographic indicator in which racial differentials have increased in the United States while narrowing in Brazil (Table 7). In 1890 the proportion of the US black population never married was larger than its white counterpart, but only by four percentage points among males, and less than that among females. By 1950 the differential had dropped to 2.7 percentage points, and less than one percentage point among females. Black marriage rates began to drop sharply after 1970, however, and by 1980 the proportion of black males and females never married was 13 percentage points greater than among their white counterparts.30 In Brazil, by contrast, racial differentials in marriage had increased between 1890 and 1950 but then declined between 1950 and 1980 as _pardo_ and _preto_ rates of marriage rose. By 1980 the racial differential between the proportion of females never married was only 3 percentage points for _pardos_ and whites, and 6 points for _pretos_ and whites.

Table 8 about here

The decline in black marriage rates in the United States is visible in the differences in family structure in the two countries. Tabulating those living units which qualify as families under the US Census Bureau's definition,31 we find that, as of the late 1980s, nonwhite families in Brazil were much more likely to be headed by couples than were nonwhite families in the United States (Figure 3). Female-headed households were slightly more numerous among the _pardo_ population than among the whites, and almost twice as numerous among _preto_ families. But in the United States female-headed households were almost three-and-a-half times more numerous in the black population than in the white.

Figure 3 about here

The demographic indicators examined in this section yield a striking longitudinal comparison. In 1950 the United States was the more racially unequal of the two societies in every area except for marriage. By 1980, this comparative relationship had been reversed on every indicator except for median age. Racial differentials in life expectancy and fertility were now greater in Brazil than in the United States, and racial differentials in marriage were now greater in the United States than in Brazil. In the area of median age as well, the relative relationship which had existed in 1950 appeared close to reversal by the end

of the 1980s, as American racial differentials fell from the peak recorded in 1960 and Brazilian differentials continued to rise.

Education

Brazil and the United States share very different historical traditions of public education. In the United States the provision of education has been one of the primary obligations of state and local governments. Only since World War II, however, have Brazilian governments assumed extensive responsibility for educating the nation's citizenry. The result, when combined with Brazil's lower levels of economic development, has been that Brazilians have had much more restricted access to classroom instruction than has been the case in the United States.32 While most adult Americans, black or white, are high school graduates, the average white adult Brazilian has completed less than four years of schooling, and the average nonwhite less than two (Figure 4). Since the absolute levels of education in the two countries are thus quite different, racial disparities in education will be measured not by subtracting black rates from white, as in previous sections, but by looking at black rates as a proportion of white rates. (This same procedure will be used in the next section when we examine racial differentials in earnings.)

Indicative of the differences in educational attainment in the two countries is the fact that the achievement of basic

literacy remains a serious problem in Brazil. As recently as 1950 almost half of the white population, and the great majority of nonwhites (71 percent of _pardos_ and 79 percent of _pretos_), were illiterate. By 1987 literacy rates had improved substantially for both groups, but brown and black illiteracy was still about 30 percent, more than double the rate for whites.

Table 9 about here

Brazil's 1987 literacy figures were roughly comparable to those for the United States in 1910, when 95 percent of whites were literate, and 70 percent of blacks. By 1947, the last year in which the Census Bureau gathered racial data on literacy, the black literacy rate was 90 percent of the white rate. In Brazil at that time, as we have seen, the _pardo_ literacy rate was slightly over half the white rate, and the _preto_ rate was 40 percent of the white rate.

Brazil lacks historical data by race on school enrollment and number of years of schooling completed. The 1950 census did, however, include information on the numbers of blacks and whites completing high school and college. These data confirm that secondary and baccalaureate degrees had been obtained by only a small minority of whites, and a minute number of blacks. The rate of high school completion was almost ten times higher for whites than for _pardos_, and the number of _pardo_ and _preto_ college graduates (3,568 and 87, respectively, in all of Brazil) was too

small to generate even a one-decimal-point percentage rate (Table 10).

In the United States at the same time, the proportion of whites completing high school was 2.6 times greater than the proportion of blacks; the proportion of whites completing college was almost three times greater than the proportion of blacks. By 1987, however, black/white differentials in rates of high school graduation had been almost eliminated. Whites were still almost twice as likely as blacks to graduate from college; but blacks had almost quintupled their rate of college completion since 1950, and were now graduating at rates higher than those of Brazilian whites (as had also been the case in 1950).

Table 10 about here

Absolute rates of increase in the number of _pardos_ and _pretos_ graduating from high school and college were even more rapid in Brazil than in the United States. Nevertheless, the proportion of white high school graduates in 1987 was still almost 75 percent greater than the proportion of _pardo_ graduates, and over two-and-a-half times greater than the proportion of _pretos_. The disparities were even more extreme at the university level, which whites were completing at a rate four-and-a-half times higher than _pardos_, and over nine times higher than _pretos_.

Most Brazilians, however, regardless of race, never get as far as high school. Education for most stops in the fourth grade

or before, though even at this level whites receive on average twice as many years of schooling as nonwhites (Figure 4). In the United States that disparity, as of 1987, was three-tenths of a year. This low US differential in years of schooling completed reflects the absence of racial disparities in school enrollment: by 1987 essentially the same proportion of blacks and whites were receiving classroom instruction (Figure 5). In Brazil, rates of enrollment were much lower, especially at the high school and college levels. And a discouraging forecast of the future was the fact that racial disparities between the white and _pardo_ groups were even greater among students currently enrolled (Figure 5) than among past graduates (Table 10). While whites aged 25 or over were 74 percent more likely than _pardos_ to have graduated from high school, and 4.6 times more likely to have graduated from college, whites under the age of 25 were 88 percent more likely than _pardos_ to be enrolled in high school, and 4.8 times more likely to be enrolled in college. The _preto_ population had achieved relatively higher rates of representation among students currently enrolled than among past graduates. But their rates of matriculation still lagged behind those of the _pardos_, which were already quite low.

Figures 4 and 5 about here

The United States has a considerable distance yet to go before it can claim full racial equality in the education of its

citizens. Racial disparities in test scores, drop-out rates, and college enrollment continue to pose serious obstacles to black upward mobility, as do harder-to-measure differences in the quality of primary and secondary schooling received by blacks and whites.33 Despite these shortcomings, there is no question that the United States not only provides higher levels of education to its black and white citizens than does Brazil, but has also achieved greater racial equality in the provision of that education.34

Jobs and Earnings

Table 11 tabulates changes in rates of economic activity (i.e., participation in the civilian labor market) from 1940 through 1987. The major trend evidenced by those rates, in both countries and among all racial groups, is one of gradually declining participation by males in the labor force, and sharply increasing participation by females. In both countries declines in male participation were greater among nonwhites than among whites and were especially pronounced among Afro-American men, who by 1987 were either employed or seeking work at rates significantly below their white counterparts.35 In Brazil in the same year, by contrast, rates of labor force participation among white, *pardo*, and *preto* males were more or less equal, with *pretos* only slightly lower than *pardos* and whites.

Table 11 about here

Increases in female labor force participation in both countries have more than compensated for male withdrawal from the labor market, resulting in increased total rates of participation for all five racial groups. Since 1950, _preta_ women in Brazil have taken part in the labor market at rates roughly six percentage points higher than white or _parda_ women. In the United States, the gap between black and white female employment, which was almost 10 percentage points in 1950, had been reduced to two percent by the late 1980s, the result of white women entering the labor force in large numbers. By 1987 more than half of black and white women in the United States were either employed or seeking employment, a proportion considerably higher than among Brazilian women.

This higher rate of female labor force participation in the United States, and the greater ability of Afro-American women (as compared to Afro-Brazilians) to obtain jobs and earnings comparable to those of white women, prove to be key factors in explaining how racial inequality in employment and earnings has changed over time in the two countries. Tables 12 and 13 tabulate vocational data from the Brazilian and American censuses of 1950 and 1980 and then use that data to calculate indices of dissimilarity between each racial and gender group (e.g., for Brazil, dissimilarity between whites and _pardos_, whites and _pretos_, white males and _pardo_ males, white males and _preto_ males,

white females and _parda_ females, and white females and _preta_ females).36

In 1950 the overall index of dissimilarity between black and white workers in the United States was 30.1, almost two-and-a-half times the indices yielded by Brazilian data from that year. When one divides the labor force into gender groups, however, one finds inequality to be twice as high among women as among men. Most of the disparity between white and black women is accounted for by two areas of the labor market: the service sector, where black women were overwhelmingly concentrated; and the white-collar administrative sector, where white women were most heavily represented. Not coincidentally, these two sectors accounted for two-thirds of the overall difference between the black and white racial groups.37

By 1980 the index of dissimilarity for the American labor force as a whole had fallen by almost half, and was now lower than the Brazilian indices for that year. This was the result in part of a significant reduction in inequality between black and white males. But even greater progress had been made in the female sector of the labor market, where racial inequality was now approximately one-third what it had been in 1950. Service and clerical jobs remained the areas of greatest disparity. But by 1980 a larger proportion of the black female labor force worked in white-collar positions than in service jobs, and the percentage of black men and women working in office jobs had quadrupled since 1950.38

Tables 12 and 13 about here

Brazil, by contrast, moved in a quite different direction between 1950 and 1980. The country's vocational structure was unmistakeably "modernized" during those years: professional and administrative employment expanded exponentially, while agriculture declined sharply in importance. Both those changes, however, redounded disproportionately to the benefit of the white population, which exited agriculture at a much more rapid rate than nonwhites, and seized the new opportunities in white-collar office work in much greater numbers than nonwhites. Indeed, in every area of the labor market except for sales and non-agricultural manual labor, racial disparities in employment were greater in 1980 than they had been in 1950.[39]

While those disparities had grown for both _pardos_ and _pretos_, the increase was greater among the _pretos_. Gender differences within the _preto_ racial group were less pronounced than in 1950, when indices of dissimilarity had been almost three times higher for _preta_ women than for _preto_ men. But racial inequality was still twice as high for _preta_ women as for _preto_ men, and, as in the United States in 1950, was caused mainly by their over-representation in domestic service and under-representation in office work. Statistical rates of vocational inequality in 1980 were actually fairly similar among Afro-American and Afro-Brazilian men, and among Afro-American women

and *parda* women. But *preta* women clearly suffered extreme disadvantage in the Brazilian labor market, and it is their much higher rates of inequality vis-a-vis white women which put the *preto* racial group as a whole at such disadvantage as compared to whites and *pardos*.

Published data on salary inequality by race have only been available for Brazil since 1976; our discussion of this topic is therefore less historical in character and more focused on current conditions. We begin by contrasting salary data from the American and Brazilian censuses of 1980 (Table 14).40 As might be expected from the preceding discussion of vocational distribution, the levels of salary inequality revealed in those documents were higher in Brazil than in the United States. Again one is struck by the degree of parity which Afro-American women had achieved with respect to white American women, in contrast to the disparities between white and nonwhite Brazilian women.41 It is true that, within vocational groups, Afro-Brazilian women tended to earn salaries closer to those of their white counterparts than did Afro-Brazilian males. But this reflects the fact that in both countries gender inequality in earnings was greater than racial inequality, which resulted in lower earnings for white women than for nonwhite men in the same vocational category. And since *parda* and *preta* women were so heavily concentrated in low-paying agricultural and service occupations, their total median earnings lagged far behind even those of white women.

Table 14 about here

Salary inequality among males was somewhat similar in the two countries. In the United States in 1980, Afro-American men earned on average 69 percent of the salaries earned by white males; in Brazil, _preto_ males earned 63 percent of the salaries received by white males, and _pardo_ males earned 60 percent. For both _pardo_ and _preto_ men, inequality was most pronounced in white-collar employment: the professions, administrative positions, and sales. A similar pattern obtained in the United States, where, except for agriculture, salary inequality was greatest for black men in technical/professional jobs, managerial positions, and sales. But Afro-Americans in these positions still earned, on average, a higher proportion of white median earnings than did nonwhite males in Brazil.

Table 15 about here

Table 15 extends the salary comparison into the late 1980s, presenting total nonwhite median earnings as a fraction of white median earnings, for the racial group as a whole and by gender. For the period 1980-1987, the data show quite similar increases in earnings inequality among nonwhite males in both Brazil and the United States. _Parda_ and Afro-American women also lost ground during this period, while _preta_ women improved their

relative position vis-a-vis white women. In terms of the nonwhite racial groups as a whole, salary inequality remained more or less constant for the _pardos_ and _pretos_ of Brazil, while increasing slightly for Afro-Americans.

A final economic indicator on which comparative data are available is the proportion of families living in poverty (Figure 6). In the United States this indicator is determined by a formula which takes into account the size and composition of families. The Brazilian government does not make such calculations, but it does designate a "minimum salary" which in theory represents an income sufficient to support a working-class family. It is well known in Brazil, however, that the minimum salary is inadequate for that purpose. I have therefore doubled that figure to produce an approximate indicator of what, by American standards, would still constitute acute poverty.[42]

Figure 6 about here

The absolute racial differentials in the number of families living in poverty are quite similar: in the United States the difference between the proportion of black and white families falling below the poverty line is 22 percentage points; in Brazil the racial disparity is 20 percent between white and _pardo_ families, and 22 percent between white and _preto_ families. But as Figure 6 indicates, the proportion of all families living in poverty is much greater in Brazil than the United States. If we

adopt the proportional method used above to compare earnings, we find that black families in the United States are 3.6 times more likely than white families to suffer poverty status. This is double the figure for Brazil, where pardo families are 1.8 times more likely than whites to live in destitution, and preto families 1.9 times more likely. Thus while racial inequality in labor force earnings is greater in Brazil, racial inequality in rates of poverty is greater in the United States. However, Brazil's greater equality in this area is in some senses a purely negative achievement, reflecting the much higher likelihood that Brazilian whites, in comparison to American whites, will spend some part, or all, of their lives in poverty.

Conclusions

From 1890 to 1960, racial differentials in the United States exceeded racial differentials in Brazil on almost every indicator for which data are available: regional distribution, life expectancy, fertility, median age, and vocational distribution. The only areas in which racial disparities were lower in the United States than in Brazil were marriage (1890, 1950) and educational achievement (literacy, and rates of high school and college graduation, 1950).

By 1980 the statistical comparison of racial differences in the two countries no longer favored Brazil. Indicators of educational achievement (literacy, enrollment, and graduation),

which had shown Brazil to be more unequal than the United States in 1950, showed the same relationship in the 1980s. More strikingly, almost all of the indicators on which in 1950 the United States had ranked as a more unequal society than Brazil-- regional distribution, life expectancy, fertility, and vocational distribution -- had reversed direction, now showing greater inequality in Brazil. Only in marriage patterns did the reversal of indicators between 1950 and 1980 work to Brazil's advantage, indicating greater inequality in the United States.

Several new indicators (i.e., indicators for which comparative data were unavailable in 1950) also showed lower inequality in Brazil than in the United States. These included urban residential segregation, family structure, and poverty. They were balanced, however, by other new indicators -- school enrollment, median years of schooling, and earnings -- which showed greater equality in the United States.

Clearly a major transition had taken place between 1950 and 1980. While most measures of racial inequality had declined markedly in the United States, the same measures in Brazil had tended either to remain stable, or in some cases -- most notably vocational distribution -- actually to increase. As a result, by 1980 the two countries had reversed position, with the United States now ranking as the more racially equal of the two societies. Several of the comparative observers of the 1940s, 50s, and 60s had predicted a gradual convergence of Brazilian and American race relations in the second half of the century.[43]

None had foreseen, however, that the two countries might pass the point of convergence and then continue on their separate ways, the United States toward less inequality and Brazil toward more. What caused this transition? Several factors appear to have been operating, some revealed by the comparative analysis in this essay, some suggested by other research on the two countries.

Migration, or the lack thereof, from economically backward regions to regions offering greater opportunities for education, employment, health care, etc., played a central role in either reducing or maintaining racial disparities in the two countries.44 Afro-Americans' long-term movement out of the underdeveloped, segregationist South into the industrial cities of the North contributed directly to the improvements in black earnings and educational and vocational achievement registered since the 1930s. In Brazil, by contrast, the racial characteristics of interregional migration were quite different. Pardos did move out of the Northeast to the South and West, but at lower rates than whites, with the result that by 1980 Afro-Brazilians were far more likely than Euro-Brazilians to suffer the ill effects of the Northeast's continuing poverty.

A second factor contributing to the transition has been the character of economic growth in the two countries, and the income-concentrating effects of such growth in Brazil. As we have seen, Brazil experienced remarkable economic expansion between 1950 and 1980, from which all sectors of Brazilian society benefitted to some degree.45 But those benefits tended

to flow disproportionately to the top 20 percent of Brazilian society: the upper and middle classes, which were overwhelmingly white in composition. The absence of published racial data on earnings from 1950 or 1960 makes it impossible to say whether racial differentials in income increased during this period.[46] But vocational inequality clearly worsened, and racial disparities in education remained very high. These formed unlikely conditions for closing the racial gaps documented in 1950; and indeed, by 1980 those gaps had tended either to remain stable or to widen.

In the United States, by contrast, income inequality remained at significantly lower levels than in Brazil, and actually declined somewhat between 1950 and 1975.[47] This more equitable distribution of the wealth generated by the United States' postwar expansion formed an environment much more conducive to black social and economic advancement, which was already underway in the 1940s and 1950s.[48]

Further promoting that advancement was a third and final factor distinguishing the Brazilian and American experiences: state action at the Federal level to combat racial discrimination. In 1950 most Afro-Americans still lived in the segregationist South; and even those living in the North and West faced systematic and pervasive discrimination. A series of court decisions in the 1950s and 1960s mandating desegregation in education and public facilities, and the passage of the Civil Rights and Economic Opportunity Acts of 1964, struck directly at

these racist practices in American life, enabling blacks to take part in postwar economic growth to a degree unprecedented in American history. Not only did racial differentials in income and earnings, education, and vocational achievement decline substantially during this period; analysis by economists and demographers suggests that the role of discrimination in causing the remaining differentials declined as well. Discrimination by no means disappeared during those years (see the studies cited in note 8), but by 1980 its importance as an obstacle to black advancement had been greatly reduced as compared to 1950.[49]

As with migration and income concentration, Brazil's experience with discrimination, and its official response to discrimination, diverges sharply from trends in the United States. While statistical analyses of black/white income inequality in the United States from 1960 to 1980 show discrimination declining in importance as a determinant of such inequality, similar work on Brazil shows just the opposite. In both countries, research of this sort measures the proportion of the income gap which can be explained by "compositional" differences in the black and white populations -- differences in age, education, family background, region of residence, etc.-- and attributes the unexplained residual to racial discrimination. In 1960 17 percent of the disparity between white and nonwhite incomes in Brazil was left unexplained by "compositional" differences; by 1980, that proportion had risen to 32 percent, suggesting that the role of discrimination in creating racial

differentials in earnings had almost doubled during those twenty years.50

These data support predictions made by several observers in the 1950s and 1960s that Brazil's apparently harmonious race relations were likely to deteriorate as growth and modernization generated more opportunities for upward mobility and thus for more intense social and economic competition among Brazilians seeking to seize those opportunities. The intensity of the competition created strong incentives for some whites, particularly within the middle class, to attempt to use racial barriers as a means of barring Afro-Brazilians from the contest, thus reserving opportunities for upward mobility for themselves and their children.51

Afro-Brazilians responded to the rising discrimination of the 1960s and 1970s by demanding equal access to education, employment, and the other goods created by modern industrial society -- by demanding, in short, that Brazilian society live up to the national ideology of racial democracy. By 1980 middle-class Afro-Brazilians angered by the racial exclusion which they were confronting in their efforts to move upward in Brazilian society had joined together to create a political movement inspired in part by the American civil rights and black power movements.52 Noting the impacts of anti-discrimination legislation in the United States, black activists focused their efforts on enacting similar laws and programs in Brazil. They pointedly criticized the anti-discrimination statute of 1951, the

Afonso Arinos Law, which, mainly because of its lack of enforcement provisions, has been notoriously ineffective in combatting even well-publicized cases of bias in employment, education, and public services.53 Some black politicians also lobbied for equal opportunity and affirmative action legislation of the sort enacted in the United States during the 1960s.

The black movement's proposals generated some scattered response at the state level, particularly in Rio de Janeiro, where Governor Leonel Brizola was elected to office in 1982 on a program of socialismo moreno (literally, "brown socialism"). But they have been rejected at the Federal level, and denounced both as "reverse racism" and as an imported, alien concept inappropriate for Brazil.54 The official ideology of racial democracy, and Brazilian elites' deepseated resistance to redistributive policies of any sort, explain much of the resistance to the movement's demands. But it is also instructive to note how differences in the two countries' structural situations in the 1960s and 1980s helped determine their respective responses to calls for equal opportunity and affirmative action.

Those programs were enacted in the United States after twenty years of robust economic growth, with the promise of more to come. The resulting mood of prosperity and expansion made it possible for white Americans to acquiesce in the broadening of opportunity to the nation's racial minorities, who at that time constituted less than one-eighth of the national population.

Nonwhites in Brazil, by contrast, compose almost half of the national population. And the Brazil of the 1980s, unlike the United States of the 1960s, was in the grip of a profound economic crisis which has continued unabated into the 1990s.[55] In such a setting of scarcity and widespread anxiety, whites have little incentive to accept proposals for them to share the limited opportunities available with that near-majority of the population which is nonwhite. The Brazilian pie is seen as simply too small to be shared out among a greatly expanded number of would-be consumers.

Of course such feelings are by no means limited to Brazil. By 1980 American voters and politicians were also questioning the concept of affirmative action, as well as socially redistributive policies more generally. The result, following the presidential elections of that year, was a sharp redefinition of Federal policy which reversed previous governmental efforts to reduce racial inequality.[56]

Recent structural changes in the American economy have also worked against the further reduction of black/white disparities. The movement of Afro-Americans out of the South and into Northern cities, which in any case had come to an end by 1970, lost its previous positive effects as urban economic conditions deteriorated in the 1970s and 1980s. Reductions in manufacturing employment struck hard at black male workers, and especially young black males, whose levels of employment and earnings dropped far below those of their white counterparts.[57]

Declining industrial employment, and declining real wages at lower-skill levels of the economy, were part of a larger trend obstructing further reduction in racial disparities: the concentration of wealth and income which took place in American society during the 1980s. After dropping slightly from 1950 through 1975, income concentration in the United States began to increase in the late 1970s and then jumped sharply in the 1980s.58 As in Brazil, such increases had a particularly negative effect on the black population. In employment, earnings, and even higher education, the rate of reduction in racial inequality had slowed appreciably during the second half of the 1970s; it came to a halt, and on some indicators -- most notably earnings and life expectancy -- was actually reversed during the 1980s.59

Factors which had made major contributions to the reduction of American racial inequality between 1950 and 1980 -- migration and urbanization of the black population, non-income-concentrating economic growth, Federal policy in the area of race -- were either no longer in place by the 1980s, or had exhausted their positive effects. Further reductions in such inequality therefore seem unlikely in the 1990s, and the possibility of widening racial disparities is very real.

Forces tending to reduce racial inequality are even less in evidence in Brazil than in the United States. A contrarian view, however, would note that Brazil has yet to experience the positive effects of reductions in regional, class, and

urban/rural inequality. Should future governments succeed in reducing some of the severe disparities between Northeast and Southeast, between city and countryside, between rich and poor, the indirect impacts on racial inequality would be substantial. And should future governments undertake as well to confront racial discrimination in employment and education, Brazil would almost certainly resume its pre-1950 position as the more racially equal -- or perhaps better put, the less unequal -- of the two societies. But until such changes occur, the United States will provide more convincing evidence of racial democracy than will Brazil.

Notes

1. George M. Fredrickson, "Comparative History," in Michael Kammen, ed., The Past Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States (Ithaca, 1980), p. 465.

2. Stanley B. Greenberg, Race and State in Capitalist Development: Comparative Perspectives (New Haven, 1980); George M. Fredrickson, White Supremacy: A Comparative Study in American and South African History (New York, 1981); John W. Cell, The Highest Stage of White Supremacy: The Origins of Segregation in South Africa and the American South (Cambridge and New York, 1982); George Reid Andrews, "Comparing the Comparers: White Supremacy in the United States and South Africa," Journal of Social History 20, 3 (1987), pp. 585-599.

3. E. Franklin Frazier, "A Comparison of Negro-White Relations in Brazil and in the United States," Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences, Series 2, 6, 7 (1944), pp. 251-269; Frank Tannenbaum, Slave and Citizen (New York, 1946); Marvin Harris, Patterns of Race in the Americas (New York, 1964); Pierre van den Berghe, Race and Racism: A Comparative Perspective (New York, 1967); Carl Degler, Neither Black nor White: Slavery and Race Relations in Brazil and the United States (New York, 1971); Thomas Skidmore, "Toward a Comparative Analysis of Race Relations since ABolition in Brazil and the United States," Journal of Latin American Studies 4, 1 (1972), pp. 1-28; Robert Brent Toplin, Freedom and Prejudice: The Legacy of Slavery in the

United States and Brazil (Westport, CT, 1981); I. K. Sundiata, "Late Twentieth Century Patterns of Race Relations in Brazil and the United States," Phylon 48, 1 (1987), pp. 62-76.

4. Slavery was abolished in 1865 in the United States, and in 1888 in Brazil.

5. See for example Evaristo de Moraes, Brancos e negros nos Estados Unidos e Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 1922); Tannenbaum, Slave and Citizen; Donald Pierson, Negroes in Brazil: A Study of Race Contact in Bahia (Chicago, 1942); Leslie B. Rout, "Sleight of Hand: Brazilian and American Authors Manipulate the Brazilian Racial Situation, 1910-1951," The Americas 29, 4 (1973), pp. 471-488.

6. Luis de Aguiar Costa Pinto, O negro no Rio de Janeiro (São Paulo, 1953); Roger Bastide and Florestan Fernandes, Relações raciais entre negros e brancos em São Paulo (São Paulo, 1955); Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Octávio Ianni, Côr e mobilidade social em Florianópolis (São Paulo, 1960); Florestan Fernandes, A integração do negro na sociedade de classes (São Paulo, 1965); Florestan Fernandes, The Negro in Brazilian Society (New York, 1969); Florestan Fernandes, O negro no mundo dos brancos (São Paulo, 1972); Degler, Neither Black nor White; Carlos Hasenbalg, Discriminação e desigualdades raciais no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 1979); Pierre-Michel Fontaine, ed., Race, Class and Power in Brazil (Los Angeles, 1985); George Reid Andrews, Blacks and Whites in São Paulo, Brazil, 1888-1988 (Madison, 1991).

7. Frazier, "Comparison," pp. 268-269; Degler, Neither Black nor White, pp. 267-287; Claudia Mitchell-Kernan, "Foreword," in Fontaine, Race, Class and Power, p. ix.

8. Joe R. Feagin, "The Continuing Significance of Race: Antiblack Discrimination in Public Places," American Sociological Review 56, 1 (1991), pp. 101-116; Ian Ayres, "Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations," Harvard Law Review 104, 4 (1991), pp. 817-873; George Galster, "More than Skin Deep: The Effect of Housing Discrimination on the Extent and Pattern of Racial Residential Segregation in the United States," in John Goering, ed., Housing Desegregation and Federal Policy (Chapel Hill, 1986); "When Blacks Shop, Bias Often Accompanies Sale," New York Times (April 30, 1991), pp. A1, A14; "Study Finds Bias in House Hunting," New York Times (September 1, 1991), p. 14.

9. Brazil's 1990 census was postponed to 1991; its results were therefore not available for use in this article.

10. "To attain a situation of complete racial equality, it is necessary that the two [white and nonwhite] racial groups be equally distributed along the social and economic hierarchy." Carlos Hasenbalg and Nelson do Valle Silva, Estrutura social, mobilidade e raça (Rio de Janeiro, 1988), p. 140.

11. Werner Baer, The Brazilian Economy: Growth and Development (New York, 1989), p. 68; United States Bureau of the Census (hereafter USBC), Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, 1975), pp. 238-240.

12. Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (hereafter IBGE), Estatísticas históricas do Brasil 3 (Rio de Janeiro, 1987), table 4.7, pp. 111-112; George Thomas Kurian, The New Book of World Rankings (New York, 1984), p. 199.

13. US data from USBC, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1990 (Washington, DC, 1990), table 695, p. 428; Brazilian data from Baer, Brazilian Economy, p. 102; Inter-American Development Bank, Social and Economic Progress in Latin America: 1989 Report (Washington, 1990), table B-1, p. 463. Per capita GNP in 1988 was $2,449 in Brazil, $19,810 in the United States.

14. Charles H. Wood and José Alberto de Magno Carvalho, The Demography of Inequality in Brazil (Cambridge and New York, 1988).

15. Simon Kuznets, "Economic Growth and Income Inequality," American Economic Review 45 1 (1955), pp. 1-28; Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth (New Haven, 1966); Montek S. Ahluwalia, "Inequality, Poverty and Development," Journal of Development Economics 3, 4 (1976), pp. 307-342; Peter H. Lindert and Jeffrey G. Williamson, "Growth, Equality, and History," Explorations in Economic History 22 (1985), pp. 341-377.

16. Jeffrey G. Williamson and Peter H. Lindert, American Inequality: A Macroeconomic History (New York, 1980), pp. 82-94; Kevin Philips, The Politics of Rich and Poor: Wealth and the American Electorate in the Reagan Aftermath (New York, 1990), pp. 8-25, 185-209; Andrew J. Winnick, Toward Two Societies: The Changing Distribution of Income and Wealth in the U.S. since 1960

(New York, 1989).

17. The relative decline in the US white population accelerated between 1980 and 1990. By 1990 the US population was 80.3 percent white, 12.1 percent black, and 7.6 percent "other." "Census Shows Profound Change in Racial Makeup of the Nation," New York Times (March 11, 1991), pp. A1, B8.

It is worth noting that the Afro-Brazilian population is considerably larger than the Afro-American population. In 1980, the year of the last Brazilian census, Afro-Brazilians numbered 45.4 million, versus 26.5 million Afro-Americans. Afro-Brazilians constitute the second-largest black population in the world, exceeded in size only by Nigeria.

18. Table 1 employs data from the United States census of 1860 for two reasons. First, because of unsettled conditions in the South following the Civil War, the census of 1870 suffered from large undercounts of both the black and white populations in that region. Second, the 1872 Brazilian census and the 1860 United States census are the last enumerations of those countries' national populations while slavery was still in existence.

19. IBGE, Recenseamento geral de 1940. Censo demográfico: Estados Unidos do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 1950), table 4, pp. 6-7; IBGE, Recenseamento geral de 1950. Censo demográfico: Estados Unidos do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 1956), table 5, p. 5. Between 1940 and 1950 the analogous *preto* cohort declined from 4.2 million to 3.0 million, a rate of decline far beyond that expected for such a young population. Had the *preto* cohort

declined at the same rate as the white cohort during this period, it would have contained 800,000 more people than the number indicated in the census of 1950 -- a shortfall almost equivalent to the increase in the pardo cohort.

20. Charles H. Wood, "Categorias censitárias e classificações subjetivas de raça no Brasil," in Peggy A. Lovell, ed., Desigualdade racial no Brasil contemporâneo (Belo Horizonte, 1991).

21. USBC, Negro Population in the United States, 1790-1915 (Washington, 1915), pp. 207-209.

22. Degler, Neither Black nor White, p. 224. See also Harris, Patterns of Race, pp. 54-94; Gilberto Freyre, The Mansions and the Shanties: The Making of Modern Brazil (New York, 1963), pp. 354-399.

23. Nelson do Valle Silva, "Black-White Income Differentials in Brazil, 1960" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1978), p. 143. See also Nelson do Valle Silva, "Updating the Cost of Not Being White in Brazil," and Carlos Hasenbalg, "Race and Socioeconomic Inequalities in Brazil," in Fontaine, Race, Class and Power; Lúcia Elena Garcia de Oliveira et al., O lugar do negro na força de trabalho (Rio de Janeiro, 1985). A slightly dissenting voice is Peggy Lovell, who finds "crucial differences between blacks and mulattoes" in the Brazilian labor market. Nevertheless, she concludes that "the major dividing line [in salary inequality] falls between whites and nonwhites (hence confirming Silva's findings)." Peggy A. Lovell, "Racial

Inequality and the Brazilian Labor Market" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida, 1989), pp. 152-153.

24. The index of dissimilarity is a commonly used measure of inequality or difference between two populations. In the case of Table 2, it measures differences in the regional distributions of whites and non-whites; in Table 4 it measures racial differences in distribution among neighborhoods within cities; and in Tables 12 and 13 it measures racial differences in distribution among vocational groups. The index is calculated by summing the absolute values of the differences in distribution for each category (for Table 2, region; for Table 4, neighborhood; for Tables 12 and 13, vocational group) and dividing by two. It thus indicates the percentage of individuals in either racial group who would have to move from one category to another (in the case of Table 2, from one region to another) in order to produce complete equality. An index of 100 indicates total difference, or complete inequality; an index of 0 indicates no difference whatsoever, and therefore complete equality. See Henry S. Shryock and Jacob Siegel, The Methods and Materials of Demography (Washington, 1973), pp. 232-33; Reynolds Farley and Walter R. Allen, The Color Line and the Quality of Life in America (New York, 1987), p. 140.

25. IBGE, Pesquisa nacional por amostra de domicilios -- 1987. Cor da população (Rio de Janeiro, 1990), Volume 1, pp. 82, 90, 122, 130.

26. Gavin Wright, Old South, New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy since the Civil War (New York, 1986), pp. 239-274.

27. Black workers in the South earned median incomes of $7,902, versus $9,391 for black workers in the North and West. The comparable figures for white workers were $12,109 in the South, $12,785 in the North and West (Southern earnings 95 percent of North and Western earnings.) These data, and those in text, from USBC, Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 442, The Black Population in the United States: March 1988 (Washington, 1989), tables 6-7, pp. 25-29. Note that this publication's figures for years of schooling completed are somewhat lower than those reported in another Census Bureau publication, the Statistical Abstract of the United States (Figure 4).

28. In 1980, median per capita monthly income for the Brazilian population aged 10 or over was $36 per month in urban areas, and $0 in the countryside. IBGE, Censo demográfico -- Mão de obra -- Brasil, 1980 (Rio de Janeiro, 1983), table 1.6, p. 28. In urban areas the median number of years of schooling completed was 3.1; in the countryside the median number of years is impossible to determine from published data, because most ruralites (57 percent) are indicated as having received "no instruction or less than one year." IBGE, Censo demográfico -- dados gerais, migração, instrução, fecundidade, mortalidade -- Brasil, 1980 (Rio de Janeiro, 1983), table 1.5, p. 12. In 1987 81 percent of urban residents lived in homes with piped running water, and 96

percent had electricity. In the countryside, only 29 percent had running water, and 45 percent had electricity. IBGE, Pesquisa nacional -- 1987, 1, table 25, pp. 38-39.

29. For more discussion of residential segregation in the two countries, see Edward E. Telles, "Contato racial no Brasil urbano: Análise da segregação residencial nas quarenta maiores áreas urbanas do Brasil em 1980," in Lovell, Desigualdade racial; Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, "Trends in the Residential Segregation of Hispanics, Blacks, and Asians, 1970-1980," American Sociological Review 44 (1987), pp. 802-824.

30. On declining black marriage rates since 1970, see Reynolds Farley, Blacks and Whites: Narrowing the Gap? (Cambridge, MA, 1984), p. 135. On the heated debate over the causes of that decline, see Gerald David Jaynes and Robin M. Williams, Jr., eds., A Common Destiny: Blacks and American Society (Washington, 1989), pp. 526-546.

31. "A group of two persons or more, related by birth, marriage, or adoption and residing together." Black Population, 1988, p. 34; Jaynes and Williams, Common Destiny, p. 519.

32. On education in Brazil, see Robert J. Havighurst and J. Roberto Moreira, Society and Education in Brazil (Pittsburgh, 1965); and Cláudio de Moura Castro, "What Is Happening in Brazilian Education?" in Edmar Lisboa Bacha and Herbert S. Klein, eds., Social Change in Brazil, 1945-1985: The Incomplete Transition (Albuquerque, 1989).

33. Jaynes and Williams, Common Destiny, pp. 329-389; Farley and Allen, Color Line, pp. 188-208.

34. On the question of race in the Brazilian educational system, see Raça negra e educação, Cadernos de Pesquisa (Fundação Carlos Chagas) 63 (1987); and Carlos A. Hasenbalg and Nelson do Valle Silva, "Raça e oportunidades educacionais no Brasil," in Lovell, Desigualdade racial, pp. 241-262.

35. Conservative analysts (e.g., Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980 [New York, 1984]) have argued that declines in black male economic activity were caused by the expanded social programs and transfer payments of the 1960s and 1970s; their critics (e.g., William Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy [Chicago, 1987]) stress structural changes in the American economy and declining employment opportunities for less educated, lower-skill laborers. On this debate see Jaynes and Williams, Common Destiny, pp. 301-312; Farley and Allen, Color Line, pp. 241-250; James P. Smith and Finis R. Welch, "Black Economic Progress after Myrdal," Journal of Economic Literature 27, 2 (June 1989), pp. 548-551.

36. As indicated in note 24, this index indicates differences in distribution among the various vocational categories.

37. The index of dissimilarity between whites and blacks in 1950 was 30.1; 20.1 of those points are accounted for by the differences in black and white representation in administrative and service occupations.

38. On changes in vocational distribution in recent decades, see Jaynes and Williams, Common Destiny, pp. 272-277; Farley and Allen, Color Line, pp. 256-282; Smith and Welch, "Black Economic Progress"; and Bart Landry, The New Black Middle Class (Berkeley, 1987). Racial differentials in vocational distribution remained more or less stable during the 1980s; the index of dissimilarity for 1987 was 16.1 "Household Data Annual Averages," Employment and Earnings 35, 1 (1988), table 21, p. 180.

39. The Brazilian national household survey of 1987 provides additional, more recent data on vocational distribution. However, it did not canvass rural areas in the northern states and thus lacks nationally comprehensive data for agricultural workers, who, as the census of 1980 indicates, are still a major component of the Brazilian labor force. This precludes the calculation of indices of total vocational inequality for that year; but indices restricted to vocational categories other than agriculture show further slight increases between 1980 and 1987 for both pardo/white and preto/white inequality.

40. As indicated in Table 17, white median earnings for both countries are expressed in current (1980 or 1979) US dollars; non-white median earnings are then expressed as a fraction of white earnings for the same vocational category and gender group.

41. Farley and Allen's analysis of wage data from the 1980 census "suggest[s] that black women no longer suffer from racial discrimination in wage rates.... Black women ... did not receive lower rates of return than white women. Their wages may be

limited once because they are women, but they are not penalized a second time because their skin color is black." Farley and Allen, Color Line, p. 340.

42. In September 1987, when the national household survey of that year was taken, the minimum salary was equivalent to US $41 per month. See also Helga Hoffman, "Poverty and Prosperity in Brazil: What is Changing?", in Bacha and Klein, Social Change in Brazil, p. 218, which uses two minimum wages as an indicator of poverty.

43. See note 7.

44. On the United States, see Farley and Allen, Color Line, pp. 103-136; Smith and Welch, "Black Economic Progress," pp. 539-547. On Brazil, see Hasenbalg, Discriminação, pp. 134-193.

45. Note for example the improvement in black life expectancy during this period, which increased faster in both absolute and relative terms than did white life expectancy (Table 5).

46. Peggy Lovell, working with public use samples from those censuses, argues that such differentials remained constant between 1960 and 1980, with nonwhites earning between 56 and 57 percent of white earnings in both years. Peggy A. Lovell, "Development and Racial Inequality: Wage Discrimination in Urban Labor Markets, 1960-1980" (unpublished paper presented at The Peopling of the Americas Conference, Veracruz, Mexico, 1992). However, her samples are limited to urban male wage-earners and therefore do not take into account the increased disparity (by 1980) between white and nonwhite employment in agriculture, and

increased female participation in the labor force. Both these factors would tend to increase overall white/nonwhite earnings inequality.

47. Gini indices of inequality for family income in the United States are as follows: 1950, .379; 1960, .364; 1970, .354; 1980, .365. USBC, _Current Population Reports_, P-60, 137, _Money Income of Households, Families and Persons in the United States: 1981_ (Washington, 1982), table 17, p. 47.

48. Smith and Welch, "Black Economic Progress"; Jaynes and Allen, _Common Destiny_; Farley and Allen, _Color Line_.

49. For statistical analyses of discrimination, see Farley and Allen, _Color Line_, pp. 277-280, 320-342; on the implications of reduced discrimination, see William Julius Wilson, _The Declining Significance of Race in American Life_ (2nd edition, Chicago, 1980).

50. Lovell, "Development and Racial Inequality"; for similar findings, see Silva, "Updating the Cost." Compare these findings to Farley and Allen, _Color Line_, pp. 335-342, who report both decreasing disparities between black and white earnings in the United States between 1960 and 1980, and the decreasing importance of discrimination in explaining those disparities. For a description of how discrimination functions in the Brazilian labor market, see Andrews, _Blacks and Whites_, pp. 166-174.

51. Van den Berghe, _Race and Racism_, pp. 70, 74-75; Roger Bastide and Florestan Fernandes, _Brancos e negros em São Paulo_ (3rd edition, São Paulo, 1971), pp. 168-169; Degler, _Neither Black nor_

White, pp. 284-285; Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Le préjugé de couleur au Brésil," Présence africaine 25 (1965), pp. 120-128.

52. Lélia Gonzalez, "The Unified Black Movement: A New Stage in Black Political Mobilization," in Fontaine, Race, Class and Power; Michael George Hanchard, "Orpheus and Power: The Movimento Negro of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, Brazil, 1945-1988" (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1991), pp. 178-236.

53. Hasenbalg, Discriminação, pp. 271-281; Peter R. Eccles, "Culpados até prova em contrário: Os negros, a lei e os direitos humanos no Brasil," Estudos Afro-Asiáticos 20 (1991), pp. 135-164. A strengthened version of the Afonso Arinos Law was incorporated into the Constitution of 1988, but the same problems concerning enforcement persist.

54. Andrews, Blacks and Whites, pp. 191-207, 221, 226, 241-243.

55. Inflation ran at annual rates of 934 percent in 1988, 1,765 percent in 1989, and 1,795 percent in 1990. "Inflation," Latin America Weekly Report (December 26, 1991), p. 6.

56. For an analysis of that redefinition and its impacts on a single city, Atlanta, see Gary Orfield and Carole Ashkinaze, The Closing Door: Conservative Policy and Black Opportunity (Chicago, 1991). These changes in Federal policy provoked comment in Brazil: see "A volta (discreta) do racismo," Jornal do Brasil (September 23, 1987).

57. Jaynes and Williams, Common Destiny, pp. 294-312; Smith and Welch, "Black Economic Progress," pp. 541-545.

58. See the sources cited in Figure 1 and note 16.

59. Jaynes and Williams, Common Destiny, pp. 271-379 passim; William P. O'Hare et al., African Americans in the 1990s (Washington, 1991), pp. 2-4 and passim; "Growing Gap in Life Expectancies of Blacks and Whites," New York Times (October 9, 1989), p. A6; "Life Expectancy for Blacks in US Shows Sharp Drop," New York Times (November 29, 1990), p. A1.

Table 18

Percentage Distribution, Total Population by Race, Brazil and the United States, 1860-1980

Brazil

	White	Pardo	Preto	Other[a]	Total (in 000's)
1872	38.1	38.3	19.7	3.9	9,930
1890	44.0	32.4	14.6	9.0	14,334
1940	63.5	21.2	14.6	0.7	41,236
1950	61.7	26.5	11.0	0.8	51,944
1960	61.0	29.5	8.7	0.8	70,191
1980	54.2	38.9	5.9	1.0	119,011

[a]Other: 1872, 1890: *caboclos* (Indians); 1940-1980: *amarelos* (Asians) and unknown

United States

	White	Black	Other	Total (in 000's)
1860	85.6	14.1	0.3	31,443
1890	87.5	11.9	0.6	62,948
1940	89.6	9.7	0.7	132,165
1950	89.3	9.9	0.8	151,326
1960	88.6	10.5	0.9	179,323
1980	83.1	11.7	5.2	226,546

Sources. Brazil: 1872, Directoria Geral de Estatistica, *Recenseamento da população do Impêrio do Brasil a que se procedeu no dia 1 de agosto de 1872. Quadros geraes* (Rio de Janeiro, 1873), table 1; 1890, Directoria Geral de Estatistica, *Synopse do recenseamento de 31 de dezembro de 1890* (Rio de Janeiro, 1898), pp. 2-3; 1940, Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (hereafter IBGE), *Recenseamento geral de 1940. Censo demográfico: Estados Unidos do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, 1950), table 4, pp. 6-7; 1950, IBGE, *Recenseamento geral de 1950. Censo demográfico: Estados Unidos do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, 1956), table 1, p. 1; 1960, IBGE, *Recenseamento geral de 1960. Censo demográfico: Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, n.d.), table 5, p. 10; 1980, IBGE, *Recenseamento geral do Brasil - 1980. Censo demográfico--dados gerais, migração, instrução, fecundidade, mortalidade--Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, 1983), table 1.4, pp. 10-11. United States: 1850-1890, USBC, *Negro Population in the United States, 1790-1915* (Washington, 1918), table 2, p. 25; 1940-1980, USBC, *1980 Census of Population* (Washington, 1983), Volume 1, Chapter B, Part 1, table 45, pp. 1-42-43.

Figure 1



Sources. Brazil: Charles H. Wood and José Alberto Magno de Carvalho, The Demography of Inequality in Brazil (Cambridge and New York, 1988), table 3.5, p. 76. United States: 1960, 1980, United States Bureau of the Census (hereafter USBC), Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 137, Money Income of Households, Families and Persons in the United States: 1981 (Washington, 1983), table 17, p. 47; 1988, USBC, Current Population Reports, P-60, 166, Money Income and Poverty Status in the United States: 1988 (Washington, 1989), table 5, p. 31.

Figure 2

Mulattoes as Percentage of Total Black Population, Brazil, 1872-1980, and the United States, 1850-1920



<u>Sources</u>. Brazil: see Table 1. United States: 1850-1910, <u>Negro Population, 1790-1915</u>, p. 208; 1920, Joel Williamson, <u>New People: Miscegenation and Mulattoes in the United States</u> (New York, 1980), p. 113.

Table 2

Percentage Distribution, Regional Distribution by Race, Brazil and the United States, 1890, 1950, 1980

	Brazil				United States	
	White	Pardo	Preto		White	Black
1890						
Northeast	32.8	52.1	40.2	South	23.9	90.2
Southeast	46.5	37.4	51.7	Northeast	31.1	3.6
South	16.4	4.5	5.0	North Central	39.8	5.8
Rest of Brazil	4.3	5.9	3.1	West	5.2	0.4
Index of White/Non-White Dissimilarity	-	20.9	12.4		-	66.3
1950						
Northeast	23.4	58.3	42.0	South	27.3	65.7
Southeast	49.8	26.1	46.9	Northeast	27.7	13.2
South	21.9	2.9	6.4	North Central	31.2	14.9
Rest of Brazil	4.9	12.6	4.6	West	13.8	6.3
Index of Dissimilarity	-	42.7	18.7		-	38.4
1980						
Northeast	14.5	49.6	33.2	South	31.1	52.2
Southeast	53.2	28.3	51.5	Northeast	22.4	18.6
South	24.8	5.0	8.5	North Central	27.1	20.5
Rest of Brazil	7.5	17.1	6.7	West	19.4	8.6
Index of Dissimilarity	-	44.7	18.8		-	20.8

Sources. Brazil: 1890, Synopse, 1890, pp. 2-3; 1950, Recenseamento, 1950, table 39, p. 69; 1980, Recenseamento, 1980, table 1.11, pp. 34-35. United States: 1890, Negro Population, table 13, p. 44; 1950, USBC, Census of Population: 1950 (Washington, 1953), Volume 2, Part 1, table 60, p. 1-107; 1980, USBC, Current Population Reports, P-20, 442, The Black Population in the United States: March 1988 (Washington, 1989), table B, p. 3.

Table 3

Percentage Distribution, Urban and Rural Residence by Race, Brazil and the United States, 1890, 1950, 1980

	Brazil			United States	
	White	Pardo	Preto	White	Black
1890					
Urban	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	38	20
Rural	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	62	80
1950					
Urban	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	64	62
Rural	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	36	38
1980					
Urban	73.7	58.9	67.7	71.3	85.3
Rural	26.4	41.1	32.3	28.7	14.7

Sources. Brazil: *Recenseamento, 1980*, table 1.4, pp. 10-11. United States: 1890, 1950, USBC, Current Population Reports, Series P-23, No. 80, *The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the United States: An Historical Overview, 1790-1978*, (Washington, 1980), table 6, p. 14; 1980, *1980 Census*, 1, B, 1, table 38, p. 20.

Table 4

Indices of Racial Dissimilarity in Urban Residential Patterns,
Ten Largest Metropolitan Areas,
Brazil and the United States, 1980

Brazil

City	Population (1987) (in 000,000's)	Pardo/ White	Preto/ White
São Paulo	16.2	39	41
Rio de Janeiro	10.8	38	43
Belo Horizonte	3.3	42	43
Recife	2.8	39	50
Porto Alegre	2.8	41	42
Salvador	2.3	49	53
Curitiba	2.0	42	48
Fortaleza	2.0	41	56
Brasilia	1.7	41	42
Belem	1.0	38	50
Mean		41	47

United States

City	Population (1980) (in 000,000's)	Black/ White
New York	9.1	78
Los Angeles	7.5	79
Chicago	7.1	88
Philadelphia	4.7	78
Detroit	4.4	88
San Francisco	3.3	71
Washington	3.1	71
Dallas	3.0	78
Houston	2.9	74
Boston	2.8	77
Mean		78

Sources. Brazil: Edward E. Telles, "Contato racial no Brasil urbano: Análise da segregação residencial nas quarenta maiores áreas urbanas do Brasil em 1980," in Peggy A. Lovell, ed., Desigualdade racial no Brasil contemporâneo (Belo Horizonte, 1991), table 2, p. 353. United States: Gerald David Jaynes and Robin M. Williams, Jr., eds., A Common Destiny: Blacks and American Society (Washington, 1989), table 2-5, pp. 78-79.

Table 5

Average Life Expectancy, by Race,
Brazil and the United States, 1950, 1980

	Brazil			United States		
	White	Black[a]	W-B	White	Black	W-B
1950	47.5	40.0	7.5	69.1	60.8	8.3
1980	66.1	59.4	6.7	74.4	68.1	6.3

[a] _Pardos_ and _pretos_ combined.

Sources. Brazil: Wood and Carvalho, _Demography of Inequality_, p. 145. United States: USBC, _Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1989_ (Washington, 1989), table 106, p. 71.

Table 6

Total Fertility Rates, by Race,
Brazil and the United States, 1940-1984

Brazil

	White	Pardo	Preto	Pa-W	Pr-W
1940	6.0	6.3	5.5	.3	-.5
1950	6.1	6.9	5.8	.8	-.3
1960	6.2	6.9	5.8	.7	-.4
1980	3.6	5.6	5.2	2.0	1.6
1984	3.0	4.4	4.3	1.4	1.3

United States

	White	Black	B-W
1940	2.2	2.9	.7
1950	2.9	3.8	.9
1960	3.5	4.5	1.0
1980	1.8	2.3	.5
1984	1.7	2.1	.4

Sources. Brazil: Alicia M. Bercovich, "Considerações sobre a fecundidade da população negra no Brasil," in Peggy A. Lovell, ed., Desigualdade racial no Brasil contemporâneo (Belo Horizonte, 1991), p. 312. United States: Reynolds Farley and Walter R. Allen, The Color Line and the Quality of Life in America (New York, 1987), pp. 58-62; Gerald David Jaynes and Robin M. Williams, eds., A Common Destiny: Blacks and American Society (Washington, 1989), pp. 513-514.

Table 7

Median Age, by Race, Brazil and the United States, 1940-1988

Brazil

	White	Pardo	Preto	W-Pa	W-Pr
1940	18.7	18.0	19.2	.7	-.5
1950	19.3	17.7	19.7	1.6	-.4
1960	19.2	17.1	19.7	2.1	-.5
1980	21.7	18.1	21.6	3.6	.1
1987	23.7	19.4	23.3	4.3	.4

United States

	White	Black	W-B
1940	29.5	25.3	4.2
1950	30.7	26.1	4.6
1960	30.3	23.5	6.8
1980	31.3	24.9	6.4
1988	33.1	27.3	5.8

Sources. Brazil: 1940, Recenseamento, 1940, table 4, pp. 6-7; 1950, Recenseamento, 1950, table 5, p. 5; 1960, Recenseamento, 1960, table 5, p. 10; 1980, Recenseamento, 1980, table 1.4, pages 10-11; 1987, IBGE, Pesquisa nacional por amostra de domicilios-1987 (Rio de Janeiro, 1990), Volume 1, table 1, pp. 2-3. United States: 1940-1980, 1980 Census, 1, B, 1, table 45, pp. 1-42-43; 1988, Black Population, 1988, table C, p. 5.

Table 8

Percentage Distribution, Marital Status by Race and Sex, Brazil and the United States, 1890, 1950, 1980

Brazil

	White		Pardo		Preto	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
1890[a]						
Single	69.3	64.7	72.9	70.2	73.1	73.0
Married	28.1	29.2	24.5	24.1	24.2	22.0
Widowed or Divorced	2.7	6.1	2.5	5.6	2.7	5.0
1950[b]						
Single	40.1	32.3	46.0	39.5	47.6	45.7
Married	56.9	58.0	50.6	50.2	48.2	42.4
Widowed or Divorced	3.1	9.7	3.5	10.3	4.2	11.9
1980[b]						
Single	N.A.	30.3	N.A.	33.4	N.A.	36.6
Married	N.A.	58.0	N.A.	55.1	N.A.	48.1
Widowed or Divorced	N.A.	11.6	N.A.	11.5	N.A.	15.3

United States

	White		Black	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
1890[a]				
Single	61.7	55.8	65.7	59.3
Married	35.4	37.1	31.6	31.7
Widowed or Divorced	2.8	7.0	2.6	8.9
1950[c]				
Single	26.0	20.0	28.7	20.8
Married	68.0	66.2	64.1	62.0
Widowed or Divorced	6.0	13.8	7.2	17.2

Table 8 (cont.)

United States (cont.)

	White		Black	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
1980[b]				
Single	28.2	21.2	41.1	34.4
Married	64.0	59.2	48.8	43.8
Widowed or Divorced	7.8	19.6	10.2	21.8

[a] Percentage of total population
[b] Percentage of population aged 15 or over
[c] Percentage of population aged 14 or over

Sources. Brazil: 1890, Synopse, 1890, pp. 2-3; 1950, Recenseamento, 1950, table 7, pp. 6-7; 1980, Elza Berquó, "Demografia da desigualdade," Novos Estudos CEBRAP 21 (July 1988), table 4, p. 78. United States: 1890, Negro Population, 1790-1915, table 4, p. 238; 1950, Census, 1950, 2, 1, table 46, p. 1-97; 1980, 1980 Census, 1, B, 1, table 46, pp. 1-45-46.

Figure 3

Percentage Distribution of Family Heads, by Race, Brazil, 1987, and the United States, 1988



[a] Brazilian percentages calculated excluding 2.2 million families (6.9 percent of total) for whom family head was not specified.

<u>Sources.</u> Brazil: <u>Pesquisa nacional, 1987</u>, 1, table 20, p. 26. United States: <u>Black Population, 1988</u>, table E, p. 8.

Table 9

Percentage Literate, by Race,
Brazil and the United States, 1910-1987

	Brazil[a]			United States[b]	
	White	Pardo	Preto	White	Black
1910	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	95.0	69.6
1930	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	97.3	83.7
1940	47.2	25.7	18.6	N.A.	N.A.
1950[c]	52.8	29.3	20.9	98.0	89.0
1987	87.7	71.0	70.5	N.A.	N.A.

[a] Percentage of population aged 5 or over

[b] 1910, 1930: percentage of population aged 10 or over; 1950 (1947): percentage of population aged 14 or over.

[c] United States data from 1947

Sources. Brazil: 1940, Recenseamento, 1940, table 17, pp. 28-29; 1950, Recenseamento, 1950, table 17, pp. 20-21; 1987, Pesquisa nacional, 1987, 1, table 2, p. 4. United States: 1910, Negro Population, 1790-1915, table 1, p. 404; 1930, Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930 (Washington, 1933), Volume 2, table 4, p. 1223; 1950 (1947), Black Population, 1790-1978, table 68, p. 91.

Figure 4

Median Years of Schooling, Population Aged 25 or Over, United States, 1950-1987, and Brazil, 1987



<u>Sources</u>. United States: 1950, <u>Census, 1950</u>, 2, 1, table 44, p. 1-96; 1980, <u>1980 Census</u>, 1, C, 1, table 83, pp. 21-23; 1987, <u>Statistical Abstract, 1989</u>, table 212, p. 131. Brazil: see Table 10.

Figure 5

Percentage of Population Aged 5-24 Enrolled in School, by Race, Brazil, 1987, and the United States, 1980



Sources. Brazil: Pesquisa nacional, 1987, 1, tables 4-5, pp. 7-10. United States: 1980 Census, 1, C, 1, table 123, p. 1-97.

Table 10

Percentage of Population Aged 25 or Over, by Race, Which Had Completed High School or College, Brazil and the United States, 1950, 1987

	Brazil[a]			United States	
	White	Pardo	Preto	White	Black
1950					
High school	4.9	0.5	0.2	29.0	11.0
College	1.2	0.0	0.0	6.4	2.2
1987					
High school	13.9	8.0	5.3	56.4	52.8
College	9.2	2.0	1.0	20.5	10.7

a For 1950, percentage of population aged 15 or over.

Sources. Brazil: *Recenseamento, 1950*, table 20, p. 24; 1987, *Pesquisa nacional, 1987*, 1, tables 4-5, pp. 7-10. United States: 1950, *Census, 1950*, 2, 1, table 44, p. 1-96; 1987, *Statistical Abstract, 1989*, table 212, p. 131.

Table II

Percentage of Civilian Population Economically Active, by Race and Sex, Brazil and the United States, 1940-1987

Brazil[a]

	White			Pardo			Preto		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
1940	47.6	80.8	14.6	48.6	82.4	16.4	48.9	82.9	16.6
1950	46.1	80.1	13.1	45.6	80.8	11.8	50.2	82.3	19.7
1980	48.8	72.0	27.2	48.2	71.9	24.6	53.0	72.9	33.3
1987	56.9	76.6	38.6	56.8	76.7	37.5	60.2	76.3	44.5

United States[b]

	White			Black		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
1940	51.4	78.8	24.1	58.1	79.8	37.3
1950	54.3	81.4	28.9	57.9	79.2	38.5
1980	61.9	75.7	49.3	58.8	65.6	53.1
1987	65.8	76.8	55.7	63.8	71.1	58.0

[a] Percentage of population aged 10 or over

[b] For 1940, percentage of population aged 14 or over; for 1950-1987, percentage of population aged 16 or over

Sources. Brazil: 1940, Recenseamento, 1940, table 30, pp. 36-37; 1950, Recenseamento, 1950, table 23, pp. 30-31; 1980, special tabulation of the 1980 census provided to the author by IBGE; 1987, Pesquisa nacional, 1987, table 6, p. 11. United States: 1940-1980, 1980 Census, 1, C, 1, table 86, pp. 1-25-26; 1987, Black Population, 1988, table F, p. 9.

Table 12

Percentage Distribution, Civilian Labor Force by Race and Sex, United States, 1950, 1980

	White			Black		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
1950						
Professions	9.3	7.8	13.3	3.4	2.1	5.6
Administration	22.9	18.3	35.2	5.1	5.0	5.3
Sales	7.6	6.9	9.4	1.2	1.1	1.3
Non-agricultural manual	39.8	46.3	22.2	40.0	52.4	16.8
Service	8.0	5.2	15.3	30.3	14.3	60.2
Agriculture	11.1	14.3	2.8	18.5	23.5	9.1
Other/Unknown	1.3	1.1	1.8	1.5	1.5	1.7
Index of Dissimilarity		–	–	30.1	25.3	51.2
1980						
Professions[a]	15.5	14.1	17.6	11.2	7.6	15.0
Administration	27.9	19.6	39.9	22.3	14.6	30.4
Sales	10.5	9.5	11.9	5.0	3.9	6.2
Non-agricultural manual	31.7	44.3	13.7	37.1	53.9	19.5
Service	11.4	8.1	16.1	22.3	16.5	28.3
Agriculture	2.8	4.2	0.9	2.0	3.3	0.6
Other/Unknown	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0
Index of Dissimilarity		–	–	16.3	18.0	18.1

a Includes technical personnel

Sources. 1950, Census, 1950, 2, 1, table 128, pp. 1-276-278; 1980, 1980 Census, 1, D, 1, table 281, pp. 1-274-285.

Table 13

Percentage Distribution, Civilian Labor Force by Race and Sex,
Brazil, 1950, 1980

	White			Pardo			Preto		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
1950									
Professions	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.0	0.2
Administration*	2.0	1.9	2.4	0.9	0.9	0.5	0.7	0.9	0.1
Commerce	8.4	8.8	5.7	3.4	3.6	2.1	2.2	2.5	0.9
Non-agricultural manual	21.3	21.4	20.6	18.3	18.7	15.9	19.6	21.8	11.1
Service	9.3	5.9	29.1	8.9	3.9	41.5	15.2	3.9	59.7
Agriculture	54.8	59.4	27.7	66.8	71.6	35.1	60.6	69.4	25.9
Other/Unknown	3.6	1.9	13.7	1.6	1.2	4.5	1.6	1.4	2.1
Index of Dissimilarity		-	-	12.1	12.2	19.8	11.8	10.5	30.5
1980									
Professions[b]	9.0	5.6	17.3	3.8	1.8	9.6	2.5	1.3	5.1
Administration	16.7	15.3	20.1	6.7	6.1	8.5	4.2	4.3	4.0
Commerce	9.0	9.0	9.0	6.5	6.3	7.1	4.0	4.2	3.6
Non-agricultural manual	26.0	30.5	14.6	25.6	29.6	13.8	27.9	36.1	10.3
Service	10.7	5.0	24.9	13.0	4.9	37.0	22.6	6.3	57.9
Agriculture	22.7	27.8	9.8	38.6	44.8	20.3	31.5	38.9	15.7
Other/Unknown	6.0	6.7	4.2	5.8	6.5	3.8	7.2	8.9	3.4
Index of Dissimilarity		-	-	18.3	17.0	22.5	28.9	19.9	38.9

* State administration only; includes public school teachers

b Includes technical personnel

Sources. 1950, Recenseamento, 1950, table 23, pp. 30-31; 1980, special tabulation of the 1980 census, provided to the author by IBGE.

Table 14

Median Earnings* by Race, Sex, and Vocational Category, Brazil, 1980, and the United States, 1979

Brazil

	White		Pardo		Preto	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Professions[b]	$ 509	$ 181	.48	.52	.42	.67
Administration	312	176	.62	.70	.50	.72
Commerce	198	101	.58	.72	.49	.78
Non-agricultural manual[c]	141	90	.82	.68	.83	.89
Service	109	51	.81	.78	.82	.90
Agriculture	64	0	.79	d	.85	d
Total	$ 140	$ 97	.60	.53	.63	.55

United States

	White		Black	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Professions/Technical				
Professions	$ 20,181	$ 11,034	.73	1.09
Technical	16,317	7,420	.70	1.10
Administration				
Managerial	21,694	11,113	.72	1.06
Clerical	14,732	8,107	.78	1.07
Sales	15,454	4,739	.65	1.02
Non-agricultural manual				
Skilled	15,525	8,273	.77	.97
Semi- and unskilled	12,508	6,922	.82	1.00
Service	8,393	3,828	.88	1.26
Agriculture	8,073	3,499	.62	.85
Total	$ 15,126	$ 7,251	.69	1.00

[a] For both countries, white median earnings expressed in current US dollars; nonwhite median earnings expressed as a fraction of white median earnings for the same vocational category and gender group. US figures are annual earnings; Brazilian figures are monthly earnings.

[b] Includes technical personnel

[c] Industry and construction only

[d] Nonwhite females' median earnings in agriculture: _pardas_, US $19 per month; _pretas_, US $28 per month.

Sources. Brazil: Special tabulation of the 1980 census, provided to the author by IBGE. United States: _1980 Census_, 1, D, 1, table 281, pp. 1-274-275.

Table 15

Nonwhite Median Earnings as a Fraction of White Median Earnings, by Sex, Economically Active Population, Brazil and the United States, 1980, 1987

	Brazil						United States		
	Pardo			Preto			Black		
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female
1980	.57	.60	.53	.57	.63	.55	.78	.69	1.00
1987	.57	.56	.52	.58	.58	.58	.76	.63	.98

Sources. Brazil: 1980, see previous table; 1987, Pesquisa nacional, 1987, 1, table 9, p. 14. United States: 1980, see previous table; 1987, Black Population, 1988, table H, p. 14.

Figure 6

Percentage of Families Living in Poverty, by Race, Brazil and the United States, 1987



<u>Sources</u>. Brazil: <u>Pesquisa nacional, 1987</u>, 1, table 21, p. 27. United States: <u>Black Population, 1988</u>, table I, p. 16.